ekr____

13 ms·

181.
Understanding Memory Management, Part 6: Basic Garbage Collection(educatedguesswork.org)
9 points by ekr____ 1y ago|0 comments
182.
Understanding Memory Management, Part 5: Fighting with Rust(educatedguesswork.org)
6 points by ekr____ 1y ago|0 comments
183.
by ekr____ 1y ago
The situation is actually somewhat more complicated than this. ECH gets the key from the DNS, and there's no real authentication for this data (DNSSEC is rare and is not checked by the browser). See S 10.2 [0] for why this is reasonabl
184.
by ekr____ 1y ago
It actually is part of standard HTTP [0], just not part of commonly implemented HTTP. The basic difference between SMTP and HTTP in this context is that email addresses do not contain enough information for the client to know whether it s
185.
by ekr____ 2y ago
> Interest article, but overlooks SPEKE, which solves problem #1. Well, sort of. At a high level there are two scenarios: 1. The endpoints have had no prior contact. 2. The endpoints have had some prior opportunity to establish shared st
186.
Understanding Memory Management, Part 4: Rust Ownership and Borrowing(educatedguesswork.org)
5 points by ekr____ 2y ago|0 comments
187.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Thanks for the correction.
188.
by ekr____ 2y ago
The grigri in particular is a bit of a mixed blessing. Because it has an auto brake, it's harder -- though not impossible, as you indicate -- to just totally fail to brake the climber on top rope. If you let go of an ATC, there is no b
189.
Understanding Memory Management, Part 3: C++ Smart Pointers(educatedguesswork.org)
5 points by ekr____ 2y ago|0 comments
190.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Author here. As the comment below suggests, I'm building my way up to smart pointers, so that requires doing some suboptimal things along the way. I'm trying to make clear that they're suboptimal as I go, without getting too
191.
Understanding Memory Management, Part 2: C++ and RAII(educatedguesswork.org)
3 points by ekr____ 2y ago|0 comments
192.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Aargh. You're totally right about the off by one error. Thanks for catching it. I don't believe you're right about the comparison to zero, however, as the comment below indicates.
193.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Author here. Quite so. See footnote 3: https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/memory-management-1/#fn3 "If you know you're going to be doing a lot of reallocation like this, many people will themselves overa
194.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Author here. Thanks for the flag. As you have probably noticed, I just abort the program a few lines below on realloc failure, so this doesn't leak so much as crash. However, this is a nice example of how fiddly C memory management is.
195.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Author here. You're quite right that this isn't the thing you would normally do. I'm just trying to help people work through the logic of the system with as few dependencies as possible, hence this (admittedly yucky) piece of
196.
Understanding Memory Management, Part 1: C(educatedguesswork.org)
237 points by ekr____ 2y ago|92 comments
197.
Why it's hard to trust software, but you mostly have to anyway(educatedguesswork.org)
119 points by ekr____ 2y ago|128 comments
198.
by ekr____ 2y ago
In the case of TLS, at least, there is a set of mandatory to implement algorithms, so in principle two conformant implementations should be able to interoperate using those. Currently, they are: - ECDSA with P-256 for signature - ECDH with
199.
by ekr____ 2y ago
A lot of people do write in markdown but when things finally get the RFC Production Center they work with the XML directly. This can actually cause problems if you want to produce a revised RFC (jargon: a "-bis") later, because th
200.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Moreover, a significant fraction of JS vulnerabilities are logic errors in the JIT, so even if the JIT itself is memory safe, that doesn't make the resulting code free of vulnerabilities.
201.
by ekr____ 2y ago
I don't think this is that helpful a framing of the situation. We don't know if or when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) will be developed, but if it happens, it will be a very serious problem for most of the e
202.
by ekr____ 2y ago
I'm not following you. The way pinning (specifically HPKP) works is that you're supposed to use a valid WebPKI certificate, so the initial connection works, and then you send a header to pin that certificate (or more likely it&#x2
203.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Well, requiring a WebPKI valid certificate itself prevents MITM attacks. What pinning does is prevent MITM attacks in the case where the attacker has a valid (but misissued) certificate. It's true that CT doesn't prevent this clas
204.
by ekr____ 2y ago
This won't really work technically, because pins can only be installed after the client has formed a TLS connection to the server, so if you have a self-signed certificate, the client will refuse to connect. In principle you can over
205.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Yes, that's correct about ECH. In general, there's no real way to conceal your browsing behavior if you are connecting to an IP address that isn't shared. So either you use ECH to something like Cloudflare or you connect to s
206.
Overloaded fields, type safety, and you(educatedguesswork.org)
2 points by ekr____ 2y ago|0 comments
207.
by ekr____ 2y ago
The way to think about HPKE is really as a primitive building block for use in other protocols, rather than as a protocol on its own. For example, in TLS Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) [0], the server publishes a public key which is then used
208.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Yes, the situation is somewhat confusing. RFCs produced by the IRTF are not IETF standards. However, as a practical matter, when the IETF wants to specify cryptographic algorithms, it has the Cryptographic Forum Research Group (part of IRTF
209.
by ekr____ 2y ago
It's not just WebRTC. Basically, if you want things to work when both endpoints are behind typical NATs (a very common situation), you need some kind of signaling system. There are several reasons for this: - NAT bindings are usually n
210.
Notes on Post-Quantum Cryptography for TLS 1.2(educatedguesswork.org)
3 points by ekr____ 2y ago|0 comments

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