Because bcrypt is still viable. Its cost factor is easily scaled to commodity performance, keeping the attack cost high. The main attack vector these days is

Because bcrypt is still viable. Its cost factor is easily scaled to commodity performance, keeping the attack cost high. The main attack vector these days is GPU-based compute. There, SHA* algorithms are particularly weak because they can be so efficiently computed. Unlike SHA algorithms, bcrypt generates high memory contention, even on modern GPUs. Add in the constraint of broad support, low "honest use" cost, and maturity (extensive hostile cryptanalysis), bcrypt stays as one of the better choices even 25 year later. That said, bcrypt's main limitation is it has a low memory-size cost. There are some newer algorithms that improve on bcrypt by increasing the memory-size cost to more than is practical even for FPGA attacks. More importantly, bcrypt didn't actually fail here. The vulnerability happened because okta didn't use it correctly. All crypto is insecure if you use it wrong enough.