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While LastPass seems to be responding well, I find their entire service exceeds my tolerance for risk. If you don't use a password manager, you've got 99 probl

• makeitsuckless 11y ago
  A centralized store is however unavoidable if you want to share and manage passwords inside an organization. Although I share you discomfort, looking at it rationally I prefer to trust a specialized service, who's very existence and reputation depends on it, more than the alternatives. The other alternative for sharing is stuff like 1Password over Dropbox, which is imho the worst of both worlds.
  • jlev 11y ago
    Why is 1Password over Dropbox the "worst of both worlds"? Seems like it's potentially safer, because it's encrypted with your passphrase and also your dropbox credentials. Sure, the NSA can probably get it, but J Random Hacker can't.
    • TheSwordsman 11y ago
      Dropbox doesn't encrypt files, AFAIK.
      • quonn 11y ago
        I think Dropbox encrypts data before storing it with 3rd-party providers (Amazon). At least I think they used to.
      • maccam94 11y ago
        - Dropbox files at rest are encrypted using 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). - Dropbox uses Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) to protect data in transit between Dropbox apps and our servers; it's designed to create a secure tunnel protected by 128-bit or higher Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption. Source: https://www.dropbox.com/help/27 https://www.dropbox.com/help/27
        • hawkes 11y ago
          But don't they provide the "I forgot my password" option?? Doesn't that mean tjey have enough info to decrypt your data whenever thy want to, let you change your password, and encrypt it again with that new one??? Looks like the same problem to me in the fact that any Dropbox worker can take anything you upload. Moreover, Condoleza Rice hired??! Wtf.
    • quonn 11y ago
      I'm not even convinced the NSA can get it. There are no side-channels to exploit here (which we know the NSA is good at) and cooperation from online services won't work either. The protocols used to encrypt this are fairly simple and well-understood and we should not assume that the NSA is capable of breaking the underlying (strong) primitives.
      • avn2109 11y ago
        The NSA will just get your data off Dropbox by having a judge ask them nicely. That much is undeniable. Whether or not they can break the Keepass encryption after getting your data is debatable but strikes me as "probably yes."
    • radicalbyte 11y ago
      I'm not sure how encryption will stand up when you have a set of all deltas from V1... Vn of the encrypted file. From my admittedly small knowledge of encryption I would assume that such a set of data could be used to greatly decrease the size of the search-space for the decryption key. There are a few people experts who post here, anyone care to comment?
      • quonn 11y ago
        1Password actually stores new data in new files, presumably to make synchronisation work properly. For example, I have approximately 600 such files in my Dropbox. Interestingly, some metadata such as the login URL and the creation date is not encrypted, so it would be possible to build a list of the sites I have stored passwords for. Formally, if your cipher would weaken in a way that makes practical attacks possible as more data is encrypted, it would be considered broken. Furthermore, it is possible to work around this by rotating keys and just encrypting the keys in a master file. 1Password definitely uses encryption keys that are fully independent from your master password, although I don't know if they periodically use new keys for new data.
      • tptacek 11y ago
        I'm not sure whether I'm an "expert", but I can't think of a competently designed cryptosystem falls to that particular attack.
    • Freaky 11y ago
      Anyone else remember that time Dropbox accidentally turned off authentication and you could log in as anyone? https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/06/21/dropbox-lets-anyone-log-in-as-anyone/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/06/21/dropbox-lets-any...
  • quonn 11y ago
    1Password only stores encrypted files in Dropbox. The encryption is done offline. Assuming the encryption is done properly, it is difficult to conceive of a way to attack it even assuming that Dropbox is compromised.
    • Someone1234 11y ago
      Actually that's how LastPass works (they move around an AES-256 encrypted database, and decrypt it on the client/browser). The problem LastPass has, is that they re-use the same master password for two distinct things: - Authenticating to login to your account. - Encrypt your password database. So in situations like this the loss of the authentication hash is relevant. I'd prefer to have a different password for the account than the database, but they don't offer that as far as I know. In general I am broadly happy with LastPass's security. But it could be a little better for power users.
      • tptacek 11y ago
        I find this design kind of baffling. Why go through the trouble of storing data encrypted only to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory by demanding that the client provide a secret derived from the encryption key just to log in?
        • eric_the_read 11y ago
          I finally managed to convince my mother to start using LastPass recently; if I'd had to convince her to use two "master" passwords-- one for the encryption key, one for the service-- I'm fairly sure she'd still be using Google Contacts to store her secrets. :-\
          • Someone1234 11y ago
            Exactly. Why is why I entirely understand LastPass's reasoning for not doing that by default. But it would be a nice "advanced user" option (like 2F and all the other toys hidden in the account settings advanced tab).
• cissou 11y ago
  I understand your take on the problem, but one of the features of those services is that they are precisely online: I can get my passwords on my phone, tablet, desktop, laptop, abroad or at work. If my password manager is offline, it's safer, but it's also a poorer experience. Maybe if there was a way to deploy our own personal password manager server on a dedicated server that would help the "one big target" issue.
  • bargl 11y ago
    You could roll out your own. But I personally trust the specialized team at Lastpass to monitor and look for these sorts of breaches a lot more than I trust myself. That coupled with convenience makes it so I'm going to stick with an online password manager. Even under a worst case scenario, I could change my major passwords fast enough with lastpass that I wouldn't be worried about loosing my online presence to anyone. It'd be a pain, but I'm confident that the LastPass team would keep me informed if that was necessary.
  • Klathmon 11y ago
    But even that won't help much. If you are using "off the shelf" software, then that means i have something to scan for, and a vulnerability in the software means that i have tons of targets. Most of which won't be as secure as LastPass servers might be, and probably won't update immediately.
    • comex 11y ago
      Only if the software itself has a vulnerability - and it isn't that hard to secure a website or server that can't be accessed at all without a password, as opposed to one that needs to provide some level of service to anyone. Centralized services are also at risk of generic attacks such as convincing the hosting service/domain registrar/a company employee/etc. that you're authorized to change things, while pulling this off for many independently hosted site instances is considerably more difficult.
  • fluidcruft 11y ago
    I think if lastpass just allowed use of an out-of-channel external file as an additional encryption layer (as keepass can) then you should be able to worry about keeping that external file secure rather than worry about what's in the cloud.
• walterbell 11y ago
  STRIP (https://www.zetetic.net/strip/ https://www.zetetic.net/strip/) is a mature offline password manager that has been around since the late 1990s, available on iOS, Android, Windows and OSX. It uses the open-source encryption extension to SQLite, https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher, developed by the same company. STRIP supports mobile-desktop synchronization over local wifi or remote cloud (Dropbox & Gdrive).
  • llimllib 11y ago
    > STRIP supports mobile-desktop synchronization over local wifi or remote cloud (Dropbox & Gdrive). Right, but the threat model here is exactly the same! Except you're trusting Dropbox and Google instead of LastPass.
    • walterbell 11y ago
      Or you can use local WiFi -- now you have a choice. If you do choose a cloud service, note that the database file is encrypted by STRIP, https://www.zetetic.net/blog/2014/09/10/how-strip-syncs-with-dropbox-google-drive/ https://www.zetetic.net/blog/2014/09/10/how-strip-syncs-with... "When initialized with a passphrase SQLCipher derives the key data using PBKDF2 (e.g. OpenSSL’s PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1 on some platforms.) Each database is initialized with a unique random salt in the first 16 bytes of the file. This salt is used for key derivation and it ensures that even if two databases are created using the same password, they will not have the same encryption key."
      • PuffinBlue 11y ago
        The LastPass database is encrypted client side too. Only the encrypted blob is synced to the cloud. Are people under the impression the passwords are stored up in the cloud in a for accessible to LastPass or otherwise unencrypted? https://lastpass.com/whylastpass_technology.php https://lastpass.com/whylastpass_technology.php
    • sk5t 11y ago
      Only if you want to use that approach for syncing; you can also sync strip with local files, then delegating cross-device accessibility to network share, btsync, or something else.
• pdabbadabba 11y ago
  But this depends on the alternative. If, instead of using a password manager, uses only one (or even two or three) passwords across all the websites they frequent, then you are still, in effect, trusting numerous third parties to keep your password safe in the cloud--if any one of these sites is compromised, then your password for all (or half, or 1/3rd, etc.) is compromised along with it. I agree with you that an offline password manager is better in theory. But the problem is that I am aware of no such service that is easy to use across numerous devices, so much so that none has struck me as a viable option given my patterns of usage. Maybe there are people out there who will accept much more inconvenience in exchange for avoiding the risk associated with a cloud-based service. But, for me, the inconvenience is simply too much. So the choice once more, for me, becomes cloud-based password manager or no password manager at all. (Though if you've found a good option, that will allow me to easily sync across my home desktop, laptop, office pc, tablet, and smartphone, without using the cloud, I would absolutely love to hear about it! Maybe something Bluetooth based?)
  • jjarmoc 11y ago
    > Maybe there are people out there who will accept much more inconvenience in exchange for avoiding the risk associated with a cloud-based service. But, for me, the inconvenience is simply too much. Sure, it's a balance everyone has to find for themselves. As you note earlier, a cloud password manager is better than shared passwords. I'm certainly happy to accept a bit more inconvenience than most. I only do banking on one device, and one device only. I set up per-device passwords for things like Gmail (and MFA for my primary password), I authorize mobile apps via API keys, and try to avoid services that require I use my password on multiple devices in the first place. For the most part, devices I use frequently can access things I use frequently without passwords. For web services (like HN) I simply don't need to log in and comment that badly if I'm on an unusual device. > So the choice once more, for me, becomes cloud-based password manager or no password manager at all. If those are you're options, you're probably right to go with the cloud option. For many people, even a physical notebook of single-service passwords would be an improvement. > (Though if you've found a good option, that will allow me to easily sync across my home desktop, laptop, office pc, tablet, and smartphone, without using the cloud, I would absolutely love to hear about it! Maybe something Bluetooth based?) Not really. It's largely the magic of cloud synching that I don't like. A lot of people run standalone password managers like Keepass or 1Password and store the database in some sort of file synchronization service like Dropbox. I guess that's workable, but it's still not something I'm going to be doing. I simply don't want a single place where all my passwords are available that isn't hardware physically under my control.
• scotu 11y ago
  >This is one area where I feel strongly that the conveniences of 'Cloud' are outweighed by the risks. I wish this was true, in fact with at least 3 devices I use daily, having an offline password manager means I need to type in manually "difficult" passwords on 2 (n-1) devices (at least that's assuming how password managers and username-password auth work today). Call me lazy but that's already above threshold for me, I'd rather use same password everywhere than do that. Am I missing something?
  • thom_nic 11y ago
    I've taken to using Keepass which is an encrypted, open source offline password manager, plus Dropbox for sync between all of my devices. While I can't control the security of Dropbox, I can at least control the level of encryption on my Keepass database. Keypass lets you use a "key file" (in addition or instead of a password) which you could copy to each of your devices once, which would make for a very secure password database at-rest. It's still not perfect but I think it's a better than LastPass or 1Password. And if you have a more secure file sync (maybe AeroFS?) you could use that instead.
    • ionised 11y ago
      You can also use another encryption mechanism like GPG or something akin to TrueCrypt's (not sure how people feel about using TrueCrypt 7.1a these days) encrypted hidden containers to hold your KeePass database on your cloud storage, which itself would also be encrypted and need a key file. This way you have three or four separate, strong barriers of entry to your KeePass database.
• ikeboy 11y ago
  If your master password is long enough, then it should be safe regardless. The only problem would be if there's a bug in Lastpass's encryption.
• Lawtonfogle 11y ago
  I just write down my passwords. Well not exactly. A few key ones I have memorized, and a few throw away ones I rotate between for when a site requires an account and I'll never be back. But my rare use passwords for important things are physically recorded in a locked notebook. Anyone who could get access to that could've just installed a keylogger into my computer. My problem with a password manager in general is that once your computer is compromised, all of your passwords are compromised.
  • jjarmoc 11y ago
    > I just write down my passwords. People may laugh, but for many people that's a huge step up. I've tried explaining password managers to family members, and I've failed. The usability just isn't there for many classes of user, and as noted elsewhere in this thread losing access to that database is catastrophic. Getting them to use unique passwords per-site, even if those passwords are written down and stored in their desk drawer, can be an improvement. I'm far less worried about someone breaking into my (grand)?parent's house and stealing their password diary then compromises their bank account than I am someone popping some random site and re-using the compromised password. Now for enterprise credentials where the (physically) stored credential and the service to which it's applicable have a closer proximity there's a higher change of this kind of meatspace targeting. But then, the 'common local admin password across all domain-joined machines' problem persists too.
    • Lawtonfogle 11y ago
      I'm just not facing any meatspace targeting with my current businesses. Security is about considering reasonable defenses against potential threats. For me a virus on my computer is a far more likely threat.
• binxbolling 11y ago
  Not sure I'm with you on the "responding well" part. Why blog about it before even notifying your customers? And Joe's whole post seems fairly low-key given that this was a security breach and security is their entire business.
  • jjarmoc 11y ago
    In the comments, they indicate that they're in the process of sending out emails to users. Sending lots of emails takes some amount of time; hopefully those are arriving in inboxes now. It's low key given the impacts as they understand them now, but seems reasonable unless there's more to it than it currently known. We'll see how things develop in the coming days - just being forthcoming days after it was detected and providing guidance on how to respond is commendable though.
• serf 11y ago
  Lastpass is a huge target, and while I believe they generally take reasonable security measures, for many the risk of compromise may be greater than an encrypted stand-alone password database. Couldn't you frame that same basic belief around any large 'nearly-monolithic' web service, like Google, Apple, or Facebook? I agree, passwords are a risky business (you're storing security tokens for other people for chrisakes), but the power that access to someones Facebook or Google account is pretty equivalent - people run their worlds on those services. By the way, I happen to agree with your stance. We rely on singular entities far too much on the net.
  • ocdtrekkie 11y ago
    Yes, and I'd consider Google, Apple, and Facebook huge targets with major compromise risk as well. People tell me Google security is absolutely without equal, but when it's hacked, I, for one, will be unsurprised. With cloud services hacks, there is no "if"s, only "when"s.
    • zaroth 11y ago
      What do you mean "when"? Google was hacked quite thoroughly by China a few years past. Not to mention the NSA.
      • ocdtrekkie 11y ago
        How about... "when" it'll happen again then. ;)
• PuffinBlue 11y ago
  You understand that all the passwords/data are encrypted client side and only the encrypted blob is stored in the cloud? This is exactly what users of Keepass et al espouse when they talk of having their 'locally encrypted database' and syncing it over dropbox etc. You, at least, are identifying the benefit of physical security, but if we are to place any trust at all in encryption then we must accept such a scheme (local encryption, cloud sync) as being robust, if correctly implemented. Under this scheme, obtaining the encrypted blob (which hasn't happened in this case) would still not be a cause for alarm, if we are to trust the strength of the encryption scheme. There comes a point that you must trust 'something'. That choice for me is in encryption.
  • socceroos 11y ago
    ROT13 fan?
    • PuffinBlue 11y ago
      ?
      • socceroos 11y ago
        Encryption is as good as it's independent proofs. Even then, the proofs are only as good as the attention it gets from qualified, quality cryptographers. And again, only when used in a library that can independently prove it's algorithm and implementation is sound - open source. For everything important, there is OTP.
        • PuffinBlue 11y ago
          You're stating truisms really. And you trust OTP (quite rightly) - ergo you trust encryption. My personal trust point is properly implemented AES-256 with a slow hashing function.
          • socceroos 11y ago
• tssuser 11y ago
  My solution: 3 security tiers: high (email, banking): Just memorize a unique password for each medium (sites that might have my credit card info): Lastpass + salt, which I memorize and manually insert (last pass doesn't have it) low (everything else, e.g. hacker news): I trust lastpass (w/ 2f) for these sites. I feel that this strikes a good balance between security and convenience for me, without putting too much trust in the central store. I don't think LastPass is the weak point in this system (I am).
  • sekasi 11y ago
    This is identical to how I approach passwords. Super interesting to hear I'm not alone. I'm finding it works extraordinarily well, and even in situations where my Lastpass details are compromised (like today), it's not necessarily a disaster, just an inconvenience. But in return, almost complete peace of mind and liberation from passwords.
• bhauer 11y ago
  Whenever the cloud fails to live up to its popular reputation as bulletproof and resilient, I cannot resist suggesting that the "cloud" as it exists today distracts us from alternative forms of computing that I feel would be superior. I've routinely proposed a theoretical I call personal application omnipresence or PAO [1], wherein user applications run on a personal application server and are made available to all devices via multiple views (in a manner similar to responsive web design). Ultimately, I think a principle failure of modern computing is our collective inability to deliver secure, private networks (what we currently call "VPNs") in a form that is easily digestible by laypeople—or even semi-technical people, for that matter. With today's mess, configuring a VPN properly takes an enormous amount of attention to detail. VPN technologies are mired with a proprietary and confusing lexicon alongside a continent-sized minefield of potential configuration errors. Of all the R&D being sunk into the cloud, I am not aware of significant R&D investment in making personal private networks that are trustworthy and easily configured. The inability to give individuals and families omnipresent private networks makes their multi-device lifestyles an all-too-convenient target for the facile omnipresence of today's plain cloud. The plain cloud offers omnipresence while forcing acquiescence of privacy, self-control, and even knowledge of how your data and information about your actions is being used. It also centralizes sensitive data into especially juicy targets like Lastpass. I'm not suggesting a distributed model is definitely more secure, but a plurality of implementation approaches, perimeter firewalls, and the tiny size of individual networks makes each target less interesting. For the time being, I use a Keepass database on a file server I operate that I reach via an IPSec VPN from all of my devices. I am not a network professional, so my IPSec VPN may have been configured improperly, but I've tried to follow best practices. What I really want—to reiterate—is a high-quality, simple (not stupid but feature-constrained) private network that our proverbial parents could use. That is always on, from all devices I use, providing a secure channel to communicate with my data on my file server anywhere. What I have, however, is the monster that is IPSec which forces me to think about concepts like SA lifetime, IKE, Key Groups, and certificates. [1] http://tiamat.tsotech.com/pao http://tiamat.tsotech.com/pao
• mangeletti 11y ago
  I couldn't agree more with your first point, but rather than recommend a local password manager, I recommend using a password algorithm of sorts. For instance, start with a password base (8 chars), a site specific "salt" (could be the domain or something simple like "email"), and a small per-site password or a pin (4 digits). With this, you can easily remember 1 password base for all your accounts, a convention for the "salt" (you don't have to remember each salt if you have a strong convention), and the only site specific info you'll need to remember is a 4 digit pin, which should be different per site. If you can remember a really small password or 4-digit pin, this method affords you all the protection you need. I use this method, but my passwords are 20-30 chars in length, because I'm paranoid.
• deciplex 11y ago
  Why does anyone use LastPass when KeepPass and GDrive/BTSync/SpiderOak exist?
  • PuffinBlue 11y ago
    I use LastPass and KeePass extensively in the setup you outline. Why do people use LastPass? Convenience, and you aren't really gaining any extra security (except through obscurity) when using those other services. LastPass encrypts and decrypts client side, their cloud only synchronises the encrypted blob. This is what is happening in the KeePass + Cloud service scenario too. You gain a little security through obscurity as you'd probably need to be attacked as an individual, but mass breaches are not unknown (Dropbox for example) and at that point you have no more security than LastPass. KeePass does have the keyfile feature, which is a particularly nice version of two-factor authentication, but LastPass offers various options - including One Time Passwords (Sesame), YubiKey and even good old fashioned offline paper grid method (arguably more secure as you have a an air-gapped authentication method). LastPass has fantastic apps and plugins that make using unique high entropy random strings for your online accounts absolutely painless. The plugins are better and more widely available than the KeePass versions. I've said it in another comment, but it comes down to trust in the encryption method. If the method is properly implemented then the overall scheme is secure (save for other attacks like keyloggers which both would be susceptible to).
    • deciplex 11y ago
      Ah, I did not realize LastPass had a client which did the encryption and decryption locally. Thanks for clarifying. Is the client open-source?
      • PuffinBlue 11y ago
        Therein lies the rub, I don't think it is - the main plugins aren't anyway. There is an open source CLI version though [1]. So it's on trust. I trust them to have correctly implemented it based on the logic that their entire business' existence is build on the security of the platform. If it fails, they fail, so I trust them to have put the work in and to do continual monitoring. I have to trust KeePass too, I don't have the skill to audit it myself and the fact it's Open-Source is no guarantee of security (Heartbleed anyone?) so it's all about where your trust point/compromise lies. [1] https://blog.lastpass.com/2014/10/open-sourced-lastpass-command-line-application-now-available.html/ https://blog.lastpass.com/2014/10/open-sourced-lastpass-comm...
• MaxGhost 11y ago
  An offline alternative with tons of features (still mostly in development but available for purchase and support): https://www.password-injector.com/ https://www.password-injector.com/
• omouse 11y ago
  I use Keepassx and the only thing I use the cloud for is to store the password file which is encrypted by either a pass phrase or key file. LastPass always struck me as a dumb thing to use. The investigation has shown, however, that LastPass account email addresses, password reminders, server per user salts, and authentication hashes were compromised. Great so maybe you can't attack the stolen hashes (at least not all of them) but you can use this information for social engineering which narrows things down. In my case, you'd have to break into SpiderOak and steal the passwords.kdb file and attack the hash, but at least that would only attack my passwords; you wouldn't have a target-rich environment.