ClayShentrup

9 ms·

91.
by ClayShentrup 4y ago
Yes you're correct. but cardinal methods are just generally better all around.
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
i didn't say your 2nd can't hurt your 3rd, but it can't *IF* your 2nd is eliminated before your 1st. which often happens. for instance, a simplified version of what just happened in alaska: 35% peltola begich 33% palin begi
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
> Instant-runoff voting (used in practice for counting RCV ballots in the US) actually satisfies the "later-no-harm" criterion[0] of voting systems (unlike Approval Voting) This is a flaw for instant runoff voting at a benefit
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
No they do not convey equivalent information, because the information content isn't just the number of states, it's the encoding mechanism too. For instance suppose you encode the position of missile strikes on some land area in a
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
CES has a whole page on this. In a nutshell, the reason this works is because the people who approve only X or Y have a pretty similar X versus Y opinion as the whole electorate, just based on random chance. It's just statistical sampl
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
the big problem is that begich was by far the most preferred candidate, but didn't win. and palin voters would have been better off to rank begich in 1st place. the whole thing is a mess.
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
cordorcet methods are overly complicated and don't optimize the right thing. the goal is maximal social utility in the face of strategic behavior. cardinal methods are simpler and generally better at this. https://electionsc
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
later-no-harm is a bug not a feature. it's the whole reason IRV is so vulnerable to tactical voting. https://clayshentrup.medium.com/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 for instance, alaska just elected peltola even though begi
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
this is absurd. you're talking about what the CANDIDATE wants, not what voters (who actually do the voting) want. STAR voting is shown to outperform virtually all other methods with any mixture of honest or strategic voters. https:&#x
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
no, it's not a case for approval voting over score voting, because score voting is better than approval voting if even one voter votes sincerely. if enough people use honest scores, then score voting is better than approval voting even
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
you have this exactly backwards, as explained by 3 different math phd experts here. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD https://electionscience.github.io&#
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
no. scoring is more resistant to strategy. consider a green party supporter who normally votes democrat. with score voting or approval voting, he also votes green (of course). with ranked voting, he still ranks the democrat strategically in
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
this is obviously false. simply consider that green party supporters usually vote democrat. with score or approval voting, they'd ALSO want to vote for the green. whereas with ranked voting methods, they'd still strategically rank
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
scores would be more like: STAR or score or approval = 5 IRV/RCV = 2 plurality = 0 how i'd approve them in a real election would be based on electability, which would be true with any voting method used in an actual contentiou
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
Approval voting is much better. https://www.electionscience.org/library/approval-voting-vers...
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
Of course it works in practice. You just vote for the stronger lesser evil candidate, for the same reason my aunt voted for Biden even though she preferred Warren. This is called compromise strategy. The opposite strategy would be like if T
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
This is simply wrong. Palin voters didn't get their second choice preferences counted. If they had instead tactically/ insincerely ranked Begich first, he would have won by a 5% majority against Peltola. They were punished by voti
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
Fairvote lack expertise and lie a lot.
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
Of course approval voting doesn't reduce to bullet voting, for the same reason tactical plurality voting (the status quo) isn't honest. Green supporters voting Democrat for instance. https://www.rangevoting.org/Bul
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
The normalization error, what you are calling subjectivity, is already accounted for in VSE calculations. Score voting methods like star voting and approval voting are objectively superior. https://electionscience.github.io/
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
No it's not just his opinion, there are objective metrics like voter satisfaction efficiency that back it up. https://www.electionscience.org/library/approval-voting-vers...
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
Yep
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
https://www.electionscience.org/library/approval-voting-vers...
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
LVT wouldn't reduce mortgage or rent prices, but what WOULD reduce them is eliminating property taxes. and that's easier to do if you can offset it with another more efficient tax, like LVT. https://clayshentrup.medium.
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
God I so relate to you and I just hope it all works out.
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
Seattle will become the third US city to use approval voting this November 2022. It will come to entire US states in the next few years. It will be dominant electoral reform in no time.
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
The United States has a deeply flawed democracy and is ranked number 36 by the economist. https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking We use the world's worst voting method and are heavily gerrymanded.
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
The voting method is by far the biggest problem.
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
The most promising thing happening in American activism right now is the movement for approval voting. Simpler and better than ranked voting. https://www.electionscience.org/library/approval-voting/ It's alre
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by ClayShentrup 4y ago
Nailed it.

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