7 ms·
How utterly pathetic. Encryption export restrictions are an absolute joke. I can go read a Wikipedia article right now that heavily details the inner workings
by Someone1234 12y ago
How utterly pathetic.
Encryption export restrictions are an absolute joke. I can go read a Wikipedia article right now that heavily details the inner workings of most block ciphers. They're still fining people for exporting anything over 64 bits (which is most things), even if almost every individual let alone government has access to the technological knowledge to reproduce such encryption at home.
Seems like this fine is about them exporting a custom Linux distro' with all the normal encryption libraries still in-place (e.g. 256 AES).
Why do I get the strong sense that this fine isn't really about exporting encryption and is really about Wind River failing to place backdoors into this equipment? Because frankly that makes a lot more sense than what it appears to be on the surface.
Wind River got fined for "something" to do with encryption. Now you can either take the government at their word and assume that that thing is just exporting AES 256 within a standard OS, or maybe consider it a little deeper and wonder if it was punishment for something else Wind River did or didn't do.
- api 12y agoNot only that, but anyone in any embargoed country can trivially redirect through a VPS or Tor and bypass any controls. It's sort of like the war on drugs if pot could be sent electronically. Hilarious security theater...
- tptacek 12y agoIf the USG wanted to coerce Wind River into backdooring vxWorks, they have better ways to do it than a newsworthy enforcement action regarding cryptography exports. Export controls for crypto are stupid and counterproductive, though; I agree with you there.
- Kalium 12y agoThe amount in question doesn't make sense for that. Nor does the voluntary disclosure. 750k isn't a scary and punishing fine when you have Intel backing you.
- lotsofmangos 12y agoThis could be just meant as a message to other firms. Intel might even be getting the money back through routes like tax breaks and just be playing along.
- Kalium 12y agoThen the message is "Obey the law, or you will be slapped with trivial and meaningless fines".
- lotsofmangos 12y agoThe contracts the fine was over were valued at less than 3 million dollars, so it was pretty sizable in those terms.
- AnimalMuppet 12y ago> I can go read a Wikipedia article right now that heavily details the inner workings of most block ciphers. Yes, you can. And from that, you can go implement those cyphers. And the NSA is probably OK with that, because it's really hard to implement crypto correctly. If I understand correctly, more crypto systems are broken because of implementation flaws than because of protocol flaws. So if you have to implement it yourself, odds are that you will make a mistake that makes it insecure, especially if you aren't an expert on crypto.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- bruce511 12y agoI know this is a common belief, but I'm not completely sure it's true. I mean crypto is an algorithm, and there are reference vectors for most common types, so you can be pretty sure you got the basics right. Now sure, you need to worry about other things, like the entropy of andomm number generators and so on, but this stuff isn't exactly rocket science. So does experience help? Sure. And maybe you need to be I the upper quartile to get it right, but programming is programming and yes it's going to take some time and effort, but clearly it's do'able... Now I'm not recommending you do your own - I'm just not sure I buy the idea that it's impossible for mere mortals to pull it off... Then again, maybe I'm just an NSA employee wanting to make you think it's safe...
- serge2k 12y agoSide channel attacks are more common.
- FreeFull 12y agoEspecially timing attacks. Designing security-related software that is immune to those really is challenging.
- mark-r 12y agoAnd those references are either well-studied by the NSA to learn the implementation failures, or they've actively worked on the reference to insert a weakness.
- pera 12y ago> is really about Wind River failing to place backdoors into this equipment? I also felt some bad vibes from this story. There are probably hundreds of US based companies exporting embedded crypto, but how many are exporting to China and Russia a RTOS for the aerospace and defense industries?
- jgwest 12y agoDude. $750K for Intel. They spend more per day on psychological counseling for their chip geek employees who think they're living in the Matrix. Ain't gonna force them to backdoor nothin'... ain't gonna be punishment either for not doing a backdoor job when they were told nicely to do a nice backdoor job. Sure, my tinfoil is as good as anybody's... REYNOLDS WRAP HEAVY DUTY... best there is... but this seems to be a clear case of some bureaucrat applying the rules he or she has been given to the case he or she has been given... Nothing else...
- marincounty 12y agoI laughed too hard. I'll get down voted?
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- runeks 12y ago> Encryption export restrictions are an absolute joke. I can go read a Wikipedia article right now that heavily details the inner workings of most block ciphers. You are right. Encryption exports are a joke. Not because of Wikipedia, however, but rather because of open source software. It's trivial to find instructions on how to build OpenSSL from source, especially for a foreign government with all the power and money they have. This makes the law in question nonsensical in theory and ineffective in practice.
- tptacek 12y agoAs a public policy matter, and if I had to guess, these controls have more to do with retarding the flow of any high-end technology to the USG blacklist. The policy goal isn't to prevent organizations on the blacklist from being able to deploy RSA encryption, but rather to prevent them from sourcing technology of any sort from US companies. Blacklisted organizations can obviously still source RSA, along with whatever platform they want to run it on, but it's presumably more expensive for them to do so.
- anigbrowl 12y agoI'm not even sure the object is to make it significantly more expensive, at least not in the financial sense. If I were a securocrat, I'd be monitoring entities forbidden from purchasing this stuff from the US in order to compile intelligence on them and their vendors - do they prefer to use TOR, or just hit a supplier in .xyz domain, or does a particular individual reliably purchase a plane ticket after a legal rejection?
- tptacek 12y agoThis could also be one of those things where everyone involved recognizes that the policy is incoherent, but any time someone makes a serious move towards reforming it, they're informed by DoD or DHS that aspects of the policy have convenient knock-on effects that they don't want to eliminate. If the policy isn't actively harming industry (and beyond optics it may not really be doing that much direct harm), it may seem like poor risk/reward to change it. This isn't a normative argument.
- joe_the_user 12y agoThis idiocy also give you the feeling that the Federal government is on such a roll forward that every agency that ever lost a battle on security wants to come back and re-win it.
- DenisM 12y ago>Encryption export restrictions are an absolute joke. I don't think you give BIS & NSA the credit they deserve. Experto crede. The restrictions may serve a useful purpose and if you can't see it, that doesn't mean they are the ones missing the point. Having myself had to pass the export control for one of my apps, and so having the opportunity to pour over the these regulations in great detail, I came to conclusion that the actual purpose of the crypto export regulation is not to control export of the technology. That sort of restrictions is impossible to implement, as you noted, and it's also quite unnecessary. The actual purpose of the law is to prevent export of expertise. Implementing a crypto system that would be secure end-to-end is pretty much impossible without being an expert, and even then it's exceptionally hard. The best chances belong to a team of experts with a track record of fruitful collaboration and rich history in a particular area. Unlike bits and pieces of code, cohesive teams of experts are relatively easy to keep track of. The way this control regime works, is that the entirety of the regulation revolves around two questions: 1) Are you supplying a turn-key end-to-end system to the client? 2) Are you supplying services to setup a complete, tailored system for the client? If the answer is "yes" to either question, that raises the red flag for the BIS/NSA, and they want to see what's going on there. Otherwise it's just a minor bureaucratic hoop to jump through. You are certainly welcome to export bunch of crypto code, and they even have a special open-source exception to the paperwork requirements. So, you may disagree with the goals of this regulation, but it's certainly not a joke you make it out to be.
- jackgavigan 12y agoWhilst the ability to implement secure systems is certainly not commonplace, the United States doesn't have a monopoly on encryption and security expertise.
- maratd 12y ago> The actual purpose of the law is to prevent export of expertise. You're both right. It can serve dual purposes. To prevent the export of expertise AND give the government a convenient stick to smack anyone not doing what they want.
- tkinom 12y agoBTW, other countries can and do start to apply the same rules against US companies. China started to have a lot more rules and regulations regarding to the importation of products with any kind of crypto. They are becoming bigger IT/Mobile product market than US. I can see in 2-3 years - as soon as the Chinese home grow Mobile SOC are mature, they will start to require Intel/QComm/Apple to disclose everything they do in the Chip/Software level relate to crypto before any of the next gen product are allowed to be sold in Chinese market. The choice for AAPL/QComm/Intel will be do what the Chinese government wanted or loss access to 30-50% of customers on principle - like Google did a few years ago.