zzzcpan

82 ms·

811.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
> I for one trust in the competence of the Go maintainers That's fine. But ultimately Go employees do not work for you and cannot put much effort into proving they are good at solving problems for you, since the company doesn't
812.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
Fragmentation cannot really be an issue for adoption, as it happens after adoption.
813.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
It's just means there is lack of trust to core designers. They haven't proven themselves to users, that they are capable of addressing their problems and align with their interests. Obviously core devs of Google backed language ca
814.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
> Canvas could conceivably be fixed to just behave the same everywhere, but for WebGL you have to limit it to some common denominator to hide the GPU model You can just measure performance of those things then.
815.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
But this is how big companies behave. They have this unwritten policy to justify any anti-competitive, anti-user behavior with "security" and "privacy" PR.
816.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
This will only shift efforts to extract uniquely identifiable information through side channels instead of directly. So you also need to disable javascript or redesign it to prevent side channel attacks (it's possible, but would be a c
817.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
You seem to misunderstand it. There are less points to intercept traffic at with 1.1.1.1, than without it. Much more feasible to spy on a massive scale, much less privacy and usefulness of client subnet EDNS option completely disappears. In
818.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
> There is no guarantee the name server they are querying is the same as the server in the A result That's ok. Let me try to explain a bit more: Queries to 1.1.1.1 are going over public internet. And even though they are encrypted,
819.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
So, what he claims is that state actors monitor traffic at certain locations, extract subnet information from DNS packets that only large centralized DNS resolvers include when query some authoritative servers that where probed to support t
820.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
It has nothing to do with privacy, as the next thing following DNS resolution is establishing a TCP connection which always leaks full IP address to the same person or organization controlling authoritative servers. Basically EDNS is just a
821.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
On my system authors of software can't push updates to me at all. Instead the software is packaged, there is at least some oversight over what is packaged and plenty of user control over packages.
822.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
> This seems equivalent to not running random applications but letting trusted vendors ship you automatic updates. That would be equivalent only if you were running applications from trusted vendors each in a sandboxed VM that can't
823.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
Vendor controlled auto-update is worse than SaaS. It's effectively a control over your machine. Your entire security depends on a random employee of a random organization you entrusted with this control to not get compromised, not comp
824.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
Well, CRDTs were born to simplify reasoning. You can't really claim that OT is simpler. And performance of both is implementation specific with similar theoretical bounds. But, of course, CRDTs are much more general and foundational.
825.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
No, it's the least broken event notification mechanism on all systems. And it doesn't have a 1024 FDs limit on most systems either, as long as it used directly via syscall or through an event loop library that does that. But in ge
826.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
The problem is to achieve acceptable quality of service for an online cloud OS service with all the responsive UIs and expected reliability, everything has to be done locally-first either way, using approaches like CRDTs. And even more so f
827.
by zzzcpan 7y ago
OT are inferior to CRDTs in every single way. In 2019 people shouldn't even be looking at OT.
828.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
You can surely win some laptop benchmarks by mmaping some files on certain close to the metal filesystems. But for general production case mmap shouldn't even be considered a solution to the syscall and memory copy overhead problem. If
829.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
The article is very long, I haven't even read most of it but already saw some good arguments. You are dismissing it for no reason.
830.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
Systemd doesn't matter much in the server space, since the server space is moving away from using host's init system for anything. Where it is actually problematic is linux desktop. I wasted so much time dealing with it on desktop
831.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
(1983)
832.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
They kind of acknowledge in the study that it is essentially a garbage study. Didn't prevent them from publishing it though. By the way, Russia pushed internet censorship to the population under this exact idea of saving children from
833.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
So, what's the point of the study if they choose to attack the show and ignore everything else? If anything, a third factor like mass media talking about suicide among teenagers at the time of the release probably had much bigger effec
834.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
Weirdly enough this perspective might suggest that the problem is not actually with Go, but with object oriented programming. Which wasn't considered thoroughly by original authors, because they were not OO programmers.
835.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
> You can't write go without using interfaces for I/O. You can and people do that all the time. You don't have to use its standard library I/O APIs, even its syscall package. I'm not disagreeing that Go is OO tho
836.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
You don't actually need to do asynchronous background compaction at all. You can do compaction whenever in small incremental steps not causing any spikes in read or write latencies. Just spreading it across all writes gets you slightly
837.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
Also hypocritical. Mozilla should take responsibility for its part in centralization of the online world, being one of those players with control and pushing even more of centralization into its browser.
838.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
The problem is much bigger than that. Today pretty much all mainstream languages rely on untrusted modules ecosystems, untrusted github projects, etc. If we were to create language level boundaries to address those problems, we would need t
839.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
Wayland is developed by people who don't take security seriously at all. So security arguments are irrelevant here and do not favor wayland in any way. I'd say wayland is just a new thing that breaks everything in an attempt to br
840.
by zzzcpan 8y ago
Note, they talk about retrofitting mitigations into the web browser running javascript, not in general. It's hard to find a reason why software mitigations wouldn't work for a language and a compiler designed from scratch for it.

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