ngneer

16 ms·

181.
by ngneer 3y ago
At least it was by choice.
182.
by ngneer 3y ago
I love it. This undermines the notion of ground truth. What separates correct information from incorrect information? Maybe nothing! I love how they acknowledge the never ending attack versus defense game. In stark contrast to "our AI
183.
by ngneer 3y ago
Sounds like a man in the middle attack, made possible since buyer and seller do not mutually authenticate one another?
184.
by ngneer 3y ago
This is right. The flip side is that having many talented software engineers renders each one slightly more dispensable. You want to find the right Goldilocks niche. Not too rare that mobility is limited, but not too prevalent that compensa
185.
by ngneer 3y ago
Trouble is always with scaling and equipment. Unless one uses the existing infrastructure, low chance of success.
186.
by ngneer 3y ago
On a very apt topic for HN readers, though, who likely enjoy math to some degree and have heard of LLMs. What if the post inspires someone to look into revisiting actively learning math as an adult? Is that so bad?
187.
by ngneer 3y ago
If it ain't broke don't fix it ;)
188.
by ngneer 3y ago
You are right. These days the lower layers are explored in greater detail. There was a noticeable shift over the last decade or so in mainstream security research. HW security has always been a subject of study, but there is renewed interes
189.
by ngneer 3y ago
Kind of. However, I would venture most real world attack scenarios do not leverage HW vulnerabilities. But wait, how do we know what is happening invisibly? And what about state actors? The answer is we do not know, but the economics do not
190.
by ngneer 3y ago
Hero protective case!
191.
by ngneer 3y ago
You make a good point. How to induce people to do the right thing? The carrot? The stick? Having a checklist? Inculcating a safety culture? All of the above? If you are cheating, then typically you know you are cheating. I am going to assum
192.
by ngneer 3y ago
You hit the nail on the head. It is a complex question without a straightforward answer.
193.
by ngneer 3y ago
Not sure what your decision procedure is for "a virus" versus "trustworthy RAT", but there are plenty of open source options out there, in case that helps, https://medevel.com/18-os-rat-list/
194.
by ngneer 3y ago
That confused me, too. They appear to know the person who accidentally discovered the issue, not the hacker.
195.
by ngneer 3y ago
We used to use this as a cautionary tale in the CS department security course at the Technion. First, to highlight trust relationships in the "supply chain" (as the notion is now known in contemporary usage). Second, to pose the q
196.
by ngneer 3y ago
This is a LANGSEC concept. A broader survey can be found at: https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings-article/spw/2023/1...
197.
by ngneer 3y ago
Without a sound theory for security in these instances, wouldn't one be hard pressed to claim effectiveness? Is there a slightly different attack variant that overcomes the defense?
198.
by ngneer 3y ago
Out of curiosity, and without naming names, what is people's typical response and what is the dynamic? Data security is hardly ever convenient, and most often vies for resources with other features or quality improvements, especially i
199.
by ngneer 3y ago
I recommend you research CSPRNGs before arriving at a conclusion. They, too, are seeded, which is helpful for deterministically replaying a sequence, say for fuzzing.
200.
by ngneer 3y ago
If by "this" you meant a caste-like system, then my experience at Intel in 2010s was very different. Different people (contingent workers with green badges and others with blue badges) worked well enough together, and got well eno
201.
by ngneer 3y ago
"We note that iLeakage is a significantly difficult attack to orchestrate end-to-end, and requires advanced knowledge of browser-based side-channel attacks and Safari's implementation" - possibly the reason Apple is not losin
202.
by ngneer 3y ago
Right, but that ignores the key piece, which is whether such systems can infer the equivalence relation denoted by "is". A is A. A is B implies B is A. A is B and B is C implies A is C. When a system sees that A is B, yet cannot i
203.
by ngneer 3y ago
Could you give an example?
204.
by ngneer 3y ago
Near the Weizmann Institute, there is a monument for a pilot who refused to eject over the populated area, and rather kept control over his plane for long enough to divert it away. He died in the crash, as he no doubt would have anticipated
205.
by ngneer 3y ago
Are state actors subject to different economics? Their budgets are finite, too. Why opt for a complex less reliable exploit if a simple more reliable one is available?
206.
by ngneer 3y ago
I heard a story of high up executives stepping into an Uber, only to discover that the driver was actually an employee for their firm.
207.
by ngneer 3y ago
I do not doubt the severity of the flaw, but most practical attacks end up being far more mundane. Consider SolarWinds, for example. No dazzling tricks needed, whatever gets the job done.
208.
by ngneer 3y ago
Brilliant!
209.
by ngneer 3y ago
Game theory at play. Tesla and its customers are adversaries, vying for the same dollars. Tesla implementing these security measures directly translates to being able to charge more for services. Same as John Deere and many others. This is
210.
Senate Hearing on Regulating AI Technology – C-Span.org(c-span.org)
2 points by ngneer 3y ago|0 comments

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