3 ms·

> Security of trust services basically always boil down to how "annoying" they are to compromise. No, real security is achieved by mathematical / cryptographic

> Security of trust services basically always boil down to how "annoying" they are to compromise. No, real security is achieved by mathematical / cryptographic impossibility. "Annoyance" is hardly a deterrent, except for the least determined attackers. > Because there's actual oversight of the compliance and oversight of WebPKI CAs, unlike DNSSEC. That doesn't matter at all, because if you compromise the domain's nameserver (like you would have to do in DANE to attack it), then CAs will just happily sign a rogue certificate, which can be used to do a MITM. > No standard, no proof. What a good argument. Your argument is basically like saying in 2002: "electric vehicles aren't viable because no infrastructure for them exists right now". > Says you? Well, if I'm wrong why don't you tell me why I'm wrong? How is that an argument? > You haven't provided arguments why that would be the case. I have, please read my comments. I will say it again briefly so you can understand it: governments currently can attack any domain in the world, regardless of TLD. In DNSSEC+DANE they could only attack their own TLDs. Insecure DNS and WebPKI is therefore a government's dream come true, not DNSSEC+DANE. > Please explain how so. I shouldn't be trying to prove the negative of your initial claim that is without support. In DNSSEC+DANE governments can't compromise CAs, because they wouldn't exist. That's why DNSSEC+DANE prevents the governments of Russia and China from doing MITM attacks against TLS-based services in .COM domains. Do you understand now? > > I only claimed that DNSSEC+DANE is simpler and much more secure than insecure DNS+WebPKI. > And that's the FUD part. Well, if you think it's FUD, are you going to actually provide valid technical arguments about why it's FUD like what I did with tptacek's post, or are you just going to nitpick my arguments, completely miss the points I was making and then accuse me of FUD?

Avamander 4y ago
> No, real security is achieved by mathematical / cryptographic impossibility. You can't do trust that way. It's an entirely human concept for which we use cryptography for it to scale better. > That doesn't matter at all Says you? Again. You're ignoring half of the rationale behind CT (which I will *not* be rephrasing here, it's freely available to read). > What a good argument. It is. Unless you can actually show a working DNSSEC transparency standard, it doesn't exist. Some hypothetical future feature to remedy flaws is *really* not a strong argument towards DNSSEC. > Well, if I'm wrong why don't you tell me why I'm wrong? How is that an argument? There's no argument, just your opinion. It's starting to become funny how vague this discussion is becoming with you avoiding providing anything of substance that could be properly refuted. > In DNSSEC+DANE they could only attack their own TLDs. Huh? They'd attack any of the myriad of registries, just like they could attack CA's. It's just that CA's are held to a much higher standard and supervision. You can't just ignore that part. > In DNSSEC+DANE governments can't compromise CAs, because they wouldn't exist. This is just nominative pedantry, they're functionally still trust authorities that can be compromised. Call them CAs or Key-As, it doesn't matter. > Well, if you think it's FUD, are you going to actually provide valid technical arguments about why it's FUD It's very asymmetric effort for me to counter non-technical opinions and hypotheticals with technical ones. Not very fair towards my time and I'm not going to. > completely miss the points I was making and then accuse me of FUD? You're the one calling it "insecure WebPKI" while dismissing everything wrong with DNSSEC, so it's not even an accusation, it's an astute observation.

Avamander 4y ago

> No, real security is achieved by mathematical / cryptographic impossibility. You can't do trust that way. It's an entirely human concept for which we use cryptography for it to scale better. > That doesn't matter at all Says you? Again. You're ignoring half of the rationale behind CT (which I will *not* be rephrasing here, it's freely available to read). > What a good argument. It is. Unless you can actually show a working DNSSEC transparency standard, it doesn't exist. Some hypothetical future feature to remedy flaws is *really* not a strong argument towards DNSSEC. > Well, if I'm wrong why don't you tell me why I'm wrong? How is that an argument? There's no argument, just your opinion. It's starting to become funny how vague this discussion is becoming with you avoiding providing anything of substance that could be properly refuted. > In DNSSEC+DANE they could only attack their own TLDs. Huh? They'd attack any of the myriad of registries, just like they could attack CA's. It's just that CA's are held to a much higher standard and supervision. You can't just ignore that part. > In DNSSEC+DANE governments can't compromise CAs, because they wouldn't exist. This is just nominative pedantry, they're functionally still trust authorities that can be compromised. Call them CAs or Key-As, it doesn't matter. > Well, if you think it's FUD, are you going to actually provide valid technical arguments about why it's FUD It's very asymmetric effort for me to counter non-technical opinions and hypotheticals with technical ones. Not very fair towards my time and I'm not going to. > completely miss the points I was making and then accuse me of FUD? You're the one calling it "insecure WebPKI" while dismissing everything wrong with DNSSEC, so it's not even an accusation, it's an astute observation.