jpgoldberg

8 ms·

31.
by jpgoldberg 11y ago
There is absolutely no "lock in" if you try out the beta. Our sign-on process uses a modified form of SRP. (See the draft white paper). It is not a traditional "authentication" process and so can't use other SSOs.
32.
by jpgoldberg 11y ago
Take a look at the discussion of "Crypto in the Browser" in the draft white paper for a discussion of WebCrypto. [Disclosure: I work for AgileBits]
33.
by jpgoldberg 11y ago
I understand. And this is pretty much what we are taken to task for in the article. The difficulty is that when you set thing up, we don't know what other platforms you will set up for. Since OPVault (still) doesn't work everywher
34.
by jpgoldberg 11y ago
If people end up with one set of devices synching an .agilekeychain and on another set of their devices synching an .opvault they may not notice until things have different far apart. Preventing data loss is part of data security. So many o
35.
by jpgoldberg 11y ago
Well, we've been slower than we (and you) would have liked getting OPVault to different platforms. For sophisticated users, handling the switch should be fine. But we need to make the transition rock solid everyone. If even just 1% of
36.
by jpgoldberg 11y ago
Hello all, I'm the Chief Defender Against the Dark Arts at AgileBits, the makers of 1Password. The discussion and analysis in Dale Myers' article is very good, although someone who just reads the headline could very easily come aw
37.
by jpgoldberg 11y ago
Sure, you know that. I know that. And anyone who has been through this before knows that. In some of my earlier drafts of the article, it was titled "Back (door) to the Crypto Wars". But just because we've had this conversat
38.
by jpgoldberg 11y ago
One thing that I hope is clear from the article is that whether or not you use a broad or narrow definition of "back door", the security implications are the same whether it is a "front door", a "back door", o
39.
by jpgoldberg 12y ago
If you (with some care) tried against your own instance, I don't think it would be too stupid. At the very least see if there is something listening on port 5901.
40.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password] The Agile Keychain Format was designed in 2007, and, indeed, it lacks both integrity checks and it leaves sensitive information like URL and Title unencrypted. The newer format (fi
41.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
1Password and KeyPass don't even do "one factor authentication". This is because you are not authenticating to any service as all. Your Master Passwords for these are "encryption" passwords not "authentication
42.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
I work for AgileBits. As the document you linked to explains, this is an accident of history that we would love to undo. It is hard to provide the user flexibility that people want in selecting their data location. We don't want to tra
43.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password] I didn't come here to engage in sales pitches, but when you specifically ask for a feature introduced in 1Password 4, it is hard for me not to mention it. 1Password Mini lives
44.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password] In 1Password 4, there is no auto-filling. People can use Ctrl-\ or Cmd-\ to tell 1Password to "fill this page". In versions prior to 4, auto-fill was an option. (I'm
45.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, makers of 1Password] One way of characterizing the particular paper is "password managers with browser extensions don't always prevent you from submitting your data to the wrong place." Syst
46.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password] We need to put the headline and some of the odd generalizations stated in the paper aside, and look at the specific security issues raised. When we do that, we find that 1Password
47.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
I've been a big advocate of things like PBKDF2 and such to slow things down where appropriate . But except for very specialized circumstances (and an RNG isn't one of them), we want cryptographic operations to be fast. In general
48.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
I was wrong. The updater in 1Password for Windows 1.0.9.333 is vulnerable to an evilgrade attack. It fails to verify the the trust of the certificate on the (alleged) upgrade server and will accept any old self-signed certificated. I would
49.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password. The PBKDF2 speed up was 2x, not 4x. Jens was simply wrong about that. The "disputed" speed up comes from an PBKDF2 optimization that is available to the defender as it is
50.
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password] The PBKDF2 speedup that hashcat achieved really was just 1 bit. This is because the other optimization is used by 1Password as well as by hashcat. The particular flaw in PBKDF2 tha
51.
by jpgoldberg 14y ago
We use a minimum of 10000 iterations, and where available we use CCCalibratePBKDF http://blog.agilebits.com/2011/12/01/staying-ahead-with-secu...
52.
by jpgoldberg 14y ago
It was only around the time of the Elcomsoft report that we (at AgileBits) became aware of the importance of authenticated encryption. The theorems had been around for more than a decade, but news didn't filter down to application developer
53.
by jpgoldberg 14y ago
Forgive me for not reading all of the comments, I've had a busy couple of days. (I'm the Chief Defender Against the Dark Arts at AgileBits, the makers of 1Password.) We didn't explicitly call PBKJDF2 twice. We called it once, but asked for
54.
by jpgoldberg 14y ago
I'd really like to direct people to our discussion forums where questions like this our discussed. It's kind of hard to provide user support spread out over a range of sites. There are some counter measures in 1Password to try to thwart key
55.
by jpgoldberg 14y ago
No worries. You aren't the only person to have been confused by this.
56.
by jpgoldberg 14y ago
That is simply not true. I recommend that people actually read Elcomsoft's outstanding report on the security of password managers on mobile devices. At Blackhat, Andre demonstrated a Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) against PKCS CBC padding
57.
by jpgoldberg 14y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password] It's true that in the Agile Keychain Format item title and URL are not encrypted, but it is a mistake to think that only passwords are encrypted. That's not how it works. The deta