14 ms·

Italian Anti-Corruption Authority Adopts Onion Services

341 points by jakobdabo 9y ago

newbuser 9y ago
Anyone able to comment on the state of Tor security and suggest an up to date OpSec guide to using Tor?
- 3pt14159 9y ago
  This opinion is controversial, and I’m not going to go into all of the reasons why, but unless you REALY know what you’re doing Tor can’t be trusted. I’d wager only 1% of people on Hacker News would be capable of using a Tor setup for more than a day without getting owned. You’re better off buying a burner iPod or iPad, stick to public wifi spots, and factory reset it once a week. Even then, watch what you type since vocabulary is fingerprintable. It’s very hard to stay dark these days.
  - jernejzen 9y ago
    Pretty bold claim about !%. Do you by any chance have any refs or links at hand explaining the topic more into depth. There are quite a lot on Tor www but covering more common use.
    - 3pt14159 9y ago
      If you're good enough to understand how to use Tor securely you're good enough to know why random "newbuser"s shouldn't be on it. Tor is far more fingerprintable than people think it is and its riddled with adversaries and malware. Even if you're good you have a separate problem now: Keeping the USG et al from painting a target on you. It isn't worth it. You're in league with wannabe terrorists, misguided natsec journalists, blackhats, child pornographers. For what? What problem are you solving that warrants this heat? Just use a burner iPad and wipe it frequently. If you're truly paranoid light up a DigitalOcean droplet with a pre-paid credit card and a false name and install OpenVPN on it make an image and cycle your IP. But short of being both a data scientist & cybersec expert (or an actual state actor with training from both) you aren't going to stay black from the NSA and to pretend otherwise is stupid.
      - emodendroket 9y ago
        To bolster your argument in a non-technical way: if Tor made users untrackable by US intelligence, would US intelligence really keep funding it?
        dragonwriter 9y ago
        > To bolster your argument in a non-technical way: if Tor made users untrackable by US intelligence, would US intelligence really keep funding it? Maybe; if US intelligence's high-value targets can be targetted by means that Tor does not protect (compromising endpoints, emissions-based techniques, etc.), and Tor provides US intelligence agents a way to exfiltrate information in a way immune to any but more involved, specifically targetted techniques, it might still be valuable to both have Tor exist and have it used by enough people not on US intelligence payroll that it's mere use didn't finger people as agents. You have to remember that US intelligence does more than monitor people's communications, it also needs communication channels that are accessible, unmonitored, and deniable for its own agents.
        emodendroket 9y ago
        Right, that's the theory, and certainly they do need users on Tor to create noise for their own agents. But considering their nonstop drive to weaken other forms of encryption and insert backdoors, I'd be a little bit cautious about taking that at face value if I wanted to start the next Silk Road.
        nickpsecurity 9y ago
        " if Tor made users untrackable by US intelligence, would US intelligence really keep funding it?" On top of dragonwriter's answer, I'll point out that "U.S. intelligence" doesn't exist as one entity in the way you ask that question. There are a number of groups that cooperate in some ways and compete or just diverge in others. The NSA and FBI want Tor cracked the most to find their targets. Whereas, the State Dept and/or the CIA that back Tor's funding want to protect both dissidents and assets overseas from state-level agencies monitoring communications. They need it to be unbreakable for some set of nation-state attackers. Now, that doesn't mean that it needs to be unbreakable for the NSA, etc. The original guidance I read on Tor even warned that global adversaries would probably break it. The Many Eyes collaborations have visibility into a lot of the network. They're probably also honeypotting it with high-bandwidth links. It's also written in a tricky protocol in unsafe language on OS's done similarly running untrustworthy apps. They'll probably always have attacks on it for at least worthwhile targets even if State and CIA don't want that. It will still be valuable in many threat models, including NSA if combined with other methods. Especially if about delaying rather than permanently denying them info.
  - asquabventured 9y ago
    [Citation needed]
  - danieltillett 9y ago
    Does anyone know what is state of the art in vocab fingerprinting?
  - kasey_junk 9y ago
    Is that actually a controversy? I feel like everyone I talk to with any credible claim to security expertise recommends against it. So much so that I’d like to see an expert recommend it.
    - jerheinze 9y ago
      > So much so that I’d like to see an expert recommend it. Bruce Schneier?
    - emodendroket 9y ago
      Yeah, I've seen people go apoplectic at the idea.
    - 3pt14159 9y ago
      There is a wide and growing gulf between what cyber experts know and what the tech savvy public knows. The world is changing so fast right now you almost need to invent your adversary's tools to be free from them. If you're talking with large numbers of people that don't trust Tor then it speaks more to the quality of your friends than it does about the prevalence of this opinion.
  - emodendroket 9y ago
    Even if you use it perfectly, between fingerprinting techniques which could be used to cross-reference your logged-in "normal" use and some of the communications Yasha Levine dug up (showing that Tor gave intelligence services early notice of vulnerabilities that had not been patched), I would be sure someone couldn't pierce the veil of anonymity.
    - jerheinze 9y ago
      > Yasha Levine dug up (showing that Tor gave intelligence services early notice of vulnerabilities that had not been patched) That's an unfounded accusation. Micah Lee wrote a very concise refutation of his smear campaign.[1] > I would be sure someone couldn't pierce the veil of anonymity. That still doesn't contradict the fact that using Tor is better than not. [1] : https://micahflee.com/2014/12/fact-checking-pandos-smears-against-tor/ https://micahflee.com/2014/12/fact-checking-pandos-smears-ag...
      - emodendroket 9y ago
        That article is four years old. This claim I heard in an interview from him for his book that just came out (he got a bunch of e-mails through FOIA requests, as I understand it), and isn't addressed by this "very concise refutation." And some of the claims seem a little bit of a stretch (using the "Gate" suffix is a nod to Gamergate? Isn't it more plausible that this is the same reference to Watergate that's been applied to every political scandal since 1973?). And it seems like that article mostly agrees with all the factual claims it examines but disagrees with the interpretation or their level of significance, rather than exposing anything as a falsehood. > That still doesn't contradict the fact that using Tor is better than not. Is it a fact? If Tor achieves nothing for someone trying to hide from the government except announcing that you have something you want to hide (is that the case? I don't pretend to be certain, but it seems possible) then I'm not sure it's better.
        itdaniher 9y ago
        He posted the FOIAd docs here: https://surveillancevalley.com/the-tor-files/master-list https://surveillancevalley.com/the-tor-files/master-list He and I discussed them a bit on Twitter: https://twitter.com/itdaniher/status/961307347950940161 https://twitter.com/itdaniher/status/961307347950940161 I was not impressed by his response. The "bunch of emails" seemed remarkably banal. I've written similar emails about sponsored open-source work myself. edit: email stack 1: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4367176-Tor-BBG-correspondence-Stack-1.html https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4367176-Tor-BBG-corr... email stack 2: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4367193-Tor-BBG-correspondence-Stack-2.html https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4367193-Tor-BBG-corr...
- jerheinze 9y ago
  > and suggest an up to date OpSec guide to using Tor? Use Disposable Whonix VMs in Qubes OS (available in the 4.0-rc4) for the best secure experience that you can get right now. For less security, an alternative would be to use Tails or Subgraph. You can also control how much attack surface you expose in your browser in the Security Settings in the Tor Button (Medium (now termed Safe) disables JS on HTTP websites, JIT optimization, and sets media files to click-to-play. High (now termed Safest) disables JS everywhere, and SVG...).[1] [1] : https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-slider.html https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-slider.html
  - QasimK 9y ago
    In what way are Disposable Whonix VMs in Qubes OS more secure than Tails? I understand that the VM won't have access to the real IP address, but isn't there a possibility of breaking through the VM (while with Tails the entire system is disposable)? Are there other ways that it is more secure?
    - jerheinze 9y ago
      > In what way are Disposable Whonix VMs in Qubes OS more secure than Tails? To de-anonymize Tails one needs to exploit Tor Browser first, then get root access. For Disposable Whonix VMs in Qubes OS one would need the additional availability of a Xen exploit to break out of the VM in order to de-anonymize it.
      - QasimK 9y ago
        Thank you for the straightforward explanation.
ecesena 9y ago
Onion link to the service: http://bsxsptv76s6cjht7.onion/ http://bsxsptv76s6cjht7.onion/ (source linked in the article, but in Italian: http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/Servizi/ServiziOnline/SegnalazioneWhistleblowing http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/Servizi/S...)
- mtgx 9y ago
  Looks like they aren't taking advantage of the latest version of the onion services. A shame. https://blog.torproject.org/tors-fall-harvest-next-generation-onion-services https://blog.torproject.org/tors-fall-harvest-next-generatio...
  - jerheinze 9y ago
    > Looks like they aren't taking advantage of the latest version of the onion services. A shame. Because they're still not production ready. The code for v3 onion services still needs to mature, and when it does, it will become the default.
kodablah 9y ago
Nice. I am hoping onion services become more ubiquitous for desktop use. So many decentralized networks work so hard to solve things like NAT busting and network issues, and they still forget about anonymity. I am personally working on a tiny side project to build a chat/forum/etc platform based around onion services for all users. Traditionally, it was annoying to have to ask users to install Tor and open up the control port so your app could leverage it. In a recent alpha there is an experimental tiny little C API that can start the Tor system in-app [0]. Leveraging some of the work from [1], I put in some effort to get all the steps working to compile Tor statically in a a single Rust exe on Windows [2]. As Tor's embeddability game increases, I hope more apps will consider using it as part of their network stack. Granted I know the problems that are inherent with "vendoring" security libs like these, but for some uses the benefits outweigh the costs of requiring separate downloads and separate daemons running. 0 - https://blog.torproject.org/tor-0331-alpha-released-back-unstable-development https://blog.torproject.org/tor-0331-alpha-released-back-uns... 1 - https://github.com/iCepa/Tor.framework https://github.com/iCepa/Tor.framework 2 - https://github.com/cretz/rtsw-poc https://github.com/cretz/rtsw-poc
- jerheinze 9y ago
  A mix between IPFS and onions would also be very promising. There's current work on that.[1] [1] : https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37 https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37
  - kodablah 9y ago
    Yeah, I've seen that. OpenBazaar's onion transport is similar to what I'm talking about when I mean the user has to have their own tor process IIRC. I would have used Go instead of Rust of CGO on Windows and static compilation didn't suck so much.
- synchronise 9y ago
  Would it be possible for you to port your work to I2P as well? It's good to have a fallback network in case issues arise in Tor and something needs to plug the gap in the interim, and I2P would fulfill that roll pretty well.
singularity2001 9y ago
Too bad onions was compromised by the NSA. that makes speaking up against the Bad Guys a bit more dangerous. Admittedly there is a high chance that the Italian high brass has NO finger on the American high brass, however as long as there is no certainty it's a safety risk.
- jstanley 9y ago
  Even if you believe the NSA have some practical attacks against Tor, are you not still better off using Tor than not using it?
  - singularity2001 9y ago
    better off staying silent
  - hathawsh 9y ago
    Well, anything special you do that covers your tracks may make you look suspicious. If Tor becomes more ubiquitous, maybe it won't draw suspicion anymore.
    - jstanley 9y ago
      Right. Reporting corruption over Tor makes you look suspicious, but they probably don't know what you're doing. Reporting corruption without using Tor means they know exactly what you're doing and will catch you.
  - tlrobinson 9y ago
    Heh... https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt Context: https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-2.html https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-2.html
  - singularity2001 9y ago
    What happened to my brain? I just bought the idea that the surveillance state is overall more effective in suppressing criminality.
rotrux 9y ago
It's been unfortunate to watch regulatory bodies accross the globe try to suppress p2p over the last few months by highlighting only its illicit uses. Kudos to Italy for betting on the horse that will inevitably win.
- chii 9y ago
  why do you think tor is going to 'inevitably win'? Win at what exactly?
  - rotrux 9y ago
    Ahh ok good question I didn't really flesh that out. >"Why do you think tor is going to 'inevitably win'?" Not just tor, but p2p in general. Basically the theory is that, as a species, we're used to few-source/many-sink communications networks. We've been using them from the printing-press all the way up to DVDs. The internet & its "many-source" capabilities represents a threat to the prior (and existing) information-source monopolies...such as any media industries, national-banks, or governments. A great way not completely lose control of information dissemination is to control the paths information must take. Two great examples of threatening p2p protocols are Tor and the distributed bitcoin-ledger. Taken in conjunction with "criminal activity" historically being the way to demonize most cutting-edge tech when it challenges the status-quo, and a pattern starts to present itself. To answer your question: I think our regulators are being reactionary Luddites & that p2p is sort of the spirit of what's driving this whole internet-thing...otherwise it would be interactive television.
    - chii 9y ago
      i understand your sentiments, but i think the p2p model is never going to become so mainstream that they take over the equivalent centralised model. The reason being that "normal" people prefer ease and convenience. The internet is practically already interactive television! very few people create and host, compared to the number of consumers.
      - 9y ago
forgotmypw 9y ago
They're running a Tor website... that requires JavaScript. smh >Error! :( >Your browser is not running Javascript that is required to use the whistleblowing client. >It's common believe that Javascript and security don't sound well together, for this reason we suggest to use the Tor Browser, an extremely tuned FireFox browser with Tor integrated. Here you can found and download the latest release of: Tor Browser.
- jerheinze 9y ago
  Note that those who want a JS-free whistleblowing platform should look for SecureDrop.[1] It's also harder to setup and may not be possible for certain threat models. [1] : https://securedrop.org/directory https://securedrop.org/directory
ziofill 9y ago
It's refreshing to notice that in the typical italian political climate of general incompetence, there are still people who do a good job.
- fmntf 9y ago
  You are right in the first part (I'm italian). Regarding people doing a good job, I don't know if this is the case. I tried to use this service (just to see how it works), and: - "anonymous reports will be considered only in particular cases" (!) - you cannot report if you are a private person/company - you have no kind of legal counseling / protection - other limitations I'm not sure if it was designed to get actual reports or not.
  - jessaustin 9y ago
    How anonymous could it be, if they know whether a reporter is a "private person/company"?
    - fmntf 9y ago
      Look at the form, they ask for you are you working, in which departments, etc.. It is just silly!
      - mirgj 9y ago
        Not really, they ask you other information and only these market with * are required. In fact, only a few information are required. Your job title aka position (make sense in case is a manager reporting an illegal activity other than a cleaner which might have really small amount of information) the entity involved and if you work in that entity or you just had some sort of relationship. After all it make sense to have a big set of data to investigate in. If not would be complicated for anyone to understand what's going on. You're still reporting it at the anti corruption authority, so even if you give them more details you should be confident that they'll treat it carefully. All the personal data (such as name, last name and so on) are optional. And, if you choose to not share your personal data, the form will be considered only if you complied with a level of detail that's enough to do an eventual investigation (if not, since they can't reach you out to ask you or details, would be useless to say "on December 2014 I saw a guy giving 10 euro to another one in the aisle of the department X in the state company Y. But was too dark and I can't tell who they are").
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
cm2187 9y ago
Stupid question: there are so many public places that provide free wifi without authentication. If you go into one of these places and it is populated enough, and you have MAC randomization on, no smartphone on you, isn’t it good enough? Surely there are CCTV. But if you connect from a changing room or toilets of a busy mall, I don’t see how anyone could trace the connection.
- letsgetphysITal 9y ago
  https://panopticlick.eff.org/ https://panopticlick.eff.org/ See how unique you are. Spoiler; You are unique unless you are paranoid. Really, really paranoid.
  - otempomores 9y ago
    Its not paranoia if your mind makes them up to compensate for crushing self isolation due to not paranoia...
  - cm2187 9y ago
    Unique doesn't mean identified (and if you disable javascript browser fingerprinting doesn't really works). In any case Tor doesn't help with that either.
- bufferoverflow 9y ago
  At the very least you need to add a VM into that mix to stop (most of) the fingerprinting. You also need a trusted VPN, all kinds of JS and privacy blockers. And that's assuming there are no hidden backdoors in your hardware. Which will be used, if you're important enough to track.
  - cm2187 9y ago
    But Tor won't protect you against hardware backdoors either. If you disable javascript and open an incognito chrome session, I don't think browser fingerprinting can do much harm. If all you are doing is submitting a form on a whistle blower hotline, I'd expect it to be reasonably secure.
Pica_soO 9y ago
The more one studys the mechanics of corruption, the more one begins to understand that a similar battle has been waged in biology since the dawn of time. The corrupting entity can not replace the corrupted entity, because it does not have the sufficient structures- and would fall prey to other corrupting entitys almost instantly. It can not grow bigger then the corrupted entity, due to its being dependent regarding nourishment on the corrupted entity. All is fair in this little war. Strategys include shedding hard to corrupt matter (skin, muscus, nails and hair), have tissue with incredible replacement rates (colon-cells). Fast pace the life cycle of the corrupted entity, and have not enough nourishment in the offspring to continue the corruption. Remedys include using of all natural substances (eat leaves to kill the worms), to behaviour changes (famous the way foxes bath, with a brush of hair forming a flea-raft) Synchronize breeding cycles, to starve parasites and diseases. Destroy breeding grounds and switch locations, for stationary parasites. Diversify into different corrupted entity-types to prevent specialized parasites from target hopping. Im aware that this is dangerous comparison, and thus want to press that i do not compare humans with vermin. I do compare organizations made up by humans with organisms and parasites. This measure is basically encouraging the parasites infrastructure to turn upon themselves. There is no reward and there is no protection of the parasite being damaged. So it will be used mainly by other parasites to battle among one another (leak information about the neighboring clan)- or to have parasites on the parasites (aka the lower echelon members of the mafia removing upper echelons to raise).
- dandare 9y ago
  I would love to read this as a much longer article with links. What did you mean with the fox?
  - Pica_soO 9y ago
    My father is a hunter- he observed foxes, with lots of fleas ripping out hair and then going slowly into ponds, letting the raft of hair float away with the fleas on them. I have to admit i never observed this myself, so for what is worth is currently hear say.

341 points by jakobdabo 9y ago

newbuser 9y ago

Anyone able to comment on the state of Tor security and suggest an up to date OpSec guide to using Tor?

3pt14159 9y ago
This opinion is controversial, and I’m not going to go into all of the reasons why, but unless you REALY know what you’re doing Tor can’t be trusted. I’d wager only 1% of people on Hacker News would be capable of using a Tor setup for more than a day without getting owned. You’re better off buying a burner iPod or iPad, stick to public wifi spots, and factory reset it once a week. Even then, watch what you type since vocabulary is fingerprintable. It’s very hard to stay dark these days.
- jernejzen 9y ago
  Pretty bold claim about !%. Do you by any chance have any refs or links at hand explaining the topic more into depth. There are quite a lot on Tor www but covering more common use.
  - 3pt14159 9y ago
    If you're good enough to understand how to use Tor securely you're good enough to know why random "newbuser"s shouldn't be on it. Tor is far more fingerprintable than people think it is and its riddled with adversaries and malware. Even if you're good you have a separate problem now: Keeping the USG et al from painting a target on you. It isn't worth it. You're in league with wannabe terrorists, misguided natsec journalists, blackhats, child pornographers. For what? What problem are you solving that warrants this heat? Just use a burner iPad and wipe it frequently. If you're truly paranoid light up a DigitalOcean droplet with a pre-paid credit card and a false name and install OpenVPN on it make an image and cycle your IP. But short of being both a data scientist & cybersec expert (or an actual state actor with training from both) you aren't going to stay black from the NSA and to pretend otherwise is stupid.
    - emodendroket 9y ago
      To bolster your argument in a non-technical way: if Tor made users untrackable by US intelligence, would US intelligence really keep funding it?
      - dragonwriter 9y ago
        > To bolster your argument in a non-technical way: if Tor made users untrackable by US intelligence, would US intelligence really keep funding it? Maybe; if US intelligence's high-value targets can be targetted by means that Tor does not protect (compromising endpoints, emissions-based techniques, etc.), and Tor provides US intelligence agents a way to exfiltrate information in a way immune to any but more involved, specifically targetted techniques, it might still be valuable to both have Tor exist and have it used by enough people not on US intelligence payroll that it's mere use didn't finger people as agents. You have to remember that US intelligence does more than monitor people's communications, it also needs communication channels that are accessible, unmonitored, and deniable for its own agents.
        emodendroket 9y ago
        Right, that's the theory, and certainly they do need users on Tor to create noise for their own agents. But considering their nonstop drive to weaken other forms of encryption and insert backdoors, I'd be a little bit cautious about taking that at face value if I wanted to start the next Silk Road.
      - nickpsecurity 9y ago
        " if Tor made users untrackable by US intelligence, would US intelligence really keep funding it?" On top of dragonwriter's answer, I'll point out that "U.S. intelligence" doesn't exist as one entity in the way you ask that question. There are a number of groups that cooperate in some ways and compete or just diverge in others. The NSA and FBI want Tor cracked the most to find their targets. Whereas, the State Dept and/or the CIA that back Tor's funding want to protect both dissidents and assets overseas from state-level agencies monitoring communications. They need it to be unbreakable for some set of nation-state attackers. Now, that doesn't mean that it needs to be unbreakable for the NSA, etc. The original guidance I read on Tor even warned that global adversaries would probably break it. The Many Eyes collaborations have visibility into a lot of the network. They're probably also honeypotting it with high-bandwidth links. It's also written in a tricky protocol in unsafe language on OS's done similarly running untrustworthy apps. They'll probably always have attacks on it for at least worthwhile targets even if State and CIA don't want that. It will still be valuable in many threat models, including NSA if combined with other methods. Especially if about delaying rather than permanently denying them info.
- asquabventured 9y ago
  [Citation needed]
- danieltillett 9y ago
  Does anyone know what is state of the art in vocab fingerprinting?
- kasey_junk 9y ago
  Is that actually a controversy? I feel like everyone I talk to with any credible claim to security expertise recommends against it. So much so that I’d like to see an expert recommend it.
  - jerheinze 9y ago
    > So much so that I’d like to see an expert recommend it. Bruce Schneier?
  - emodendroket 9y ago
    Yeah, I've seen people go apoplectic at the idea.
  - 3pt14159 9y ago
    There is a wide and growing gulf between what cyber experts know and what the tech savvy public knows. The world is changing so fast right now you almost need to invent your adversary's tools to be free from them. If you're talking with large numbers of people that don't trust Tor then it speaks more to the quality of your friends than it does about the prevalence of this opinion.
- emodendroket 9y ago
  Even if you use it perfectly, between fingerprinting techniques which could be used to cross-reference your logged-in "normal" use and some of the communications Yasha Levine dug up (showing that Tor gave intelligence services early notice of vulnerabilities that had not been patched), I would be sure someone couldn't pierce the veil of anonymity.
  - jerheinze 9y ago
    > Yasha Levine dug up (showing that Tor gave intelligence services early notice of vulnerabilities that had not been patched) That's an unfounded accusation. Micah Lee wrote a very concise refutation of his smear campaign.[1] > I would be sure someone couldn't pierce the veil of anonymity. That still doesn't contradict the fact that using Tor is better than not. [1] : https://micahflee.com/2014/12/fact-checking-pandos-smears-against-tor/ https://micahflee.com/2014/12/fact-checking-pandos-smears-ag...
    - emodendroket 9y ago
      That article is four years old. This claim I heard in an interview from him for his book that just came out (he got a bunch of e-mails through FOIA requests, as I understand it), and isn't addressed by this "very concise refutation." And some of the claims seem a little bit of a stretch (using the "Gate" suffix is a nod to Gamergate? Isn't it more plausible that this is the same reference to Watergate that's been applied to every political scandal since 1973?). And it seems like that article mostly agrees with all the factual claims it examines but disagrees with the interpretation or their level of significance, rather than exposing anything as a falsehood. > That still doesn't contradict the fact that using Tor is better than not. Is it a fact? If Tor achieves nothing for someone trying to hide from the government except announcing that you have something you want to hide (is that the case? I don't pretend to be certain, but it seems possible) then I'm not sure it's better.
      - itdaniher 9y ago
        He posted the FOIAd docs here: https://surveillancevalley.com/the-tor-files/master-list https://surveillancevalley.com/the-tor-files/master-list He and I discussed them a bit on Twitter: https://twitter.com/itdaniher/status/961307347950940161 https://twitter.com/itdaniher/status/961307347950940161 I was not impressed by his response. The "bunch of emails" seemed remarkably banal. I've written similar emails about sponsored open-source work myself. edit: email stack 1: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4367176-Tor-BBG-correspondence-Stack-1.html https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4367176-Tor-BBG-corr... email stack 2: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4367193-Tor-BBG-correspondence-Stack-2.html https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4367193-Tor-BBG-corr...
jerheinze 9y ago
> and suggest an up to date OpSec guide to using Tor? Use Disposable Whonix VMs in Qubes OS (available in the 4.0-rc4) for the best secure experience that you can get right now. For less security, an alternative would be to use Tails or Subgraph. You can also control how much attack surface you expose in your browser in the Security Settings in the Tor Button (Medium (now termed Safe) disables JS on HTTP websites, JIT optimization, and sets media files to click-to-play. High (now termed Safest) disables JS everywhere, and SVG...).[1] [1] : https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-slider.html https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-slider.html
- QasimK 9y ago
  In what way are Disposable Whonix VMs in Qubes OS more secure than Tails? I understand that the VM won't have access to the real IP address, but isn't there a possibility of breaking through the VM (while with Tails the entire system is disposable)? Are there other ways that it is more secure?
  - jerheinze 9y ago
    > In what way are Disposable Whonix VMs in Qubes OS more secure than Tails? To de-anonymize Tails one needs to exploit Tor Browser first, then get root access. For Disposable Whonix VMs in Qubes OS one would need the additional availability of a Xen exploit to break out of the VM in order to de-anonymize it.
    - QasimK 9y ago
      Thank you for the straightforward explanation.

ecesena 9y ago

Onion link to the service: http://bsxsptv76s6cjht7.onion/ http://bsxsptv76s6cjht7.onion/ (source linked in the article, but in Italian: http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/Servizi/ServiziOnline/SegnalazioneWhistleblowing http://www.anticorruzione.it/portal/public/classic/Servizi/S...)

mtgx 9y ago
Looks like they aren't taking advantage of the latest version of the onion services. A shame. https://blog.torproject.org/tors-fall-harvest-next-generation-onion-services https://blog.torproject.org/tors-fall-harvest-next-generatio...
- jerheinze 9y ago
  > Looks like they aren't taking advantage of the latest version of the onion services. A shame. Because they're still not production ready. The code for v3 onion services still needs to mature, and when it does, it will become the default.

kodablah 9y ago

Nice. I am hoping onion services become more ubiquitous for desktop use. So many decentralized networks work so hard to solve things like NAT busting and network issues, and they still forget about anonymity. I am personally working on a tiny side project to build a chat/forum/etc platform based around onion services for all users. Traditionally, it was annoying to have to ask users to install Tor and open up the control port so your app could leverage it. In a recent alpha there is an experimental tiny little C API that can start the Tor system in-app [0]. Leveraging some of the work from [1], I put in some effort to get all the steps working to compile Tor statically in a a single Rust exe on Windows [2]. As Tor's embeddability game increases, I hope more apps will consider using it as part of their network stack. Granted I know the problems that are inherent with "vendoring" security libs like these, but for some uses the benefits outweigh the costs of requiring separate downloads and separate daemons running. 0 - https://blog.torproject.org/tor-0331-alpha-released-back-unstable-development https://blog.torproject.org/tor-0331-alpha-released-back-uns... 1 - https://github.com/iCepa/Tor.framework https://github.com/iCepa/Tor.framework 2 - https://github.com/cretz/rtsw-poc https://github.com/cretz/rtsw-poc

jerheinze 9y ago
A mix between IPFS and onions would also be very promising. There's current work on that.[1] [1] : https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37 https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37
- kodablah 9y ago
  Yeah, I've seen that. OpenBazaar's onion transport is similar to what I'm talking about when I mean the user has to have their own tor process IIRC. I would have used Go instead of Rust of CGO on Windows and static compilation didn't suck so much.
synchronise 9y ago
Would it be possible for you to port your work to I2P as well? It's good to have a fallback network in case issues arise in Tor and something needs to plug the gap in the interim, and I2P would fulfill that roll pretty well.

singularity2001 9y ago

Too bad onions was compromised by the NSA. that makes speaking up against the Bad Guys a bit more dangerous. Admittedly there is a high chance that the Italian high brass has NO finger on the American high brass, however as long as there is no certainty it's a safety risk.

jstanley 9y ago
Even if you believe the NSA have some practical attacks against Tor, are you not still better off using Tor than not using it?
- singularity2001 9y ago
  better off staying silent
- hathawsh 9y ago
  Well, anything special you do that covers your tracks may make you look suspicious. If Tor becomes more ubiquitous, maybe it won't draw suspicion anymore.
  - jstanley 9y ago
    Right. Reporting corruption over Tor makes you look suspicious, but they probably don't know what you're doing. Reporting corruption without using Tor means they know exactly what you're doing and will catch you.
- tlrobinson 9y ago
  Heh... https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt Context: https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-2.html https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-2.html
- singularity2001 9y ago
  What happened to my brain? I just bought the idea that the surveillance state is overall more effective in suppressing criminality.

rotrux 9y ago

It's been unfortunate to watch regulatory bodies accross the globe try to suppress p2p over the last few months by highlighting only its illicit uses. Kudos to Italy for betting on the horse that will inevitably win.

chii 9y ago
why do you think tor is going to 'inevitably win'? Win at what exactly?
- rotrux 9y ago
  Ahh ok good question I didn't really flesh that out. >"Why do you think tor is going to 'inevitably win'?" Not just tor, but p2p in general. Basically the theory is that, as a species, we're used to few-source/many-sink communications networks. We've been using them from the printing-press all the way up to DVDs. The internet & its "many-source" capabilities represents a threat to the prior (and existing) information-source monopolies...such as any media industries, national-banks, or governments. A great way not completely lose control of information dissemination is to control the paths information must take. Two great examples of threatening p2p protocols are Tor and the distributed bitcoin-ledger. Taken in conjunction with "criminal activity" historically being the way to demonize most cutting-edge tech when it challenges the status-quo, and a pattern starts to present itself. To answer your question: I think our regulators are being reactionary Luddites & that p2p is sort of the spirit of what's driving this whole internet-thing...otherwise it would be interactive television.
  - chii 9y ago
    i understand your sentiments, but i think the p2p model is never going to become so mainstream that they take over the equivalent centralised model. The reason being that "normal" people prefer ease and convenience. The internet is practically already interactive television! very few people create and host, compared to the number of consumers.
    - 9y ago

forgotmypw 9y ago

They're running a Tor website... that requires JavaScript. smh >Error! :( >Your browser is not running Javascript that is required to use the whistleblowing client. >It's common believe that Javascript and security don't sound well together, for this reason we suggest to use the Tor Browser, an extremely tuned FireFox browser with Tor integrated. Here you can found and download the latest release of: Tor Browser.

jerheinze 9y ago
Note that those who want a JS-free whistleblowing platform should look for SecureDrop.[1] It's also harder to setup and may not be possible for certain threat models. [1] : https://securedrop.org/directory https://securedrop.org/directory

ziofill 9y ago

It's refreshing to notice that in the typical italian political climate of general incompetence, there are still people who do a good job.

fmntf 9y ago
You are right in the first part (I'm italian). Regarding people doing a good job, I don't know if this is the case. I tried to use this service (just to see how it works), and: - "anonymous reports will be considered only in particular cases" (!) - you cannot report if you are a private person/company - you have no kind of legal counseling / protection - other limitations I'm not sure if it was designed to get actual reports or not.
- jessaustin 9y ago
  How anonymous could it be, if they know whether a reporter is a "private person/company"?
  - fmntf 9y ago
    Look at the form, they ask for you are you working, in which departments, etc.. It is just silly!
    - mirgj 9y ago
      Not really, they ask you other information and only these market with * are required. In fact, only a few information are required. Your job title aka position (make sense in case is a manager reporting an illegal activity other than a cleaner which might have really small amount of information) the entity involved and if you work in that entity or you just had some sort of relationship. After all it make sense to have a big set of data to investigate in. If not would be complicated for anyone to understand what's going on. You're still reporting it at the anti corruption authority, so even if you give them more details you should be confident that they'll treat it carefully. All the personal data (such as name, last name and so on) are optional. And, if you choose to not share your personal data, the form will be considered only if you complied with a level of detail that's enough to do an eventual investigation (if not, since they can't reach you out to ask you or details, would be useless to say "on December 2014 I saw a guy giving 10 euro to another one in the aisle of the department X in the state company Y. But was too dark and I can't tell who they are").

deleted 9y ago

[deleted]

cm2187 9y ago

Stupid question: there are so many public places that provide free wifi without authentication. If you go into one of these places and it is populated enough, and you have MAC randomization on, no smartphone on you, isn’t it good enough? Surely there are CCTV. But if you connect from a changing room or toilets of a busy mall, I don’t see how anyone could trace the connection.

letsgetphysITal 9y ago
https://panopticlick.eff.org/ https://panopticlick.eff.org/ See how unique you are. Spoiler; You are unique unless you are paranoid. Really, really paranoid.
- otempomores 9y ago
  Its not paranoia if your mind makes them up to compensate for crushing self isolation due to not paranoia...
- cm2187 9y ago
  Unique doesn't mean identified (and if you disable javascript browser fingerprinting doesn't really works). In any case Tor doesn't help with that either.
bufferoverflow 9y ago
At the very least you need to add a VM into that mix to stop (most of) the fingerprinting. You also need a trusted VPN, all kinds of JS and privacy blockers. And that's assuming there are no hidden backdoors in your hardware. Which will be used, if you're important enough to track.
- cm2187 9y ago
  But Tor won't protect you against hardware backdoors either. If you disable javascript and open an incognito chrome session, I don't think browser fingerprinting can do much harm. If all you are doing is submitting a form on a whistle blower hotline, I'd expect it to be reasonably secure.

Pica_soO 9y ago

The more one studys the mechanics of corruption, the more one begins to understand that a similar battle has been waged in biology since the dawn of time. The corrupting entity can not replace the corrupted entity, because it does not have the sufficient structures- and would fall prey to other corrupting entitys almost instantly. It can not grow bigger then the corrupted entity, due to its being dependent regarding nourishment on the corrupted entity. All is fair in this little war. Strategys include shedding hard to corrupt matter (skin, muscus, nails and hair), have tissue with incredible replacement rates (colon-cells). Fast pace the life cycle of the corrupted entity, and have not enough nourishment in the offspring to continue the corruption. Remedys include using of all natural substances (eat leaves to kill the worms), to behaviour changes (famous the way foxes bath, with a brush of hair forming a flea-raft) Synchronize breeding cycles, to starve parasites and diseases. Destroy breeding grounds and switch locations, for stationary parasites. Diversify into different corrupted entity-types to prevent specialized parasites from target hopping. Im aware that this is dangerous comparison, and thus want to press that i do not compare humans with vermin. I do compare organizations made up by humans with organisms and parasites. This measure is basically encouraging the parasites infrastructure to turn upon themselves. There is no reward and there is no protection of the parasite being damaged. So it will be used mainly by other parasites to battle among one another (leak information about the neighboring clan)- or to have parasites on the parasites (aka the lower echelon members of the mafia removing upper echelons to raise).

dandare 9y ago
I would love to read this as a much longer article with links. What did you mean with the fox?
- Pica_soO 9y ago
  My father is a hunter- he observed foxes, with lots of fleas ripping out hair and then going slowly into ponds, letting the raft of hair float away with the fleas on them. I have to admit i never observed this myself, so for what is worth is currently hear say.