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Google: Security Keys Neutralized Employee Phishing
- decasia 8y agoI guess this is a dumb question, but is it still "multi factor authentication" if you only use a single physical device to complete the login process? The way the article is written, it makes it sound like the physical key is a replacement for 2FA instead of just a hardware device that handles the second factor (while leaving the password component in place).
- izacus 8y agoThe key replaces the keycode of 2FA auth - password still has to be used. You can already use the same process on your GMail if you have a compatible U2F key.
- decasia 8y agoOK thanks, this clarifies the part that says "it began requiring all employees to use physical Security Keys in place of passwords and one-time codes," which I found super confusing.
- Freak_NL 8y agoThe password can be replaced by something simpler like a PIN, which is why you'll read about U2F replacing passwords and one-time codes. Sometimes 'replacing passwords' is used to mean 'replacing the traditional username and password login' as well.
- ehsankia 8y agoStrange sentence, but I believe they mean replcaing "password + one time code" with "password + U2F"
- Boulth 8y agoActually U2F can be used to devise several different schemes, either token+password, or token alone, even just token without username. Of course each of these has various advantages and disadvantages.
- cbhl 8y agoSome logins are cookie + security key (basically if I've already logged in today) which basically feels like "tap my security key and I'm logged in". Of course, more sensitive stuff (access to production, access to pay stubs, access to $cloud_erp) requires re-entering password plus the security key.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- giancarlostoro 8y agoFirst paragraph answers it: > Google has not had any of its 85,000+ employees successfully phished on their work-related accounts since early 2017, when it began requiring all employees to use physical Security Keys in place of passwords and one-time codes, the company told KrebsOnSecurity.
- puzzle 8y agoNow the real question becomes: how often were they getting phished before the new policies? Knowing Google, there's no way they will answer THAT before another decade.
- SmellyGeekBoy 8y agoWhy? What does it matter? Presumably it must have happened at least once for them to bring in this policy.
- puzzle 8y agoWell, for one, it would put the non negligible costs in perspective. Second, it would be an additional data point. More data is usually better than less of it. In this case, though, it's sensitive data, for a number of reasons, which is why I don't see it happening for years.
- akerl_ 8y agoIf they "use (physical security keys) in place of (passwords and one-time codes)", that would no longer be MFA: they're authing strictly with "something they have". A more in-depth quote is later in the article: "Once a device is enrolled for a specific Web site that supports Security Keys, the user no longer needs to enter their password at that site (unless they try to access the same account from a different device, in which case it will ask the user to insert their key)." The parenthetical seems to imply that they're doing initial auth (and thus cookie generation) with password + U2F, and then re-validating U2F for specific actions / periodically without re-prompting for the password, similarly to how GitHub prompts for "sudo mode" when you do specific account actions.
- brightball 8y agoThe best explanation is really: https://fidoalliance.org/ https://fidoalliance.org/ Short version: the keys are matched directly from the device to the site making it virtually impossible to phish unless you control the site itself.
- chimeracoder 8y ago> I guess this is a dumb question, but is it still "multi factor authentication" if you only use a single physical device to complete the login process? This is a common misconception. The threat model of 2FA is not "I lost my device, and it is now in the hands of someone who knows the password". The threat model of 2FA is one of: 1) "An attacker has gained remote access to my computer, but not physical access" 2) "I have been targeted by a sophisticated phishing attack, and I trust the machine that I am currently using" TOTP (and even SMS) protects against (1) in most cases, though U2F is still preferable. U2F is the only method that protects against (2).
- decasia 8y agoThat's interesting, thanks. I always thought the 2FA threat model was "Someone acquired my password" or else "someone has access to my email account and may try to do password resets by email."
- wool_gather 8y ago> U2F is the only method that protects against (2) Would you be able to elaborate on this? I'm not understanding the difference between TOTP and the physical key from the article for this scenario.
- toast0 8y agoWith TOTP, a sufficiently clever phish may convince you to enter the one time code. With U2F, there is communication between the browser and the device, requesting authentication for a specific origin hostname -- that can't (shouldn't) be fooled by a phish hosted at Google.com-super-secure-phishing.net
- tzs 8y agoWhere do password managers fit in here? If a phisher convinces me to try to login to google.com-super-secure-phishing.net using my google account I'm going to notice something is wrong when my password manager refuses to fill in the login form.
- dboreham 8y agoHuh? The article literally is about 2FA, as originally conceived. It isn't replacement for 2FA -- it is 2FA. The key (sic) thing about U2F isn't that it is new and special (it isn't -- it's plain old 2FA as used for more than a decade) but rather that it is practical to deploy for smaller organizations. You don't need to buy large quantities of keys. You don't need a special server. You don't need staff with special skills to deploy it. It works with "cloud" providers like Google and Facebook, out the box (same key as you use for your internal services).
- lima 8y agoNo, the key thing about U2F is that it can't be phished. Any other 2FA method can.
- dboreham 8y agoHow do you phish a smart card?
- resonanttoe 8y agoNot quite. A 6 digit code can be phished out from users pretty easily. They'll enter it anywhere its asked, similar to a password. However the U2F and Fido spec requires a Cryptographic assertion (with all that replay attack mitigation stuff like Nonces) that makes it so that an attacker can reuse a Token touch. I'd probably encourage a glance over this https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.0-ps-20141009/fido-u2f-overview-ps-20141009.html https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.0-ps-20141009/fid... Sadly the Wikipedia article doesn't have a good layman's explanation yet, but I'm sure it'll will soon. Yes at a high level, its still 2FA but like most options in any factor of Auth. It can be improved upon. (For a simple case, take Fingerprint readers and look at the advances of liveliness checks and how many unique points it requires.)
- dboreham 8y agoWhen I say "2FA" I mean proper 2FA with a hard token. As used for 20 years or so in government, large companies.
- sytse 8y agoDo the security keys prevent phishing because they will only login to the same site by checking the domain? So you can't mitm someone.
- occams_chainsaw 8y agoEven if you phish their password to a site, the person can't log in because they also need the physical key. The key doesn't validate anything related to the domain AFAIK
- wwwv 8y agoThat would be useless, as the key could just be passed through.
- occams_chainsaw 8y agoWhat do you mean "passed through"? You can't just steal a key and replay it whenever you want. (Unless you physically steal the key)
- pliny 8y agoBut you can trick Bob into entering his credentials + using his security key on corp.bank.co.m and then use those credentials + security key interaction to log into corp.bank.com IF the security key interaction is domain agnostic (like you can do with the 2FA codes you get on your phone - if you can trick Bob into entering his password you can trick corp.bank.com into sending Bob a 2FA code which he will also give you).
- snowwrestler 8y agoU2F key interaction is not domain agnostic. That's why it's so good against phishing--it can't be collected by a fake domain to pass through to the real one.
- deleted 8y ago
- drcongo 8y agoYou really have to trust something that you stick in a USB port and press a button on.
- klodolph 8y agoYes, that's true! But we are still okay with buying USB keyboards, and typing our passwords in on them. I think once you stop trusting your hardware vendors you are in a very expensive and time-consuming realm of paranoia. The idea that someone has compromised a hardware vendor in order to attack your company is not without its merits, like how RSA was compromised, but the attack is very costly and historically it's followed by key revocation which means that the attack only works once. So you'd only use this kind of attack for extremely high-value targets.
- SmellyGeekBoy 8y agoSo? You have to trust your firmware, HDD controller, keyboard controller, OS, browser... What's one more device in that chain of trust?
- drcongo 8y agoSeeing as I'm getting downvoted for this, we've already seen breaches due to infected USB sticks being sold next to NATO in Kabul [1], these seem like a pretty good black hat attack vector to me, especially as most employees are going to carry these things around on a keyring so they don't lose them. It only takes a second to switch it out for a compromised key when that employee is at the bar. [1] http://uk.businessinsider.com/russia-planted-bugged-thumb-drives-to-break-into-us-govt-computers-2017-3?r=US&IR=T http://uk.businessinsider.com/russia-planted-bugged-thumb-dr...
- joshuamorton 8y agoEach key is locked to an account. If you tap your key and it doesn't work, that's a potential security issue to be reported.
- drcongo 8y ago
- AdmiralAsshat 8y agoI got a Yubikey for free through Ars Technica, but I haven't set it up yet. Regrettably it was a base model instead of the NFC model, which means I'll have to grab several adapters to be able to use it with my various Android devices, all of which tie to the Gmail account.
- chimeracoder 8y ago> I got a Yubikey for free through Ars Technica, but I haven't set it up yet. Regrettably it was a base model instead of the NFC model, which means I'll have to grab several adapters to be able to use it with my various Android devices, all of which tie to the Gmail account. For what it's worth, you can have multiple U2F devices. Twitter is the only website I'm aware of that only lets you register one U2F key.
- klodolph 8y agoFor those interested, I recommend reading how FIDO U2F works. There's more in a security key than just FIDO U2F, but FIDO U2F is easily the most ergonomic system that these security keys support. Simplified: * The hardware basically consists of a secure microprocessor, a counter which it can increment, and a secret key. * For each website, e.g., GitHub, it creates a HMAC-SHA256 of the domain (www.github.com) and the secret key, and uses this to generate a public/private keypair. This is used to authenticate. * To authenticate, the server sends a challenge, and the security key sends a response which validates that it has the private key. It also sends the nonce, which it increments. If you get phished, the browser would send a different domain (www.github.com.suspiciousdomain.xx) to the security key and authentication would fail. If you somehow managed to clone the security key, services would notice that your nonces are no longer monotonically increasing and you could at least detect that it's been cloned. I'm excited about the use of FIDO U2F becoming more widespread, for now all I use it for is GitHub and GMail. The basic threat model is that someone gets network access to your machine (but they can't get credentials from the security key, because you have to touch it to make it work) or someone sends you to a phishing website but you access it from a machine that you trust.
- brightball 8y agoIt's also tremendously more efficient to tap your finger on the plugged in USB than it is to wait for a code to be sent to your phone or go find it on an app to type in. I've added it to everything that allows it, more for convenience than security at this point. Most places that allow it require that you have a fallback method available.
- DanBlake 8y agoDoes a password management / U2F solution exist that would let you view all password titles with a master password but only dispense the actual passwords, one at a time, via a button press? Would prevent having your entire password DB stolen if you were keylogged/mitmd/whatever. Picture of what I kind of mean here : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Diylx-0X4AIjrqO.jpg https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Diylx-0X4AIjrqO.jpg *edit- slide #2 and #3 are backwards. The passwords are stored on the USB device, if that wasnt clear. Master password allows you to view password titles and essentially 'unlock' the usb device. However, every action needs to be confirmed one by one. So for instance, you could in theory export 'all' passwords in one shot, but it would present you with that prompt on the device itself.
- ylk 8y agoI'm storing a GPG key on a yubikey (set to always require a touch to decrypt [1]) and use that with pass [2]. pass stores the password, username (and whatever else you want) in a simple textfile, which is gpg encrypted. There's a browser extension for it, a GUI implementation and lots more (all on the website at link [2]). [1]: https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/Card_edit.html https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/Card_edit.html [2]: https://www.passwordstore.org/ https://www.passwordstore.org/ Edit: Addressing your edit: you could use pass with pass-tomb (puts all the separate password files in a folder and encrypts that, see website) and use a GPG key with password to encrypt all that (and re-enter that on every separate password decryption attempt). Don’t know any other password manager that would allow you to do exactly that..
- DanBlake 8y agoLooks like the trezor has native support for ALMOST this exact functionality: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Jva-vcFQjE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Jva-vcFQjE (it for whatever reason, stores the passwords on dropbox, instead of in the device...)
- palisade 8y agoDropbox isn't secure. They have a master key override and have many times already unlocked boxes without the user's permission. Also, they cache your credentials, anyone who gets a hold of the cache file can put it on another machine and get into the box without authenticating.
- otterpro 8y agoIs there any inexpensive USB-based security keys? I'd love to get one for my Mac and PC but Yubico Nano is $50; I would like two of these, but they are $100 already. EDIT: I also see Yubico Fido Keys which are $20 each (and $36 for 2). Are there any differences between these and the regular Yubico keys?
- resonanttoe 8y agoI looked in to it a while ago, but none except for portability. The Nano's are designed to take up a USB slot and be semi-permanent in there. That is, they can be removed, but its not as easy as removing a normal USB key. Either good grip or a pair of pliers for the fingernail-less.
- JCharante 8y agoAnd you have to be very delicate when using tools on it or else you'll chip away at it. I've found needle and thread to be effective.
- resonanttoe 8y agoyeh this is probably miles better than what I do to my Nanos.
- klodolph 8y agoYubico Fido keys (Security Key by Yubico, the blue ones) only support FIDO U2F. This lets you use them for logging into GMail, DropBox, and other websites which support FIDO U2F. You can't store passwords or other data on them. This means you can't use them for storing SSH keys or things like that. There's not some technical reason why you can't use FIDO U2F for SSH authentication, it's just that the software support isn't there yet. You could probably hack this together yourself, the idea would be that you generate a SSH key on your computer, authenticate to some certificate manager with U2F, and then use that to install the public key on the computers you want to access. You could then have it automatically expire 8h later, forcing you to reauthenticate, giving attackers a shorter window to compromise your machine if they want to hop to others with SSH.
- pasta 8y agoWhen I buy a key, how will I know I can trust that key? Is there any way to validate it? Edit: It seems Yubico is a trusted brand so I guess you are safe when you buy keys from them. Here is a list of FIDO certified products: https://fidoalliance.org/certification/fido-certified-products/ https://fidoalliance.org/certification/fido-certified-produc...
- Bedon292 8y agoI guess you also should buy directly from Yubico? You can buy them on Amazon, but how do you trust that its the right hardware? Do they offer some sort of validation?
- foepys 8y agoDon't buy anything you need to trust from Amazon, especially when it's stuff that is easy to manipulate and/or easy to make a counterfeit of. Amazon puts everything that claims to be the same product into a single bin and if somebody sends Amazon counterfeited Yubico products, they will be delivered to anybody that buys a Yubico product, even when the seller they are buying from made sure to only send verified ones to Amazon. This obviously only applies to products that are being shipped with "Fulfilled by Amazon". Sources: https://www.engadget.com/2018/05/31/fulfilled-by-amazon-counterfeit-fake/ https://www.engadget.com/2018/05/31/fulfilled-by-amazon-coun... https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/27/amazon-site-awash-with-counterfeit-goods-despite-crackdown https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/27/amazon-si... https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinese-counterfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinese-counterfeit-...
- tialaramex 8y ago(Cheap) Security Keys are very dumb objects. They don't know anything secret except their own secret key. So I think the two naughty things bad guys might do are: 1. Sell you a key whose secret key they already know. This is hard to defend against. But if you just buy a generic key from a reputable manufacturer and aren't a major target this seems pretty safe in practice. 2. Hide something malevolent inside the security key's case, e.g. it's secretly a GPS tracker or it's a tiny USB disk plus keyboard that hacks your PC after detecting inactivity.
- HillaryBriss 8y ago> ...thieves can intercept that one-time code by tricking your mobile provider into either swapping your mobile device’s SIM card or “porting” your mobile number to a different device. I know I'm paranoid, but this makes me wonder how safe it is at cell phone kiosks and stores when you grant them access to your account so they can see if you're eligible for a promotion or upgrade. Last time I was at one of these kiosks (in a busy store) I had to ask the guy to log out of my account before I walked away.
- ObscureId 8y agoThat isn't really just being paranoid. Logging into your account on any public device is not secure at all. Those kiosks are just computers, even if that employee logged out, who is to say that he didn't also install a keylogger before you typed in your credentials? That is a really bad idea.
- HillaryBriss 8y agoYeah. I agree. Maybe this makes it slightly less bad: to log into my account, the guy typed in a single-use random code which their special administrative interface texted to my phone. Assuming that code is truly only good for one use, there's a little safety in that. But, I still wonder what exactly these cell-phone representatives do with the info they can access on my account, and whether they truly log off, or capture that web page's info somehow, etc. I once saw a cell phone rep in-training take a picture of such a private account screen with their personal phone and then text it to another person in the company so that they could ask that person how to carry out the next step in the sequence of screens they needed to fill out. It was pretty disturbing. Customers have to place a lot of faith in the retailer, unfortunately.
- djrogers 8y agoQuestion here - how do I use a technology like this with my iPhone and iPad? This looks great for my laptop, but that’s only about 20% of my online time...
- ctime 8y agoFor Google Apps, you could use a Bluetooth LE U2F Security key, like a Feitan [1] plus the Google Smart Lock app on the App store[2]. 1. https://www.amazon.com/Feitian-MultiPass-FIDO-Security-Key/dp/B01LYV6TQM https://www.amazon.com/Feitian-MultiPass-FIDO-Security-Key/d... 2. Google Smart Lock by Google, Inc.
- tedd4u 8y agoYubi has added near-field for mobile - supports both Android and iOS and maybe others. I think on iOS though you need iOS 11+ and then app developers need to use the Yubi SDK.
- kop316 8y agoSo something to note on using them: https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2018-02/ https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2018-... If Chrome has WebUSB enabled and can see it, it would be possible to get around the security U2F affords.
- 0xfffff 8y agoSurprised not more people mentioned or recalled this, its perfect for phishing. one click, thats it.
- tonysdg 8y agoAll I can think of is this fun story from a few years back: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/01/16/developer_oursources_job_china/ https://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/01/16/developer_oursource...
- adrian_mrd 8y agoHow does one use a U2F / YubiKey on a mobile device like an iPhone (lightning port), or are they only compatible with laptops and Android phones (USB-2, USB-C, USB-3) connections?
- sumitgt 8y agoThere is a NFC Yubikey which you can tap against your phone to log in. There is also a bluetooth version which is not manufactured by Yubikey. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B01LYV6TQM/?coliid=I3IA8VD7QRRZDT&colid=A3T6TCVLX696&psc=0&ref_=lv_ov_lig_dp_it https://www.amazon.com/dp/B01LYV6TQM/?coliid=I3IA8VD7QRRZDT&...
- smiley1437 8y agoYou have to get the version that works on mobile (Neo?) which uses NFC to connect to the phone. It works properly on Android. Due to some restrictions from Apple it doesn't work well on IOS yet: https://www.yubico.com/2017/10/iphone-support-yubikey-otp-via-nfc/ https://www.yubico.com/2017/10/iphone-support-yubikey-otp-vi...
- Steltek 8y agoOn Android, you have plenty of options and they all work. Specifically, my Neo key works with NFC and my YK4 works with USB OTG (both original flavor and USB-C). Apple limits the capabilities of Yubikeys so much that it's best to summarize it as "Doesn't work". It's more of Apple's anti-competitive restrictions that seem to go unnoticed by most people because they have a shiny UI.
- adrian_mrd 8y agoThanks for that info. So, then, if Apple wanted to adopt a similar solution to Google - i.e. for their own enterprise security, as opposed to for their customers - could they use one of the Yubikey NFC options, or, would they have to ‘create’ a Bluetooth-specific device? Maybe the long-rumoured Steve Jobs ring could take the form factor?! And from an Apple customer perspective, is there a valid argument to be made that iOS devices can be, or are currently, less secure than Android counterparts because of the current lack of Yubikey / U2F options?
- jwr 8y agoU2F is fantastic. I wish Apple supported it in Safari (hoping!). Also, YubiKey 4 is a great device. Set it up with GnuPG and you have "pretty good privacy" — with convenience. I recommend this guide for setting things up: https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide The great thing about YubiKeys is that apart from U2F, you also use them for OpenPGP, and the same OpenPGP subkey can be used for SSH. It's an all-in-one solution.
- palisade 8y agoYea, except YubiKey got compromised. https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2017-01/ https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2017-... And, if you lose your fob or your backup fob you're boned.
- iwalsh 8y agoThat vuln only affected RSA keys generated for specific niche functionality and not most uses of the YubiKey. > The issue weakens the strength of on-chip RSA key generation and affects some use cases for the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) smart card and OpenPGP functionality of the YubiKey 4 platform. Other functions of the YubiKey 4, including PIV Smart Cards with ECC keys, FIDO U2F, Yubico OTP, and OATH functions, are not affected. YubiKey NEO and FIDO U2F Security Key are not impacted.
- palisade 8y agoHm, I suppose, though that is the functionality the poster I was replying to was discussing. Though, one has to wonder, what other flaws are lurking below the surface on that chip. It isn't flawless. Once there is another major issue it is going to be an abandon ship type of situation. What are the alternatives if any, move to a new key that doesn't have the problem or look into an alternative means, etc.
- munchbunny 8y agoI think this is a revocation and provisioning problem: when the device is compromised, how hard is it to revoke that device and provision a new one for yourself? Structurally, actually making these tokens should be commoditized anyway. So on the software side, it needs to be not absolutely painful to rotate credentials. Something like a one-time-pad that you can use in "in case of fire break glass" situations.
- phillipseamore 8y agoI'd like to mention that I've been testing the Krypton app (iOS only for now) for U2F. You install Krypton on your iOS device, it creates keys that are only on the device. You then install the extension for Chrome. When U2F is requested they send the challenge to the iOS device which calculates the response and sends it back to the extension. App can be configured to require approval or always send response. App also support SSH keys. Works very well for me and the service is free. https://krypt.co/ https://krypt.co/
- krrrh 8y agoWhen I started using Krypton for ssh and code-signing last year, the first thing I did was ask the Krypton team on twitter if they were going to add U2F. Glad to hear it’s in beta! It’s rarer these days to subsume another device into our phones’ functionality, but it’s still a good feeling.
- 4kevinking 8y agoGood to hear you're liking U2F on Krypton. Android support was released last week, and Firefox/Safari support is coming soon!
- xena 8y agoI wish you just had the workstation download on the homepage again. I had to find your homebrew bottle GitHub repo to figure out how to install Krypton on my new MacBook.
- 4kevinking 8y agoSorry for the inconvenience. You can also find the install instructions on the help screen of the app.
- paulopontesm 8y agoAgree. The new page seems phishy. I double checked the domain and certificate before trusting the page at all. Other than that.. great product
- exabrial 8y agoNotice something important: they didn't use SMS. Also, look at how GitHub uses U2F. Anytime you need to make an account change, you can simply tap your u2f key. It's a great user experience and really locks down your account.
- twunde 8y agoDoes anyone know how to enable U2F support for LastPass as the article claims? I was under the impression that LastPass only supported OTP codes with YubiKeys and not U2F.
- superdaniel 8y agoI agree. I think it’s a mistake in the article. The author most likely saw that LastPass supports Yubikeys and thought that was the same as U2F?
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- baxtr 8y agoNice article. However a bit weird that they link to one of their advertisers :/
- amaccuish 8y agoI wish smartcards had gotten more support. I like that it can combine two factors in one authentication mechanism.
- foepys 8y agoThis is surprising to me as well. In Germany, where I live, the government is using smartcards as authentication mechanisms at many places for at least 5 years now, if not 10 or more. The workers don't need passwords or user names, they're simply plugging in their card into their keyboard and when they're leaving for a break or are going home, they're taking their card with them and everything locks automatically. This is only working internally, externally they have to log into a VPN via username/password and then have to use the smartcard as well. I don't see why this is suddenly innovative.
- droopybuns 8y agoJohn C. Dvorak has been complaining for years about how Google handles press requests. I don't have a good link to point to that captures what he's stated- but i'd summarize his position as this: Google is completely shut down to journalists. They ignore press requests with legitimate information requests and if they don't like the tone, you'll get no official response. Dvorak observes that Google is starting to get worse and worse coverage in mainstream tech media as a result. When articles like this do come out, they're usually privileged access and tightly controlled. Lots of beautiful photos of young, attractive google employees "changing the world." In this case, we have yet another article published talking about how google is doing everything right. Krebs is typically a reliable journalist, but this article stinks of privileged access to me. The key point is right at the beginning of the article: Google has not had any of its 85,000+ employees successfully phished on their work-related accounts since early 2017 [...] the company told KrebsOnSecurity. How much trust should we be investing in The Great Google again?
- snurk 8y agoTaken literally, the article only highlights a correlation - introduction of the physical keys + absence of phishing. But Google may have introduced other security changes as well. The article doesn't go so far as to say that the switch to physical keys from SMS 2FA actually solved the problem on its own.
- draw_down 8y agoSeems like that’s what any rational actor their size would do. But leaving that aside, I’m not sure why that stance should affect whether they are generally considered trustworthy?
- guessmyname 8y agoToo bad the MacBook Pro (without TouchID) only has two USB-C ports. I use one for charging and the other one for the external display. Guess I'll have to buy the one with TouchID for extra security.
- red_phone 8y agoA USB-C hub would be cheaper.
- t3f 8y agoOnly if your looking for a USB-C to USB-A hub. There is a surprising lack of good USB-C multi-port hubs, let alone any that support USB PD on anything but the upstream port. You're just now starting to see any that even have generic pass-through of PD.
- dwaite 8y agoIt is surprising; I understand the difficulty in making a USB-C multi-port hub, but it seems like a huge missed market opportunity. The MacBook is far from the only device with only a single USB-C port and a headphone jack.
- bdhess 8y agoIf you buy the one with TouchID, you can use the TouchID element for U2F as well: https://github.com/github/SoftU2F/pull/29 https://github.com/github/SoftU2F/pull/29
- snurk 8y ago> ...thieves can intercept that one-time code by tricking your mobile provider into either swapping your mobile device’s SIM card or “porting” your mobile number to a different device. Are these theoretical attacks? Has this ever actually happened? The article only correlates the end of phishing with introduction of the physical keys. I'm wondering if it's really necessary - if typical 2FA via one-time pw to SMS is easily sufficient.
- vxNsr 8y agoYes I can't find the articles now but there are reports of phishers using this technique to get around 2FA over SMS.
- SpaethCo 8y agoThey got around 2FA over SMS because a number of services like GMail offered password reset via SMS as well as 2FA over SMS. It was the password reset process that was the most vulnerable, and strangely the part that kept getting glossed over when people reported on the takeover incidents.
- apawloski 8y ago>> ...thieves can intercept that one-time code by tricking your mobile provider into either swapping your mobile device’s SIM card or “porting” your mobile number to a different device. > Has this ever actually happened? Yes. For example: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/t-mobile-employee-made-unauthorized-sim-swap-to-steal-instagram-account/ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/t-mobile-employee-made-u...
- ams6110 8y agoIt's possible if you're targeted for some reason. IMO it's very unlikely if you're Joe Random logging in to your bank's website, and better than not having any 2nd factor at all.
- kerng 8y agoAdversaries just steal the cookie issued after MFA completes these days. “We have had no reported or confirmed account takeovers since implementing security keys at Google,” the spokesperson said. Makes me wonder if they have the right detections in place. It's extremely unlikely and naive to think that Google would not have at least one compromised account at any given time.
- djrogers 8y ago> Adversaries just steal the cookie issued after MFA completes these days. Stealing a cookie is a much different attack vector than phishing, which is what TFA is discussing. It also requires a completely different level of access and sophistication, which puts it in a category so different as to make comparisons irrelevant. > It's extremely unlikely and naive to think that Google would not have at least one compromised account at any given time. Stealing a session cookie does not equal a compromised account, while phising does.
- kerng 8y agoIn the online world a session cookie or Bearer token is pretty much equivalent to an account compromise, in fact often it is exactly the same. Hard to argue if one gets email access to claim that their account wasn't compromised.
- puzzle 8y agoNot so fast. For years, Google has supported channel binding between GFEs and Chrome. The cookie alone is not enough: you need to steal the private key as well. I can't remember if that's the case, but it would make sense for @google.com accounts to have more aggressive settings. http://www.browserauth.net/channel-bound-cookies http://www.browserauth.net/channel-bound-cookies Even before that, Google has had a system to detect cloned or tampered cookies on the server side for more than a decade, as described in its patented glory (don't open if you think your company's lawyercats are going to be unhappy): https://patents.google.com/patent/US8302169B1 https://patents.google.com/patent/US8302169B1
- indentit 8y agoI guess one limitation of this approach is that one can't login to anything from a VM that is running on a server that one has no physical access to - i.e. no way to plug the USB key in.
- somebodythere 8y agoKeys like this usually have a secondary function to generate a one-time-key, which can be autotyped over the connection.
- paxys 8y agoI'd say that is a feature rather than a limitation.
- vl 8y agoThere are one-time codes and and there is support of remote keys over SSH (in most simple from this key just pretends to be USB keyboard and does typing of the code for you).
- datguacdoh 8y agoMost remote desktop apps have a form of USB passthrough. And I believe you can also do this in a variety of ways with ssh plus some combo of libusb.
- abalone 8y agoWhat are the mobile prospects here? Sound like the main motivation is that phone numbers are not secure second factors. But the result is a solution that only works on desktops (is that correct?) and requires a physical key that can be easily lost. Modern phones now have secure coprocessors and biometric authentication. Why not use that method for the second factor? It doesn’t rely on a phone number and it would handle both mobile and desktop.
- sGatling1788 8y agoAm I only the one who is disappointed in the seemingly stalling of traction for U2F? Google, Github, and Facebook supported U2F 2 years ago - so all I can see is Twitter, Dropbox and niche security news like KrebsOnSecurity.com have added support since then? Sure it's something, but 2 years I would have expected more - Who am I missing? Without more websites, consumer mass market has little incentive to adopt - and without users, websites have little incentive to support U2F - thereby furthering the stalling.
- packet_nerd 8y agoI needed a new bank and thought surely there will be one that offers U2F.. days of searching later, and I still have yet to find one that does. It seems like the vast majority of online banks don't even support any kind of 2FA except email/text. Really really sad. For regular guys like me, I can't think of any online service more important to protect than my bank account.
- sGatling1788 8y agoFrom https://twofactorauth.org/#banking https://twofactorauth.org/#banking, the only American or Canadian bank that supports a Hardware Token is Wells Fargo - which only seems to support RSA SecurID: https://www.wellsfargo.com/privacy-security/advanced-access https://www.wellsfargo.com/privacy-security/advanced-access
- macintux 8y agoBanks seem very slow to adapt to technology. My credit union for years after the release of the first iPhone still used a Flash login, although they did have a mobile login link you could get from them by asking.
- jakubp 8y agoFWIW, in Poland some banks started using 2FA (many different types) several years before Google or any other site I know of.
- 8y ago
- EngineerBetter 8y agoSeries of blog posts on how to use a YubiKey for SSH, 2FA, and 1Password: http://www.engineerbetter.com/blog/yubikey-all-the-things/ http://www.engineerbetter.com/blog/yubikey-all-the-things/
- urda 8y agoHow does everyone keep track of where they have used their Yubikeys?
- idlewords 8y agoGoogle's instructions for setting up these keys are unfortunately very bad, so I wrote this guide: https://techsolidarity.org/resources/security_key_gmail.htm https://techsolidarity.org/resources/security_key_gmail.htm
- supernova87a 8y agoFor my personal email (gmail) I only recently went to Google Authenticator because I finally figured out how to put it on multiple devices. I was worried about the SMS code method's security, but I had no other way to ensure that losing my phone wouldn't leave me with no way to get into my accounts. (If I lose my phone I can still resurrect my phone # on another device by SIM replacement). The U2F works fine for corporate, etc. where you have a support team who can help you in case you lose it or forget anything. They can make you come in person and prove that you are you. The problem with implementing this for personal is that if you ever lose the key or code generator, you are absolutely fucked because there is no way to prove who you are to Google and have them reset your password / security.
- dmoy 8y agoWhat I personally do is the backup codes stored in a bank vault.
- modeless 8y agoYou don't need multiple authenticators. The right thing to do is print multiple copies of your one-time emergency backup codes (https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/1187538 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/1187538) and put them in many places. Wallet, car, house, parents' house, etc. You only have to do this once. The codes are useless without your password and you can revoke them at any time if you really need to, so spread them widely and then you won't ever have to worry about losing your authenticator.
- IloveHN84 8y agoImagine if a promoter of a technology implemented in their browser was flawed/didn't work. If you ask a wine producer how tasty his/her wine is, she would reply that's awesome.
- kerng 8y agoIf Google has an internal offensive pen test team, I assume they would likely disagree with that statement, esp. since Chrome allowed (maybe still allows?) to read Yubikey info via WebUSB for instance - only one click in UI that was the mitigation. If Google would authorize external hackers (eg via bug bounty), it probably would take about 2-4 hours to phish an account successfully. :)
- kyrra 8y agoI believe this is the key quote: “We have had no reported or confirmed account takeovers since implementing security keys at Google,” Security keys basically remove the account takeover path, but there are still many other types of phishing attacks out that are still effective.
- 0xFFFF0000 8y agoThe WebUSB angle is interesting - hadn't thought about that. I remember hearing about this during a Chaos Communication Congress talk last December. It only required one wrong click from a Chrome user to authorize exposure.
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- orbitingpluto 8y agoIf security keys are so great, why do I still have to process two to five reCAPTCHAs every single time I log into almost any website? reCAPTCHAs are ubiquitous and becoming increasingly time consuming. I probably have to spend 4 minutes every day filling them out. Google is getting 20-25 hours of free labour from me this year. The class action suit that was questionably dismissed by the judge in 2016 should be revisited.
- vel0city 8y agoreCAPTCHAs usually have a trustiness factor built into the code. If some combination of identity (IP address, browser fingerprint, last login on the site, etc) is questionable, it will give you more captchas. Do you use a lot of public VPNs? Are things from your network stuff Google might consider shady?
- orbitingpluto 8y agoLovely argument you have there. It boils down to this: "Perhaps you are not subjecting yourself to monitoring by Google so that they may further monetize your Internet history." My initial argument stands: "If security keys are so great, why is Google subjecting me to so many CAPTCHAs? Perhaps it is because they want free work. A password and security key challenge should be all the proof that Google needs." I've had similar discussions before. I've even had someone call me a criminal for running an ad blocker. I'm not fond of the word shady either.
- scarlac 8y agoIf you are on mobile internet or often clear your browser cache/cookies/go incognito, you are more likely to get CAPTCHAs. Could also be that you are on a VPN through a data center.
- orbitingpluto 8y agoMy comment wasn't a technical support request that also completely misses the point.
- 8y ago
- trumped 8y agoeven Google employees fall for these phishing attacks?
- h000per 8y agoWhile password based phishing might have been stopped by U2F it still leaves Gmail accounts vulnerable to OAuth phishing attacks which can be just as devastating.
- technion 8y agoMicrosoft's position is interesting. The article states Edge will be implementing support this year. They run Github, which supports U2F. But Microsoft are in the process of launching a new MFA and password management product in Office 365/Azure, and I'm informed U2F isn't on the roadmap.
- codinghorror 8y agoWelcome to The Strategy Tax
- homakov 8y agoSame can be achieved without hardware part.
- sapphire_tomb 8y agoDoes anyone know if these things are possible to get working when your daily interaction is with a thin client? My workstation sits in a rack in a server room, and where I work's current policy of 1.7 people to a desk means we all hot desk. Whatever thin client I sign into uses RDP to connect to my workstation. Is there enough UDP redirection support in RDP to make using these keys possible?
- tialaramex 8y agoI am not sure. I'm assuming your thin clients have USB sockets and you can plug in generic USB keyboards, mice, etcetera. If you have to use a built-in keyboard + pointing device then you're almost certainly screwed. The USB FIDO tokens are HID devices, but they deliberately don't specify what _sort_ of HID device they are. The idea is that this makes the client (browser) side easier as every major OS has some means for ordinary programs to talk to generic HID devices - to support graphics tablets and other odd things. So it's possible that a system generic enough to let you plug in any HID device (mouse, keyboard, trackball, stylus, whatever) to your thin client could work with FIDO. Security Keys do seem like an attractive idea for a thin client environment if they work. RDP does have "input redirection" but the problem is whether it's low level enough to redirect a HID protocol it doesn't understand. If RDP insists on thinking about keys pressed or movement of a pointer that's obviously no help for FIDO, but if it can just proxy the HID layer itself that's enough.
- ringbugger 8y agoWe use keys like the one pictured at our company. Handy for key stores of any kind and for U2F. That said, the dongles are an abomination of engineering. I know that USB-jacks have a defined top. That is to no interest to vendors as it seems...
- djhonson196 8y agohttps://www.globaltechinsights.com/cyber-insurance-all-you-need-to-know-global-tech-insights/ https://www.globaltechinsights.com/cyber-insurance-all-you-n...
- djsumdog 8y agoI wonder what happens when you forget your key at home. If I forget my keyfob for work, I usually have to do the walk of shame, around the hallway from the reception desk, whenever I use the bathroom. But I can still get in. And if I really wanted to, I could get a temp key for the day. Do compiles like Google, et. al. have security departments that give people temporary keys that expire after a day, or do they have to run back home?
- rkeene2 8y agoThe US Federal Government started migrating to using "security keys" almost 15 years ago for this reason. Thanks George W. Bush ! https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-12 https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive...
- Svoka 8y agoI don't get it: how it's better than my password manager not autofilling passwords? Which is basically free, and doesn't require inconvenient usb dongles. (I'm not claiming that it isn't better, honestly asking how it's better because I don't understand benefits of this technology over simpler solutions like password manager)