shuckles

66 ms·

841.
by shuckles 5y ago
I think Apple (i) genuinely believes scanning on device is better for privacy because it lets users (theoretically) confirm the behavior of the system and (ii) is learning from others’ mistakes of deploying scanning server side and having t
842.
by shuckles 5y ago
No. The reference you provide characterizes it correctly: the FBI wanted Apple to create and sign a one-off build of iOS. The specific request was to allow automated passcode input and remove retry back offs and auto-erase constants. This i
843.
by shuckles 5y ago
To be fair, Google and Facebook both do plenty of content scanning, but you’re right that it likely doesn’t use the CSAM pipelines. Apple’s pipeline is probably even harder to repurpose since it’s designed very closely for this use case.
844.
by shuckles 5y ago
Your terrifying idea mischaracterizes the nature of false positives. Any photo in your library is equally liable to be a false positive as any other; the perceptual hash is not looking for similar images by the metric of what you find simil
845.
by shuckles 5y ago
The PRISM revelations, to this day, are very ambiguous about their implications for cooperation. When they came out, most involved companies flat out denied cooperation. The types of data the NSA claimed to get were available by tapping int
846.
by shuckles 5y ago
Most importantly, people are arguing that there is new technical risk, so a difference in intent or beneficiaries is not relevant for that argument.
847.
by shuckles 5y ago
Their response to such demands has not been we are technically incapable of doing what’s requested. The demand from the FBI in the San Bernardino case was a very small change to passcode retry constants, because the terrorist’s device did n
848.
by shuckles 5y ago
It’s not a non sequitur. The comment is engaging with a series of rhetorical questions that imagine a slippery slope by observing that very little has changed about the trust model between iPhone users and their devices. If you are convince
849.
by shuckles 5y ago
…in the same way any existing feature of iOS that makes device data available to Apple (eg iCloud Backup) “owns” the endpoint, no? What’s to stop a malicious Apple from turning on iCloud Backup for all its users and hoovering up your Signal
850.
by shuckles 5y ago
How do you think Apple will increase the scope of what’s scanned without every person with Ghidra skills not noticing?
851.
by shuckles 5y ago
If you believe this is true, why didn’t Apple also launch in the EU where antitrust scrutiny and case law are both more strongly against Apple?
852.
by shuckles 5y ago
This claim is often repeated but the only source for it I’ve found is reporting in Reuters citing anonymous sources. The user experience challenges of end to end encryption are immense, especially since iPhone is many users’ only iCloud cli
853.
by shuckles 5y ago
The key generation routine for iCloud Keychain is shipped in iOS and tangled with your device passcode. Chinese iPhones have the same iOS builds as iPhones everywhere, so if some backdoor code was present to have them generate iCloud Keycha
854.
by shuckles 5y ago
This is a claim which should require extraordinary evidence, since Apple has very publicly resisted pressure to build technology at the government’s behest in the past.
855.
by shuckles 5y ago
It’s an incorrect reading of the article. The HSMs in the data center are operated by the Chinese company so any CloudKit data escrowed by Apple could be accessed, but end to end encryption keys are synced through iCloud Keychain which uses
856.
by shuckles 5y ago
As far as is documented, the behavior of iCloud does not change, just the operator. In particular, the difference is that end to end encrypted data in iCloud remains that way, so saying all iCloud data is handed over is incorrect. In fact,
857.
by shuckles 5y ago
It’s not a leak. It’s an observation from evidence that came out during discovery in the Apple vs. Epic trial that’s being reported now that it’s useful context: https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2021/
858.
by shuckles 5y ago
I haven’t ever had feedback about a company which I could both politely give and hadn’t already given directly to my manager (and other coworkers) before leaving the role. What does HR need to hear that’s both appropriate to say and not bes
859.
by shuckles 5y ago
Can you share more about industrial protections used by Singapore? And didn’t China grow as an export manufacturer long before it had any homegrown industrials? In fact, IP from the former was likely an input to the latter in my understandi
860.
by shuckles 5y ago
Sincere question: why be forthright in the exit interview? I’ve always politely left doors open.
861.
by shuckles 5y ago
Are you asking me to provide evidence that the account posted false information and never redacted it? How about the very tweets in the linked thread where the account makes fact-free claims about how a “single IP” accessing “hundreds of ac
862.
by shuckles 5y ago
Given that the accused was arrested in 2007 for similar sex crimes while a Geek Squad employee, one must imagine that he’s been up to this for years.
863.
by shuckles 5y ago
This Twitter account continues to debase discourse about the child safety proposals with FUD. It posted incorrect information about the proposal before launch and has continued with useless speculation. How many of the hypothesized threat m
864.
by shuckles 5y ago
There isn’t enough information in the linked article to reveal the attacker’s methods. Do you have further information or are you speculating?
865.
by shuckles 5y ago
If you have two factor enabled, which is required for many iCloud features, every single Apple device you own will receive an alert with the location of login before you can reveal the 2FA code, even for iCloud logins. What more would you l
866.
by shuckles 5y ago
Malicious compliance is certainly one approach, but an org which relies on it is probably messing up in a way that will leak to everything else. I never said the desire for reporting was useful, but it is fundamental to how management works
867.
by shuckles 5y ago
Didn’t that get hardened in response to the Onavo revelations? In particular, Facebook was using their developer certificate to sign spyware installed via MDM. I don’t remember it being a requirement from the beginning, even though China ha
868.
by shuckles 5y ago
In cases like this, it’s always useful to have an expansive definition of “user”. For example, day to day experiences for caretakers might have degraded under the new patient information system, but maybe it’s now easier to produce charts w
869.
by shuckles 5y ago
I agree with your framing except that in 2 and 3, the matter is already settled. The status quo is Apple gets to build what it wants. It’s on you and others to do an immense amount of work to prove that Apple should be forced into building
870.
by shuckles 5y ago
If your argument is that Apple should be forced to give everyone access to the proprietary abstractions it builds on its own operating systems, like PHAssets, then we are no longer in the world of privacy and now in the world of “when is it

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