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aruss
searching PlanetScale…
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8 ms
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31.
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by
aruss
6y ago
GCD(0,0) exists in any commutative ring by definition (and is not unique) :) d is a common divisor of a,b if there exists x,y such that dx = ay, and d is a GCD of a,b if all divisors c divide d. So there exist many such x where GCD(0,0) = x
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by
aruss
6y ago
The number of post-hoc internal memos and studies clearly shows that there are many consequences that FB engineers did not anticipate (though FB is not unique in this regard; consider how YouTube's recommendation algorithm feeds misinf
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by
aruss
6y ago
Isn't this just being pedantic? How is TFA's point changed by substituting "social sciences and other humanities" for "social science"?
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by
aruss
6y ago
Definitely, social sciences have gotten a lot of things wrong. And the pipeline from science (social or otherwise) to policy is pretty broken, to put it mildly. Isn't it all that much more important that computer science absorbs that h
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by
aruss
6y ago
Historically that may have been true; I won't argue that point. The difference between the atom bomb and CS is that the latter has a ubiquity of access and reproducibility that subject it to completely different ethical and philosophic
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by
aruss
6y ago
Take it from a former mathematician, the computer "science" students wouldn't either.
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by
aruss
6y ago
You're joking right? You're proving the article's point. The social sciences have informed policymakers for decades. The US was founded by social scientists (as TFA defines them, the social sciences include philosophy and so
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by
aruss
6y ago
Physicists and mechanical engineers simply do not wield the same amount of power that computer scientists/software engineers do. FYI the article does not suggest literally putting CS in the social science department. TFA is just arguin
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by
aruss
6y ago
That's true that it's theoretically impossible, but you can get close by using verifiable computation protocols like Pinocchio to restrict the computations that the adversary can do. That is to say that before blindly accepting th
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by
aruss
6y ago
It's a requirement of these algorithms that they run in polynomial time with respect to the size of the input. They're large polynomials with big constants, but they're dwarfed by the exponentials you're considering.
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by
aruss
6y ago
Not quite. The data is encrypted, the computation is not. Through the use of universal circuits (circuits that run other circuits) you could give an encrypted executable to an untrusted party to run on encrypted data, but note that the resu
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by
aruss
6y ago
I did part of a PhD in this field; your comment about information leakage is not true. FHE schemes are IND-CPA secure, which means you can't test for equality in the encrypted space (Note that in the standard definition of homomorphic
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by
aruss
9y ago
Gravity isn’t metricized (and it would be hard to do so), the best we can do at the moment is indirectly measure it via +/- or other stats like what SC30’s teammates’ true shooting percentages are with him on and off the floor.
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by
aruss
9y ago
To add to your post, lattice attacks (LLL/BKZ/etc) are becoming even more prevalent in cryptanalysis as they are the best known attacks against next-gen cryptosystems like NTRU, or anything based on the Learning-with-Errors proble
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by
aruss
9y ago
So, solving CVP? That's a pretty neat application, though.
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by
aruss
9y ago
There's nothing inherently wrong with browser-based crypto. Most issues arise when you try to e.g. replace like TLS with JavaScript to encrypt passwords before sending them to a server. SHA256 doesn't become broken simply because
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by
aruss
10y ago
Shor has done it again! I'm not an expert on quantum algorithms, but if you're wondering what the implications of this are, here's what I understand as a cryptographer: a lot of post-quantum cryptography (i.e., not anything w
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An Efficient Quantum Algorithm for a Variant of the Closest Vector Problem
(arxiv.org)
3 points
by
aruss
10y ago
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1 comments
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Czech climber Adam Ondra has conquered the Dawn Wall in record time
(outsideonline.com)
233 points
by
aruss
10y ago
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127 comments
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by
aruss
10y ago
It's theoretically sound with a good HSM. But agreed, I'd rather rely on getting a sound software implementation of an asymmetric signature scheme than rely on protecting a symmetric key with hardware.
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by
aruss
10y ago
While security does not rely on simplicity, a simple system is much easier to reason about security. What you add is a whole stack of complexity through multiple hashes, entropy generation (on your end), and network transport (TLS). There&
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by
aruss
10y ago
We can also detect them by a Doppler shift of the star, because the planet (if big enough) will move the star as it orbits. This works when the transit method fails, but provides fewer data on the planet itself.
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by
aruss
10y ago
They also found decreased rates of incarceration, which is pretty significant.
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by
aruss
10y ago
Just FYI - some people[1] have expressed rigorous ideas about deniable encryption, too! [1] http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/454.pdf
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by
aruss
10y ago
That's right, symmetric encryption is fine. You're also right that protocols that rely on factoring or discrete log (more generally, any hidden subgroup problem) will be broken by quantum computers. However, this still means sym
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by
aruss
11y ago
Is this a joke?
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by
aruss
11y ago
It's a decent introduction to P vs. NP but gets a few things wrong: factoring is technically an NP problem, but it's not (known to be) NP-complete, and packet routing is a pathfinding problem rather than a TSP, which is distinctl
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by
aruss
11y ago
The security of a system should never rely on an attacker not knowing the details of the algorithm or implementation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity
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by
aruss
11y ago
First, to clarify: what I meant by "your" was an entity like a standards community, not an individual, and by "often" I meant within a timeframe that makes bruteforcing parameters infeasible (which itself changes over ti
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by
aruss
11y ago
ECC just shifts the problem domain. Just change your curve/prime modulus often and don't use NSA-recommended parameters.
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