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Strengthening 2-Step Verification with Security Key

220 points by newscasta 12y ago

semenko 12y ago
No one has mentioned the coolest feature of U2F/Fido auth: TLS Channel IDs. Via an internal Chrome extension ("cryptotoken"), authentication state & the handshake can be bound to a specific TLS session -- preventing cookie theft. Incredibly cool: http://www.browserauth.net/channel-bound-cookies http://www.browserauth.net/channel-bound-cookies
- sweis 12y ago
  This is indeed a cool feature. I hadn't been aware of it until now. I see that Dirk Balfanz from Google published a IETF draft a couple years ago. I need to digest the security implications, but it seems like a nice mitigation to session theft.
  - zobzu 12y ago
    until tls session resumption gets more common and someone comes up with a "tls session resumption is not in fact secure" :( there were some talks in 2013 about this in various sec conferences
wnevets 12y ago
is this the result of the partnership with yubikey?
- higherpurpose 12y ago
  Google is supporting the FIDO U2F standard just like Yubikey now.
  - yanonymator 12y ago
    They pay upwards of $100k+ per year to have a seat on the board and direct the "standard" to suit their products.
    - SEMW 12y ago
      Your comment reads as if you believe that having an authentication standard that suits the products of the largest webmail provider is somehow bad. I'm having trouble understanding this. Better suiting the use-case of things like gmail seems like unequivocally a good thing. (As does the consortium being better funded by $100k+ a year, for that matter.)
StavrosK 12y ago
This is very interesting. Is this Yubikey-compatible? http://www.amazon.com/Plug-up-International-U2F-SK-01-FIDO-Security/dp/B00OGPO3ZS/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1413900231&sr=8-1&keywords=FIDO+U2F+Security+Key http://www.amazon.com/Plug-up-International-U2F-SK-01-FIDO-S... Can I buy one of these to use with SSH auth/password programs/Chrome?
- lambada 12y ago
  Some of YubiKey's products claim to be compatible with the U2F FIDO standard. https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/ https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/
- higherpurpose 12y ago
  It should be: https://fidoalliance.org/adoption/video/yubico-fido-alliance-universal-2nd-factor-u2f-demonstration https://fidoalliance.org/adoption/video/yubico-fido-alliance... https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/fido-u2f-security-key/ https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/fido-u2f-se...
  - iancarroll 12y ago
    Blog post: https://www.yubico.com/2014/10/google-releases-support-fido-u2f-security-key/ https://www.yubico.com/2014/10/google-releases-support-fido-...
- bjeanes 12y ago
  Yes, but importantly, only with firmware 33 or higher. I have 32.0 :( AIUI, for security reasons YubiKeys are not firmware upgradeable.
deleted 12y ago
[deleted]
bluesign 12y ago
I don't get this, what about malware pretending to be a browser? Is there a protection against this in protocol
- joshzayin 12y ago
  If there's malware on your computer, it could just as easily keylog your password and one-time code the next time you try to log in to google, silently drop those packets on the floor (so you think there was just a connection issue), and then use your credentials to get access to your account. If there's malware on your computer running as you, with access to things like USB devices, it becomes significantly harder (if not impossible) to do anything security critical on it.
- dragonwriter 12y ago
  That's not what this is intended to protect against. If your local machine is compromised, you are screwed, and 2FA no matter what the form isn't going to help you. At a minimum, for that, you need out-of-band confirmation of critical actions (e.g., a message to a different pre-registered device to confirm financial transactions before they are executed.)
- wmf 12y ago
  Yes, I think the protocol protects against MITM and replay attacks. http://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-ref-v1.0-rd-20140209.pdf http://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-ref-v1.0-rd-2014...
  - yanonymator 12y ago
    No, not really - if you're a MITM, you control what the user sees, as well as what gets sent to the device, and nothing prevents those 2 things being different. You might SEE that you're sending $100 to Grandma, but when you tap the key, you're authenticating your entire bank balance to some place in the Bahamas.
- tiziano88 12y ago
  At the very minimum, this requires physically interacting with the security key (by touching it), which prevents software from silently using the key to authenticate in the background. Then again, if your entire machine is compromised you basically have a MITM attack so close to your side of the channel that it is virtually impossible to do anything about it.
chris-at 12y ago
Sounds like an interesting idea but isn't it a bit limited? I can only use it on a computer, not on mobile devices.
- pgeorgi 12y ago
  Yubikey Neo should provide FIDO U2F over NFC.
  - kissickas 12y ago
    So the mobile version of this would be /less/ secure than standard 2FA?
    - emu 12y ago
      Why? Even if you can eavesdrop on the NFC communication, how does intercepting the challenge/response help you?
      - kissickas 12y ago
        I'm just asking, because I have no idea how this works. I figured an assailant could more easily make use of an NFC signal than they could see the code on the front of the device in the short time it takes you to memorize or copy/paste the code.
        nyolfen 12y ago
        it uses an OTP so even if they intercepted it, it wouldn't be useful
bjelkeman-again 12y ago
With more interaction online moving to smartphones and tablets, what do we do instead of USB hardware keys like these?
- x1798DE 12y ago
  Probably a similar device but with some sort of low-power NFC transponder rather than a physical connection.
  - janzer 12y ago
    I've never used it but, https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/yubikey-neo/ https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/yubikey-neo... seems to fit the bill.
    - jgrowl 12y ago
      I have one. It is pretty cool but it hasn't been real useful up until now. I haven't found many apps that support it. I ended up just grabbing the clipboard app that yubikey puts out. I tried using the static password feature by using it as part of my master password in 1password but the newer versions of 1password block using the clipboard in android (with good reason). It would be pretty awesome if password-managers added support for it.
      - ascorbic 12y ago
        LastPass supports Yubikey natively, including on mobile.
- iancarroll 12y ago
  Authy allows Bluetooth communication to get 2FA codes from your phone onto your Mac.
- tpurves 12y ago
  Wearables with BTLE.
higherpurpose 12y ago
Could we instead use smartwatch Bluetooth or NFC (probably better, I don't like the long range of Bluetooth for something like this) to unlock sites instead of these USB keys? Does the FIDO Alliance support such a protocol? I know Android 5.0 supports that but it's only for unlocking the phones (and Chromebooks I believe). But what about sites? Or is that too risky compared to an USB key?
- minisu 12y ago
  FIDO U2F strives to support Bluetooth and NFC, see https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-overview-v1.0-rd-20141008.pdf https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-overview-v1.0-rd-201...
kmfrk 12y ago
Security Key does not work on browsers other than Chrome. Well that's a bummer. Doesn't mean it can't be useful in some settings, though.
- wlesieutre 12y ago
  Also this though: > Security Key and Chrome incorporate the open Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) protocol from the FIDO Alliance, so other websites with account login systems can get FIDO U2F working in Chrome today. It’s our hope that other browsers will add FIDO U2F support, too.
  - philip1209 12y ago
    If you share the same FIDO U2F key between services, does that mean that one service could spoof tokens for a different service? e.g. foo gets compromised, so attackers can generate codes for google apps.
    - ef4 12y ago
      No. There are no shared secrets. This is real asymmetric crypto.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
- cbhl 12y ago
  You should go contribute patches to the browser of your choice. ;)
barrkel 12y ago
This seems to me to be a bit of a narrow market. At the upper end of secure machines, USB ports will be physically disabled. And if you're not hyper security conscious, you're not going to bother with a physical key. So with this, you need to be somewhat paranoid, but not totally paranoid.
- thomasahle 12y ago
  I think I might prefer this to the current mobile authentication. I often find that the times I need to log in to somebody elses computer, is also when I don't have my phone around. A small usb-something which fits in my wallet would be a nice back-up.
- dragonwriter 12y ago
  > At the upper end of secure machines, USB ports will be physically disabled. And if you're not hyper security conscious, you're not going to bother with a physical key. The reason that "upper end of secure machines" have disabled USB ports is because they are organization-owned machines that are issued to untrusted employees (often in organizations where all employees are untrusted in the relevant sense). But in the case of first-party machines (e.g., personally owned machines) where the user is similarly security-conscious, that factor doesn't exist. So, really, all you need to be is a security-conscious individual that uses your own computer for things where you have security concerns. (Or, as an organization, be one where the threat profile you concerned about addressing is more external than internal.)
- jgrowl 12y ago
  You could disable USB but maybe still have NFC readers on your machines at higher levels of security?
  - VLM 12y ago
    Until someone releases a NFC related exploit (shouldn't take long) and then corporate machines have their NFC disabled (open them up and snip the antenna coil with a scissors? Tuned RF field of high enough power to destroy the NFC chip electrically but not damage the rest of the machine? This will be interesting to watch...)
snowwrestler 12y ago
To me, USB seems more and more like a security problem in general. Operating systems trust USB devices implicitly, despite the fact that every single one is a little computer of its own that can be compromised. 2-factor auth via a mobile device airgaps the devices from one another, which seems like a great idea for security. If both factors are directly connected by a trust-by-default data channel, it seems at least possible that one exploit could affect both factors.
rlpb 12y ago
How does the challenge get from the web browser out to the USB device? I've spent some time looking for a specification, but haven't managed to find the answer to this question.
- elteto 12y ago
  The device probably registers as a USB keyboard, and it "types out" the 2-factor code when you tap it.
  - deleted 12y ago
    [deleted]
    - minisu 12y ago
      No, it's not. It's using HID, but not by identifying itself as a keyboard.
      - orclev 12y ago
        The Yubikey website specifies that the device registers as a Keyboard, flash card, and flash reader when you plug it in. That said it isn't entirely clear if this new standard utilizes that or if that's merely provided as a fallback for older devices that don't support this new protocol. Edit: After consulting the specification for this standard it does appear as if it uses the core USB specification to communicate with supported devices when using this protocol. There is also information stating that NFC, bluetooth and other transports will have specification provides later on but that they currently only have a spec for communication over USB. The takeaway appears to be that the Yubikey device can function as a 2FA over NFC or USB when in a sort of fallback mode that emulates a keyboard, but when used directly with this protocol can only support USB. It's possible there might be some driver shims that allow it to communicate over NFC while still appearing as a USB device to the browser, but that would of course require a custom driver be installed and most likely violates this standard in its current formulation.
        12y ago
hangonhn 12y ago
Not much of an improvement over 2FA using my phone because the times when I really need it to be easy is when I'm browsing on my phone. Since this is USB I can't use it on my phone. When I'm on my laptop I just pull out my phone and type in a short code and be done with it.
- orclev 12y ago
  Not sure how it will interact with this, but at least one of the compatible Yubikey devices that was mentioned also supports NFC specifically for use on mobile devices that lack USB ports.
  - orclev 12y ago
    As an addendum to this, after looking over the spec, it appears that the FIDO-U2F protocol currently only supports USB, but that support for NFC and bluetooth is planned in later versions of the specification. Presumably a firmware update sometime down the line would be sufficient to bring the Yubikey device up to date with the NFC standard and allow it to work over NFC in addition to the currently supported USB version of U2F.
    - hangonhn 12y ago
      That would be quite awesome.
    - amluto 12y ago
      Yubico doesn't allow firmware updates. They do, however, support the GlobalPlatform standard for uploading new JavaCard applets, and, if the NFC bindings were designed such that a JavaCard applet could implement it, then a U2F applet could be uploaded to an existing YKNeo.
Someone1234 12y ago
Shame I have to pick EITHER 2-step or Security Key. My ideal would be to use Security Key to bypass 2-step on devices that supported it and then use 2-step elsewhere. For example, some public computers have the USB port literally glued shut, therefore Security Key won't work. In those cases I'll still have my phone with me and could bypass it via 2-step. Essentially I want to use the Security Key as a way to save me typing in my 2-step code because I'm lazy, rather than to "add" security. Google's current 2-step "remember-device" doesn't really work for me as it utilises cookies which get cleared. I could add it to a white-list of preserved cookies but they use obscure often changing sub-domains.
- dragonwriter 12y ago
  > Shame I have to pick EITHER 2-step or Security Key. You don't. You must use 2-step to use Security Key. > My ideal would be to use Security Key to bypass 2-step on devices that supported it and then use 2-step elsewhere. That's exactly what happens when you use Security Key. FTFA: If you use 2-Step Verification, you can choose Security Key as your primary method [...] In general, you’ll still be able to use a verification code the way you normally do on any device that doesn’t support Security Key.
- wastedhours 12y ago
  Not sure about it, but this page [1] does say "In general, you’ll still be able to use a verification code the way you normally do on any device that doesn't support Security Key." Assuming you'd be able to tell it that it doesn't support it, rather than it just deciding based on hardware? [1] https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103523 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103523
- handsomeransoms 12y ago
  You don't have to pick one or the other. According to the FAQ [0] (linked from the blog post): "In general, you’ll still be able to use a verification code the way you normally do on any device that doesn’t support Security Key." [0] https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103523 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103523
tokenizerrr 12y ago
Interesting. I've hacked something together for my personal usage with my OpenGPG smartcard for use on my Windows desktop and developer-mode chromebook. In the end I had to work with "chrome native messaging" which basically calls native binaries on the host OS and is a nightmare to set up. This doesn't look like they're planning to start supporting existing smartcards, but hopefully it's a first step? My idea was to create a login page that requires the user to sign a secret with their private key which can be completed manually, but also automatically with the click of a button if the extension is installed. The key could live securely on a smartcard or in the user's gpg keyring, it doesn't matter as that part is deferred to gpg. In case anyone happens to be interested, my un-documented prototype sits at https://github.com/r04r/GPGThing https://github.com/r04r/GPGThing. It consists of a chrome extension, a golang application do some juggling between json input/output (which is a limitation by chrome native message passing) and gpg, and apache configs to set it up as an authentication method. There's some more hacks necessary to get it working on chromebook, including a crouton installation with gpg.
- iancarroll 12y ago
  Is there more info on GPG smart cards? I use a SafeNet eToken and highly reccomend it but it does X.509 certificates instead of GPG.
  - tokenizerrr 12y ago
    I've found https://wiki.debian.org/Smartcards/OpenPGP https://wiki.debian.org/Smartcards/OpenPGP a really good resource with plenty of links. There's also https://www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/smartcard-howto-single.html https://www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/smartcard-howto-s... & http://www.narf.ssji.net/~shtrom/wiki/tips/openpgpsmartcard http://www.narf.ssji.net/~shtrom/wiki/tips/openpgpsmartcard which I've found helpful. Once they're set up they behave just as if the key was part of your local keyring encrypted with the smartcard's passphrase, but is of course only usable when the card is plugged in. It actually seems like the Yubikey Neo also supports GPG, so that is quite nice. I own http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=42 http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=4... & http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=119 http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=1...
eykanal 12y ago
So, we recently had a bunch of articles coming out on "the fundamental insecurity of USB" [1]. How does that jive with a USB-based security key? Can't this be "flashed" like any other USB device? [1]: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/07/the_fundamental.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/07/the_fundament...
- wmf 12y ago
  That's really about the "fundamental insecurity" of a few low-end USB chips. Obviously a device whose entire purpose is security can't be reflashed with arbitrary compromised firmware.
- Someone1234 12y ago
  You cannot verify that the key hasn't been altered. Meaning that theoretically someone could steal your key, alter the firmware, turn it into a virtual hub and attach virtual keyboards/USB sticks which do nasty things. However the same can be said for any electrical device you carry. If you carry your laptop through a US border they can seize it for almost no reason, and attach things to the PCI bus directly internally (see the NSA's foreign intelligence catalogue for numerous examples). The USB security issues are just fun ones to exploit (relatively easy, with great results). No firmware is REALLY verifiable (e.g. baseband, CPU microcode, BIOS/uEFI, et al). Ultimately it boils down to physical security of your electronics and buying anonymously (so devices cannot be intercepted before they're delivered to you).
- mankyd 12y ago
  The insecurity relates the problem with allowing random usb devices to be plugged into a computer. Specifically, it points out that, even if you wipe an usb stick, you still can't trust that it's safe. The devices that Google is referring to should be inherently safe. If you don't trust the supplier of these devices then yes, that's an issue. But, in theory, you receive these from a trusted source. As long as the device doesn't leave your possession, you're ok. Edit: I should add that I didn't quite summarize the vulnerability correctly. If you plug a trusted USB device into an untrusted computer, you also have the potential for attack. If the USB device can be made writable, the computer can infect the USB device, propagating malware forward. I _assume_ that these security keys are made read-only before they leave factory, but vulnerabilities can be found in the darnedest of places!
fidotron 12y ago
Would be good if next gen chromebooks have a bay on the bottom with a USB socket so you can leave one of these attached without it dangling off the side (and maybe permanently glued in by paranoid IT). Another trick might be NFC in the palmrests that can detect your watch . . . Looks like a solid step in the right direction though.
- DEinspanjer 12y ago
  Yubikey's first offering that is U2F compatible is that bright blue USB key, but they have previously offered a USB key that is almost flush with the port, and the conductive contact is on the edge of it. I suspect they'll be updating that product to offer U2F soon, and it should be a better fit for what you are asking.
  - bri3d 12y ago
    The (expensive) Yubikey Neo Nano already supports U2F in the 'micro key' form-factor: http://www.amazon.com/Yubico-Y-110-YubiKey-NEO-n/dp/B00O8ST7MM/ http://www.amazon.com/Yubico-Y-110-YubiKey-NEO-n/dp/B00O8ST7... Hopefully they'll come out with a cheap U2F only nano-key soon.
  - cdjk 12y ago
    They already have with the neo-n: https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/ https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/ It does cost a bit more than the U2F-only version, however.
- jgrowl 12y ago
  I really just want a NFC reader on my macbook!
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
- semenko 12y ago
  The next release of ChromeOS will include nearby/proximity unlock features integrated with Android L, which they're calling "Easy Unlock". There are a few somewhat-spammy blog summaries, e.g. http://www.omgchrome.com/chrome-os-smartphone-easy-unlock-feature/ http://www.omgchrome.com/chrome-os-smartphone-easy-unlock-fe...
billpg 12y ago
My worry about using my phone as the second factor is that my phone is attractive to thieves. I would personally prefer to carry around a keyring with many fobs on it.
- jberryman 12y ago
  It seems a bit cheesy, but I just put a lock screen on my phone. I figure if anyone steals it, they're unlikely to have the chops to bypass it without wiping the phone (I assume that's possible with adb at least). That combined with Google's remote wipe functionality and I'm pretty comfortable with the theft scenario.
semenko 12y ago
EDIT: Looks like this is now working! Looks like there is a tiny UI bug -- make sure your account is correctly selected on the Security Token page if you have multiple accounts signed in. #userError Ouch, looks like a serious downside is that a given key can only be used with one Google account. Trying to add a U2F-compatible token to more than one Google account results in errors: "This Security Key is already registered. Use a key that is not registered yet and try again."
- Someone1234 12y ago
  I just looked at the specification for this, it looks like a Google-specific limitation. There's no reason why a single site couldn't support the same U2F for multiple accounts. In fact in Google's presentation they advertise a husband and wife using the same exact token for both of their accounts [0]. [0] https://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/gnubby https://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/gnubby
  - semenko 12y ago
    Ah, it looks like their FAQ also says this is supported: Can I use the same Security Key with multiple Google Accounts? Yes. You can register the same Security Key with multiple Google Accounts. https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103543?hl=en https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103543?hl=en
- rictic 12y ago
  Huh, that's odd. I just registered a second google account with the same security key and everything seems to have gone fine. I'd recommend filing a bug and/or posting more details here.
  - deleted 12y ago
    [deleted]
- DannyBee 12y ago
  I have the same security keys registered with three completely different google accounts (two completely unrelated domain accounts and one gmail account), so i'm not sure what's going on for you.
IgorPartola 12y ago
Cool, but I will continue using the Google Authenticator app. Google is not the only thing that requires 2FA, so do numerous other sites, and GA app is the most widely supported and the least pain in the behind. I don't see a point in plugging my entire keychain (the physical keychain, with my car keys) into my laptop every time I want to log into GMail, much less carrying around 10+ different USB tokens. Now, a NFC-based token where I don't have to type anything in, or an iWatch/FitBit/whatever type wearable as a token would be pretty cool. Or even better: a universal library/service that abstracts which token I use. That way I can have multiple tokens for different situations.
- andreyf 12y ago
  rtfa: "As more sites and browsers come onboard, security-sensitive users can carry a single Security Key that works everywhere FIDO U2F is supported."
  - IgorPartola 12y ago
    First, where would I carry this key? My phone is always with me, while my keys are not. (Yes, I know I could use the exercise to go get them when I am home, etc.). I also am not fond of attaching my entire keychain to the USB port of my laptop: I have broken several USB ports on older laptops this way. Taking the USB key off the keychain will inevitably result in me losing this small item (that's knowing me, not the same for everyone obviously). Second, the GA-style 2FA works great because it's so easy to support and so many things support it. TFA mentions more browser support. Well, I use 2FA for more than just the web. For example, ssh supports it. I am all for this becoming a standard and being more widely adopted, but the security vs usability tradeoff for me here is just not worth it. With these physical tokens I get marginally better security than with the GA app, while giving me a much worse experience.
    - rictic 12y ago
      Unlike usb drives though you don't need to leave this plugged in for more than a couple seconds, which greatly limits the danger of damaging your usb port.
AdmiralAsshat 12y ago
I like the idea of a physical key distinct from the phone, but I'm not sure about having to plug it in every time and/or restricting it to Chrome devices. Is there some way that it could instead be made compatible with a device like the RSA SecurID tokens? That way it remains separate from the devices I'm trying to get into and doesn't require a USB slot.
- amluto 12y ago
  Unfortunately, the FIDO Alliance seems to have forgotten to specify CCID bindings for U2F (i.e. they left out the trivial part of the protocol that would describe how to talk to one of these tokens in a smart card slot or over NFC). The specs describe USB HID bindings. https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/download https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/download
tantalor 12y ago
Some comments are pointing out how awkward this might be, > I don't see a point in plugging my entire keychain (the physical keychain, with my car keys) into my laptop every time I want to log in > I'm not sure about having to plug it in every time I'll share my experience. I use two of these on a laptop and desktop and I have never unplugged them; there's no reason to. They sit very flush in the USB slot. I suppose if I ever needed the extra USB slot for something else I might unplug it.
- semenko 12y ago
  Yeah, it looks like more reasonably priced U2F/FIDO tokens are coming soon, probably to the Play Store. Behind the scenes, the auth layer in Chrome is handled by a sneaky extension. There's a huge listing of product IDs in the manifest, all likely to launch very soon: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/master/chrome/browser/resources/cryptotoken/manifest.json https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/master/... (And some explicit Play Store references: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/c6b104c56f131bb6d1e70909f2708884f57aab9b https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/c6b104c... )
  - exhilaration 12y ago
    $6 is pretty reasonable, on Amazon: http://www.amazon.com/Plug-up-International-U2F-SK-01-FIDO-Security/dp/B00OGPO3ZS/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1413900011&sr=8-1&keywords=FIDO+U2F+Security+Key http://www.amazon.com/Plug-up-International-U2F-SK-01-FIDO-S...
- dingaling 12y ago
  > I use two of these on a laptop and desktop and I have never unplugged them; there's no reason to. I use a Yubikey for ${WORK} and we are required to remove such tokens as soon as they have fulfilled their purpose. On pain of disciplinary action, as it is considered on par with leaving a password on a Post-it. Otherwise there's no point in them as an additional security step in the event that the laptop is lost or stolen.
  - 12y ago
yanonymator 12y ago
Good luck plugging a USB key into your iPad, or letting your security-sensitive workplace let you plug arbitrary USB keys into your workstation, or convincing your bank that you really did not send your entire balance to Nigeria, even though you signed that transaction with a tap, etc etc... Remember Mt.Gox? That's Yubico's most public failure so far :-) Strong authentication needs to be out-of-band, and support transaction signing, and work everywhere, or there's no point using it. You can't get "out of band" with anything that you "plug in" - that's simply connecting it directly to the same threats. You also can't get "secure" when less than 100% of users can enjoy it's protection - it only needs to "not work" on one model of iPad, and it opens up the door to support bugs like "I can't log in to XYZ from my iPad 2" - so they need to give customers alternate access methods, like printable codes or recovery/bypass emails etc, at which point the entire protection goes out the window because that's just what the phishing gangs need to bypass it all. Solving half the problem, even if you paint it blue and write lots of nice publicity about it, does not a secure solution make!
- saganus 12y ago
  Can you please explain or give sources on why Mt.Gox is Yubi's most public failure? I started using Yubikey some months ago and this is news to me, so any info would be appreciated.
  - orclev 12y ago
    It had nothing to do with Yubikey. Mt.Gox implemented time based 2FA (think google authenticator) via Yubikey. The fact that Mt.Gox subsequently imploded had nothing to do with Yubikey and seems almost entirely to be based around a poor implementation with regards to handling bitcoin transactions combined with insider fraud. Public disclosure, I lost ~$700 to Mt.Gox, a tiny amount compared to some, mostly I was just trying to cash out a couple coins at the height of the bubble. I'm not terribly upset over it, although it would have been nice to see that $700 in my account, or at least get my 2 coins back.
- amluto 12y ago
  The prototype I've seen requires that you tap it, which is a major step forward. And I believe that the spec allows it to show something like "google.com" if it had a screen.
danielsju6 12y ago
Super cool; this a great win on the path to U2F acceptance. I ordered a key to try it out; I've been meaning to anyway. I want to try out the using U2F via NFC on Android and see if I can hack something together using Apple's private NFC framework. Wish the tokens had BTLE compatibility though.
jessaustin 12y ago
ISTM that a nice feature for HN would be to strip out the ?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Google... crap that gets stuck in URLs occasionally when people use RSS readers. In this case it doesn't seem to include any PII but I think sometimes it does?

220 points by newscasta 12y ago

No one has mentioned the coolest feature of U2F/Fido auth: TLS Channel IDs. Via an internal Chrome extension ("cryptotoken"), authentication state & the handshake can be bound to a specific TLS session -- preventing cookie theft. Incredibly cool: http://www.browserauth.net/channel-bound-cookies http://www.browserauth.net/channel-bound-cookies

sweis 12y ago
This is indeed a cool feature. I hadn't been aware of it until now. I see that Dirk Balfanz from Google published a IETF draft a couple years ago. I need to digest the security implications, but it seems like a nice mitigation to session theft.
- zobzu 12y ago
  until tls session resumption gets more common and someone comes up with a "tls session resumption is not in fact secure" :( there were some talks in 2013 about this in various sec conferences

wnevets 12y ago

is this the result of the partnership with yubikey?

higherpurpose 12y ago
Google is supporting the FIDO U2F standard just like Yubikey now.
- yanonymator 12y ago
  They pay upwards of $100k+ per year to have a seat on the board and direct the "standard" to suit their products.
  - SEMW 12y ago
    Your comment reads as if you believe that having an authentication standard that suits the products of the largest webmail provider is somehow bad. I'm having trouble understanding this. Better suiting the use-case of things like gmail seems like unequivocally a good thing. (As does the consortium being better funded by $100k+ a year, for that matter.)

StavrosK 12y ago

This is very interesting. Is this Yubikey-compatible? http://www.amazon.com/Plug-up-International-U2F-SK-01-FIDO-Security/dp/B00OGPO3ZS/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1413900231&sr=8-1&keywords=FIDO+U2F+Security+Key http://www.amazon.com/Plug-up-International-U2F-SK-01-FIDO-S... Can I buy one of these to use with SSH auth/password programs/Chrome?

lambada 12y ago
Some of YubiKey's products claim to be compatible with the U2F FIDO standard. https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/ https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/
higherpurpose 12y ago
It should be: https://fidoalliance.org/adoption/video/yubico-fido-alliance-universal-2nd-factor-u2f-demonstration https://fidoalliance.org/adoption/video/yubico-fido-alliance... https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/fido-u2f-security-key/ https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/fido-u2f-se...
- iancarroll 12y ago
  Blog post: https://www.yubico.com/2014/10/google-releases-support-fido-u2f-security-key/ https://www.yubico.com/2014/10/google-releases-support-fido-...
bjeanes 12y ago
Yes, but importantly, only with firmware 33 or higher. I have 32.0 :( AIUI, for security reasons YubiKeys are not firmware upgradeable.

deleted 12y ago

[deleted]

bluesign 12y ago

I don't get this, what about malware pretending to be a browser? Is there a protection against this in protocol

joshzayin 12y ago
If there's malware on your computer, it could just as easily keylog your password and one-time code the next time you try to log in to google, silently drop those packets on the floor (so you think there was just a connection issue), and then use your credentials to get access to your account. If there's malware on your computer running as you, with access to things like USB devices, it becomes significantly harder (if not impossible) to do anything security critical on it.
dragonwriter 12y ago
That's not what this is intended to protect against. If your local machine is compromised, you are screwed, and 2FA no matter what the form isn't going to help you. At a minimum, for that, you need out-of-band confirmation of critical actions (e.g., a message to a different pre-registered device to confirm financial transactions before they are executed.)
wmf 12y ago
Yes, I think the protocol protects against MITM and replay attacks. http://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-ref-v1.0-rd-20140209.pdf http://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-ref-v1.0-rd-2014...
- yanonymator 12y ago
  No, not really - if you're a MITM, you control what the user sees, as well as what gets sent to the device, and nothing prevents those 2 things being different. You might SEE that you're sending $100 to Grandma, but when you tap the key, you're authenticating your entire bank balance to some place in the Bahamas.
tiziano88 12y ago
At the very minimum, this requires physically interacting with the security key (by touching it), which prevents software from silently using the key to authenticate in the background. Then again, if your entire machine is compromised you basically have a MITM attack so close to your side of the channel that it is virtually impossible to do anything about it.

chris-at 12y ago

Sounds like an interesting idea but isn't it a bit limited? I can only use it on a computer, not on mobile devices.

pgeorgi 12y ago
Yubikey Neo should provide FIDO U2F over NFC.
- kissickas 12y ago
  So the mobile version of this would be /less/ secure than standard 2FA?
  - emu 12y ago
    Why? Even if you can eavesdrop on the NFC communication, how does intercepting the challenge/response help you?
    - kissickas 12y ago
      I'm just asking, because I have no idea how this works. I figured an assailant could more easily make use of an NFC signal than they could see the code on the front of the device in the short time it takes you to memorize or copy/paste the code.
      - nyolfen 12y ago
        it uses an OTP so even if they intercepted it, it wouldn't be useful

bjelkeman-again 12y ago

With more interaction online moving to smartphones and tablets, what do we do instead of USB hardware keys like these?

x1798DE 12y ago
Probably a similar device but with some sort of low-power NFC transponder rather than a physical connection.
- janzer 12y ago
  I've never used it but, https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/yubikey-neo/ https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/yubikey-neo... seems to fit the bill.
  - jgrowl 12y ago
    I have one. It is pretty cool but it hasn't been real useful up until now. I haven't found many apps that support it. I ended up just grabbing the clipboard app that yubikey puts out. I tried using the static password feature by using it as part of my master password in 1password but the newer versions of 1password block using the clipboard in android (with good reason). It would be pretty awesome if password-managers added support for it.
    - ascorbic 12y ago
      LastPass supports Yubikey natively, including on mobile.
iancarroll 12y ago
Authy allows Bluetooth communication to get 2FA codes from your phone onto your Mac.
tpurves 12y ago
Wearables with BTLE.

higherpurpose 12y ago

Could we instead use smartwatch Bluetooth or NFC (probably better, I don't like the long range of Bluetooth for something like this) to unlock sites instead of these USB keys? Does the FIDO Alliance support such a protocol? I know Android 5.0 supports that but it's only for unlocking the phones (and Chromebooks I believe). But what about sites? Or is that too risky compared to an USB key?

minisu 12y ago
FIDO U2F strives to support Bluetooth and NFC, see https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-overview-v1.0-rd-20141008.pdf https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-overview-v1.0-rd-201...

kmfrk 12y ago

Security Key does not work on browsers other than Chrome. Well that's a bummer. Doesn't mean it can't be useful in some settings, though.

wlesieutre 12y ago
Also this though: > Security Key and Chrome incorporate the open Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) protocol from the FIDO Alliance, so other websites with account login systems can get FIDO U2F working in Chrome today. It’s our hope that other browsers will add FIDO U2F support, too.
- philip1209 12y ago
  If you share the same FIDO U2F key between services, does that mean that one service could spoof tokens for a different service? e.g. foo gets compromised, so attackers can generate codes for google apps.
  - ef4 12y ago
    No. There are no shared secrets. This is real asymmetric crypto.
deleted 12y ago
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cbhl 12y ago
You should go contribute patches to the browser of your choice. ;)

barrkel 12y ago

This seems to me to be a bit of a narrow market. At the upper end of secure machines, USB ports will be physically disabled. And if you're not hyper security conscious, you're not going to bother with a physical key. So with this, you need to be somewhat paranoid, but not totally paranoid.

thomasahle 12y ago
I think I might prefer this to the current mobile authentication. I often find that the times I need to log in to somebody elses computer, is also when I don't have my phone around. A small usb-something which fits in my wallet would be a nice back-up.
dragonwriter 12y ago
> At the upper end of secure machines, USB ports will be physically disabled. And if you're not hyper security conscious, you're not going to bother with a physical key. The reason that "upper end of secure machines" have disabled USB ports is because they are organization-owned machines that are issued to untrusted employees (often in organizations where all employees are untrusted in the relevant sense). But in the case of first-party machines (e.g., personally owned machines) where the user is similarly security-conscious, that factor doesn't exist. So, really, all you need to be is a security-conscious individual that uses your own computer for things where you have security concerns. (Or, as an organization, be one where the threat profile you concerned about addressing is more external than internal.)
jgrowl 12y ago
You could disable USB but maybe still have NFC readers on your machines at higher levels of security?
- VLM 12y ago
  Until someone releases a NFC related exploit (shouldn't take long) and then corporate machines have their NFC disabled (open them up and snip the antenna coil with a scissors? Tuned RF field of high enough power to destroy the NFC chip electrically but not damage the rest of the machine? This will be interesting to watch...)

snowwrestler 12y ago

To me, USB seems more and more like a security problem in general. Operating systems trust USB devices implicitly, despite the fact that every single one is a little computer of its own that can be compromised. 2-factor auth via a mobile device airgaps the devices from one another, which seems like a great idea for security. If both factors are directly connected by a trust-by-default data channel, it seems at least possible that one exploit could affect both factors.

rlpb 12y ago

How does the challenge get from the web browser out to the USB device? I've spent some time looking for a specification, but haven't managed to find the answer to this question.

elteto 12y ago
The device probably registers as a USB keyboard, and it "types out" the 2-factor code when you tap it.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
  - minisu 12y ago
    No, it's not. It's using HID, but not by identifying itself as a keyboard.
    - orclev 12y ago
      The Yubikey website specifies that the device registers as a Keyboard, flash card, and flash reader when you plug it in. That said it isn't entirely clear if this new standard utilizes that or if that's merely provided as a fallback for older devices that don't support this new protocol. Edit: After consulting the specification for this standard it does appear as if it uses the core USB specification to communicate with supported devices when using this protocol. There is also information stating that NFC, bluetooth and other transports will have specification provides later on but that they currently only have a spec for communication over USB. The takeaway appears to be that the Yubikey device can function as a 2FA over NFC or USB when in a sort of fallback mode that emulates a keyboard, but when used directly with this protocol can only support USB. It's possible there might be some driver shims that allow it to communicate over NFC while still appearing as a USB device to the browser, but that would of course require a custom driver be installed and most likely violates this standard in its current formulation.
      - 12y ago

hangonhn 12y ago

Not much of an improvement over 2FA using my phone because the times when I really need it to be easy is when I'm browsing on my phone. Since this is USB I can't use it on my phone. When I'm on my laptop I just pull out my phone and type in a short code and be done with it.

orclev 12y ago
Not sure how it will interact with this, but at least one of the compatible Yubikey devices that was mentioned also supports NFC specifically for use on mobile devices that lack USB ports.
- orclev 12y ago
  As an addendum to this, after looking over the spec, it appears that the FIDO-U2F protocol currently only supports USB, but that support for NFC and bluetooth is planned in later versions of the specification. Presumably a firmware update sometime down the line would be sufficient to bring the Yubikey device up to date with the NFC standard and allow it to work over NFC in addition to the currently supported USB version of U2F.
  - hangonhn 12y ago
    That would be quite awesome.
  - amluto 12y ago
    Yubico doesn't allow firmware updates. They do, however, support the GlobalPlatform standard for uploading new JavaCard applets, and, if the NFC bindings were designed such that a JavaCard applet could implement it, then a U2F applet could be uploaded to an existing YKNeo.

Someone1234 12y ago

Shame I have to pick EITHER 2-step or Security Key. My ideal would be to use Security Key to bypass 2-step on devices that supported it and then use 2-step elsewhere. For example, some public computers have the USB port literally glued shut, therefore Security Key won't work. In those cases I'll still have my phone with me and could bypass it via 2-step. Essentially I want to use the Security Key as a way to save me typing in my 2-step code because I'm lazy, rather than to "add" security. Google's current 2-step "remember-device" doesn't really work for me as it utilises cookies which get cleared. I could add it to a white-list of preserved cookies but they use obscure often changing sub-domains.

dragonwriter 12y ago
> Shame I have to pick EITHER 2-step or Security Key. You don't. You must use 2-step to use Security Key. > My ideal would be to use Security Key to bypass 2-step on devices that supported it and then use 2-step elsewhere. That's exactly what happens when you use Security Key. FTFA: If you use 2-Step Verification, you can choose Security Key as your primary method [...] In general, you’ll still be able to use a verification code the way you normally do on any device that doesn’t support Security Key.
wastedhours 12y ago
Not sure about it, but this page [1] does say "In general, you’ll still be able to use a verification code the way you normally do on any device that doesn't support Security Key." Assuming you'd be able to tell it that it doesn't support it, rather than it just deciding based on hardware? [1] https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103523 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103523
handsomeransoms 12y ago
You don't have to pick one or the other. According to the FAQ [0] (linked from the blog post): "In general, you’ll still be able to use a verification code the way you normally do on any device that doesn’t support Security Key." [0] https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103523 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103523

tokenizerrr 12y ago

Interesting. I've hacked something together for my personal usage with my OpenGPG smartcard for use on my Windows desktop and developer-mode chromebook. In the end I had to work with "chrome native messaging" which basically calls native binaries on the host OS and is a nightmare to set up. This doesn't look like they're planning to start supporting existing smartcards, but hopefully it's a first step? My idea was to create a login page that requires the user to sign a secret with their private key which can be completed manually, but also automatically with the click of a button if the extension is installed. The key could live securely on a smartcard or in the user's gpg keyring, it doesn't matter as that part is deferred to gpg. In case anyone happens to be interested, my un-documented prototype sits at https://github.com/r04r/GPGThing https://github.com/r04r/GPGThing. It consists of a chrome extension, a golang application do some juggling between json input/output (which is a limitation by chrome native message passing) and gpg, and apache configs to set it up as an authentication method. There's some more hacks necessary to get it working on chromebook, including a crouton installation with gpg.

iancarroll 12y ago
Is there more info on GPG smart cards? I use a SafeNet eToken and highly reccomend it but it does X.509 certificates instead of GPG.
- tokenizerrr 12y ago
  I've found https://wiki.debian.org/Smartcards/OpenPGP https://wiki.debian.org/Smartcards/OpenPGP a really good resource with plenty of links. There's also https://www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/smartcard-howto-single.html https://www.gnupg.org/howtos/card-howto/en/smartcard-howto-s... & http://www.narf.ssji.net/~shtrom/wiki/tips/openpgpsmartcard http://www.narf.ssji.net/~shtrom/wiki/tips/openpgpsmartcard which I've found helpful. Once they're set up they behave just as if the key was part of your local keyring encrypted with the smartcard's passphrase, but is of course only usable when the card is plugged in. It actually seems like the Yubikey Neo also supports GPG, so that is quite nice. I own http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=42 http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=4... & http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=119 http://shop.kernelconcepts.de/product_info.php?products_id=1...

eykanal 12y ago

So, we recently had a bunch of articles coming out on "the fundamental insecurity of USB" [1]. How does that jive with a USB-based security key? Can't this be "flashed" like any other USB device? [1]: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/07/the_fundamental.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/07/the_fundament...

wmf 12y ago
That's really about the "fundamental insecurity" of a few low-end USB chips. Obviously a device whose entire purpose is security can't be reflashed with arbitrary compromised firmware.
Someone1234 12y ago
You cannot verify that the key hasn't been altered. Meaning that theoretically someone could steal your key, alter the firmware, turn it into a virtual hub and attach virtual keyboards/USB sticks which do nasty things. However the same can be said for any electrical device you carry. If you carry your laptop through a US border they can seize it for almost no reason, and attach things to the PCI bus directly internally (see the NSA's foreign intelligence catalogue for numerous examples). The USB security issues are just fun ones to exploit (relatively easy, with great results). No firmware is REALLY verifiable (e.g. baseband, CPU microcode, BIOS/uEFI, et al). Ultimately it boils down to physical security of your electronics and buying anonymously (so devices cannot be intercepted before they're delivered to you).
mankyd 12y ago
The insecurity relates the problem with allowing random usb devices to be plugged into a computer. Specifically, it points out that, even if you wipe an usb stick, you still can't trust that it's safe. The devices that Google is referring to should be inherently safe. If you don't trust the supplier of these devices then yes, that's an issue. But, in theory, you receive these from a trusted source. As long as the device doesn't leave your possession, you're ok. Edit: I should add that I didn't quite summarize the vulnerability correctly. If you plug a trusted USB device into an untrusted computer, you also have the potential for attack. If the USB device can be made writable, the computer can infect the USB device, propagating malware forward. I _assume_ that these security keys are made read-only before they leave factory, but vulnerabilities can be found in the darnedest of places!

fidotron 12y ago

Would be good if next gen chromebooks have a bay on the bottom with a USB socket so you can leave one of these attached without it dangling off the side (and maybe permanently glued in by paranoid IT). Another trick might be NFC in the palmrests that can detect your watch . . . Looks like a solid step in the right direction though.

DEinspanjer 12y ago
Yubikey's first offering that is U2F compatible is that bright blue USB key, but they have previously offered a USB key that is almost flush with the port, and the conductive contact is on the edge of it. I suspect they'll be updating that product to offer U2F soon, and it should be a better fit for what you are asking.
- bri3d 12y ago
  The (expensive) Yubikey Neo Nano already supports U2F in the 'micro key' form-factor: http://www.amazon.com/Yubico-Y-110-YubiKey-NEO-n/dp/B00O8ST7MM/ http://www.amazon.com/Yubico-Y-110-YubiKey-NEO-n/dp/B00O8ST7... Hopefully they'll come out with a cheap U2F only nano-key soon.
- cdjk 12y ago
  They already have with the neo-n: https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/ https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/ It does cost a bit more than the U2F-only version, however.
jgrowl 12y ago
I really just want a NFC reader on my macbook!
deleted 12y ago
[deleted]
semenko 12y ago
The next release of ChromeOS will include nearby/proximity unlock features integrated with Android L, which they're calling "Easy Unlock". There are a few somewhat-spammy blog summaries, e.g. http://www.omgchrome.com/chrome-os-smartphone-easy-unlock-feature/ http://www.omgchrome.com/chrome-os-smartphone-easy-unlock-fe...

billpg 12y ago

My worry about using my phone as the second factor is that my phone is attractive to thieves. I would personally prefer to carry around a keyring with many fobs on it.

jberryman 12y ago
It seems a bit cheesy, but I just put a lock screen on my phone. I figure if anyone steals it, they're unlikely to have the chops to bypass it without wiping the phone (I assume that's possible with adb at least). That combined with Google's remote wipe functionality and I'm pretty comfortable with the theft scenario.

semenko 12y ago

EDIT: Looks like this is now working! Looks like there is a tiny UI bug -- make sure your account is correctly selected on the Security Token page if you have multiple accounts signed in. #userError Ouch, looks like a serious downside is that a given key can only be used with one Google account. Trying to add a U2F-compatible token to more than one Google account results in errors: "This Security Key is already registered. Use a key that is not registered yet and try again."

Someone1234 12y ago
I just looked at the specification for this, it looks like a Google-specific limitation. There's no reason why a single site couldn't support the same U2F for multiple accounts. In fact in Google's presentation they advertise a husband and wife using the same exact token for both of their accounts [0]. [0] https://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/gnubby https://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/gnubby
- semenko 12y ago
  Ah, it looks like their FAQ also says this is supported: Can I use the same Security Key with multiple Google Accounts? Yes. You can register the same Security Key with multiple Google Accounts. https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103543?hl=en https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6103543?hl=en
rictic 12y ago
Huh, that's odd. I just registered a second google account with the same security key and everything seems to have gone fine. I'd recommend filing a bug and/or posting more details here.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
DannyBee 12y ago
I have the same security keys registered with three completely different google accounts (two completely unrelated domain accounts and one gmail account), so i'm not sure what's going on for you.

IgorPartola 12y ago

Cool, but I will continue using the Google Authenticator app. Google is not the only thing that requires 2FA, so do numerous other sites, and GA app is the most widely supported and the least pain in the behind. I don't see a point in plugging my entire keychain (the physical keychain, with my car keys) into my laptop every time I want to log into GMail, much less carrying around 10+ different USB tokens. Now, a NFC-based token where I don't have to type anything in, or an iWatch/FitBit/whatever type wearable as a token would be pretty cool. Or even better: a universal library/service that abstracts which token I use. That way I can have multiple tokens for different situations.

andreyf 12y ago
rtfa: "As more sites and browsers come onboard, security-sensitive users can carry a single Security Key that works everywhere FIDO U2F is supported."
- IgorPartola 12y ago
  First, where would I carry this key? My phone is always with me, while my keys are not. (Yes, I know I could use the exercise to go get them when I am home, etc.). I also am not fond of attaching my entire keychain to the USB port of my laptop: I have broken several USB ports on older laptops this way. Taking the USB key off the keychain will inevitably result in me losing this small item (that's knowing me, not the same for everyone obviously). Second, the GA-style 2FA works great because it's so easy to support and so many things support it. TFA mentions more browser support. Well, I use 2FA for more than just the web. For example, ssh supports it. I am all for this becoming a standard and being more widely adopted, but the security vs usability tradeoff for me here is just not worth it. With these physical tokens I get marginally better security than with the GA app, while giving me a much worse experience.
  - rictic 12y ago
    Unlike usb drives though you don't need to leave this plugged in for more than a couple seconds, which greatly limits the danger of damaging your usb port.

AdmiralAsshat 12y ago

I like the idea of a physical key distinct from the phone, but I'm not sure about having to plug it in every time and/or restricting it to Chrome devices. Is there some way that it could instead be made compatible with a device like the RSA SecurID tokens? That way it remains separate from the devices I'm trying to get into and doesn't require a USB slot.

amluto 12y ago
Unfortunately, the FIDO Alliance seems to have forgotten to specify CCID bindings for U2F (i.e. they left out the trivial part of the protocol that would describe how to talk to one of these tokens in a smart card slot or over NFC). The specs describe USB HID bindings. https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/download https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/download

tantalor 12y ago

Some comments are pointing out how awkward this might be, > I don't see a point in plugging my entire keychain (the physical keychain, with my car keys) into my laptop every time I want to log in > I'm not sure about having to plug it in every time I'll share my experience. I use two of these on a laptop and desktop and I have never unplugged them; there's no reason to. They sit very flush in the USB slot. I suppose if I ever needed the extra USB slot for something else I might unplug it.

semenko 12y ago
Yeah, it looks like more reasonably priced U2F/FIDO tokens are coming soon, probably to the Play Store. Behind the scenes, the auth layer in Chrome is handled by a sneaky extension. There's a huge listing of product IDs in the manifest, all likely to launch very soon: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/master/chrome/browser/resources/cryptotoken/manifest.json https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/master/... (And some explicit Play Store references: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/c6b104c56f131bb6d1e70909f2708884f57aab9b https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/c6b104c... )
- exhilaration 12y ago
  $6 is pretty reasonable, on Amazon: http://www.amazon.com/Plug-up-International-U2F-SK-01-FIDO-Security/dp/B00OGPO3ZS/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1413900011&sr=8-1&keywords=FIDO+U2F+Security+Key http://www.amazon.com/Plug-up-International-U2F-SK-01-FIDO-S...
dingaling 12y ago
> I use two of these on a laptop and desktop and I have never unplugged them; there's no reason to. I use a Yubikey for ${WORK} and we are required to remove such tokens as soon as they have fulfilled their purpose. On pain of disciplinary action, as it is considered on par with leaving a password on a Post-it. Otherwise there's no point in them as an additional security step in the event that the laptop is lost or stolen.
- 12y ago

yanonymator 12y ago

Good luck plugging a USB key into your iPad, or letting your security-sensitive workplace let you plug arbitrary USB keys into your workstation, or convincing your bank that you really did not send your entire balance to Nigeria, even though you signed that transaction with a tap, etc etc... Remember Mt.Gox? That's Yubico's most public failure so far :-) Strong authentication needs to be out-of-band, and support transaction signing, and work everywhere, or there's no point using it. You can't get "out of band" with anything that you "plug in" - that's simply connecting it directly to the same threats. You also can't get "secure" when less than 100% of users can enjoy it's protection - it only needs to "not work" on one model of iPad, and it opens up the door to support bugs like "I can't log in to XYZ from my iPad 2" - so they need to give customers alternate access methods, like printable codes or recovery/bypass emails etc, at which point the entire protection goes out the window because that's just what the phishing gangs need to bypass it all. Solving half the problem, even if you paint it blue and write lots of nice publicity about it, does not a secure solution make!

saganus 12y ago
Can you please explain or give sources on why Mt.Gox is Yubi's most public failure? I started using Yubikey some months ago and this is news to me, so any info would be appreciated.
- orclev 12y ago
  It had nothing to do with Yubikey. Mt.Gox implemented time based 2FA (think google authenticator) via Yubikey. The fact that Mt.Gox subsequently imploded had nothing to do with Yubikey and seems almost entirely to be based around a poor implementation with regards to handling bitcoin transactions combined with insider fraud. Public disclosure, I lost ~$700 to Mt.Gox, a tiny amount compared to some, mostly I was just trying to cash out a couple coins at the height of the bubble. I'm not terribly upset over it, although it would have been nice to see that $700 in my account, or at least get my 2 coins back.
amluto 12y ago
The prototype I've seen requires that you tap it, which is a major step forward. And I believe that the spec allows it to show something like "google.com" if it had a screen.

danielsju6 12y ago

Super cool; this a great win on the path to U2F acceptance. I ordered a key to try it out; I've been meaning to anyway. I want to try out the using U2F via NFC on Android and see if I can hack something together using Apple's private NFC framework. Wish the tokens had BTLE compatibility though.

jessaustin 12y ago

ISTM that a nice feature for HN would be to strip out the ?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Google... crap that gets stuck in URLs occasionally when people use RSS readers. In this case it doesn't seem to include any PII but I think sometimes it does?