15 ms·
Ask HN: Insider history of the demise of Kodak?
Most are familiar with the fact that Kodak developed the first digital camera in the 70s, and then never followed up on it, eventually becoming bankrupt as film became obsolete.
I'm interested in an 'insider' account of what was going on at Kodak during the rise of digital. My naive assumption is a bunch of 60+ executives with a 1950's mindset of "We're Kodak", and some junior execs proposed projects that are either ignored or ridiculed.
But I wonder, what really happened? Is there a source or interviews or the like? What were they saying in the meetings while digital products were hitting the market?
- DanBC 10y agoI'm also interested in the more specialist products - holography, xray, and movie film.
- jrockway 10y agoXray film is just cheaper orthochromatic black & white film. Some large format photographers like it because it's so cheap, despite being harder to use. (Double-sided emulsion, so you can't manhandle either side of the sheet; very contrasty, so development has to be carefully controlled; and generally a very slow ISO, around 25.) http://matmarrash.com/blog/2012/8/28/working-with-large-format-x-ray-filmcontinued http://matmarrash.com/blog/2012/8/28/working-with-large-form... I've experimented with similar film (Ilford Ortho Copy), but I generally prefer the look of contrasty skies (filter out blue and green), which is the opposite of what orthochromatic film will look like. (This is why older B&W photos have stunningly-bright skies, contributing to the characteristic look of photos from that era. Panchromatic film didn't exist, and the sky is very bright relative to terrestrial objects when all you have is blue light.) Generally the stuff gets the job done, though. Here's a test shot of Ilford Ortho Copy: https://goo.gl/photos/qkretyMoozuNXczXA https://goo.gl/photos/qkretyMoozuNXczXA Versus the same scene on Tri-X 320: https://goo.gl/photos/cwCn4c7XUzNM3xuh8 https://goo.gl/photos/cwCn4c7XUzNM3xuh8 It was cloudy, so you don't really see the overexposed sky effect, but you can see how the trees on the top right look darker. Presumably there was some greenish moss on there or something.
- shas3 10y agoBig ships are slow to turn. One systemic cause based on my experience in old-big companies is that if profit margins on some products are high, mid and some high level managers maximize that product (e.g. roll-to-roll manufactured films in Kodak). With such optimization, you end up at "local-maxima". This continues until you have an "iceberg right ahead" moment when profits start to spiral downward. Depending on the pace of growth of the technology/sales of your competitor(s), this descent is rapid and irreversible.
- yuhong 10y agoI wonder what would happen to record companies if DAT tape existed in the 1970s (before they really consolidated).
- agumonkey 10y agoBig systems also rarely want to kill their "ego". The desire to develop what means your current self will disappear (physical print) is difficult to do. Not in the same way a young group can.
- lawpoop 10y agoI understand that abstract idea in the big picture, but I am interested in the specific history of how that played out at Kodak.
- redtexture 10y agoThe story of staggering institutional inertia and failure is amazingly similar to Xerox's, and similar to hundreds of other US corporate manufacturing giants declining into bankruptcy over the last 40 years, by failing to be concerned with, or collectively act on (board, executive, staff) the future year risks of on a several-decade time scale. This list of inertially failing organizations, among others, includes General Motors, IBM, HP, AT&T, and others. [Can any public company plan on a multi-decade time scale? This is an anthropological, sociological, cultural and business question of interest in the academic literature.] Others, along with Harvard Business School professor Clayton M. Christensen, have written extensively on the general cultural difficulty of spending money now for an uncertain future while making money presently on a multi-decade investment. Xerox was originally under the thumb of Kodak, in Rochester, New York, as the maker of photographic paper, chemicals and related equipment, known as the "The Haloid Photographic Company" (halides -- bromine and related chemical elements, along with silver, being the key photographic chemicals of photography) and founded in 1906. The owner-leadership of the Haloid company in the 1930s and 1940s knew the company was doomed in the long-run with their then-present capability. Later on, it turns out that neither the Xerox of 1995, nor the Kodak of 1995 understood the necessity of having a keen paranoia of their technology's changing future and future unreliable income. Xerox's, Kodak's, and other corporate stories are both studied in graduate-level business and engineering programs looking at the risks of failing to plan for change, the end of patent monopoly and market domination, and the cultural and financial necessity for understanding, committing to, and planning on the demise of the present technology currently sustaining an organization. The Haloid company was not crushed by Kodak, in part, because of antitrust laws, but it was always in danger of failing in a competitive market dominated by Kodak, and from the 1930s onward had committed money to find and own a technology that was sustainable and patentable to survive: the Haloid company invented the term "xerography" (dry image transfer). After the growing success of xerography in the late 1950s, and 1960s, after near-death experiences bringing the technology to market, the culture of developing and ultimately surviving on the new market of new-but different technology was lost in the profits of xerography in the minds of the then-present executive leadership, addicted to the amazing profits of xerographic patents: thus the results of new research and technology failed to be supported to make it to market. Yet the Xerox company's creations, developments and discoveries are the present backbone of the present era of computing: ethernet, laser printers, personal computers, graphical user interfaces, Smalltalk (see also Object Oriented Programming and Virtual Machines, and the like). Look up the history of Xerox's "Palo Also Research Center (PARC). The Smallalk VM was the foundation of Self, and the later Java VM, with the addition of a couple decades of further work. See "Fumbling the Future: How Xerox Invented, Then Ignored, the First Personal Computer" by Douglas K. Smith and Robert C. Alexander for that story, published in 1988, nearly three decades ago. The cultural failures and non-response parallels are remarkable. Doubtless there are dozens of similar reports on the Kodak cultural inertia and failure to understand change, in academic articles, and books. Google is your friend. Kodak leadership thought that they could not profit from digital cameras, and early and expensive technology could only be used by large institutions (NASA). As costs dropped, Kodak thought that their market was commodity consumables, so they licensed the technology they created. The consumables chemistry and photographic films and papers market ended with with the rise of digital photography (no negatives), and digital, color ink-jet and xerographic reproduction of images. EDIT: halide elemental chemical family
- aaronbrethorst 10y agoThere are quite a few articles online that go into some detail about it. Just search for "Kodak Clay Christensen", or something similar. Here's one: http://www.economist.com/node/21542796 http://www.economist.com/node/21542796 Another reason why Kodak was slow to change was that its executives “suffered from a mentality of perfect products, rather than the high-tech mindset of make it, launch it, fix it...” Bad luck played a role, too. Kodak thought that the thousands of chemicals its researchers had created for use in film might instead be turned into drugs. But its pharmaceutical operations fizzled, and were sold in the 1990s. On a related note, I just purchased a 10 pack of Kodak Portra 400 4x5" sheet film last night. I normally shoot Kodak's Tri-X and 5222 cine film, or Fuji's Acros 100, but thought it'd be fun to get into large format color photography on occasion.
- Turing_Machine 10y agoChristensen's book, The Innovator's Dilemma, is well worth reading. I don't think it's one of Christensen's examples (it's been a while since I read the book) but IMO the all-time greatest blunder of this type was Sears closing down their catalog operation the same year the first graphical web browser was introduced. The younger readers may not remember this, but there was a time when the Sears catalog sold everything. You could even buy an entire pre-cut house that would be shipped to you for assembly. They basically had Amazon, and threw it away. Now they're essentially nothing but a subsidiary brand of K-Mart.
- m_mueller 10y agoThat one has always astonished me a lot more than Kodak, even as a foreigner. Why the hell would you close down a successful business operation, especially of that sort?
- epc 10y agoBy the mid-1990s Sears was getting destroyed by Walmart, which was running circles around them with their logistics operation.
- 10y ago
- rando444 10y agoDigital cameras in the 70s and 80s were impractical, low quality devices that were mostly useless without a computer, which is not something that the majority of people had in their homes. Kodak did follow up with digital though. They had a digital SLR by 1994 (before Canon or Nikon) and digital cameras for $299 by 1996. The advantage that companies like Nikon and Canon had are their lenses, and the huge investments photographers made in their lenses is what locked them in to a particular brand. This is why a lot of traditional camera companies (Konica, Minolta, Fuji, Polaroid) were unable to keep up.
- cpks 10y agoMinolta had rather astonishingly good lenses, actually. They had a number of oddballs, from an STF lens (great bokeh) to a tiny 500mm autofocus mirror lens (with very good image quality -- not the reputation mirror lenses have), and many others.
- sgt101 10y agoAnd Minolta is now Sony I think?
- rmason 10y agoWhat I've always been curious about was whether Apple's engineers reached out to Kodak when designing the iphone's camera? It would seem logical that Kodak could have potentially been a possible supplier.
- pavlov 10y agoKodak? Around 2005 when the iPhone hardware spec was being designed? They had completely lost the digital camera game by then.
- TheOtherHobbes 10y agoI had a Kodak digital camera in 2003. It was no better or worse than competing consumer digital cameras - i.e. it was a usable but mediocre affordable snap cam. I think where Kodak lost it was failing to bring high end technology into compacts. Kodak had a big stake in professional digital cameras before 2000. It's completely wrong to say they weren't in the market. In fact they almost owned it. The first professional digital bodies were being sold by Kodak in 1991, and the former sensor division is still going under another name. But they didn't seem to understand that the same technology was going to move into affordable prosumer cameras, and eventually into consumer snap cameras. They certainly didn't understand it was going to move into mobile phones, where it would kill consumer film cameras. And they totally failed to anticipate photosharing culture online. To be fair, I think almost everyone underestimated mobile. I had a Nokia 9500 Communicator with a camera at around the same time I had the Kodak. The quality was pretty bad, and there was nowhere near enough bandwidth to consider photo sharing. Now I have an iPhone with a camera which can give an old SLR a run for its money, and photo sharing is no problem. The difference is that Kodak were creating products - technological artefacts for a single purpose. Jobs and co were creating a culture - a set of experiences that include hardware, software, marketing, and media attention. Culture companies are much more likely to kill product companies in the same niche than vice versa.
- mschuster91 10y ago> Now I have an iPhone with a camera which can give an old SLR a run for its money, and photo sharing is no problem. Well, the iPhone may be nice if you're near the object you want to photograph and it's a bright sunny day, but: - it horribly sucks at low-light photography, you can't just screw an iPhone to a camera tripod to get a beautiful shot of the night sky - there are CF and SD cards with WiFi support, which can be used in virtually any camera - good luck taking a good distance shot with an iPhone - good luck putting an iPhone onto a stabilizer (e.g. Steadicam)... and no, software can't replace that.
- themgt 10y agoI lived in Rochester, NY and got a 20 hr/week job interning at Kodak in the slide film research department during HS in 1999-2000. I remember on one occasion my boss, a mid-level executive (head of new slide film research? something like that) asked me what I thought about digital cameras, I think both because I was young and seen as "the computer guy". I didn't own one but I'd read about them a decent amount. I told him I understood they were expensive/low-quality at the moment but the advantage of ditching film and using ever-improving digital tech still seemed huge. I don't remember his exact words, but he couldn't really see the appeal or promise. The 7-story building I worked in is just a mound of grass last I looked. I have thought from time to time just about the institutional inertia that fights against seeing what's going on and adapting. There were just tens of thousands of people with very highly specialized skills around film and chemicals and processing and dark rooms and paper and so many things most of which simply aren't relevant to a digital photography world. Now, granted, other film/pre-digital camera companies did a far better job making the jump. I'd argue maybe in part again that Kodak seeing itself as emotionally wed to film while other companies saw themselves moreso as camera/photo companies. That Fuji has been able to survive is more surprising to me than Canon/Nikon/Olympus/etc.
- rrrx3 10y agoI had never really put much thought into it, but you're totally right- the expectation was that a chemical company (essentially) would transform itself into a Hardware & software manufacturer. That's a might, mighty leap. That Fuji was actually able to do it is even more impressive. I worked for a company that did some work for Kodak - both directly and indirectly - around some of their software initiatives & partnerships with mobile manufacturers. They were not pretty or well-run projects, to be sure.
- ghaff 10y agoCertainly Kodak did a lot of things wrong but there's a common meme straight out of Marketing Myopia [1] that, had they only thought of themselves as a photography company rather than a film company, all would have been well. This is basically nonsense. Even had Kodak been more aggressive about cannibalizing its film sales with digital, it's unclear how much of its expertise and competitive advantage would have carried over. In any case, it wouldn't have nearly replaced the film consumables business in terms of revenue and profit. Fujifilm did do better--mostly, current camera line notwithstanding--by branching out into other areas of chemistry. Good read from The Economist here [2] but Fujifilm had tough times too and I believe that they were also significantly smaller. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marketing_myopia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marketing_myopia [2] http://www.economist.com/node/21542796?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ar/thelastkodakmoment http://www.economist.com/node/21542796?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ar/the... [Second link fixed.]
- bendykstra 10y agoMy high school physics teacher worked at Kodak's research labs on CCDs, including some that were for use in "specialized applications," which I assume to mean spy satellites†. He said that he had quit when Kodak decided to stop shooting themselves in the foot and shot themselves in the head instead. That would have been the early 90s, I think. I don't have any specific mismanagement stories, but I'll send you his email address (the most recent that I could find.) I always wished that he would talk about it in more detail and now that it is some years later, maybe he will. † He told us one fun story. One of his research papers had been cleared by the censors for publication and accepted by a scientific journal. However, just before the journal went to print, the censors changed their minds. It was too late to fix the layout, so the edition was released with a sheaf of blank pages in the middle. He said that it was the proudest anyone had ever been of some blank paper. Edit: Apparently, there is no way to private message an HN user. If you have a Reddit account or similar, I can pm you there.
- dasmoth 10y agoKodak was always a big part of US IMINT capabilities. Before CCDs, they were making specialised films for the film-return spacecraft, and operating the facility where it was processed. There's some interesting stuff in the declassified NRO histories about upgrades to the film emulsions -- which I'm sure filtered through into Kodak's civilian products (e.g tabular grains). While it seems likely that they remained involved in sensors and also optics, I wonder whether the loss of these secret film contracts may have left them weakened in the late 80s/early 90s (last film-return satellite should have flown in 1986, but was lost due to a launch failure), just when they needed to focus on some new product lines.
- brudgers 10y agoThe end of the Cold War probably wasn't all that good for people in the National Security segment of the remote imaging business, either.
- themtutty 10y agoI worked a summer job in 1987 or 1988, doing 9cm glass-plate manufacturing. The main application for these plates was apparently U2/SR-71-style high-altitude photography. Of football games, I'm sure. They always told us they could blow up the exposure to that size, anyway :)
- guscost 10y agoHere's a memoir from Brad Paxton, a family friend. Might be worth checking out (disclaimer: I'm related to the editor) since he was a VP who had a lot to do with high-tech projects during this time: https://www.amazon.com/Pictures-Pop-Bottles-Pills-Electronics/dp/0991021606 https://www.amazon.com/Pictures-Pop-Bottles-Pills-Electronic...
- ernestbro 10y agoThought experiment..even if you could time travel, how would you have saved Kodak?
- kpil 10y agoThe answer to the rhetoric question is probably to invest every earned dollar into Kodak2.0 for 10 or more years, and then hope that "digital" takes off. As you probably already know, most people would probably rather take the money as long as it comes in instead of making that bet.
- watmough 10y agoGet Dick Merrill in there and take my chances on Kodak being able to make something of the Foveon sensor. Mind you, at least Sigma managed to get the DP1/2/3M cameras out into the wild, and very nice they are too!
- MarkMc 10y agoThe answer is not to save Kodak, but rather sell the patents and chemicals business, and wind down the photography business in a way that maximises shareholder returns (ie. without ploughing capital into a low margin business like digital cameras, or a business where they had no competitive advantage such as ink jet printers). Michael Dell received a lot of criticism for saying in the 90s that if he was CEO of Apple he would wind down the company and return capital to shareholders. But far too many CEOs are blind to this option.
- WalterBright 10y agoI (and I've noticed this in others my age) still have a lingering thought that photography is expensive, and to conserve 'film'. Back in the day, even with slides, the finished cost per slide was about a buck each. It's just hard to dispel the habitual thought "is this shot worth taking?" I'm still getting used to the ability to snap a pic and casually text it to a friend instead of trying to describe it. I just downloaded a phone app that turns it into a scanner, complete with OCR. It's not as good as my flatbed, but it's incredibly convenient. I feel like I'm living in the future.
- ekianjo 10y agoFilm is expensive but its still unbeatable in terms of dynamic range and details, especially if you go to larger formats than 35 mm.
- WalterBright 10y agoI know. But I never was a good photographer, and digital photography has improved to the point where it's more than good enough for me. My dad had a rangefinder Leica, and he swore by it. But I look at the pictures he took, and they're often slightly out of focus, grainy, under/over exposed, etc. I'm sure great photographs can be taken with a Leica, but you've got to be a great photographer to get them. But for sure they were better than the brownie he had before :-)
- ohazi 10y agoThat's not really true anymore. While large format film may still have a slight resolution advantage IF you have high resolution lenses to match, most high-end sensors have better dynamic range than film (~14-15 stops vs ~13 stops).
- combatentropy 10y ago> most high-end sensors have better dynamic range than film (~14-15 stops vs ~13 stops) Film is the one with 14-15 stops. Plus its automatic S-shaped gamma curve, with gentle roll-off of the highlights, makes it easier to produce pleasing images. Movies, TV shows, and commercials that were shot on 35mm film in the 80s and 90s usually look better than the digitally shot ones today.
- YZF 10y agoI worked for Creo when it was acquired by Kodak in 2005 for $1B and then later for Kodak for quite a few years. At the time Kodak still had cash but film was obviously in decline. This acquisition was part of a $3B acquisition spree. Kodak's mangement proceeded to run Creo into the ground through a series of layoffs, remote micromanagement, shuffling things around etc. At the time of the acquisition Creo was profitable (though definitely with some challenges) and had a few growth initiatives that looked promising (all cancelled). Very capable management, good people, and well run. There were a lot of opportunities to create some long term value in different areas but the only Kodak strategy was to keep cost cutting and milk all the businesses to their death. What was amazing to me is that the CEO kept his job even after Kodak's market cap went below $1B. I forget what that market cap was at the time of the acquisition but probably in the $10-$20B range. Gotta be one of the top ten value destroying CEOs of all times. For many many years it didn't matter what management did, film kept printing money for the company. Only when things changed you could tell that management was actually incompetent. Before that you didn't need to be competent to keep making money. Kind of like Warren Buffet says, only when the tide goes out you find who is swimming without their bathing suits... I just saw something on Bloomberg the other day about Kodak finally getting some anti-counterfeiting technology that AFAIK is the same one developed in Creo over 10 years ago (Traceless) released. EDIT: Another personal anecdote is that the first "real" digital camera I ever used, I'm guessing around 1996, was a Kodak. It was pretty decent. I think the price tag was quite high. At that point in time Kodak had a good reputation in digital cameras. The problem is digital cameras would never replace film as a business even if Kodak went 100% into digital. They needed to diversify.
- mattmcknight 10y ago"The problem is digital cameras would never replace film as a business even if Kodak went 100% into digital. They needed to diversify." In my short time in business, I have noticed how rare it is for a company to successfully get smaller and survive- even when the obvious business is going away.
- jzwinck 10y agoIf you have 1000 mid-level managers, how many of them can you get on board with a plan to end up with 300 mid-level managers? The ones who do not get on board are a huge cost that your competitors don't have to offset in their top line.
- Syzygies 10y agoMy dad devised the "Bayer filter" used in digital cameras, in the 1970's in the Kodak Park Research Labs. It is hard to convey now exactly how remote and speculative the idea of a digital camera was then. The HP-35 calculator was the cutting edge, very expensive consumer electronics of the day; the idea of an iPhone was science fiction. Simply put, my dad was playing. This was the decade that the Hunt brothers were cornering the silver market. Kodak's practical interest in digital methods was to use less silver while keeping customers happy. The idea was for Kodak to insert a digital step before printing enlargements, to reduce the inevitable grain that came with using less silver. Black and white digital prints were scattered about our home, often involving the challenging textural details of bathing beauties on rugs.
- zfedoran 10y agoI wish he would have designed it to be easier to remove ;) A few of us adventurous armature astrophotography nerds have been trying to remove the bayer matrix off our DSLRs, without destroying the sensor, for a while now. It's unfortunate that there are so few options for true monochrome sensors. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1Lgju9L23c https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1Lgju9L23c https://stargazerslounge.com/topic/166334-debayering-a-dslrs-bayer-matrix/ https://stargazerslounge.com/topic/166334-debayering-a-dslrs... Interestingly, the kodak KAF-8300 is still a very popular option for commercial monochrome sensors.
- emmelaich 10y ago"armature" Nice pun :-)
- icelancer 10y ago>My dad devised the "Bayer filter" used in digital cameras What? That's amazing! I work in high-speed videography and your father's filter is a part of my daily live. Awesome!
- rplst8 10y agoYour dad is Bryce Bayer?
- _ph_ 10y agoI have no inside information what so ever, but I am still today using a digital camera with a Kodak sensor almost daily (a M9). I am still baffled, how a company of this size and revenue can fall apart like this - probably only paralleled by the demise of Nokia. Till the early 2000s, Kodak was not only a leader in film but also in digital photography. Their CCD sensors are still made today, their sensor division now owned by OnSemi. All the first Nikon and Canon DSLRs had Kodak technology in them. Not sure how things happened in detail, but eventually Nikon and Canon had their own digital technology, mostly based on CMOS sensors. Kodak had one more CMOS camera of their own - the 14n based on a Nikon body. But while being the highest resolution body at that time, it got mixed reviews. Still at that time Kodak probably would have had enough cash to buy Nikon. Yet they withdrew from professional digital cameras, the last life sign was providing sensors for the Leica M9 and S. And with no other leg to stand on, the company mostly vanished with the collapse of the film market. Ironically, the price you pay per roll of film is on an all-time high, so in theory, the business of making film should be more profitable than it was, but the scale just is not there any more.
- SoapSeller 10y agoOnSemi are retiring their CCD offering, IIRC they will stop producing CCD sensors by the end of this year.
- fezz 10y agoAs are Sony.
- mxwll 10y agoRecent design grad from RIT. I learned from / worked with many former Kodak employees from the late 90's into early 00's. The majority of them worked on the consumer product side of the business. It is my understanding that Kodak's efforts were too little too late. The organization was driven by the business people and was hemorrhaging money and only staying afloat through licensing and selling off their patent portfolio and the medical imaging devision. They watched their consumer product profits from film evaporate and failed to transition into the digital age. These designers and engineers that I have learned from and worked with are certainly brilliant individuals. It seems that the organizational culture did not provide them with the creative freedom needed to envision and develop products competitive with those coming from smaller, nimbler companies.
- QueueUnderflow 10y agoSteven Sasson, the man who invented the camera gave a talk to my program (CE at Rochester Institute of Tech) about the process and downfall of his invention at Kodak. It all started as some backroom research project with no funding to see if they could do something with the new technology of CDC cells. The camera ended up at .01 Megapixels and stored on a tape (with about 20+ second write time). What most people did not realize is he also made a device for displaying the image onto a TV (what good is a digital image if there is no way to display it). IIRC the first "public" demo of this technology was during the Tiananmen Square Massacre to smuggle/transmit the video out of the county. If you watch one of the original broadcasts the only sign of it was a little Kodak logo at the bottom of the screen. Now there is something you need to know about film.... it was probably one of the most profitable products ever. Also Kodak was not really a pure technology company, it was more of a consumer tech/chemical company. While they did have a lot of engineers (many of my professors all worked there), some were more focused on the manufacturing process rather than an end product. A lot of their internal structure was focused on making and processing chemical film. When he showed this product to the upper level (however never the CEO) the demo went something like: walk into room with the camera, take picture of attendees, show picture on TV. While this was totally unheard of the time, mostly they all just laughed at the quality of the image and brushed it off. They also saw no appeal in viewing pictures on a TV screen vs an actual picture. A patent was filed and that was mostly the end of it. A lot of people laugh at Kodak for that mistake, but it really it’s just another example of the inventors dilemma. At that time though it made perfect sense for Kodak to make that decision because they were just making so much money. One could say the technology was ahead of its time. Well then digital really started to take rise. They ended up turning a lot of their focus into making personal photo printers. In 2004 Kodak then realized that almost every company that made a digital camera infringed on their patents and started to sue them all. They ended up winning a lot of money but they could never get their foot back into the market. TLDR: Camera was ahead of its time and threatened to undo the whole company whose main focus was producing and processing chemical film.
- QueueUnderflow 10y agoSteven Sasson, the man who invented the camera gave a talk to my program (CE at Rochester Institute of Tech) about the process and downfall of his invention at Kodak. It all started as some backroom research project with no funding to see if they could do something with the new technology of CDC cells. The camera ended up at .01 Megapixels and stored on a tape (with about 20+ second write time). What most people did not realize is he also made a device for displaying the image onto a TV (what good is a digital image if there is no way to display it). IIRC the first "public" demo of this technology was during the Tiananmen Square Massacre to smuggle/transmit the video out of the county. If you watch one of the original broadcasts the only sign of it was a little Kodak logo at the bottom of the screen. Now there is something you need to know about film.... it was probably one of the most profitable products ever. Also Kodak was not really a pure technology company, it was more of a consumer tech/chemical company. While they did have a lot of engineers (many of my professors all worked there), some were more focused on the manufacturing process rather than an end product. A lot of their internal structure was focused on making and processing chemical film. When he showed this product to the upper level (however never the CEO) the demo went something like: walk into room with the camera, take picture of attendees, show picture on TV. While this was totally unheard of the time, mostly they all just laughed at the quality of the image and brushed it off. They also saw no appeal in viewing pictures on a TV screen vs an actual picture. A patent was filed and that was mostly the end of it. A lot of people laugh at Kodak for that mistake, but it really it’s just another example of the inventors dilemma. At that time though it made perfect sense for Kodak to make that decision because they were just making so much money. One could say the technology was ahead of its time. Well then digital really started to take rise. They ended up turning a lot of their focus into making personal photo printers. In 2004 Kodak then realized that almost every company that made a digital camera infringed on their patents and started to sue them all. They ended up winning a lot of money but they could never get their foot back into the market. TLDR: Camera was ahead of its time and threatened to undo the whole company whose main focus was producing and processing chemical film.
- vibrolax 10y agoRochester NY resident since 1982, Kodak's peak employment year. Wrote embedded software for Xerox for a couple years around 2000. My belief is that companies like Kodak, Xerox, HP, IBM, etc. have business structures that cannot survive in a low margin business. These companies drove and thrived with technological change for decades. The leadership could not accept the change of their key lines of business into low margin commodities.
- rgovind 10y agoIf that is true, I believe Google, MS wold have a similar problem but Amazon won''t
- Spooky23 10y agoMicrosoft seems to finally get it. We'll see how it works out.
- vibrolax 10y agoGoogle's cash cow product is knowledge of people's behaviors. Can equivalent product be built for much less, or be much easier to use? MS seems eager to build a similar business. Amazon store seems built to survive at a near zero margin. Maybe AWS as well. I think Amazon's ultimate success is predicated on eventually developing a higher margin business. It seems many previous businesses founded on the low cost producer strategy, e.g. Dell, uses it as a means to get scale, then emphasise higher margin products and services.
- intrasight 10y agoThis is something I'd posted previously on HN: I worked at Kodak as a summer intern in '85. Was the era of the disk camera. Was also my first programming job. Lotus 1-2-3. Most people today can't comprehend the scale of American manufacturing as it still was at that time. The Elmgrove plant where I worked (one of a dozen facilities in the Rochester area) has over 14 thousand employees. Our start and end times were staggered in 7 minute increments to manage traffic flow. That none of that would exist 20 years later was inconceivable at the time. The word "disruption" wasn't in business vocabulary. Nor was the phrase "made in China". Some senior technical managers saw the "digital" writing on the wall. But what could they do? What could anyone do? There was no way to turn that aircraft carrier on a dime. At the end of my summer internship, I attended a presentation that our small team gave to more senior managers at the top of Kodak Tower in the conference room adjacent to President Chandler's office. One of the managers took me to the window and pointed out to me different plants and facilities of the vast Kodak empire spread out across the Rochester region. I assumed like many that Kodak had a bright future ahead because they had a world-renowned brand and excellent scientists and engineers. What many at the time didn't yet recognize was that there was no business model in digital cameras that would employ 100 thousand engineers, managers, factory workers, technicians, and staff. There were certainly no senior managers willing or able to sacrifice the golden goose of film to pursue something entirely different.
- GFK_of_xmaspast 10y agoThe way I remember 1985 is that "made in China" wasn't a phrase but "made in Japan" absolutely was, see forex https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gung_Ho_%28film%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gung_Ho_%28film%29 and reckon that that didn't get made in a vacuum.
- rosege 10y agodownsizing was also introduced around then - during the time of James Goldsmith and the corporate raiders
- flyinghamster 10y agoMy own memory of 1985 was that "Made in China" was just starting to get off the ground. Example: at the time, Black & Decker had bought out GE's small home appliance division. I had a Black & Decker-branded hair dryer (that had been a GE product beforehand) and was rather surprised to see "Made in China" on it. I felt it to be a bit ominous even at the time, never mind that products imported from Japan, Taiwan, etc. were already commonplace.
- thisjustinm 10y agoI worked for Kodak from 2002-2009 in their Windsor, CO plant, in the Thermal Media Manufacturing division and also wrote the occasional post for the corporate blog (thermal media == Dye sublimation printer media used in Kodak Picture Kiosks mainly). AMA. It was the same thing every year - digital is cannibalizing film faster than we thought, we need to close down X or lay off N people. A year or two of that sure but over and over again and it became clear the executives were just not getting it. Looking back I wonder if they just decided to slowly ride the ship down, extracting nice salaries along the way. I still can't understand how someone - activist shareholders, a board member with half a brain, an executive willing to speak out - didn't make a bigger stink and try to get fresh leadership. I remember one year at an all division meeting they showed the latest corporate "motivational" video - "Winds of Change" (http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=JYW49bsiP4k http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=JYW49bsiP4k). We thought finally, they get it and are admitting we've been stagnating and now we're gonna turn it all around. Everyone was super pumped up for weeks. Then we realized the only thing that had changed was our ad agency who had produced the video.
- musesum 10y agoWow, that is an amazing video! 2006. Facial recognition. Sharing to your PDA ... oops! Then, a few months later, the iPhone happened.
- asimuvPR 10y agoAnd beat Kodak with the grace of an anaconda eating a chicken...What a way to shut them up.
- evan_ 10y agoHaha, I worked for a photography studio during that time period and we used your printers. We had an 8660, which destroyed itself spectacularly and violently during an event, and an ML-500, which destroyed itself somewhat more slowly and had to have virtually every mechanical part replaced numerous times. When they worked they were great, but that never lasted very long. I spoke with Kodak support people quite a bit during that time and they always gave me the impression that Kodak was not giving them the support they needed to keep up with demand. The ML-500 at least seemed to have been hand-built, and when I called in because it stopped printing yellow or whatever I would often end up speaking to one of the actual engineers. Great for figuring out what was wrong with it, but it seemed really weird that these guys were seemingly fielding calls all day. The main thing I remember (other than the printers broke constantly) was that after a few years it became next to impossible to get media for it- we'd call our distributor and he'd say "I don't have any this month, try xxx." So we'd call them and they'd give us another lead, and eventually we'd find some and order as much as we could, and then start the process again the next month. We always assumed that most of the stock was reserved for kiosks. I'd love to hear more about what was going on with that, if you know.
- afian 10y agoFrom the warren buffet autobiography ... “What about Kodak? asked Bill Ruane. He looked back at Gates to see what he would say. “Kodak is toast,” said Gates.8 Nobody else in the Buffett Group knew that digital technology would make film cameras toast. In 1991, even Kodak didn’t know that it was toast.9 “Bill probably thinks all the television networks are going to get killed,” said Larry Tisch, whose company, Loews Corp., owned a stake in the CBS network. “No, it’s not that simple,” said Gates. “The way networks create and expose shows is different than camera film, and nothing is going to come in and fundamentally change that.” “You’ll see some falloff as people move toward variety, but the networks own the content and they “can repurpose it. The networks face an interesting challenge as we move the transport of TV onto the Internet. But it’s not like photography, where you get rid of film so knowing how to make film becomes absolutely irrelevant." Check out this book on the iBooks Store: https://itun.es/us/hj_bz.l https://itun.es/us/hj_bz.l Excerpt From: Schroeder, Alice. “The Snowball.” Bantam Books, 2009. iBooks.
- rahimnathwani 10y agos/autobiography/biography
- porsupah 10y agoEven amongst more technically minded folk, there were some having difficulty accepting that the technical challenges facing digital photography would, in fact, be overcome. Here's quite an interesting thread from rec.photo, Dec 1990 onwards, discussing just that. https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/rec.photo/ZnqcQVzAln0 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/rec.photo/ZnqcQVzAln...
- arethuza 10y ago"No doubt, my recent $8000 35mm camera investment was a safe one." Ouch!
- PostOnce 10y agoThey're right, it was 1990. The first DSLR didn't come out for 5 years, and it was less than 2 megapixels. The Nikon D1 didn't come out until 1999, so nine years later, for $6000, for a 2.75mp camera. Did that even compete with film? Can you put that on the cover of a magazine at under 3 megapixels? So yeah, it was a safe investment in 1990.
- Broken_Hippo 10y agoThis isn't exactly insider, but offhand experience. I worked at a pharmacy from 2005-2013 that had Kodak film processing and digital printing machines. Early on, there was a still a great deal of actual film. Digital cameras still were expensive or not rivaling the quality of film. Many machines didn't offer negative-to-cd, but offered a floppy disk. This slow updating of their equipment was a theme in the company. As film sales slowed, Kodak grew worse. Outsourced tech support for the machines, who were graded on whether or not they had to send a technician out to the store. That was switched to another system, where a tech called back. Most times this was recorded as done, but wasn't. This sort of thing was very common, and didn't improve as they sold off and outsourced bits of the company. They did finally start updating machines, and having fewer locations that processed film quickly and phased out send-away processing - truly focusing on digital products. By then, their advantage had slipped. While they relied on quality film before, their prints seemed no better quality than competitors. Part of the problem was obviously that they didn't take digital seriously soon enough. This in combination with what seemed like a poorly run company meant software always lagged behind sometimes by years. For example, it took some time before folks could put video from their camera onto a dvd, and the cd's themselves could only hold 120 pictures while SD cards were keeping thousands. It was a software issue. In addition, some of the retail outfits they contracted through seemed overpriced. I think the official story was filled with lament over not taking digital technology seriously early on. While I read some stuff about them, it has been some years and I don't know how much was reserved for the workplace environment.
- nl 10y agoThere are few insider details from a NYTimes profile on Steven Sasson[1] who invented the digital camera while at Kodak. [1] http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/kodaks-first-digital-moment/?_r=0# http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/kodaks-first-digita...
- ChuckMcM 10y agoThis is the essence of that tale, and the quintessential definition of "Enterprise Blindness." “They were convinced that no one would ever want to look at their pictures on a television set,” he said. “Print had been with us for over 100 years, no one was complaining about prints, they were very inexpensive, and so why would anyone want to look at their picture on a television set?” You are a hugely successful business, and all of your numbers are great, so this indication that some time "far off" into the future you will have an issue? Well you can worry about that when you get there. And senior management will continue to manage "to the numbers." That means sales guys are making their quota, margins are hitting their targets, Etc. And in Kodak's case, when they lost a customer they had no visibility into it, that customer simply stopped buying film and prints. They didn't buy them more cheaply from some competitor (that would have shown up in their market surveys) instead they just vanished. What was more, their competitors were living off the amateur market. The amateurs who wouldn't buy the professional grade film, and so their competitors died or quietly exited the business while Kodak's core business remained "strong". There was no price pressure on film or processing. As a result it was easy not to see the fundamental cancer growing in the middle of the film business, and when demand for film started falling off a cliff the company was already half dead. The "fix" would have been to reduce the company size to a point where it didn't have the capacity to meet all of the current film demand, because by the time the company had shrunk that far demand would have shrunk to meet it. This is all obvious looking backwards, and to some other peoples points the executives all retired and got pensions and payouts. As an institution, the company failed. There was no process for re-creating the company from the ashes of the dying product line.
- brudgers 10y agoTen years ago, "the mobile web" might have been a reference to WAP. Nine years ago, when the iPhone arrived, mobile web was Edge: where you could get it and when you could afford it. Companies like RIM and Nokia had smartphones. The people running them were smart. Their engineering was good. It had to be because wireless access to the internet wasn't ubiquitous. Suddenly the companies faced the first mover disadvantage. It's difficult to imagine how revolutionary the technology of Kodachrome was. It utterly disrupted consumer photography and photojournalism and professional photography. The fact that Kodak was experimenting with digital photography in the 1970's shows how out front they were and they were right to treat it as a technology that wouldn't be viable for more than two decades...and one that nobody has figured out how to monitize except via the sale of hardware. There's probably no plausible alternate universe where Kodak managed to produce sustainable profit from processing and storing digital images or selling media or anything related to their core business. Digital photography moved image production out of retail channels. I could text an image to ten of my relatives without a trip to Walgreens for one hour processing, and $0.08 3x5 prints in an hour available in the mid 1990's was a pretty amazing innovation versus the four or five days and significantly higher prices that were typical in the 70's and 80's. Kodak wasn't a company standing still. It just didn't have a good way to make money from digital imagery: HP had them beat in the printer ink as liquid gold market and the camera manufacturers weren't going anywhere: optics are still bounded by the physics of optics. Circling back, I think it wasn't so much people sitting around and thinking "we're Kodak" as it was the fact that Kodak wasn't Nokia and hence didn't have a history of selling off it's mainline business and moving into a new industry. Not that as a publicly traded company in the US that would have ever really been a viable option. Quarter by quarter, Kodak was obligated to maximize stockholder value for the short rather than long term. Companies become obsolescent. Consider Sun.
- timbarrett 10y agoSpent a 3 weeks integrating the kodak robotic microfilm system with VMS based Vax in a joint bid with Kodak and Digital in this time frame. This system was supposed to save kodak. The Kodak VP of Government Systems from Washington flew in to "supervise" and royally screwed everything up. Guy was the biggest nut bag in the world.
- hemancuso 10y agoGrew up in Rochester. Both my father and Grandfather did about 30 years at Kodak at a fairly high level. How can you transition from the highest margin CPG product of all time to a new regime where there are almost no marginal costs per use? Kodak had well over 100k employees at its peak and was a global brand just like coke. They even saw their demise decades before it occurred. But what is management supposed to do in a quarterly environment where CEOs are getting ousted other than double down on their success and cut costs? There was never any real money to be made in digital photography and if anyone was going to figure it out, they certainly weren't living in Rochester.
- MicroBerto 10y agoDo you want to Make America Great Again?
- sctb 10y agoPlease don't do this here.
- bawana 10y agoI wonder why the largest corporation in the US has not yet gone bust - the federal govt? They are a dinosaur, the laws they make are inscrutable cold cuts whose composition is unknowable, they require layers of agencies to translate their laws into practice, they are short sighted and so monolithic and unresponsive that their members spend most of their time arguing about who controls what.
- estrabd 10y agoI heard a similar story about Polaroid having their own digital camera. Not sure about the details.
- markbnj 10y agoWe lived in upstate NY during the 1960's and I visited the Kodak campus in Rochester, I think as a cub scout. It was an amazing place. I remember feeling awe as we were walked through this long dark place where they proofed new rolls of film. The memory of the feeling, at least, is still quite clear after all these years. Great to read all the anecdotes about the company here.
- earthserver 10y agoIt's worth noting that Eastman Chemical, which was spun off from Kodak in 1994, is doing just fine as a Fortune 500 company with about 15,000 employees and a market cap of $10B USD. It's stock is up some 200%+ since the spin-off from Kodak in '94 (compared to 400%+ for the S&P500). If you had kept your Eastman Chemical stock after the spin-off from Kodak in '94, sold your Kodak stock, and reinvested the proceeds into Eastman Chemical, you would have more than doubled your capital, not including dividends.
- miesman 10y agoI worked for a subsidiary of Kodak around 91' and can offer a small view. My impression was that they were very aware of what was coming. They came out with the PhotoCD during this time. If you look at it was really a way to lock people into film for a longer time since you still needed to take your negatives in to be transferred. I also remember taking a photography class in 95 and having the teacher say right at the beginning that in 10 years everything is going to be digital. My impression of the time is that everyone knew what was coming.
- PhantomGremlin 10y agoThey came out with the PhotoCD during this time. I used a follow-on product called Picture CD, which was an epic fail as far as I was concerned[1]. You paid an extra $7 IIRC when you had your film developed, and you got JPEGs on a CD. I gave them 35 mm print film and they gave me back 1024×1536 resolution JPEGs? That was literally worse resolution than the Canon S110 pocket camera I had then. They got $7 out of me. Once. The unwashed masses won't pay an extra $7 for a CD to go along with their prints, which probably cost about them about $7 for the roll (about $0.20 or $0.25 per print IIRC). They were being asked to pay double the total price. More knowledgeable customers won't pay an extra $7 for such low resolution scans. So who was this product for? I would have probably tried Photo CD but I think that was much more of a niche product and I didn't know about it. The mini-labs were only offering Picture CD. The services I used were usually 1 or 2 day (which meant actual processing was off-site), so they certainly could have been set up to do much higher quality scans than that. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Picture_CD https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Picture_CD
- lmm 10y agoI paid for it. The quality was pretty poor, but it beat scanning pictures myself (don't think I even owned a scanner at that time), and as a result I still have photos from 15-odd years ago that would almost certainly have been lost in my house moves since then otherwise.
- mathattack 10y agoHere is the irony.... They were not too late, they were too early. [0] Their CEO pushed hard in digital from the early 90s, but they couldn't handle the losses. This is an example of a company's executives seeing the right thing, but not being able to survive the losses until the market caught up. [0] http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB869781042786228000 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB869781042786228000
- jwillis85 10y agoIn some sort of alternate history. Setting Apple acquisition aside.. Kodak would have acquired Kinkos and branched out into online ondemand photo proofing for digital images. Then went totally Android and came out with something more like an iPad than a phone, perhaps leaning in the direction of GeoTagging and Environmental sensing. Phone tech might take a second seat to messaging and something more akin to video calls on demand. Yeah Shoulda Coulda Woulda, it just seems there were less barriers to survivial and thriving than simply egos and business as usual attitudes.
- bkyan 10y agoI was a summer intern working in OLED research at Kodak in the early 90's. While not that many people associate Kodak with OLED, Kodak was considered one of the world leaders in OLED research at that time. There is a short paragraph about the folks I was working for, on the OLED page on Wikipedia ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OLED https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OLED ). While Kodak was able to license the associated technology/patents, it didn't seem like they came out with any consumer OLED products of their own in the years that followed my short stay, there.
- power 10y agoIt's tangential, but I'm reading Dracula atm and Jonathan Harker mentions taking pictures with a Kodak. It was written in 1897.
- cm2187 10y agoWhat I don't get is that my very first digital camera was a Kodak (must have been in 2000). It wasn't very good (but no camera were then) but it was one of the cheapest. So it's not like they were absent from the digital market. But still somehow they missed the boat.
- lordnacho 10y agoI don't see it as so much of a failure of management. To grab a large slice of some niche, you need to be invested in exploiting it. In Kodak's case, that meant having all these huge facilities for film technology. There's no other way to be a big player in this niche. The upside is nobody will ever avoid thinking of your brand when they are shopping for film. The downside is you can't just change direction. If film becomes obsolete, the market in the replacement is not going to be big enough at the stage when you can see it. And its size is in itself what you will be using to judge whether it will happen, so it's quite hard to decide to dump all the old tech in favour of a tiny industry that might run into trouble. I'm sure there were many naysayers pointing out various flaws and potential roadblocks with digital. If you do change direction, you inevitable step on the toes of someone else in the value chain. You make your own camera, you annoy the camera manufacturers. You want to be a chemicals business? It's full here, too. Remember you're a huge operation, and there's only so many things to do. We should not mourn the death of large corporations though. Just like in nature, it frees up resources for new players doing new things.
- themtutty 10y agoExcept when the retirement and health benefits of 10% of the entire city is eliminated, so that the CEO can still get his $5M "performance bonus". That's not exactly efficient use of capital.
- DoubleGlazing 10y agoI worked for Kodak UK for a few months in 2002. I was a contractor working on their ERP systems, specifically reporting and BI tools. I wasn't privy to anything strategic but I could see some odd things. The oddest thing was that they were still trying hard to push the APS format, despite the fact that is was a pretty poor format when it first came out it was now looking even worse when compared to early mass market digital cameras. There was a certain arrogance amongst higher up managers. A sort of "We're Kodak, we're the best, we dictate the market!" There was a noticeable staff churn problem as a result. I was on a team of 20 of which 14 were contractors. I can see some interesting parallels between Kodak and Nokia. Two giants who dominated their sectors and just didn't anticipate changes in consumer demand and then couldn't/wouldn't adapt.
- syats 10y agoJust thought it make the thread more interesting if I mentioned the fact that Kodak used a non-standard calendar up until 1989. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Fixed_Calendar https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Fixed_Calendar
- tmaly 10y agoI was at RIT during the later half of the 90s. Most of my professors had done work at Kodak, and the mantra was that if you had a job there, you were set for life. I think the digital camera and the market crashed from the dotcom bust worked in tandem to take down Kodak. They had some really smart people working there, and they invented some really important tech that was used beyond cameras. Think image processing for satellites etc.
- bksteele 10y agoInteresting and sad too. I worked there from 1987 to 1996 mostly in the film business. However, the lab I worked in used digital imaging to analyze and measure silver halide grains used to make film emulsion! So we were well aware of progress being made in digital imaging. When I got to photocd, the management’s focus was on replicating the quality and detail of film in the digital space, and they did not notice/understand that the lower level of quality of digital would still be useful. Their marketing was driven too much by the voices of professional photography and the ad industry’s need for the quality capability of enlargement. My colleagues and I actually started work on a business plan to use lower resolution digital imaging for applications in real estate and other industries that could use snapshots of lower resolution. We had really just gotten started on this, when management found out via a personal dispute of one of my colleagues and hauled us in for discipline. We stated our case and said we thought Kodak should get involved, but that fell on deaf ears. Our group fell apart when Kodak did not renew one of our contracts, and he went to work for Sony writing their digital image storage software, which became one of the top tools at that time. The impression I got was that upper management was well aware of the digital advance but completely oblivious to the speed of its progress. They thought in terms of the huge length of time it took to develop new film products and their associated factories. In 1992, they actually thought that digital would not be a serious threat until about 2005. Oops!
- TheCondor 10y agoI hate these topics. After the fact it is always easy to make better choices and every big company has made more than a few mistakes, some of which really stand out in hindsight... Kodak was a darling of the entire business world, for like a century. They printed money, they provided great jobs to hundreds of thousands of people. They were disruptive and put photography into everyone's hands. I think companies have a fixed life and theirs came and went. Trust me, if they had a big pivot that was blown off, it was in to industrial chemicals or energy chemical manufacturing or something, it wasn't simply a matter of repositioning as an imaging company from a film company. Tell me, how should Pony Express have pivoted when the telegraph came on line? Kodak, the brand and most of it was in a similar position.
- devin 10y agoI know of a story where a company selling software that banked on digital, being told quite seriously by a member of the board that digital would never be a thing. This was around 97-98.
- drited 10y agoThey didn't entirely have their heads in the sand. --They invented the world's first digital camera Source: http://petapixel.com/2010/08/05/the-worlds-first-digital-camera-by-kodak-and-steve-sasson/ http://petapixel.com/2010/08/05/the-worlds-first-digital-cam... -- They developed a massive patent portfolio including many digital photography patents that had an estimated value of $1.8 to $4.5 billion at the time of their Chapter 11 filing (read the article if you're interested for why it got sold for far less - it's fascinating) Source: http://spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/innovation/the-lowballing-of-kodaks-patent-portfolio http://spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/innovation/the-lowballing-o...