wizeman

29 ms·

211.
by wizeman 4y ago
Or you could just have strong (and enforced) laws that greatly limit how much power politicians have and then you wouldn't have to keep all these additional layers of corrupt politicians, institutions and government bureaucrats fightin
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Coming from a Windows background I much prefer this system. I come from a Linux background and I much prefer that system too. Well, at least in theory, because in practice I don't usually run into these kinds of problems nowadays
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by wizeman 4y ago
> We, somewhat eccentrically, put it in last millennium by default. Hah, that is still going to make some TLS software and their certificate tests very unhappy! Does it show that I've ran into a similar issue before? ;) But of cours
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by wizeman 4y ago
Wow, that's so cool! That's actually much better than what I was thinking and if I understand you correctly, that should allow you to exploit practically all possible parallelism opportunities (given the constraints). I'm gue
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by wizeman 4y ago
Sorry, just an additional question as this project is so interesting: Does Hermit support running different processes in parallel in certain situations? It seems like this should be possible to do as long as they are appropriately isolated
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by wizeman 4y ago
> we need to implement a caching scheme to at least amortize the overhead of this sort for pathological cases. Still, we will need to trigger the sort even on a single read as you say. So there's a pathological case there -- listing
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by wizeman 4y ago
That makes a lot of sense, thanks for all the answers! It's definitely a very interesting project and I think that once more programs can work without changes, it is something that could perhaps be used for building packages by distros
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by wizeman 4y ago
> You may find mmap and mlock may be helpful. I know about mmap and mlock. Can you be more specific as to how they are useful in the scenario I mentioned above? Specifically, when memory overcommit is disabled, I can use mmap() to alloca
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by wizeman 4y ago
> AMA! I have a few questions. Hermit's README says: > Instead, in order to provide complete determinism, the user should provide a fixed file system base image (e.g., with Docker) How are you sanitizing the result of stat(), for
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by wizeman 4y ago
Sure, I know, but if you're talking about really modern filesystems (which do copy-on-write/CoW), then the fragmentation caused by CoW is even worse than that avoided by delayed allocation. SSDs certainly alleviate this problem,
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Windows does allow you to reserve address space without committing it, but it then requires you to commit the chunks before you use them (see VirtualAlloc + MEM_RESERVE) Personally, I think this is the right approach. Because you shoul
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Fortunately, this is tunable. You can also turn off overcommit entirely. I know, but as soon as I tried doing that, my systems started to experience unavoidable failures (although I don't remember exactly why, but I certainly don&
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by wizeman 4y ago
I think I agree with you, but would like to add that from reading the blog post, it sounds like Windows is actually doing this better than both Linux and Solaris (but my knowledge is a bit limited in this area). I don't quite like the
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Overcommit exists mostly because of fork(). Then why does Solaris support fork() yet it doesn't do overcommit nor have an OOM killer? And also has a long history of being a very robust OS. For more details, see my comment here: h
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by wizeman 4y ago
> One could just as easily argue similarly with respect to Unix and needing to loop over write watching for EINTR et al. I'm sorry, but I fail to see how that is related. EINTR is useful so that you can handle a signal in case it is
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by wizeman 4y ago
> See https://unix.stackexchange.com/a/521737 for example. I'm not convinced that the fork()/exec() issue is the correct justification, at least not entirely. As an example, Solaris supports fork()/ex
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by wizeman 4y ago
> You’d have to reserve much more swap than is typically ever actually used by processes, at any given time. But if the swap wouldn't actually be typically used, then what's the problem with that? Especially considering that th
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Why would you not want to be up-front about the fact that you don't have enough memory available to hand over to a process? Just because a process allocates a certain amount of address space doesn't mean it will use all of it
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Security of trust services basically always boil down to how "annoying" they are to compromise. No, real security is achieved by mathematical / cryptographic impossibility. "Annoyance" is hardly a deterrent, ex
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by wizeman 4y ago
> That'd be annoying to achieve, unless the authoritative name server is compromised... oops. We weren't discussing how annoying it is to achieve, just whether WebPKI protects against insecure DNS or not. And it doesn't (i
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by wizeman 4y ago
> You have confused discretionary revocation with misissuance. Ok, then please enlighten me. What is misissuance in DANE? Because if misissuance in DANE is your TLD hijacking your domain... how does insecure DNS + WebPKI prevent that kin
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by wizeman 4y ago
OK, I hadn't read that post before. Some of the arguments you had already made but some I hadn't read before. But I mean, it doesn't bode well when even the first paragraph is incorrect: > All secure crypto on the Internet
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by wizeman 4y ago
> We can only asymptotically approach that world (and at present we are nowhere close). Well, we're nowhere close because neither browsers nor operating systems are currently doing DNSSEC validation by default. This could change (fi
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Respectfully, it sounds like you haven't paid much attention to the last 10 years of browser DNSSEC integration. You are correct. That could mean I'm wrong, but it doesn't necessarily mean so. I would be happy to know wh
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by wizeman 4y ago
> You can read AGL's post about why DANE just adds an nth new CA to the trust store Who's AGL and where is that post? I don't see why it would be like adding a new CA. If the client can do DNSSEC validation then he could j
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by wizeman 4y ago
Oh I see what you mean. So the parent poster is saying that if some router gets compromised, then it can perform a MITM against its clients, faking the CAA record of some website which would trick the clients into believing the correct CA f
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Are you saying registrars are equivalent to CAs now and they can revoke domains just like they could reclaim them before? I'm sorry, I don't understand the question. Could you rephrase it or expand on it? Specifically, I don&
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by wizeman 4y ago
> Because DNSSEC is just a second PKI that can't fix the problems with WebPKI without fixing those same problems with itself. Oh, yes it can. In DANE, say for example, if you have a .COM website, there is no chance that some obscur
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by wizeman 4y ago
That's also true today, without CAA records. Anyone who can MITM a site can also get a valid certificate for it.
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by wizeman 4y ago
> It's worth keeping in mind that you can revoke an entire CA > ... but you can't do that with the DNS hierarchy. DANE effectively revokes ALL CAs. Forever. Once again, you are confused about what is the role of TLDs in DANE

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