3 ms·
ECC just shifts the problem domain. Just change your curve/prime modulus often and don't use NSA-recommended parameters.
by aruss 11y ago
ECC just shifts the problem domain. Just change your curve/prime modulus often and don't use NSA-recommended parameters.
- tptacek 11y agoThat's a terrible idea, trading an extremely unlikely weakness (a problematic 2048 bit standard prime) for an extremely likely weakness (a mistake in the code you probably won't even think to write to check your constantly changing parameters). Do what Colin says upthread.
- aruss 11y agoFirst, to clarify: what I meant by "your" was an entity like a standards community, not an individual, and by "often" I meant within a timeframe that makes bruteforcing parameters infeasible (which itself changes over time wrt the size of the parameters). Key rotation for example is just good practice. Nothing that I said was wrong - nor does it contradict Colin's advice - and while simple systems are better, that's a tradeoff that should be made if you care about entities with lots of resources like e.g. the NSA. As history shows, bad parameters (or parameters that are feasibly bruteforced over a particular timeframe) are not an 'unlikely' weakness. Besides, being aware of potential vulnerabilities - especially those that you know pose real threats - and not addressing them is simply bad practice.