woodman

51 ms·

451.
by woodman 11y ago
Did you not understand what I just said? Because "in this instance" doesn't address my point.
452.
by woodman 11y ago
For this specific device? Sure, but that wasn't the question that I was answering.
453.
by woodman 11y ago
Any sensor activity that is sensitive to inconsistent latency, like a GPS time source. I don't think you'll find any trusted stratum 1 ntp servers using USB for clock sources.
454.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...but anyway it is reassuring to see more writing that fails to see all sides of every debate equally valid regardless of consensus opinion among experts in the relevant fields. What are you trying to say here? Arguing for compromise
455.
by woodman 11y ago
Did you not read the article? Some guy was questioned by police for a brutal crime that is only connected to him by the fact that his father's DNA, submitted to a third party and legally fished by police, didn't match DNA recover
456.
by woodman 11y ago
This is another perfect example of how the whole "If you've got nothing to hide..." thing is totally insane. This guy had nothing to hide, seven years later the police show up.
457.
by woodman 11y ago
I still have my Handspring visor edge. I vaguely remember writing some software for it, but I clearly remember it running for more than two weeks on a single charge. Desktop sync probably would have been a higher priority if it had needed
458.
by woodman 11y ago
> That's a whole other conversation. It is, we were talking about whether or not believing that the government goes beyond public data collection in the pursuit of large scale monitoring is paranoid. You originally said that it was
459.
by woodman 11y ago
I see that I accidentally sent you down the path of addressing the problem of 'should' vs 'can and does' with my last question: "...open to government data collection?" I'd like to point out that the orig
460.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...electrical signals that you publicly broadcast from your house... If you want to maintain your position on the matter, you're going to have to broaden that even further. You know about residential power monitoring [0] right? S
461.
by woodman 11y ago
What you have in that case is a 128-bit prefix with, last I heard, less than 60 bits of security - due to md5 being so broken. Now the attacker can start the first round of sha1 with a massively reduced number of potential permutations. T
462.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...concatenate hashes... Bad idea, using 10 128-bit hash functions instead of a single 1280-bit hash function. Instead of a single post hash view of the hidden data - you've given an attacker 10 different perspectives. Instead o
463.
by woodman 11y ago
> sha1(md5(things)) Consider what would happen if the "md5" function was found to always return the number 3 for "things" greater than 999 - the "sha1" function would be no help. The entire chain is only as
464.
by woodman 11y ago
All those examples are extremely high level abstractions, but cryptography is not - it is a direct application of math to a single purpose. > ...multiple approaches and techniques and tools are always a good thing. Only at a very high le
465.
by woodman 11y ago
17 years ago I used F-prot to disinfect my school's computer lab after it was completely overrun by the Melissa worm. The antivirus industry has certainly earned its terrible reputation, but F-prot was actually pretty good software. I
466.
by woodman 11y ago
> Their legal reasoning heavily relies on Apple being the only party capable of assisting with unlocking the phone. That has been known to be false since day one, as methods of bypassing the reset have long been known that don't req
467.
by woodman 11y ago
For their image resizing tasks, I wonder if they've tried anything more complex than simply cropping around points of interest, something like seam carving [0]. I imagine that it would be pretty cheap to run a bunch of different algor
468.
by woodman 11y ago
> The point I was making is that a preference for reading email on a phone... I agree with that point - that personal preference over standard operating procedures is the likely motivator, but your pointing to the origin of the phone as
469.
by woodman 11y ago
I'm really torn on the issue of how tightly coupled the userland configuration is to the release cycle. I'm not sure that I'd be running FreeBSD today if it hadn't been that way, because having a well tested and widely
470.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...aversion to checking her personal email on a desktop... Your point depends on Clinton having an understand of the way an NSA-berry works, how the traffic is routed, and what the auditing policies are; then, using that the same leve
471.
by woodman 11y ago
Forget the shredder: the encrypted brute force resistant file system is just non-archival quality paper - flammable, sensitive to light, oxygen and humidity. The FBI isn't happy with the paper manufacturer, because if a criminal write
472.
by woodman 11y ago
The only potential practical use that I can think of, outside of procedurally generated decompression engines, is this: You find yourself on an uncharted desert island with two sailors, a movie star, some other lady, a millionaire and his w
473.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...and I feel that needs to be billable. They get paid. Telecoms do as well, they actually have billing schedules for wiretaps. > ...managers had to explain to the bean counters... You've got it backwards, the lawyers explain
474.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...difference between philosophical positions and... Philosophy is a pretty huge domain, where one end of the spectrum is navel gazing Platonic forms and the other is the propositional logic that informs compiler design. It sounds lik
475.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...how else would you or anyone define it? A geographic location where there exists a monopoly on violence. For example: the USG gets to decide who is allowed to kill who and under what circumstances, exclusively, for a specific locat
476.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...the beginning of the chain that allows enforcing laws. Years ago I wrote software for supply chain loss prevention, every so often there would be a crisis (like a hijacking) that put the department into investigation mode - where th
477.
by woodman 11y ago
You are doubling down on a logical fallacy. By your logic a state that has no law enforcement investigations is not a state, regardless of military strength and the sovereignty that enables. Now you may say that you would not want to live
478.
by woodman 11y ago
A monopoly on violence is the fundamental power of the state, which isn't being challenged here. What is being challenged is the state's methods of evidence collection, which determines an attribute of the state - not its existen
479.
by woodman 11y ago
You are aware that administrative subpoenas don't need approval right? For example: the FBI takes an interest in me and sends a subpoena to my ISP requesting all opened email older than 180 days. No judge involved. Now one could arg
480.
by woodman 11y ago
> ...hopefully the judicial branch will recognize... Not a lot of hope on that front, as they've already demonstrated a willingness to abandon their duties: administrative subpoenas, tens of thousands, issued by federal law enforcem

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