ekr____

17 ms·

211.
by ekr____ 2y ago
I would add Hugo Krawczyk's "SIGMA: the ‘SIGn-and-MAc’ Approach to Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and its Use in the IKE Protocols" https://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2003/CRYPTO/1495&#x2F
212.
by ekr____ 2y ago
Of course, WebTransport also isn't real sockets. It's more like WebSockets but with more modern transport semantics such as unreliable data and multiplexing without head of line blocking (as long as it's run over QUIC). For s
213.
by ekr____ 3y ago
> fair point, perhaps partially compensated through tls-protection for recursive dns. don't know how common that is. Yes, but this isn't a replacement for the WebPKI because it would allow the recursive to impersonate any site,
214.
by ekr____ 3y ago
The fraction of validating queries is misleading because practically all validation happens in the recursive resolver, which doesn't provide security all the way to the client. At least as far as browser clients goes, we're as far
215.
by ekr____ 3y ago
It's important to understand why one might care about trusting the zone's content. From the perspective of something like a browser, the mapping from the domain name to the IP address (i.e., the A or AAAA records) need not be secu
216.
by ekr____ 3y ago
It's kind of a misunderstanding to say that IPv6 became official in 2017. The IETF has multiple standardization levels, with Proposed Standard being the first and Internet Standard being the last (there used to be Draft Standard in bet
217.
by ekr____ 3y ago
It actually did end up as RFC 9413, albeit somewhat softened. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9413/
218.
A Hard Look at Certificate Transparency, Part I: Transparency Systems(educatedguesswork.org)
5 points by ekr____ 3y ago|0 comments
219.
by ekr____ 3y ago
The main motivation here is the desire to have a seamless transition to newer protocols without having to change the site. This way, your hosting service can enable HTTP/3 and it will just work with an HTTP/3 compatible browser. T
220.
by ekr____ 3y ago
As far as I know, they do not. Even if they did, it doesn't really address the problem. In order to mount an effective impersonation attack, the attacker needs to either control the network or the DNS. In either case, they will general
221.
by ekr____ 3y ago
Some clarification might help here. People usually think of RFCs as being the output of the IETF, and the IETF is the biggest contributor by far. Roughly half of the IETF's RFCs are standards or on what's called the "standard
222.
by ekr____ 3y ago
Yeah, MLS just assumes there is some mechanism for authorizing keys. Right now it just supports certificates and raw keys ( https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9420.html#name-credentials ) but this is extensible so you j
223.
by ekr____ 3y ago
MLS provides end-to-end integrity via signatures. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9420.html#name-content-aut...
224.
Maybe someday we'll actually be able to search the Web privately(educatedguesswork.org)
2 points by ekr____ 3y ago|1 comments
225.
The endpoint of Web Environment Integrity is a closed Web(educatedguesswork.org)
9 points by ekr____ 3y ago|0 comments
226.
How NATs Work, Part IV: Turn Relaying(educatedguesswork.org)
5 points by ekr____ 3y ago|0 comments
227.
How NATs Work, Part III: ICE(educatedguesswork.org)
5 points by ekr____ 3y ago|0 comments
228.
by ekr____ 3y ago
> The article misses one of the design goals that's pretty obvious if you look at the reverse-engineered Airtag protocol: they don't do any public key cryptography at all on the tag itself. And the reason for that is that it wo
229.
Defending against Bluetooth tracker abuse: it’s complicated(educatedguesswork.org)
3 points by ekr____ 3y ago|0 comments
230.
Everything you never knew about NATs and wish you hadn't asked(educatedguesswork.org)
6 points by ekr____ 4y ago|0 comments
231.
by ekr____ 4y ago
TLS 1.3 and QUIC both support 0-RTT modes as well (as noted in the original paper). Note that anything that runs over TCP of course first has to absorb the TCP round-trip (modulo TFO) whatever crypto it uses. That's why QUIC uses UDP,
232.
by ekr____ 4y ago
HTTP/3 is based on QUIC, and these perf properties are due to QUIC, not H3. With that said, the unusual performance dynamics of the Web make connection setup latency particularly important by contrast to, for instance, SMTP, where peop
233.
by ekr____ 4y ago
As you say, if you want to have 0-RTT data, you must have some prior information about the server. This information can come in two main forms. 1. Have the client know the server's public key in advance. You can then do a RSA or epheme
234.
by ekr____ 4y ago
Yes, that's correct. Basically the only good way to have a "first contact" fast track setup like this is by priming in DNS. My point is that the situation is th same for TurboTLS and QUIC/H3 in this respect.
235.
by ekr____ 4y ago
Without taking a position on TurboTLS versus H3... There are actually two types of middlebox problems: 1. DNS resolvers which don't carry new record types. 2. Middleboxes which don't properly handle UDP-based protocols (2) applies
236.
Network-based Web blocking techniques (and evading them)(educatedguesswork.org)
4 points by ekr____ 4y ago|0 comments
237.
by ekr____ 4y ago
A few notes on the timeline. The IETF has a two-level standards system consisting of "Proposed Standard" and "Internet Standard". IPv6 was first published as "Proposed Standard" in 1998 and finally transitioned
238.
Internet Transport Protocols, Part I: Reliable Transports(educatedguesswork.org)
5 points by ekr____ 4y ago|0 comments
239.
by ekr____ 4y ago
OP here. Yes, this seems to be the best available approach. You apparently can burn it in regular reactors if you mix it with uranium in what's called "mixed oxide fuel" (MOX). However, there are a bunch of logistical hiccups
240.
by ekr____ 4y ago
Just a note that this is an "Internet Draft", without any particular standards status. I.e., anyone can submit an I-D and the IETF will publish it. As a general matter, if you see a document with the name "draft-ietf-<some

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