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I read the book a few weeks ago, and I was somewhat disappointed. He focusses way too much on the IEX gang, and in a way that is puts the team members on a ped
by lordnacho 12y ago
I read the book a few weeks ago, and I was somewhat disappointed.
He focusses way too much on the IEX gang, and in a way that is puts the team members on a pedestal. Something about it made it sound like he spent a lot of time with this gang and not so much with others. I'm sure they're smart guys, but I just don't like the style and it seemed overdone to me. This is having worked in finance for 12 years and met loads of smart people with credentials and interesting stories.
Anyway, aside from the style I thought there was a lack of real investigation.
There was one interesting strategy mentioned, the BATS front-run. Superficially, it sounds like it might work. You see a trade on BATS, you pull and reverse. Okay. But what exactly is wrong with that? There's a number of market makers who collectively make the market. A big fish comes in, scares away the minnows. Is that wrong? If there's a big buyer, shouldn't the price be higher? That discussion didn't seem to be there.
Another interesting story is the Spread Networks line. Now, what exactly is being arbed between Chicago and New York? The S&P Future vs ETFs in NYC? Vs the basket? Can that really support a dozen or so firms paying tens of millions each? Maybe it can, let us see the data. A recent conversation with an HFT friend did not reveal the answer. And what happened when the microwave towers came in? Is the line useless now? At the end, I wasn't satisfied I knew WHY the speed was necessary. All I can think of is that there's some very obvious trade that can't lose money if you're the fastest. What is it, and why is it a no-brainer? Is is anything untoward happening?
And then there was the funny order types. How about giving us a concrete example? Use such-and-such an order, cause the market to cross, end up at the front of the queue, profit. There was some mention of the multitude of order types, but the case isn't made until you bring something concrete. Someone like Nanex might have data showing these shenanigans. I picked up another book by Tabb, who was mentioned, that has some more detail.
- infecto 12y agoI really enjoyed Dark Pools. Of course it also focused on a side but it was more enjoyable to see how things came to be, the creation of Island and how seemingly good intentions created the market we have today.
- ethbro 12y ago> how seemingly good intentions created the market we have today. It's been a bit since I read Flash Boys [edit: didn't realize you were talking about a different book], but from memory dark pools were never created with good intentions. At best, they were created with the intention of enabling cheaper trades by not having to route orders to the broader public market (just like a colo CDN)? And dark pool owners had all the information needed to gather real-time reporting on the prices predatory dark pools were trading normal investors' orders at vs. the broader market price. Which is to say, they absolutely knew they were screwing someone.
- tptacek 12y agoIt's tough to discuss dark pools for a couple reasons. First, they have a sinister name. Second, they're generally run by giant financial firms, who nobody likes right now. Third, they're a fuzzy concept. In reverse order: A dark pool is really just a private exchange, or really just what you'd call anything that functioned in any way like a private exchange. They're a tool, deployed to solve problems for (primarily) large investors. When you start talking about market structure and facilities, it can get pretty weird to talk about "intentions". Major exchanges are also routinely used for shady transactions! The best-known purpose (or "intention") of a dark pool is to allow huge buy-side institutional investor to move large blocks of securities. If you don't spend much time reading about market microstructure, you're probably unaware that this is one of the fundamental problems in trading.† Market "physics" dictate that there is no instantaneous price available for the sale of a large block of securities. A huge order will gobble up many orders off the order book, and, as it executes over time, it moves prices --- the intent of a large investor to dump a lot of securities on the market is extremely relevant to everyone else in the market, and to the correct price of that security. The best known dark pools tend to be owned by giant investment banks and similar firms. This should be unsurprising, because one of the key services those firms offer their clients is "efficiently shopping or buying large blocks of securities". To deliver that service on open exchanges, they have to compete with other firms that are aggressively trying to detect big moves and profit from quickly making prices reflect those moves, often while the move is happening. The participants in a dark pool are cooperating to "more efficiently" move large blocks in private without impacting prices (as much) while the move is happening.†† (Dark pools also end up executing some retail order flow as well; as "private exchanges", they're also a useful service for their operators to be able to sell to retail brokerages. They take on the task of trying to ensure orders are executed quickly, and their other trading clients get exposure to retail order flow, which is demographically likely to be uninformed and profitable to trade against.) Finally: the name. It sounds Death Star-ish. But really it's just a comparison to normal "lit" exchanges, where order books are visible to participants. "Lit" and "dark". It might seem like lack of transparency and visibility into prices could be a license for all sorts of shady stuff. And some shady stuff happens (apparently most of which has to do with the promises made to dark pool clients when they agree to execute orders there). But most of the "shenanigans" that drive concerns about HFT require order visibility (I like to suggest that they are direct consequences of the CAP theorem, applied to electronic markets). † Bafflingly, a huge and apparently valid complaint about _Flash Boys_ is that Lewis --- a former bond salesman --- doesn't seem to understand this fact. †† I suspect we'll find that when we start ascribing motives and intentions and morality to market activities, we'll quickly find out that this stuff is all murky, and that almost any activity can be "shady" or "virtuous" viewed through the right lens. For instance: some dark pool controversy involves big pools persuading big investors to execute trades on their pools, whereupon they're "victimized" by HFTs and other aggressive traders. Through the lens of "promises should be kept" and "truth in advertising", this is bad. But through the lens of "giant financial firms probably shouldn't have a special sneaky execution lane for dumping a zillion shares on the market without alerting other investors that they are moving the market", things look a bit different.
- CyberDildonics 12y agoIt's a book with characters, not a report.
- dnautics 12y agoIn my opinion there shouldn't be anything 'wrong' with a BATS front-run; but if you don't want to play in that pond, then you should get out. Thus the volume of trades for something like IEX would go up.... Let the market decide if people don't like how BATS operates. If I were to set up an exchange, to discourage HFT-type shenanigans, I would set up "clearance windows". You put in your bid/asks and they are held for one second while the previous bid/asks clear, and if your quote is still available in the next second, then the trade is executed.
- kasey_junk 12y agoYour "clearance windows" are known as a batch auction and are frequently mentioned as a way to prevent speed shenanigans but they don't actually address the problem for a few reasons: - If there are more orders on one side of a price than on the other, how do you handle tie breakers? FIFO leaves the need for speed, Pro rata is already being gamed in other ways, random has transparency issues. - Speed is just as important (if not more sore) for canceling existing orders. Does your batch allow you to cancel orders before the auction takes place? If so you still have a speed game. If not, it is very risky for market makers to participate and they will either leave your exchange or price the spread more conservatively. Both of those put you at a price disadvantage compared to other exchanges. - Your exchange doesn't exist in a vacuum. There are other exchanges. You cannot prevent with your batch auction people using that speed advantage to arbitrage differences between your exchange price and other exchanges.