teacup50

23 ms·

181.
by teacup50 11y ago
So you're saying that this mob is unhappy with him speaking, but has no issue with his being employed? Like this? https://twitter.com/justkelly_ok/status/713222987537756163 "In case you think it's j
182.
by teacup50 11y ago
The obvious implication is that the conference was expected to enforce a blacklist. If failing to preemptively blacklist ideologically unacceptable attendees carries with it this degree of negative response, then a preemptive Hollywood-styl
183.
by teacup50 11y ago
Everyone advocating for suppressing others always believes they hold the ethical high ground. Sometimes they do. The problem is when they don't, those tools of suppression work just as well. USSR: "[We call for] painless but full
184.
by teacup50 11y ago
That quote is out-of-context. In context, he's apparently attempting to explain Thomas Carlyle's views. I forced myself to read that entire article, and by the end of it, I still had no idea whether Moldbug held the views he ascri
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by teacup50 11y ago
Curtis Yarvin seems to have some really stupid ideas, but the only reason we're wasting time discussing them is because people like yourself felt it appropriate to introduce them in an unrelated context while asking everyone to pass ju
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by teacup50 11y ago
> Can someone describe how other models of phones can become bricks? iPhone's have a fully DRM'd trust chain, starting with the bootloader, which is itself on-die and immutable. Installing a new OS image requires online activ
187.
by teacup50 11y ago
What you're proposing isn't a good thing. It's an ugly, environmentally unfriendly, anti-consumer model. How many people are debt-financing their $800+ iPhone? How much value is that extracting from people, and what are the o
188.
by teacup50 11y ago
It's really not a pain; just update the SCM working copy. If your project has tendrils into the local system, that's the real problem to fix, because it's going to introduce pointless inefficiency at every level: new develope
189.
by teacup50 11y ago
Iterate quickly? Hardware is not software. The environmental cost alone of building a new car is outrageous. In addition to which, the SV2.0 "iterate quickly" ideal turns consumers into guinea pigs for half-baked and half-broken p
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by teacup50 11y ago
Why not both? I have a few laptops, and a high-end desktop; I get the best possible performance when I'm working at a desk, and acceptable performance when I'm traveling.
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by teacup50 11y ago
Juniper sells hardware with support demands far beyond that of Arduino, and yet somehow maintains a productive downstream relationship with FreeBSD. It's telling that Arduino is flailing now that they've extracted as much value as
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by teacup50 11y ago
I'd much rather not have a laptop (for work). Study after study have shown that screen real estate and system performance improve our work output, let us use more of our working memory for task-critical state, etc. If you need portab
193.
by teacup50 11y ago
No, I'm pretty sure it's Apple's DRM that got us into this mess.
194.
by teacup50 11y ago
Thing is, almost none of that requires software, wifi, an app, an internet connection, etc. It's an insane amount of implementation complexity for what is a very simple problem.
195.
by teacup50 11y ago
In other words, introduce a much, much longer iteration delay that makes the entire effort pointless, while risking destroying the device and all data on it by desoldering the (presumably BGA) NAND?
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by teacup50 11y ago
How do you brute force the PIN if the KDF process operates over the PIN, plus a 256-bit UID that's only accessible to signed code running on the SoC? If you modify the kernel on the NAND, signature checks in the on-die bootloader will
197.
by teacup50 11y ago
The author is absolutely, totally wrong. The PIN number is entangled with the device's 256-bit "UID", which itself is on-die in the SoC/CPU and NOT extractable without either being able to run code on the CPU, or decap
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by teacup50 11y ago
An abort()/__builtin_trap/etc shouldn't generally be manipulable.
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by teacup50 11y ago
Trust isn't binary, and verification does not require individual verification, but community or ecosystem verification. If 3rd parties can audit software (including analysis of binary-only software), and can observe the software&
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by teacup50 11y ago
The backdoor exists on new hardware, too; the firmware of the secure enclave can be updated in place by Apple without expunging key material. Even if you close this one backdoor, others exist; the fact is you can only pick two of: - Platfor
201.
by teacup50 11y ago
You misunderstand; if you can't even decrypt the binary, you can't disassemble, much less run a decompiler over it. As someone who has done quite a bit of reverse engineering work, I have no idea how I'd identify and isolat
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by teacup50 11y ago
Apple, a 3rd-party, holds the master keys, and you don't. So no, that's not DRM for your own data.
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by teacup50 11y ago
We still don't know what the deal was. Arguing the nature of what we know about NSLs is a bit pointless when things like 641A are happening. Our interpretation of already unconstitutional NSLs guarantees nothing.
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by teacup50 11y ago
How does a 3rd-party researcher find the next heartbleed if they can't even decrypt the binaries for analysis?
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by teacup50 11y ago
Which, ironically, is exactly what Apple is protecting here. DRM.
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by teacup50 11y ago
That's not really true; as evidence, I give you Room 641A: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A "Room 641A is a telecommunication interception facility operated by AT&T for the U.S. National Security A
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by teacup50 11y ago
Congress can do it. It's happened before: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_... This is something Apple practically guaranteed by using platform DRM to turn themselves into a critical sin
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by teacup50 11y ago
They're not anywhere near 99% of the way there; they've destroyed the heterogeneous decentralized ecosystem that broad security requires. Locking themselves out of the Secure Enclave isn't anywhere near sufficient. As long as
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by teacup50 11y ago
That's a lot easier than tearing apart every piece of software in a car to look for security vulnerabilities, intentional backdoors, and private information leaks.
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by teacup50 11y ago
Ironically, the biggest threat to an unregulated computer future is the massive centralization of device control via platform DRM, in the hands of just a few companies like Apple. CALEA was extended to ISPs once the industry coalesced into

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