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While security does not rely on simplicity, a simple system is much easier to reason about security. What you add is a whole stack of complexity through multip
by aruss 10y ago
While security does not rely on simplicity, a simple system is much easier to reason about security. What you add is a whole stack of complexity through multiple hashes, entropy generation (on your end), and network transport (TLS).
There's no way you could convince me to use your system over a basic KDF implementation. The only people you're going to convince to use this protocol is someone who doesn't have experience in the field, which is why I'd consider your solution snake oil.
- zaroth 10y agoI've talked to many cryptographers in the field. Universally they appreciate the solution for its simplicity. We don't use any new crypto - the whole construct is based on a CS-PRNG, hashing and HMAC. You talk to this service just like you talk to any service over the LAN or WAN. Through an encrypted channel. Goes are the days when you can just dispatch a request over the LAN and assume you're good. We are happy to setup dedicated machines with spiped as we are using TLS. But certainly you look at solutions like CloudFlare or even dare I say Firebase, and the industry has moved far beyond your level of paranoia. I don't want you to use it instead of your basic KDF, but in addition to / after your KDF. 13 million Americans had over $15 Billion stolen last year in cyber-heists and almost 70% of those attacks were using a stolen password. The basic KDF is not working, and it's time to stop blaming the user for not having 69 bits of entropy on their password and start giving companies the tech they need to actually secure their passwords.