3 ms·
> As devices become more secure, Apple will no longer be able to unlock them. That is only true if revoking trust is the only thing left to do to increase ipho
by woodman 11y ago
> As devices become more secure, Apple will no longer be able to unlock them.
That is only true if revoking trust is the only thing left to do to increase iphone security against every potential bad actor. That isn't the case, and that leaves plenty of time to pester Apple with unlocking phones collected in every investigation from now until then.
> If you put a backdoor into your phones, you should expect to have to use it.
What law is that, the All Writs act? That is what was being tested, because not everybody shares your certainty about it. The moral problem of the forced labor of an unrelated party is enough to make me disagree. Also, that logic could easily be used to justify the forced inclusion of a backdoor in an otherwise secure device. You can't have it both ways, a secure device and a device manufactured by a company that can be legally compelled to do whatever the state deems "necessary or appropriate".
- ikeboy 11y agoI don't think labor should be forced, but data should be accessible. Apple had the keys to use the backdoor, and they should have been forced to choose between using them to sign software, or handing them over and letting the FBI sign it themselves. Apple would prefer to sign it themselves, so they can effectively be forced to do so. I disagree that they can force the inclusion of a backdoor using the same logic. The reason I think they can compel action is that the real thing they want from Apple is information, I.e. the key. Apple can get out of revealing the key by using it themselves.
- woodman 11y ago> ...but data should be accessible. This is the most important part of the whole thing. Where do you draw the line, is everybody legally obligated to comply with such demands? Well obviously those directly involved with whatever crime is being investigated are exposed to such compulsion, but so are third party service providers. But in the case of these third parties, there are a lot of laws dictating their part in great detail. For its part as a service provider, Apple supplied the user data it had. What the FBI has done is declare loud and clear that they'd like to expand those subject to compulsion to include anyone it designates, for any purpose that isn't explicitly illegal, thanks to All Writs. Now in this case they say, for the victims, they're being exhaustive in pursuing what is most likely a dry hole. But what is to stop them from wielding such authority over every manufacturer of everything that the subject of the investigation touched? How about compelling every luckless individual who lives along the subject's morning commute to turn over all video and image files because it might help them in their investigation. For as crazy as that sounds, consider the fact that there is no logical distinction between any of those scenarios. > I don't think labor should be forced ... they should have been forced to choose... You can't believe both of those, because compulsion eliminates choice. That would be like saying "I'm not forcing you to run, it is your choice, but if you don't then I'll kill you". > ...they want from Apple is information, I.e. the key. No, they want on demand access - they don't care about any key. Even if Apple were to get rid of the key, there is historical precedent for the state pulling some insane precrimes logic in order to expand authority - see the commerce clause. I'll explain that reference briefly: the federal government has explicitly defined authority over commerce that occurs between states, but it was reasoned that commerce within a state could potentially result in the absence of interstate commerce, therefor the federal government has authority over all commerce... Now imagine that reasoning being applied to a manufacturer who doesn't have the capability to, but could if it wanted, respond to a court order. Oh, and lets not forget the clipper chip, a nice indicator of the state's position on forcing manufacturers to backdoor consumer products in the interested of potential investigations.
- ikeboy 11y ago>Where do you draw the line, is everybody legally obligated to comply with such demands? If I have a warrent, I can force you to hand over all information allowed by the warrent. That's how warrents work. They're able to get any data a judge agrees with. I don't think they're able to compel labor. >How about compelling every luckless individual who lives along the subject's morning commute to turn over all video and image files because it might help them in their investigation. If a judge thinks there's probable cause, they can require this, so far as I know. >You can't believe both of those, because compulsion eliminates choice. They have the ability to compel Apple to hand over data. They don't have the ability to compel Apple to perform labor unrelated to producing data. >No, they want on demand access - they don't care about any key. The FBI explicitly asked for the key at one point in the case. Could you explain how your commerce example is in any way precedent?
- woodman 11y ago> If I have a warrent... > If a judge thinks there's probable cause... > They have the ability to compel Apple to hand over data. Warrants aren't golden tickets, if a warrant exceeds the court's authority then it isn't worth anything. That is exactly what was going to be resolved here, a court ordered Apple to do something that Apple thought exceeded the state's authority - thanks to the FBI the question remain unresolved (which the DOJ prefers to a precedent going against them). > I don't think they're able to compel labor. Subpoena to appear immediately comes to mind, NSLs might reach that level as well - they certainly exceed "hand over data". But the point isn't really about court orders during discovery, it is the final interpretation of an existing law that will determine the nature of forced labor. There are plenty of laws that compel labor. > The FBI explicitly asked for the key at one point in the case. No, they presented it as an alternative after they met resistance (aka threatened). > Could you explain how your commerce example is in any way precedent? "historical precedent" (an example, a demonstration of disposition), not a legal precedent. I'm disappointed that you focused on that and overlooked the point - the use of "precrimes", "potential" and "clipper chip" is the hint.