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Researchers Found They Could Hack Wind Farms
- djaychela 9y agoI'm constantly (and serially) amazed at the lack of lessons learned in other fields of security in new areas. It's as if every new area where computers are used erases the minds of the people who make the systems, and then researchers find the issues and expose them; only then will something be done about it - if, indeed, something is done. I'm not a security expert by any stretch of the imagination, but I'm staggered at how easy it seems to be to gain access and control to these kinds of systems, as if them being air gapped (if indeed, they are) is enough to ensure they can't be compromised. I appreciate that no system is truly secure, but the example given here seemed trivially easy in terms of both physical and electronic access. I do wonder if the lack of security is because of budget constraints (i.e. it was proposed by engineers but rejected by management as a needless cost), or if everyone didn't even think that there would be the potential of a breach and the possibility of exploitation?
- Quarrelsome 9y agogetting it working > having it secure then its taken out of the hands of those that want to secure it. If you take two companies one developing a secure and working product and the other just developing a working product capitalism will weed out the secure product and pass the insecure one. This is because it is cheaper to create, will get to market more quickly and be easier to configure. As these sorts of attacks are rare and there is no established and straight forward legal framework to economically punish those without security; the company with least security almost always wins. Then when someone does show the security holes the tendency is just to arrest them in order to keep this awful system going. :D I'm not entirely sure how we start to fix this.
- FLUX-YOU 9y agoPieces like this should hopefully scare other companies into action. After all, it was conducted with permission from the wind farm companies. That they've hired pentesters indicate they are now working towards fixing the problems.
- Quarrelsome 9y agoIts governments that need scaring. Industry will never self-regulate.
- TeMPOraL 9y ago> I'm not entirely sure how we start to fix this. This needs to be solved at regulatory level. High computer security standards need to become part of whatever work and product safety rules companies already have to follow. But that doesn't look like is going to happen soon, so as an alternative... Did Maersk recover from that ransomware attack two days ago? I sincerely hope they didn't. We need an economically meaningful clusterfuck to get people to pay attention. Related: I think the only way for security to get taken seriously, by both companies and governments alike, is to have someone do some high-profile, damaging hacks "pro bono". Now I would hope such actors stay away from power systems due to risk of loss of life (don't want to disrupt traffic, or hospitals). But this was yesterday on Morning Paper: https://blog.acolyer.org/2017/06/28/an-experimental-security-analysis-of-an-industrial-robot-controller/ https://blog.acolyer.org/2017/06/28/an-experimental-security... I'd say industrial robots could be a good target. If someone started shutting down the plants of some prominent manufacturers of non-life-critical products, maybe enough people would lose money for someone to start treating it seriously...
- pbhjpbhj 9y agoIsn't the problem in part that some people see "we done been hacked in our car making doohickey" (/cletus) and respond "backdoor all the things" thinking that allowing tougher security just let's the crackers hide whilst backdoors let the "feds" catch them. I'm not even sure they're wrong per se. In theory (!!) a benevolent watchful government can promote liberty and protect its citizens (or in my case The Queen's subjects).
- bllguo 9y agothat is definitely a problem. But wouldn't backdoors only allow feds to catch cybercriminals after the act? Better security would prevent disasters in the first place. This seems to me a much better way of thinking about the issue
- itgoon 9y agoNot as comprehensive as I'd like, but there are standards and regulations. Part of the problem is that these are relatively "new", as far as power companies go. http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx
- arca_vorago 9y agoI think I have some insight into this subject, due to some of the wide array of similar industries I've worked in or consulted for (not wind but oil, etc) and you are very close with your question of budget constraints. It is more than budget constraints though. I have primarily determined that budget constraints, while a factor, are a side-effect issue of a more root cause. Namely, a lack of representation for the IT department to the decision makers, whether that be a board of directors, the C-levels, etc. The problem is two-fold. The first problem is the management types are failing to understand that they need that representation to help guard from issues like these. Instead they often see more people as in their way and extra salary costs, and I have seen a disturbing trend the past 10 years or so of straight up gutting IT departments, often replaced by half-assed msp type consultants and highly overworked t1 and t2s. Second, is that the kinds of people that should be filling that role, often don't want to or don't have the business background to do it properly. Over on /r/sysadmin, ask how many senior sysadmins don't even have a CTO or CIO to report to, and instead are reporting straight to a CEO or even to a CFO. Often, when a CTO is hired, they are too far on the MBA side to do the department justice, or they are simply too focused on trying to be a techy often spending too much of their time pretending to be a programmer or something similar. Many of the sysadmins spend an inordinate amount of their time either supporting the business and trying to keep up with industry movement, to the point they often are failing to bridge the business-political gap that exists. They often understand the issue, but fail to put in to upper-management in a way that convinces them, which often leads to resentment or apathy over time, not to mention increased burn-out. I think there is a lot of opportunity to fix these issues though. A good sysadmin who transitioned into an MBA style program and then attempted to take a CTO/CIO role could really shine. In general I feel like the role of CTO/CIO is ripe for a huge turnover of fresh blood able to push more radical changes needed to survive the future. Another potential solution is in IT workers forming some type of actually useful or powerful union. LOPSA just doesn't cut it. We have seen union busting in the past, but the IT workforce is in a huge position of power to get a real union going, and hopefully with mechanisms to protect from the degredation and devolution other union forces have endured. The bottom line is this, in the end, these problems are managements fault, and until management is punished monetarily, legally, or through some other mechanism, they will not change their ways. bonus: you would be surprised at how many IT departments don't even have a budget (IE aren't given the numbers, or not in a proper form, etc. They get told to make proposals and they either get rejected or approved. You can guess which happens more.) second bonus: excess proprietary black boxes and reliance on third-party support breeds contempt for security. Misconfigured or lazily configured crap because everyone is cutting corners.
- pcunite 9y agomake it work, make it secure, make it cheap. Pick two.
- SuperGent 9y agoSecure and cheap please! What you should be saying is that secure software isn't cheap, and management doesn't see a point in spending extra money
- noir_lord 9y agoSecure and cheap means it doesn't work, if not working is the criteria I can paint a brick black and call it the control computer if you'd like.
- arm85 9y agoSo the significance here is that if you had remote access to a single wind turbine, you can control the others? Implying, if there were a vulnerability in the control system of one turbine, the rest of them are exposed? Rather than showing that you can stop wind turbines from spinning, if you had physical access to the turbines. Their "hack", which requires physical access, is about as practical as throwing a physical spanner in the mechanics. EDIT: I'd like to point out, there are reasons why you might want to be able to access the SCADA system of other wind turbines, from the network access of one wind turbine, which would be to allow wind-yaw optimising wind lidar systems to optimise the yaw of other, local, turbines.
- horsawlarway 9y agoI agree, the issue here is physical security. That's it. Now, there are some great arguments to be made that software security in those buildings should also be improved, but that literally doesn't matter if someone has physical access. At best you're delaying. Physical access trumps everything. There is no software on the planet that can prevent a determined attacker with physical access.
- brianwawok 9y agoAnd as mentioned above, this is silly to ignore software security. Software attacks are often far far amplified and harder to trace than their in person counterpart.
- horsawlarway 9y agoNo one is ignoring it... The whole freaking article is about companies paying specialists to see how secure their farms are. My issue is that the article glides past the "physical access" part to focus on the "scary cyber weapons" part. That's bullshit. If it was a remote exploit from an internet connected machine, sure: that's scary. This wasn't that.
- haltingthoughts 9y ago
- cannonpr 9y agoAll of Amsterdam's power charging station network for cars is accessible via a very similar method. Unauthenticated Telnet just a serial connection away, allowing you city wide access from any charging point. It's frightening especially combined with the amount of data access charging points have to cars plugged into them.
- horsawlarway 9y agoThis whole article seems to basically boil down to this: >And in the meantime, a few stronger locks, fences, and security cameras on the doors of the turbines themselves would make physical attacks far more difficult. I mean, any time someone has physical access to your machines, you're going to lose the security fight. Full stop. At that point, if the goal is damage or extortion, and you've walked into an unguarded and poorly secured building (or turbine), a little bit of dynamite is a WAY better bet than a network compromise.
- brianwawok 9y agoMaybe? I mean if I wanted to blow up 1000 turbines with dynamite, I would need: * Physically drive to 1000 turbines * Purchases 1000 sticks of dynamite * Physically walk up to 1000 turbines * Set up some kind of ransom remote detonator that I could set off * Somehow monitor all 1000 turbines to see no one could defuse my bomb * Not blow up myself while setting up the bombs Vs if you could send 1 packet from Russia that told the turbine to go "full speed reverse" that could shred the device? You are going to argue that those two things are the same level of effort, and we shouldn't guard against the second due to how easy the first is?
- bluedino 9y agoIf you have dynamite and want to take a windfarm out, you're better off taking out a few towers in a 138kV transmission line or the substation the turbines all connect to.
- jws 9y agoDynamite is not required. In the 1970s in Minnesota angry farmers destroyed about a dozen transmission towers with nothing but wrenches. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/CU_project_controversy https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/CU_project_controversy
- rm_-rf_slash 9y ago>Protesters covered themselves in pig manure and asked the police to arrest them. Now that's a piece of civil disobedience history I'm never gonna forget.
- ocschwar 9y agoI'm close enough to the industry that I can see the root cause. There's a huge cultural difference between Telecom and Power. When AT&T started out, they hired telegraph boys to operate the switches, and then after getting tired of their antics, fired them en masse and replaced them with young women. That sparked the first wave of people tampering with telecom wires to pull pranks, and the telecom sector has been familiar with that issue ever since. Phone phreaking, as in tampering with crossbar switches remotely, is at least as old as the Arab Israeli war of 1948. Power utilities, meanwhile, have had some protection from the simple fact that even sociopaths don't like to risk their own lights going out. Even during civil wars, militias will spare the other side's power because they want to use it when they conquer the other side's territory. Power utilities have to worry about copper thieves, squirrels, and tree branches. Getting bits diddled remotely by bad actors is not something they've had to think about as long.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- rsync 9y ago"Getting bits diddled remotely by bad actors is not something they've had to think about as long." They should never have to worry about this. Power plant equipment, etc., should not have networking capability. Not just no Internet, but no networking.
- ceejayoz 9y agoWind farms can cover hundreds of square miles. I don't think that's a reasonable limit to set.
- ocschwar 9y agoWhen a major storm hits, and linemen swarm a region, the lack of remote-control and monitoring on distribution substations and unmanned windfarms makes things much worse. And storms hit far more often.
- thom_nic 9y agoYou might be surprised to learn that all power plants have some sort of primitive "networking" capability, albeit something that looks more like a direct point-to-point phone line between plants and the grid operator (see DNP3.) As you can imagine these are relatively expensive to install, but part of the bring-up of a new power plant. All of these plants also have some sort of SCADA system internally and turbine fields need the same (the turbines need to be connected to each other, and the operator needs to be able to control the turbines in some way: e.g. turning them off when there is an excess of power, reading power output, faults, etc.) So one way or another, communication needs to occur whether it's over an IP network or a dedicated PTP line. If someone gets physical access it's mostly game-over unless you've got builtin hardware-level encryption between all of the internal components of the facility. If there wasn't an ethernet port in the server cabinet the hacker could just connect an RS-485 line and start sending MODBUS commands or whatever protocol the SCADA system is using. But the article does a good job pointing out that the assumption that "the facility/network is secure" does not hold as well in distributed generation as it did for traditional power generation. Edit: see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNP3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNP3
- scblock 9y agoThe article isn't _wrong_ wrong, as the core of this security issue is right, but it's also not really right either. Wind Farm SCADA is generally well protected from internet attacks by design, but it is based on a fiber ring ethernet network that does indeed tend to treat internal nodes on the network as trusted. The article's notes on physical security make sense. And operators generally expect to be able to control the system from any machine, not just the central server. But it seems like much of the solution is better locks. And I don't know who the author got this idea from: "The equipment is designed for lightness and efficiency, and is often fragile as a result.", but it's not accurate. It's designed for a balance of performance, robustness, and cost. Just because the machines are not designed for repeated emergency braking or doesn't make them fragile. Bigger picture though, next time you're out and about take a good look at your surroundings. The U.S. is huge, and much of our grid infrastructure is remote. Forget the nuclear power plant example in the article. It wouldn't be stupendously difficult to take down a major transmission line or switchyard if you were determined. Much of the world operates because people generally leave well enough alone, for better or worse.
- drcross 9y agoIt's a bit like the people raving that the sky will fall when cars are all internet connected because they will vulnerable to hacking but completely ignoring that you could cause far more damage with a pallet of bricks being thrown off a motorway bridge, which generally doesn't ever happen.
- GavinMcG 9y agoTo be fair, throwing a pallet of bricks off a bridge wouldn't cause as much damage as causing 1% of an area's cars to crash, and it's a crime you actually have to be on site for. People are quite reasonably more afraid of attack vectors that can affect huge numbers of people all at once, especially when the attacker could be anywhere in the world. One obvious example of why that's reasonable is the recent ransomware – sure, you've always been able to easily extort $300 from someone, but now you can take money from a lot of people, and not get caught.
- Damogran6 9y ago"Windworm, another piece of malicious software, went further: It used telnet and FTP to spread from one programmable automation controller to another, until it infected all of a wind farm's computers." What year is this?
- digi_owl 9y agoWonder if the article author had bothered highlighting the model of laptop if it was anything other than a Macbook. Hell, going by the image used it was wrapped in a non-descriptive case (not even a window for the logo).
- campuscodi 9y agoThis is a hype article. Wind farms and their equipment could be hacked for years. Just subscribe to the ISC-CERT RSS feed and you'll see they were hackable going back years. Nobody discovered anything new.
- forgottenpass 9y agoNobody discovered anything new. They seem to have discovered a conference that will give them a platform to promote themselves by banging on about known security problems while providing zero actionable advice towards finding more weaknesses or preventing future weaknesses. Nah, I guess you're right. Those aren't a novel discovery either.
- CptMauli 9y agothere is actually a funny way to shut down windfarms near forests (although that would probably only work at night/dusk/dawn). Just blast with full power a recording of ultrasonic bat noises to the turbines. But as others pointed out, if you have physical access, of course you'll be able to do something nefarious. Then, wind farms are offline all the time, for all different reasons, so this would actually not that big a deal (apart from the owner of course). And that you are able to hack into the protocols, it is not really surprising, since most of the stuff has no authentication at all. You could of course filter for the MAC addresses of the devices, but this is so much hassle for any maintenance personnel that I doubt that it is in place in that many places. Additionally, at least in Europe, most of the wind farms are rather small, so we are talking about a few turbines at once. The large ones have actually often enough dedicated staff which will look after them.
- iancarroll 9y ago> You could of course filter for the MAC addresses of the devices That would not help security wise.
- noir_lord 9y agoI'm not in the security field but it still surprises me how many people don't realize how easy MAC address spoofing actually is. I generally describe it as the digital equivalent of swapping the plates on your car.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]