shuckles

72 ms·

871.
by shuckles 5y ago
Standards patents must be made available to license. Apple tried really hard to invest in a competing cellular modem provider (Intel) and gave up. Turns out, they’re really hard to build, and that’s why you can’t build one. Not patents.
872.
by shuckles 5y ago
This is already the world we’re in with digital car keys that have been a thing since 2020. I still own my BMW which supports them.
873.
by shuckles 5y ago
It integrates well with your mobile phone number as identity. Add a SIM to an iPhone and you can FaceTime it in the same way you’d call it.
874.
by shuckles 5y ago
I don’t see what public blowback has to do with legal arguments, at least without also assuming some kind of legal realism.
875.
by shuckles 5y ago
Fair point. You are right.
876.
by shuckles 5y ago
The user to whom Apple’s offer is a false choice is one that assumed they would always be able to update to the latest iOS while uploading whatever photos they wanted into iCloud Photo Library without any kind of content scanning. Turning p
877.
by shuckles 5y ago
This is a dubious legal theory. The compelled action the government asked Apple to take in the case of Apple vs. FBI was a very minor technical change.
878.
by shuckles 5y ago
A third party could implement the PHAsset abstraction over their own implementation of a photo library action sheet and the file provider APIs. It wouldn’t get you to feature parity, but the major differences are but minor frictions if your
879.
by shuckles 5y ago
It is hard to square the idea that Apple’s proposed CSAM detection pipeline is a fundamental affront to privacy, a human right, with the argument that turning off iCloud Photos is a false choice because alternatives don’t or can’t have feat
880.
by shuckles 5y ago
Apple has declared their criteria for evaluating the privacy of their CSAM scanning approach in their USENIX talk, and none of it relies on scanning all files. If you want to accuse them of lying, you will need to bring a lot more evidence
881.
by shuckles 5y ago
Per the threat model most of the people on here seem to be buying into, Apple can do whatever they want in an iOS update, including sending iCloud Keychain secret keys to a server they control.
882.
by shuckles 5y ago
I’m not a lawyer, but at the very least Apple would have to train its reviewers to recognize new image types, redact or update all statements where they explicitly drew a line in the sand about what the feature searched for, likely produce
883.
by shuckles 5y ago
I think we’re on the same page and just wanted to provide more detail about how far-fetched their argument seems when you examine the details of what was built.
884.
by shuckles 5y ago
We were never in a world where Apple was unable to do what the government was asking. Nothing impossible has been made possible, and Apple has made a stand against small changes - like changing constants - before.
885.
by shuckles 5y ago
Your link and most of the concern is about known CSAM detection announced for iCloud Photo Library, yet, again, 2/3rds of the original letter was about iMessage. Point me to the expert consensus that the parental control features annou
886.
by shuckles 5y ago
The picture is not sent to the parent. They are notified that the child viewed a sensitive photograph, after warning the child, and the parent can view the photograph on the child’s device.
887.
by shuckles 5y ago
2/3rds of their original letter was spent describing a parental control over sensitive content detection in iMessage as an end to end encryption back door. At best, that is highly cynical. At worst, it is an intentional conflation of d
888.
by shuckles 5y ago
For ideological consistency, I can only hope the EFF has a lecture prepared about two party consent for kids who show their phones to their parents if they receive a dick pic.
889.
by shuckles 5y ago
That was in the 2000s and a different issue and not opposed on privacy grounds. There they argued they were defending freedom of speech. In the 90s the argument was against early probabilistic models.
890.
by shuckles 5y ago
I didn’t say they were against either. I said their opposition to iMessage parental control features as a change to E2E encryption translates directly to other messages client safety features that may reveal the content of communication to
891.
by shuckles 5y ago
Not on the iPhone 5C which was the phone used by the terrorist and did not have an SE. Locked iPhones can be updated from DFU, but I think SE firmware can’t.
892.
by shuckles 5y ago
EFF would probably argue that technologies like safe browsing are also a shift away from E2E encryption. They were strongly against email spam protection in the 90s for this reason.
893.
by shuckles 5y ago
The request from the FBI in the San Bernardino case was to change a passcode limit constant and retry timeouts. Those are about as trivial to implement as any of the convoluted government coercion database attacks against CSAM detection bei
894.
by shuckles 5y ago
This is not a universal experience. I had to go through this recently with a large technology company, and it took multiple weeks of back and forth between the company and a major US carrier to confirm that the company wanted to release the
895.
by shuckles 5y ago
Feinstein was the head of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition under Obama, a period during which tech anti-trust scrutiny was especially lax. On matters of anti-trust specifically and platform privacy generally she is not the politician who wou
896.
by shuckles 5y ago
In the United States, there is effectively nobody in this position. The committee hearings on anti-trust and encryption have little overlap between interested parties or ideology.
897.
by shuckles 5y ago
What politician wins marginal votes on the back of: “I didn’t take on the big tech anti trust monopoly, but I got them to scan your photo library for CSAM!”?
898.
by shuckles 5y ago
This comment has nothing to do with your original theory about elite consensus which is problematic for many reasons including this one: > arriving at “practically the same solution” is a necessary but not sufficient condition for having
899.
by shuckles 5y ago
There is also no transparency if the scope or depth of iCloud scanning increases.
900.
by shuckles 5y ago
A lot of people who claim that this feature made it “easy” to scope creep don’t appreciate that Apple escrows everyone’s keys for its “end to end encrypted” messaging service. Who would be able to tell if they dropped a couple extra keys in

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