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Former NSA lawyer: the cyberwar is between tech firms and the US government
- Legogris 12y agoI'd say what he's really saying is that it is between governments and their citizens.
- maerF0x0 12y ago>"Baker said encrypting user data had been a bad business model for Blackberry, which has had to dramatically downsize its business and refocus on business customers. “Blackberry pioneered the same business model that Google and Apple are doing now - that has not ended well for Blackberry,” said Baker. Baker is incompetent. Blackberry's primary advantage was its encryption. It branded itself as a business device and supported enterprise use. As bring your own device became mainstream and as the app store markets grew, Blackberry fell behind, failing to deliver the diversity of apps that iOS and Android did. Sales of devices fell and hence they've had to lay off 1000s. TlDr; Baker has it wrong; Encryption was a business advantage for Blackberry, until access to a diversity of apps mattered more.
- higherpurpose 12y agoNot to mention the news that Blackberry started giving Indian and Saudi Arabia governments access to their encrypted data actually hurt Blackberry's image in enterprise. Also some countries are banning US tech companies now not because they encrypt stuff but because they give access to the US government to their citizens' data (including officials). Maybe it's true maybe it's not, but they have the right to question it and protect against it. If companies had end-to-end encryption and even they couldn't look at the data, I have a feeling those officials would trust them a little more. I also find it hilarious that Baker is straight out suggesting "we should be more like China" when it comes to surveillance. How is he not being laughed out of the building?
- atmosx 12y agoHm, maybe Apple can do that, but for Google not looking at the data is not an option, it's the core business. For facebook too. However maybe, just maybe, they can come up with a way to share with governments only a small fraction, protecting their customers/users. I don't see how, but their engineers are smart, they could figure out something that works. It's not just NSA or the US here. These corporations are multinational, operating on many different countries. Once the NSA has officially stepped foot in Google's data so will do the EU, Japan, China, etc.
- Zigurd 12y agoSubscription services are almost always more profitable than ad supported services. If encrypted gmail and hangouts were priced like the storage I buy from Google, I'd be a paying customer.
- ddispaltro 12y agoI personally prefer it as well, but I imagine that statement is hard to back up (although I wish it is true). Did you mean specifically profitable or income related?
- rdl 12y agoIIRC Blackberry gave PIN-based/consumer/BIS messaging keys to those governments, and had key escrow for BES deployed in country, but when I took a US-BES Blackberry into UAE, India, KSA, etc., I still had end to end protection.
- revelation 12y agoBlackberry is suddenly the posterchild for encryption? I thought Blackberry is this service where all your mail and communication is routed in cleartext through their services, a workaround from the days of 1G that they simply never got around to get rid of before smartphones flattened their business. That is not encryption, if anything it is the direct opposite.
- wmf 12y agoI thought Blackberry is this service where all your mail and communication is routed in cleartext through their services That's how consumer BlackBerry worked (while other consumer services at the time that had no encryption whatsoever) but the enterprise version was as secure as they could make it.
- hendzen 12y agoBlackBerry (RIM) is the owner of Certicom, which holds many key patents related to efficiently implementing elliptic curve cryptography.
- Spooky23 12y agoIn enterprise environments, your traffic is/was strongly encrypted from the device to your BES server.
- maerF0x0 12y agoAlso, their encryption had the key feature that it could be easily run on low powered devices. It was a big deal to run AES on a phone 10+ years ago, but apparently (I dont have a source) the eliptic curve crypto was more efficient.
- rdl 12y agoBlackberry did always support "decrypt at the BES" which meant essentially corporate key escrow. It did mean the system owner (company) had full control of everything, but it meant governments/carriers/etc. didn't. It's a great security model for businesses. For consumers, allowing "3 of 5 trusted friends" to do key recovery for you, with a 7 day delay, might also be a good model. I actually have no problem with key recovery/key repository type systems (reluctant to say "key escrow" when it's not mandatory) -- as long as the users are explicitly informed and given a choice. For 99% of users, some kind of key recovery usually is the right choice.
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- Spooky23 12y agoIt is touching that a NSA lawyer cares so deeply about Apple and Google's business model. BlackBerry fucked up their business the old fashioned way -- by screwing up. They were an early player that listened too closely to their early adopter customers. These customers, including the banks and federal government, cared about stuff like keyboards and CAC integration. I've worked in very large IT environments, and users of our networks occasionally commit crimes, including heinous crimes that disgust me. Either way, when counsel tells me that we have a lawful warrant, we have a duty to provide the data. The argument put forth by this clown is complete bunk.
- ddispaltro 12y agoThis is exactly what I was thinking. It's incredibly frustrating that this guy is spewing complete garbage. Hopefully the public (probably not true) is starting to see through this crap and realize this is a last ditch effort to attack companies trying to do the right thing.
- csandreasen 12y agoWhat Baker is trying to express is that companies like Apple could be shooting themselves in the foot with corporate sales if the data sitting on devices they're manufacturing can't be handed over when counsel tells you that there's a valid warrant. If Apple says the data on the phones is completely secure and not even the cops can get to it, then that means IT can't get to it when directed to, either. Management might not like that so much.
- Spooky23 12y agoIf as a company, you aren't managing your devices, (trivial to do at low cost via MDM) there is no difference between encrypted/unencrypted -- you're reliant on the custodian of the phone to do the right thing when turning over the device. Baker wants the US to have the same access to data that Saudi Arabian or Indian law requires, except in those countries there is actual law requiring this. NSA/et al prefers "gentleman's agreements" backed by some broadly defined law that is impossible to contest in open court.
- fnordfnordfnord 12y ago>Blackberry fell behind, failing to deliver the diversity of apps that iOS and Android did. Sales of devices fell and hence they've had to lay off 1000s. BB had a string of embarrassing system outages that also didn't help.
- rdl 12y agohttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ak4ZwLU3aX0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ak4ZwLU3aX0 is the raw video. I'm obviously a bit biased here, but I've always wondered if Baker actually believes his arguments or not.
- csandreasen 12y agoThanks for the link to the video. I think his argument makes sense (just speaking with regards to encryption - they brought up a couple of things in the discussion), but you have to keep in mind that he's arguing from a completely different perspective than most of the folks posting to HN. Whereas it's usually in the best interest for a private citizen to have all of the data on his/her device encrypted and only decryptable by him/her, it's not the same case for corporate or government data, which is a huge portion of the market. Baker is arguing from the point of view that a large organization needs to be able to monitor what its employees are doing because they're legally responsible for anything that those employees may do. Imagine having to secure a network where you couldn't look at the logs due to privacy concerns; or figuring out which disgruntled employee is siphoning data off to a competitor; or responding to warrant/subpoena when one of your employees is suspected of committing a crime. You're not in a very good position if the only one who can decrypt the data is the end user. Not to mention that there are also situations, particularly in government, where it's in the best interest of the public to be able to investigate a government official for wrongdoing. If their IT department can't get to their e-mails when the Inspector General comes knocking, what's to stop that official from just saying "Whoops, I forgot my password." ?
- Zigurd 12y agoWhy would these use cases need end to end encryption?
- csandreasen 12y agoI'm sorry if I wasn't clear. I wasn't meaning to limit my argument to data in transit - I was also including data at rest. To answer your question though, end-to-end encryption of data in transit will obviously interfere with an employer's ability to log transactions. I think Mr. Baker's arguments were more directed at the recent ubiquitous iPhone encryption controversy (in fact, after doing a quick search, he made almost the exact same argument in the NY Times directed explicitly towards Apple[1], although I think his wording could be toned down slightly). Since the decryption mechanism on the iPhone is tied to chip inside it, it limits a company's ability to hand you a corporate iPhone and still be able to monitor what you're doing with it, hand it over to the cops, etc. Baker makes the further argument that while Apple can encrypt everyone's data to the chagrin of the FBI and the federal government is unlikely to enact any laws preventing it or hindering sales, Apple will have a much harder time doing the same in certain foreign markets. A country like China will likely have much more political will to push Apple out of the market if their cops can't decrypt people's phones. Maybe that will ultimately be a good thing, but by trying to send a message to the US government they might be opening up a much larger can of worms overseas. [1] http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/30/apple-vs-the-law/data-access-shouldnt-be-up-to-companies-alone http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/30/apple-vs-the...
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- grandalf 12y agoThis is a fairly evolved astroturf argument which will likely be enjoyed by all powerful interests (government and private). The battle is between powerful interests and the masses. The powerful interests gain a lot by controlling information and dissent. Surveillance is a useful tool to help achieve that.
- justcommenting 12y agothis and the FBI's crypto wars redux both appear to be designed to divert attention and resources away from understanding and addressing surveillance-related abuses using the classic and surprisingly effective strategy: controlling the debate by defining its terms
- DannyBee 12y agoJust from the timber of the comments, i had guessed this was Stewart Baker. The man does not, IMHO, deserve to be viewed as an expert on anything other than playing political games. I'm not sure how he got to where he was, but i'm pretty sure it had nothing to do with competence (and that's something i'll rarely say). If you want to form an opinion, he posts quite often on volokh.com as a blogger.
- lotsofmangos 12y agoI do wonder if Matthew Prince's faith may be a little bit misplaced here. I presume it was meant as a figure of speech, but mathematics is not an area where faith is especially dependable.
- CurtMonash 12y ago"the easiest war to swim"???? Copy-editing fail.
- pessimizer 12y agoprobably autocorrect from 'swin.' 'S' and 'w' are very close.
- declan 12y agoI've known Stewart Baker, the ex-NSA GC quoted in the linked article, for about 15 years--not incredibly well, but well enough that he'd show up at parties I held in my home when I was living in D.C. before moving to the SF bay area. Stewart is extremely smart, should not be underestimated, and HN comments in this thread calling him "incompetent" reflect badly on the person making the comment. He's likely the single most capable adversary the HN/EFF/ACLU/Cato/Mozilla/etc. axis faces over encryption (if he ends up playing that role). Stewart is correct that end-to-end crypto will "restrict [companies'] ability to sell" products internationally. And he is narrowly correct that "the market for absolute encryption is more limited than you might think" in a corporate environment. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ak4ZwLU3aX0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ak4ZwLU3aX0 [8:45] But these are merely clever rhetorical devices. Of course Apple/Google/FB/etc. know that HTTPS will vex snoophappy governments; at this point I suspect their CEOs may view that as a welcome side effect and in any case know their business better than a DC attorney does. And of course banks and brokerage firms don't want end-to-end encryption for their employees; they have likely have FINRA and other legal obligations to preserve correspondence. Okay, Russia and China are snoophappy and banks may want access to employees' email. Now can we go back to talking about the NSA's bulk surveillance of law-abiding Americans? Stewart's comments at 12:56 about Silicon Valley companies "picking fights" with the NSA are also misleading. In reality, the NSA was "picking fights" by bulk-tapping Google's interdata center links, subverting encryption standards, and (in the 1990s) defending export controls that weakened American companies' ability to compete. I posted more about this here: https://twitter.com/declanm/status/529804398457651201 https://twitter.com/declanm/status/529804398457651201 https://twitter.com/declanm/status/529798596221095937 https://twitter.com/declanm/status/529798596221095937 Today these companies -- and hopefully the startup founders here on HN -- are merely protecting their users by adopting encryption. At http://recent.io/ http://recent.io/, which I founded after leaving CNET/CBS earlier this year, our forthcoming Android and iOS apps use only HTTPS to connect to the backend. Naturally. TLDR: You underestimate Stewart Baker at your peril.
- ihsw 12y agoHow do you feel about the assertion that the NSA et al were getting something for free, and all this hubbub about privacy and encryption is simply a smokescreen -- the Google's of the world want their pound of flesh. They see a new and robust revenue stream where the product was being shoplifted, and they're correcting that business oversight. They will give the government what they want, but at a cost. Be it in a dollar amount, backroom hand-greasing, political football, or other otherwise -- the government will pay that cost.
- billions 12y agoThe internet moves much faster than government and so the government can't control it. Information moves like water. Everybody is exposed for who they are and nobody can fake it. The whole world is in a big room and everybody can hear each other. Wars will no longer be violent and fought with weapons, they will be fought with software hacks.
- zaroth 12y agoIt's surreal reading what Baker is saying. Companies aren't generally afraid of their employees, and any competent IT department can manage BYOD. The reality is that privacy and security has become an extremely important differentiator, and I'm glad to see Apple and Google both capitalizing on it. This was by far the scariest part; "But I’ve worked with these companies and as soon as they get a law enforcement request no matter how liberal or enlightened they think they are, sooner to later they find some crime that is so loathsome they will do anything to find that person and identify them so they can be punished." Seriously? Yes, just advertise your complete contempt for following due process, because, you know, it's easier to catch crooks that way. Thank you for proving within the article exactly why end-to-end cryptography is needed, so that we don't have to trust people like this to actually follow the law.
- arethuza 12y agoAs an aside: "The crypto wars have about as much to do with the outcome of security as the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 had to do with the outcome of WW2." I've seen it argued that the Soviet-Finnish (AKA the "Winter War") actually had quite a large impact on the outcome of WW2: - The difficulties the Soviets had in fighting the Finns made them re-organize their command structure of the Red Army, re-instating traditional rank structures and reducing the role of political officers - It led Hitler to believe that the Soviets would be easy to defeat, underestimating both the size and quality of Soviet forces So you could argue that if the Soviet-Finnish hadn't happened then Hitler might not have been quite so keen to invade the Soviet Union when he did and might have encountered a more poorly organized Red Army when he did. NB The Finns put up an incredible defence of their country against apparently overwhelming attacks, including Simo Häyhä who as a sniper had 505 combat kills. Perhaps we should be concluding that a small, skilled and highly motivated defence can blunt the attack of even the most powerful of enemies?
- tfgg 12y agoDoes all the protesting by security agencies actually mean much, in terms of a signal? 1) If these measures are effective and stop them doing what they perceive to be their job, they'd have to protest. 2) If they had access to the information by other means, they'd have to protest anyway, otherwise you'd be able to conclude we're in situation 1 My guess it's a bit of both, and they're mostly just losing their ability to mass surveil against low priority targets (e.g. populations), since cracking the encryption for absolutely all connections would be too much work.
- squozzer 12y agoThe disingenuity lies in the lack of context. The emergence of the NSA as America's secret police did not happen as an aberration but within the phenomenon of shrinking rights that I've noticed since my political awareness began in 1980 or so. Since then, I have not seen any expansion of rights for anyone, except maybe for those living in the former Warsaw Pact and non-humans (e.g. pets) in the US. I have however seen a relaxation of controls for groups such as law enforcement. It may have started with the belief that "criminals have more rights than victims" that found expression in movies such as Sudden Impact. Such sympathetic arguments missed the point that the power of the state doesn't target victims. Regardless of origin, law enforcement lobbied for - and usually got - exception after exception to the bill of rights until we reached the point where an actual trial hardly matters. While the rights of suspects and law-abiding people shrank, the scope of the term "national security" grew, fueled by another belief - that the survival of the state mattered more than its' intended purpose - the protection of the lives and liberties of its' inhabitants.