4 ms·
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password. The PBKDF2 speed up was 2x, not 4x. Jens was simply wrong about that. The "disputed" speed up comes
by jpgoldberg 13y ago
[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password.
The PBKDF2 speed up was 2x, not 4x. Jens was simply wrong about that. The "disputed" speed up comes from an PBKDF2 optimization that is available to the defender as it is to the attacker. 1Password makes use of that optimization. So it gives no advantage to the attacker. It is not a speed up when the defender makes use (as we do) of the same trick.
What versions of 1Password for Windows are you using? The check for updates is over HTTPS. The download is still from a CDN, but the binary is signed (by us). You can examine the trust chain to decide whether it satisfies your requirements.
However, until not so long ago (a few months, I think) you were correct that the 1Password for Windows updater was vulnerable to "evilgrade" attacks.
- revelation 13y agoAs stated, the check for updates is finally over HTTPS in the very latest build (333), but you do not verify the certificate in any way. So its essentially HTTP with obfuscation. This allows a malicious network to downgrade clients to build 332, where the check for updates is over plain HTTP and downloaded binaries are not verified.
- teamgb 13y agoCan you write a blog post about this? Need to get this information out there. Good job finding this.
- jpgoldberg 13y agoI was wrong. The updater in 1Password for Windows 1.0.9.333 is vulnerable to an evilgrade attack. It fails to verify the the trust of the certificate on the (alleged) upgrade server and will accept any old self-signed certificated. I would like to thank whoever sent us a Proof of Concept, and I would like to apologize for actually needing the PoC before sufficiently testing my own claims.