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On the Effectiveness of Traffic Analysis Against Tor Networks Using Flow Records [pdf]
- Fogest 12y agoMore and more just keeps coming out and it honestly seems like Tor is not a flawless method at all for anonymity and it is not something I'd trust relying on. I'd put more trust on using Tor in combination with a logless VPN.
- AndrewKemendo 12y agoThere is no flawless method of anonymity. The best you can do is have plausible deniability.
- Fogest 12y agoOr use multiple layers so at least you are less likely to be targeted by larger more automated operations, and only so much at risk to a targeted attacked.
- lazaroclapp 12y agoWell, you can construct the following protocol for fully untraceable communication between n nodes, numbered i \in 1...n: Divide time into intervals of size t, where t is larger than the time it takes to propagate a message of constant size s from any node to all of the remaining n-1 (e.g. by flooding). For interval j, node i = j % n always transmits a message m of size s to all other nodes with the following characteristic: m is either the output of a PRG or a message encrypted with the key for a host k to which i wishes to communicate a message, the choice of which is entirely up to i. Under this scheme - assuming previously set up authentication between every pair of nodes and an encryption scheme in which encrypted messages are indistinguishable from random data without the decryption key - any node can send a message to any other node in such a way that no one else inside or outside this network can know the contents of the message or even that the communication took place. For any node not receiving communication, the protocol would be indistinguishable of one in which all transmissions are random noise. Of course, the issue is that latency in this scheme is O(n) and per-node bandwidth is O(1/n), with large constants. Also, it's a reasonable suspicion in practice that no one would set up this scheme and then actually have zero communication going on over it, so it still reveals that "at least one of the n nodes is talking to at least another of the n nodes".
- _nullandnull_ 12y agoAgreed. Your comments reminded me of the points in "Evil Exit Nodes Unmasked me, and all I got was this lousy jail term" by the grugq. http://grugq.github.io/blog/2013/06/14/you-cant-get-there-from-here/ http://grugq.github.io/blog/2013/06/14/you-cant-get-there-fr...
- tedks 12y agoThis link is blogspam and should be redirected to the source: https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=1545&format=pdf https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=...
- dchest 12y agoNo, it's an article about research paper. Please don't mislead moderators.
- tedks 12y agoThe article adds nothing on top of the paper besides a few remarks about other attacks. HN should uphold a higher standard than that. Link to the source.
- dang 12y agoHmm. This is a borderline case. The article mostly lifts from the paper, especially the diagrams. On the other hand, HN often prefers the best popular article on a story, with the specialized paper linked in the comments. The reason is that specialized papers are less accessible to a general-interest audience. That said, papers in computing are an exception because the audience here is informed in that field. And the thread, at this point, provides a lot of context. Given the above I think the paper is probably the better URL, and we've changed to it from http://thestack.com/chakravarty-tor-traffic-analysis-141114 http://thestack.com/chakravarty-tor-traffic-analysis-141114. Marking this subthread as obviously off-topic.
- Thaxll 12y agoWho had the terrible idea of the top scrolling menu...
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- schoen 12y agoWait, what? The paper says that NetFlow is not optimized for this kind of attack, that it is merely representative of flow data available from core routers in general ("traffic monitoring functionality built into the routers of major IXs and ASs, such as Cisco’s NetFlow"), and that you have to do research to figure out how to make it work. The authors aren't saying that Cisco intended to facilitate traffic analysis attacks against users, or that using Cisco routers in a network you set up makes you or your users more vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks by other people. I'd love to see much more research on new approaches to anonymity, but it's also important to understand the tradeoffs. In the face of active attacks like this one, it seems that a network needs to be synchronously padded (all participants and potential participants always transmit and receive at a fixed speed, regardless of whether they're communicating or not) or else high-latency (you wait a long time to forward communications far enough through the network that they genuinely could have been from anyone in a large population based on detailed traffic statistics). Even the padded versions might be vulnerable to an adversary who can actually disrupt or degrade people's connections (to prevent particular nodes from sending or receiving the amounts of traffic that they're expected to by the protocol). Even a very successful Kickstarter project isn't going to provide a path to escape these tradeoffs.
- hawkice 12y agoSo, I'm a motivated privacy-seeker with enough technical chops to configure any not-yet-for-the-masses technology out there. I would very much prefer for my ideal strategy not to be "poop my pants in terror" -- any guidance from the knowledgeable HN-osphere?
- sbierwagen 12y agoFreenet. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freenet http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freenet Upsides: Much more secure than Tor, (since it doesn't try to be a low-latency mixing router) not funded by USG. Downsides: Real slow. Real slow. SLOW. Think effective throughput in the tens of kilobytes/s, latency measured in minutes.
- higherpurpose 12y agoWhat about i2p? I hear it has quite a few bugs, but so did Tor in the beginning I'm sure. Maybe it just needs better funding. Isn't it a better design at least? Phantom also seems to have great design, but it was discontinued quite early in its implementation. No idea if it's because it was unworkable or for other reasons. Maybe someone with experience in such networks can take a look at it: https://code.google.com/p/phantom/ https://code.google.com/p/phantom/
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoI2P's garlic routing design is superior to onion routing regarding this particular attack due to the ability to shuffle packets, and being variable-latency (flows which don't need low latency can benefit from increased traffic-analysis resistance). However Tor has a big advantage in practice right now: lots of users, of every kind, to hide among. When GCHQ talked about "staining" in this context (as in the REMATION conference docs), by the way, they generally mean either a timing-based fingerprint (as here) or cookie-based fingerprint (unfortunately it seems to be used in at least two entirely different contexts, oh well).
- mrsteveman1 12y agoFreenet is faster than that in aggregate, total node throughput can be in the 150-250KB/s range even if single requests are, as you say, potentially in the tens of KB/s. File transfers can be fast, static webpages can be loaded reasonably quickly if they are popular (in the sense of being frequently accessed by users). Big security downside is that in the purely opennet configuration, your peer nodes are both untrusted strangers AND your own traffic is visible to them. There is NO "onion" effect going on, just reliance on the possibility that any traffic a peer node observes from your node is not necessarily YOUR traffic as all nodes are also routing requests for other nodes.
- tedks 12y agoThis is an easier version of a traffic analysis attack, an attack that Tor expressly does not attempt to provide a strong defense against. It relies on a malicious server and entry node. The contribution of this paper is that if you have the malicious server and entry node, you can use a less expensive data source (Cisco NetFlow data) rather than raw packets to perform a correlation attack. The correlation they achieve in a private Tor network is impressive; however, if you look at the graphs in the actual paper[0], you can see that the differences in correlations are actually quite small in the wild. The title of this post and article is actually incorrect; the technique demonstrated has an 81.4% accuracy. This means that the base rate fallacy will make it nearly unusable in practice, and more so as the scale of Tor traffic grows. For more on the Base Rate Fallacy, see [1]. So in summary: * This is an incremental improvement of an already existing and known attack pattern on low-latency anonymity systems * The technique presented in this paper is only a threat if your threat model is an adversary that can control your entry guard and the server you are trying to communicate with, but does not have the budget for packet-level correlation attacks * This technique does not achieve sufficiently high accuracy and sufficiently low false positives to reliably identify arbitrary Tor users, but might be more successful if used in combination with a prior hypothesis that, say, a specific NSA employee is communicating with GlobalLeaks. [0] https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=1545&format=pdf https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=... [1] http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Sep-2008/msg00016.html http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Sep-2008/msg00016.html
- Tepix 12y agoDo they really need to control the entry guard? Or is it "good enough" for this attack if they merely have access to the netflow data?
- tedks 12y agoThey need to be able to access netflow data at the entry point. To put it another way, let's say someone is posting bomb threats over Tor on Google Plus. Google cooperates with the FBI and deterministically perturbs all traffic going into the Tor network. What router does the FBI get netflow data from in order to find the bomber?
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- devindotcom 12y agoThe "nothing to hide" thing doesn't really hold water. And anyway, you might not live in a police state but there are millions and millions who do and rely on this kind of thing.
- schoen 12y agoA recent piece from Alvaro Bedoya on the very real things that people have had to hide in American history: http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/big_data_underground_railroad_history_says_unfettered_collection_of_data.single.html http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/1...
- tedks 12y agoThose things might have been reasonable in the past, but we live in 2014. We live in a country that has an ethnic minority president, the first nation anywhere in the world to be progressive enough to do so. We have abolished racism, sexism, homophobia, and classism. We live in an equal, classless, democratic society. It's totally fine to see problems, even with our highly progressive and forward-looking society. Dissent is the highest form of patriotism. But we are a nation of laws, and there are established procedures for changing those laws. We have the ballot box instead of the Anonabox, and for good reason. If you are a good, loyal citizen, true to the ideas of the founding fathers and possessed of respect for the rule of law, there is no reason to be anonymous. Either you are right, and the democratic voice of the people will join you in a chorus of freedom, or you are wrong and if you continue to inflict harm on our society it will be forced to defend itself.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- Noted 12y agoDid you forget a /s tag in there? You can't actually believe that racism, sexism and especially classism no long exist in our society.
- devindotcom 12y agoOne more reason to have open-developed, ground-up-built endpoint hardware. I'm surprised there hasn't been a credible Kickstarter or something. People wouldn't mind slightly fewer features or lower performance due to reverse engineering an older design - if it meant real, publicly auditable security at that link in the chain. Still lots to do to improve security but that's one that's always seemed neglected to me.
- SwellJoe 12y agoWhile I agree that open hardware is a good idea, Cisco has no malicious intent with NetFlow. It is a legitimate tool for maintaining and improving network quality. This isn't an instance of a vendor providing a back door to the NSA (or whoever). It's an accident of the protocol that it is easier to derive this data from than raw packet sniffing.
- devindotcom 12y agoNo, certainly I don't think them malicious, I'm just surprised the option doesn't exist.
- tedunangst 12y agoWell, you could use an OpenBSD firewall. But then you'll soon discover that it ships with pflow, which is compatible with netflow.
- Tepix 12y agoAs the summary mentions: Tor is susceptible to this kind of traffic analysis because it was designed for low-latency. You give up a certain amount of security, but gain a lot of comfort. Perhaps a future version of tor can offer a "comfort level" setting that introduces a varying amount of delays, bogus traffic and other concealment methods (ideally at every hop).
- amelius 12y ago> You give up a certain amount of security, but gain a lot of comfort. He who sacrifices security for comfort deserves neither :)
- randomjoe2 12y agoWell if that's the case then that should apply to anyone on the internet. It'd be much more secure to just not go on the web, so anyone on the web is sacrificing a huge amount of security. These aren't black and white arguments.
- ghodith 12y agoI think he is just taking the opportunity to quote Benjamin Franklin. Not so much offering an argument of any hue.
- comboy 12y agoIt's obviously hard to verify it, but I'd love to hear tor devs take on this. I may be paranoid, but it seems to be that there is some FUD around tor lately. And if many people will stop using it, it will indeed become less secure.
- killface 12y agoi think it's largely a misinformation campaign to keep people who aren't doing anything illegal from anonymizing their traffic. I like the idea of using Tor, but from what I can see, there's nothing of value for me on there. I don't need to buy drugs or get illegal porn, and I don't really care about anarchist-cookbook style sites. I'm glad it exists for journalists and whatnot, but I don't find it useful for an average person.
- readmission 12y agoIf you have the technical and OPSEC wherewithal, it appears that running you own "private" (PublishServerDescriptor 0) exit node has become an extremely attractive anonymity tool. There are lots of downsides to this (epistemic attacks), but if your anon use case makes sense for such a setup, it is a valuable tool to have in the toolbox.
- Torgo 12y agoCan you explain this? bridge relays are setup using "PublishServerDescriptor 0" but exit nodes? How does that work?
- readmission 12y agohttps://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2011-August/000900.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2011-Augus... If you just config it with PublishServerDescriptor as 0 and someone else knows the IP (middle relays) they will be able to use it. It's essentially a function of not announcing the node to anyone. Edit: And to be clear, priv exit nodes don't prevent the timing attack in the article.
- paulhauggis 12y agoI stopped trusting Tor a couple of years ago.
- SoftwareMaven 12y agoSo encrypting content as it travels through Tor is generally considered best practice, but how does one get/manage/pay for a VPN such that the VPN itself doesn't lead directly back to you?
- hawkice 12y agoSo, to clarify something: you connect to the VPN, and the VPN connects to TOR. If you do it the other way around (as you point out) it's pretty worthless. If you connect to TOR from the VPN then the most de-anonymized you are going to get is "customer of this VPN provider". As for paying for services such that "customer of this VPN provider" can't be linked to you, I'd look at places that specifically accept bitcoin (I'm not a fan in general, but in this case, it signals their willingness to avoid collecting normal billing data like name, address, cc#, etc.). https://proxy.sh/ https://proxy.sh/ I have no affiliation but they popped up in the googlings. Seems to be simple enough to get their service without giving away anything personally identifiable. EDIT: the reason I tease out those two parts is because I'm concerned people will think TOR can protect against entities that can do a global customer-of-VPN dereference. TOR doesn't protect against global super-adversaries, consult your local security practitioner before feeling safe, etc. etc.
- onewaystreet 12y agoVPN -> TOR is wrong. Think about what happens if the VPN gets owned or seized. The bottom line is if your need for anonymity isn't just fantasy (i.e. you are actually a target of law enforcement) then no layer of your protection should be an IP that is connected to your real identity or location.
- escapologybb 12y agoI am unsure at this VPN -> TOR notification, would you mind clarifying it for me please? At the moment if I start up my VPN client and wait for the connection to my very trustworthy VPN provider, and only then open to Tor Browser Bundle, is that the right way round? Thanks for the clarification.
- exo762 12y agoAnd as I understand this attack it is possible only if connection between target server and client is not protected by SSL.
- colordrops 12y agoEven in incognito mode, on my machine Chrome puts out enough unique info identify it across 4 million other users. You can test your browser here: https://panopticlick.eff.org/ https://panopticlick.eff.org/ How well does Tor do with panopticlick?
- Forbo 12y agoLast I had checked, using the browser bundle in Tails with javascript disabled puts the fingerprint to about 1 in 22,000, but it's been a couple months since I last tested. Going to fire up my machine and see what it shows now, will report back with results shortly. Update: Tor Browser in Tails 1.2 with javascript disabled returns a fingerprint that's shared by 1 in 2,615 with 11.35 bits of identifying information.
- newaccountfool 12y agoIs that not rather narrow? How is it not say 1 in 100k?
- kissickas 12y agoHow do I have more identifying bits of information, but it's shared by more browsers? >Within our dataset of several million visitors, only one in 4,955 browsers have the same fingerprint as yours. >Currently, we estimate that your browser has a fingerprint that conveys 12.27 bits of identifying information. I figured it would be more unique due to my running Tor Browser on a Mac - but I don't see how the math works out. Unless it actually has a count of machines with information identical to mine?
- Goopplesoft 12y ago> Unless it actually has a count of machines with information identical to mine? How else would it work (not assuming even distribution)? Im sure its a hash counter.
- mbrubeck 12y ago1/4955 means your fingerprint is shared by fewer browsers than the other commenter's 1/2915. If your fingerprint is totally unique (like mine, with 22.16 bits of information) then it is shared by only 1 in 4,697,672 browsers in their dataset.