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Opportunistic Encryption is harmful because people think it's actually useful. Here's the problem with opportunistic encryption: OE provides unauthenticated
by peterwwillis 12y ago
Opportunistic Encryption is harmful because people think it's actually useful. Here's the problem with opportunistic encryption:
OE provides unauthenticated encryption over TLS for data that would otherwise be
carried via clear text. This creates some confidentiality in the face of passive
eavesdropping,
You should never assume that 'eavesdropping' is passive. In almost every practical context of traffic interception, if you can read the transmission, you can write as well. If you're going to the trouble of installing some kind of tap, it makes more sense to make it read-write so you can actually do something with that intercepted connection. Collecting data is great, but hijacking is even better.
and also provides you much better integrity protection for your data than raw
TCP does when dealing with random network noise
This is a red herring, and if you need real integrity is totally useless since it doesn't prevent an active attacker from corrupting the data once they've hijacked your unauthenticated connection. For the majority of plaintext traffic, a small amount of corruption is way more efficient to allow for than breaking down and re-creating a connection every time a single bit gets flipped.
To use OE, you have to set up an SSL service in the first place, so just take the extra 15 minutes and make a real signed certificate. There is no such thing as "kind of" secure, after all. Encryption is intended to provide security. OE is not secure.
- Dylan16807 12y agoMitM takes more effort and is less common. You're only fooling yourself by thinking about it as black and white. How about "it's just as easy to MitM me, but I have reduced how common eavesdropping will be by 80%" I want that. And with how common ISP surveillance is, the number is probably much higher than 80. >There is no such thing as "kind of" secure, after all. If you really want to get absolute, then you have to admit that any computer you have purchased parts for is not secure. Levels of security exist.
- peterwwillis 12y agoOf course levels of security exist. And OE is not on the spectrum of levels of security, because it is not a secure connection: http://www.techopedia.com/definition/13266/secure-connection http://www.techopedia.com/definition/13266/secure-connection It's an arms race. If I have sensitive data, you install a tap to capture it. If I begin obscuring the data from you rtap, you begin injecting traffic to unobscure it. If someone is trying to steal your data, they will not stop trying to steal it just because you applied ROT13 to it. Why do you think someone would just give up just because they now need to use an active attack? Active attacks are trivial once a tap is in place. We're not talking NSA research projects here; this shit has been going on since World War II. If they have a means to exploit your data, they will use it.
- pdkl95 12y agoOE isn't about targeted attacks to get your data. This is about raising the cost of bulk eavesdropping. Yes, there are a lot of ways to easily do MitM, but all of those still cost more and have more opportunities for error and detection than a passive tap that is basically a giant tcpdump on the backbone.
- Dylan16807 12y agoIf I paint my car an ugly color, it's half as likely to get stolen as if I paint it red. It's not a "security" measure because it doesn't result in a "secure car", but it is a measure that makes me less likely to be hit by a marginal effort attack. Even if I leave the door unlocked and the keys under the seat.
- y0ghur7_xxx 12y ago> Opportunistic Encryption is harmful because people think it's actually useful. [...] You should never assume that 'eavesdropping' is passive. - Google driving by with it's street view cars and capturing all your wifi traffic for later analysis is passive. - People sitting in a coffee shop and capturing your wifi traffic is passive. OE protects against these attack vectors. It does not protect against other attack vectors, but that does not mean it's harmful or useless. Moreover, with pins it could be a first step to get rid of CAs.
- peterwwillis 12y agoThese are both examples of how OE would _not_ help you. With google street view you're barely even in range long enough to pick up a couple packets, if the person was even using their computer while the car drove by; this is not what OE is designed to protect against. If the car sat outside their house, they'd still get owned, and OE would still not be useful. Sitting on a cafe's wireless is literally the de-facto example of how to actively sniff or inject traffic on an unsuspecting victim. The only more bluntly useless case for OE is a state-sponsored mitm using coercion-induced signed certificates. And you can't get rid of CAs.
- y0ghur7_xxx 12y agoYou just continue to state the same thing: that OE does not protect against an active attacker. We know that. Nobody says that it does. What it does is protect against a passive attacker. And that makes it useful for some use cases.
- MichaelGG 12y ago>- People sitting in a coffee shop and capturing your wifi traffic is passive. OE does NOT protect against this. If you can read wifi packets you can write them and MITM. You're basically arguing that at the moment it's more likely that they are using a snooping package that doesn't MITM. Sorta like "use Mac/Linux cause there's no viruses/malware/keyloggers". If there's a shift to OE, then sniffing packages will provide plugins to MITM OE when possible. So sure, turn on OE, it won't _hurt_ if we don't tell the users via UI that there's anything special going on. It's like a CRC check to prevent minor accidents.
- belorn 12y ago> In almost every practical context of traffic interception, if you can read the transmission, you can write as well Lets look at a real-world example here. Say an adversary is tapping one of the Atlantic cables between US and EU. That is what, a few T/s of data, and a few millions of concurrent connections. Then try to do a practical MIT attack (a write) for each of those connections, while maintaining data speed. Also, you must be 100% undetectable. Can you do that?
- patcon 12y agoI would agree with you if this were released with great fanfare to regular users. I assume this won't be the case
- patrickmcmanus 12y agofwiw the reference in the blog post about integrity protection and random network noise was a reference to the inadequacy of the tcp/ip checksums for protecting your data from normal network errors of the accidental non-attacking variety. This is real problem for http cleartext data which data transported over TLS does not have.