ClayShentrup

7 ms·

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by ClayShentrup 1y ago
score voting is the key. https://asitoughttobemagazine.com/2010/07/18/score-voting/
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by ClayShentrup 1y ago
Incredibly cool to see Apple doing this. I had a great time doing pair programming with pivotal Labs on a rails app back in 2010 to 2011. Completely changed my worldview. And Rust is a super exciting language.
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
i co-founded the center for election science, which promotes approval voting. my alternative proposal to simple sortition is election by jury. https://www.electionbyjury.org/
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
do approval voting now. fight for election by jury tomorrow. https://www.electionbyjury.org/
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
approval voting gives you MORE information about opinions, even if this is counterintuitive. this is because: 1. the IRV tabulation algorithm discards a lot of useful information. (there are better ways to tabulate ranked ballots.) 2. strat
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
we call that a voting _method_ not system.
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
approval voting is also just more accurate and resistant to tactical behavior. https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
> Score voting calls for ambiguous, proven-to-be-culturally-variable ratings that have no natural relationship to preferences utter nonsense. the scores are just normalized utilities. or, if you're being strategic, you're just
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
there is no good argument for IRV over score/approval. score and approval blow IRV out of the water on literally every single metric that matters. they're simpler, more accurate (with any ratio of strategic or honest voters), and
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
there's nothing special about the condorcet criterion. it's mathematically proven that the most favored candidate can even be the condorcet _loser_. you just want the voting method with the highest voter satisfaction efficiency.
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
> As the article mentions, in the real world score voting would just be approval voting where you put a max score on some choices and 0 on others. utterly false. https://www.rangevoting.org/HonStrat https://ww
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
no, it's just a trivial minor semantic difference. https://clayshentrup.medium.com/oop-vs-fp-182475457a01 if you want the oop style you can just change "foo bar baz" to "bar `foo` baz" which is effe
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
Haskell even on a bad day is radically more sane then all of these languages doing this bizarre obsession with foo.bar() instead of bar(foo), because they only allow overloading on the first arg. semantic indenting. type inference. automati
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
what matters is satisfaction with the election outcome, not the five minutes you spent filling out a ballot. https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse6
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
yep. https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
this is a zero sum fallacy. social choice is not zero sum. voters who use intermediate scores donate more utility to society than they give up by not being strategically normalized, leading to an increase in net utility. with enough honest
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
> When it is changed from IRV complexity is never the reason it's a reason why voters vote YES to repeal it. > The argument proffered in favour of returning to FFP is always "simplicity". It is a lie. you're talkin
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
we need election by jury, not "democracy". https://www.electionbyjury.org/
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
i co-founded the center for election science. this is superficially reasonable, but IRV could paradoxically make things worse by squandering election reform resources (namely, money) on a suboptimal and overly complex fix, at the cost of pr
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
tactical voting is normally what we call it when you DON'T vote for your favorite, e.g. a green party supporter votes democrat. with approval voting they'd obviously vote for green too. some of the people who normally vote green u
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
> Even first-past-the-post seems to be doing a reasonable job of that. utterly false. https://www.rangevoting.org/PConsumer.html
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
> Arrow's theorem also doesn't guarantee that you will have problems. It just says that for some votings systems you can construct voting populations with preference that can't be captured well. no, it has nothing to do wi
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
> Arrow's theorem also doesn't apply when you allow bargaining, or people compensating each other. that doesn't make sense. the result you get after bargaining would just _be_ one of the options.
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by ClayShentrup 2y ago
well, yes. https://www.rangevoting.org/ArrowThm but technically it only applies to social welfare functions, not voting methods. i had a chance to visit kenneth arrow at his home in palo alto circa 2015 and we had a nice li
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by ClayShentrup 3y ago
cardinal (rated) voting methods are better than ordinal (ranked). so score voting, approval voting, and star voting are all good. approval voting is just score voting on a 0-1 binary scale. star voting is score voting on a 0-5 scale, follow
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by ClayShentrup 3y ago
this is a common intuition-based fallacy. i'm an expert with almost 20 years of experience working in this field with various phd's in political science, math, and game theory. i explain this here: https://medium.com&#x
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by ClayShentrup 3y ago
there's no evidence that proportional repreesntation can achieve a higher level of voter satisfaction than good single-winner methods like score voting or approval voting. and besides, you won't get PR at any scale beyond a handfu
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
> approval voting doesn't allow you to express your preferences very well yes it does, in the aggregate. because the people who approve only X or only Y will statistically have a pretty similar X-vs-Y preference as all other voters
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
i wrote a page on this very issue. https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
strategy affects all deterministic voting methods, and an optimal ranked ballot can be quite complex. see an example from andy jennings, who did his math phd thesis on voting methods and co-founded the center for election science (with myse

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