woodman

51 ms·

421.
by woodman 11y ago
If they aren't watching the line then they aren't doing it right, inducing a predictable behavior in an adversary is half the point. Remember all the hubbub several years ago around TSA behavioral profiling? I don't think I
422.
by woodman 11y ago
Before we even go into line item mode we really need to ask ourselves if this is a $336k problem in the first place. They could have just asked the military how they handle this sort of problem, and the solution they would have been given
423.
by woodman 11y ago
You are describing an agent of the state, which is a different concept than what the traditional use of civilian addresses.
424.
by woodman 11y ago
> Why is that? It is a practical problem. The military has an extremely long institutional memory and has perfected the process of mental conditioning over hundreds of years, to the point where 18 year olds can be given the power to kil
425.
by woodman 11y ago
I forgot about that because I usually go the opposite direction, removing as much as possible in the interest of power savings. For example, disconnecting the 56k modem daughter board will save you 1W. Upon further reflection, it is obviou
426.
by woodman 11y ago
... now we just need to figure out how to lure the surveillance target into our EM-shielded cage.
427.
by woodman 11y ago
Dictionaries adapt to popular usage, so unless your argument is that popular usage is correct usage - dictionaries aren't good support either. Check the word origin, it originally distinguished those who are subject to civil law and t
428.
by woodman 11y ago
For laptops I stick to Lenovo T-series and Panasonic Toughbooks, I've found both to be very amenable to end user hardware modification. I don't run Windows, so unless the manufacturer does something crazy with IME or UEFI - I&#x2
429.
by woodman 11y ago
We generally are in agreement, just for different reasons. Whatever cache that halo might have bought them is long gone, thanks to the media's collective realization that stories of police misconduct are of public interest - with no i
430.
by woodman 11y ago
The only difference between what I said and what you said is that you've added that MP training emphasizes deescalation. Both MPs and civilian police observe the same force continuum, but it seems to me that MPs are simply more discip
431.
by woodman 11y ago
> Police are civilians ... it's a very important distinction. The misuse of the word is a symptom of the real problem, it is deeply ingrained in police culture that they are fundamentally different. I think it was one of Dave Gross
432.
by woodman 11y ago
She isn't suing the man. Did you not see the second paragraph?
433.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...you can believe whatever the hell you want, as long as you don't impose it on others. I completely agree, but how far are you will to extend that logic? Because in this specific case the passenger that was asked to move is try
434.
by woodman 11y ago
A big part of the whole security clearance process is determining the competency of the individual in recognizing incorrectly classified material. Saying that the designated markings were missing is no longer an excuse once you get the cle
435.
by woodman 11y ago
> It would only have come to that if Apple continued to decline the FBI's request. > That's not blaming anyone. I guess I misunderstood you because you left out the other potential scenarios, like instead of "Apple cont
436.
by woodman 11y ago
> If I have a warrent... > If a judge thinks there's probable cause... > They have the ability to compel Apple to hand over data. Warrants aren't golden tickets, if a warrant exceeds the court's authority then it isn
437.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...but data should be accessible. This is the most important part of the whole thing. Where do you draw the line, is everybody legally obligated to comply with such demands? Well obviously those directly involved with whatever crime
438.
by woodman 11y ago
> As devices become more secure, Apple will no longer be able to unlock them. That is only true if revoking trust is the only thing left to do to increase iphone security against every potential bad actor. That isn't the case, an
439.
by woodman 11y ago
Again, victim blaming. How is that any different from the false choice "We can do this the hard way, or the easy way"? Have you considered what will happen to the number of such requests as devices continue to become more secure?
440.
by woodman 11y ago
> It only sets a precedent... Yeah, it "only" sets a precedent that the government can compel a company to reverse all the work put into securing a product, no possible market driven unintended consequences there. > If Apple
441.
by woodman 11y ago
So have you not heard that this would set a legal precedent? Apple would get pestered until they finally create an automatic gateway for turn key security breaking, not unlike the wiretap portals setup by telecoms - or the frequently abuse
442.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...you don't burn a zero-day on a dragnet; That depends entirely upon the nature of the vulnerability. Every TLS vulnerability publicly disclosed and then patched comes to mind. The NSA can use that all day long without anybody
443.
by woodman 11y ago
The female rate is closer to 0.5%, the male rate varies wildly based on race [0]: Fiji Islanders: 0.8% vs Arab: 10% So poor design is racist :) [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_blindness#Frequency_of_r...
444.
by woodman 11y ago
You eat an elephant one bite at a time. I've found that the majority the of intimidating complexity in projects I've tackled is directly related to handling legacy hardware and edge cases for things that don't matter anymore
445.
by woodman 11y ago
That isn't an attack on the encryption, which is a very important distinction to make. But I'm curious what exactly you have in mind - we are repeatedly performing the same xor instruction, so power analysis won't work, and
446.
by woodman 11y ago
Do you remember the long distance charges as well? We all owe MCI and their microwave towers - without that pressure Ma Bell would still being excusing their insane pricing with "Its this or pneumatic tubes."
447.
by woodman 11y ago
That really only makes sense if you've got a 40 year old code base that supports every platform conceived, some of which have mouse origins that are -42.333f or can only be determined at run time. Take a look at the source for tcsh, th
448.
by woodman 11y ago
One time pad using a TRNG - impossible to break, even in the case of chosen plaintext attacks. Now you could argue that having a key as long as the plaintext is impractical, but if that is your concern then let me direct your attention bac
449.
by woodman 11y ago
> It's not trivial to defeat strong encryption, but it is doable given sufficient interest. That is as wrong as saying that, given enough effort, you can make 1 + 1 = 3. Cryptography deals with unimaginably large numbers, to the po
450.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...much better than a world in which government decisions are truly final. Beware that level of power IMO. That is certainly a valid point in the case of laws that expand a state's authority, but I don't think that is true wh

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