> Are you saying registrars are equivalent to CAs now and they can revoke domains just like they could reclaim them before? I'm sorry, I don't understand the q

> Are you saying registrars are equivalent to CAs now and they can revoke domains just like they could reclaim them before? I'm sorry, I don't understand the question. Could you rephrase it or expand on it? Specifically, I don't understand what "before" is in regards to -- before what? > Right now, I trust TLDs to tell me the NS of the domain so I can query its IP against that NS, I don't trust them to validate that the true owner of the site currently controls the domain. But you trust registrars for that, right? And registrars basically send that information to the TLD and coordinate with the TLD so that they point the NS record to whatever the owner of the domain wants. Either way, yes, both your registrar and your TLD have the same technical ability to attack and perform a man-in-the-middle against your entire domain, either in the current WebPKI system or a DANE-based PKI system. So that is not a problem with DANE any more than it's a problem with the WebPKI system. Of course, what is possible to do technically and what is legal can be entirely different matters. But it is technically possible, and usually illegal in most circumstances (except under judicial order or as a result of law enforcement I suppose), to do these kinds of attacks with both DANE and WebPKI. > So under DANE, who else if not TLDs does one ultimately trust to attest to that claim? Honestly asking, I don't know enough about DANE. Which claim, who is the owner of the site? It would be the same as it is now. As far as I understand, registrars do that and then coordinate with whoever manages the TLD. In fact, that's what I've been saying, the criticism against DANE is equally valid with WebPKI, because the domain system would be the same. Except WebPKI is more fragile and has a lot more weak links in its chain. tptacek says you can't revoke keys in a DANE system. Yes, you can, you can revoke them yourself! You don't need to wait for browser vendors to revoke an entire CA, potentially affecting thousands or millions of other websites. And they may actually decide not to revoke the CA, even if they issued rogue certificates, for several reasons. What browsers can't do in DANE is revoke the TLD's keys (but the TLDs can do it themselves if they were attacked). But of course, it makes no sense to revoke the TLD's keys if they are the attacker. Because if a TLD hijacks your domain (and they already do that today, whenever law enforcement and judges require them to do it), then neither DANE nor WebPKI can do squat about it.