heliosyne

4 ms·

1. 1.▲
   by heliosyne 2y ago

   I didn't complain about anyone. The Okta vulnerability isn't because of public salts.
2. 2.▲
   by heliosyne 2y ago

   No, rainbow tables are hash-input specific. They're user-specific only if the salt is user-unique. Usernames aren't normally part of the hash input because they're assumed-public knowledge. You can test this for yourself by
3. 3.▲
   by heliosyne 2y ago

   Because bcrypt is still viable. Its cost factor is easily scaled to commodity performance, keeping the attack cost high. The main attack vector these days is GPU-based compute. There, SHA* algorithms are particularly weak because they can
4. 4.▲
   by heliosyne 2y ago

   The security of salting is twofold. Yes, it defeats the common rainbow table. But if the salt is known, a rainbow table for that salt can be computed. The security of salting depends on the salt being unknown. If the salt is externally kno
5. 5.▲
   by heliosyne 2y ago

   Desktop and phone: Firefox + uBlock. Router is OPNsense with its own validating recursor, domain blacklist, and routing blackhole. Phone runs a private VPN to my router when not on my home network.