Y
HN Search
Hacker News Search
new
|
comments
|
top
|
jobs
bri3d
searching PlanetScale…
1.
▲
2.
▲
3.
▲
4.
▲
5.
▲
6.
▲
44 ms
·
751.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
Yes, it can be exploited, just inside the sandbox. I'm pretty sure this is why the write-up is always so careful to say "read/write inside the Chrome sandbox." With the chain that's documented, you basically end up
752.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
I’m pretty sure the chain is all three bugs. 517, 518, 519.
753.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
There’s also a very interesting wasm based Ubercage (V8) sandbox escape in the chain: https://blog.exodusintel.com/2024/01/19/google-chrome-v8-cve... I don’t think the Chrome process isolation sandbox is esca
754.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
https://blog.exodusintel.com/2024/01/19/google-chrome-v8-cve... Here’s the exploit writeup.
755.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
Can they stop you? No. If they catch you (usually doing something more large-scale and real time, like having a camera pointed at the track), can they ban you? Yes, they can certainly try. It's sort of a cat-and-mouse game. I think thi
756.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
(2021) - this is part of a broader attempt at arbitrage in horse racing by front-running broadcast delays to give an edge on "in-play" (real time) betting. Drones are cheaper and more efficient than sending staff to sit trackside
757.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
SPARC had instructions (BP, Branch with Prediction) which hinted the branch predictor whether the branch was likely or unlikely. Presumably this script just edited the opcodes in memory to avoid needing to figure out how to change the gener
758.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
This is really normal for most small companies with good security posture, honestly. The company will pick one platform where endpoint management is functional, and require it. Code and secrets can't live on machines without endpoint m
759.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
This also led to a major vulnerability caused by different double-fault behavior between AMD and Intel known as “the visor bug”: https://xboxdevwiki.net/17_Mistakes_Microsoft_Made_in_the_Xb...
760.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
I’m kind of confused by this comment - I clicked the article expecting some breathless sensationalist nonsense, which is all too common these days, but it was pretty much just a summary of the actual vulnerabilities? One of them is literall
761.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
The not-quite-the-same Apple emergency contact by satellite, plus older standalone systems like inReach, are already having a huge impact on wilderness rescue, for better and for worse. It's a net-good overall for humanity, of course,
762.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
Their distribution is called Helios and is based on OmniOS. I think they were supposed to make it more suitable for consumer use / home install at some point - the package repository is public if you want to try to cobble it together o
763.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
SMS / MVNO carry and international voice call / IRSF fraud is alive and well. Probably bigger than ever. Apps which use SMS 2FA and voice 2FA are highly vulnerable - scammers will create fake accounts and request recovery over and
764.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
> Periodic reminder that these are just passwords too. They should be treated as such by users (generate random responses) and devs (hash and salt them). Unfortunately this is not how almost any business treats them; they are frequently
765.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
Colorado's has been around for four years now. I've tried to use it once (giant fail) and I've never seen or heard of anyone else using it.
766.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
> 2: Step 1 is extended to private actors. This the part which I believe would be extremely difficult to do by mandate given the current US social and political climate, which is why I think there needs to be some form of market incentiv
767.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
This implementation is QR code based, which ruins a lot of the value in terms of low-battery use and makes standardization and acceptance difficult. Anyway, for anything to work in the US, there needs to be an incentive for businesses to us
768.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
Yes, this idea would be interesting if acceptance were mandated, but I'm not aware of any movement in that direction in any state. Mandating this kind of system would be massively fraught with political and legal peril in the US and is
769.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
The Estonian e-ID system and Qualified Electronic Signature in the EU are good ideas. The government issues you a signed identity. You can use that signed identity to counter-sign challenges in places you'd otherwise (in the US) need t
770.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
What blows my mind is that they've somehow managed to turn relatively minor incidents that aren't even compromises to their core systems into top-of-the-news-cycle meltdowns. The Lapsus$ compromise in 2022 was a third-party IT sub
771.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
It's so strange to me that Okta have retained their CSO. None of the recent breaches seem particularly egregious in isolation, but the pattern around bungled communication and failed follow-up investigations is comical.
772.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
This was such a good article! The debugging was smart (writing test programs to peel each layer off), the conclusion was fascinating and unexpected, and the writing was clear and easy to follow.
773.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
Sure, and it's been done: https://github.com/christinaa/rpi-open-firmware - but that doesn't involve ThreadX source, just some standard reverse engineering work. ThreadX is really the least interesting part o
774.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
ThreadX is just the scheduler / OS functionality. There are tons of other components in the firmware (namely, the parts that actually do things) which are still encumbered by patent and copyright issues, not to mention the DRM modules
775.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
The decompiled code is a 1:1 translation, so it’s a derivative work. You can’t distribute a translated book without an agreement with the copyright owner, even if the translator contributed original creative work on top. The analogy is lite
776.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
I never really figured out why there's not a corresponding non-US market official site, it might be a regulation thing indeed. https://volkswagen.7zap.com/en/rdw/ has what I think is a scraped version of EKTA
777.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
Right, a BIOS upgrade will break the hash chain, because the system has gone and replaced the current trusted early boot software with new early boot software.
778.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
What's missing from https://parts.vw.com/ ? The Tesla UI is a little better, I guess. It's also not particularly difficult to find the VW parts catalog software, EKTA. There's an industry-standard set of inte
779.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
The opposite, really - the chassis and basic suspension design, as well as most of the interior parts, are from the Elise. The rear sub-frame, hubs (5-lug vs 4-lug), complete drivetrain, brakes, and all body components besides the windshiel
780.
▲
by
bri3d
3y ago
> a default ubuntu install could mount and decrypt a bitlocker encrypted windows drive with no trouble This means BitLocker was off or "Pending Activation," so the Volume Master Key (VMK) was available in plaintext rather than
More ›