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The backdoor exists on new hardware, too; the firmware of the secure enclave can be updated in place by Apple without expunging key material. Even if you close
by teacup50 11y ago
The backdoor exists on new hardware, too; the firmware of the secure enclave can be updated in place by Apple without expunging key material.
Even if you close this one backdoor, others exist; the fact is you can only pick two of:
- Platform DRM.
- Implicit Trust of Vendor-Signed Software & Entitlements.
- Robust Security Ecosystem.
As long as Apple can push applications with arbitrary entitlements to devices, or encrypted OS updates unreadable by 3rd-parties, and no mechanisms exists to verify that it's only ever used responsibility, there are serious, dangerous backdoors.
On the other hand, law enforcement's "backdoor" requires judicial review in the light of day.
I'd take the DoJ's precedent in this case over Apple's any day of the week.
If the DoJ/FBI then tries to shove pre-emptive crypto backdoors from congress, that's a different battle, and one I'm happy to fight. However, siding with Apple now muddies the real issues at stake and may undermine our negotiating position when it comes to the general crypto debate.
- rand1012 11y agoThe real issue is that I have a fucking right to have my device be secure against the government. It's funny how you can only make sense of your argument when you get down in the weeds and lose sight of the big picture.
- sangnoir 11y agoI'm not OP, but the gist of his argument is you cannot be secure against the government if you cannot be secure against Apple first. If Apple continues to force people to trust it, the government will subvert this trust via legal means. I find the argument quite congent. It's not getting lost in the weeeds, but generalizing the problem; instead of just fixing this bug, why not go ahead and fix the whole class of possible bugs?
- dclowd9901 11y ago> The backdoor exists on new hardware, too; the firmware of the secure enclave can be updated in place by Apple without expunging key material. Can you point me to any material documentation of this fact? Because I've been following this whole thing very closely and there's not been one word of this being fact as far as I've seen.
- frankacter 11y ago"I have no clue where they got the idea that changing SPE firmware will destroy keys. SPE FW is just a signed blob on iOS System Part" - John Kelley (Embedded Security @ Apple) https://twitter.com/johnhedge/status/699882614212075520 https://twitter.com/johnhedge/status/699882614212075520
- dclowd9901 11y agoHuh, found this reply only moments later down the stream: http://i.imgur.com/meUjRmQ.png http://i.imgur.com/meUjRmQ.png Seems even the great John Kelley doesn't seem to know what the fuck is going on.