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Has anyone started a rumor yet that the NSA infiltrated the OpenSSL development team to make OpenSSL ineffective and full of holes? The convoluted code of Open
by bhouston 13y ago
Has anyone started a rumor yet that the NSA infiltrated the OpenSSL development team to make OpenSSL ineffective and full of holes?
The convoluted code of OpenSSL alone (from yesterday's Hackernews post) seems like a great way to add all sorts of "bugs" inadvertent or not.
Unfortunately with the Snowden disclosures, there isn't much that I rule out of bounds for the NSA when it comes to things critical to internet security. OpenSSL is so widely used and critical, it would be silly to think that it would escape scrutiny by the NSA.
Remember that the Snowden docs says that the NSA can break SSL/TLS/https/VPN, etc., but we do not know the full details: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/how-does-nsa-break-ssl.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/how-does-nsa... But the one thing all of these technologies (SSL,TLS,https,VPNs) have in common is usually OpenSSL.
- simias 13y agoOr maybe it's just a bug. There's really no need for tinfoil hat theories unless you have any evidence for a possible conspiracy. That being said I agree that OpenSSL could do with a good code cleaning, but that's a massive undertaking, especially for such a popular library. You have to be backwards compatible. Maybe a big name in software could go and write a modern crypto library without all the cruft of OpenSSL but for now we have to deal with it.
- bhouston 13y ago> no need for tinfoil hat theories Unfortunately with the Snowden disclosures, there isn't much that I rule out of bounds for the NSA when it comes to things critical to internet security. OpenSSL is so widely used and critical, it would be silly to think that it would escape scrutiny by the NSA. For example of NSA efforts in related areas (which I figured you would already know): http://www.cnbc.com/id/101301261 http://www.cnbc.com/id/101301261 http://nation.time.com/2013/11/04/google-shocked-the-nsa-hacked-its-servers/ http://nation.time.com/2013/11/04/google-shocked-the-nsa-hac... http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/us-usa-security-nsa-rsa-idUSBREA2U0TY20140331 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/us-usa-security-ns... https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/11430124454/john-gilmore-how-nsa-sabotaged-key-security-standard.shtml https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/11430124454/john-...
- this_user 13y agoThere is a difference between infiltrating companies and deliberately introducing a bug that compromises a large chunk of the Internet. I would assume the NSA is interested in gaining access to systems in a way that doesn't allow basically anyone to ride on their coattails.
- doctorfoo 13y agoPerhaps they assume all software is buggy, so they may as well own the bugs?
- spacemanmatt 13y agoI would assume the NSA always assumed (note past tense) that their secrets stay pretty secret, and their wide-open backdoors will not get knockers.
- mpyne 13y agoThey don't assume that. I don't see why people think that NSA is simultaneously genius-level forces of the Illumanti architecting events that will culminate years later, and yet would make the rookie level mistake of introducing a backdoor that is protected only by obscurity. They know other security services understand how to decompile code (or read the original source). More importantly, they know that critical government services they can't predict will end up possibly running things like their broken version of OpenSSL. There's a FIPS standard, of course, but note that the Heartbleed page made quite clear that FIPS is vulnerable too.
- jrochkind1 13y ago> I would assume the NSA is interested in gaining access to systems in a way that doesn't allow basically anyone to ride on their coattails. Don't we actually already have evidence of other cases of the NSA adding backdoors to widely used systems, exploitable by anyone aware of them? Isn't that what the elliptic curve backdoor was? http://www.wired.com/2013/09/nsa-backdoor/all/ http://www.wired.com/2013/09/nsa-backdoor/all/ Apparently your assumption is quite not safe to assume. I guess the NSA either figures nobody else will notice the backdoor, or just doesn't care. I guess only they know their motivations.
- madaxe_again 13y agoYou have kept up to date with the news, right? Truecrypt, RSA... OpenSSL is low-hanging fruit by comparison. Of course it's back doored - probably more than once. You're right that it needs cleaning - it needs a full audit. I'm surprised in the light of the Snowden revelations that none of us have suggested this sooner, but hindsight is a bitch and all that.
- joosters 13y agoLots of people have suggested it. Very few people have dedicated their time to helping do it, though. Welcome to the 'other people should do this' club!
- amboar 13y agoI don't know what the gp's skills are, but assuming he's not a computer security professional then the 'other people should do this' club is exactly the club he should be in. Would you trust his audit of the code if he wasn't heavily experienced? it's the same case as "don't roll your own crypto".
- jessaustin 13y agoThere's a difference between "trusting his audit of the code" and "trusting his code". Any interested and motivated person can audit code. If nothing is found, that might not prove much. But if a vulnerability is found, the audit was worthwhile from some perspective.
- amboar 13y agoSure, so long as the bug is a genuine bug and not a misunderstanding. Debian's openssh valgrind warning springs to mind. Crypto implementations can be subtle and non obvious. Maybe it's crap design for that reason, but it seems like it's what we've got to work with currently.
- sexmonad 13y ago
- dlitz 13y ago> Maybe a big name in software could go and write a modern crypto library without all the cruft of OpenSSL but for now we have to deal with it. https://xkcd.com/927/ https://xkcd.com/927/ There are very few competent FOSS crypto implementers, and unfortunately, they're spread very thinly. I'm not sure that having yet one another crypto library is going to be helpful unless we actively move our users to the new library and kill the old projects.
- Allower 13y agoWhat would evidence of conspiracy look like? Do we need comments in the code, "this is an NSA back door...", seriously? >You have to be backwords compatible we have been making this trade off for years and it wont get any easier in the future, its about time we started a fresh initiative that doesn't make backwords compatibility a priority, except of course in the sense of maintainability moving forward.
- spacemanmatt 13y agoIn this post-Snowden era I believe Occam's razor yields a different result about NSA interference.
- TeMPOraL 13y ago> Or maybe it's just a bug. There's really no need for tinfoil hat theories unless you have any evidence for a possible conspiracy. But we do have "evidence for conspiracy". We known for certain that there are organizations with huge budgets that have introducing such vulnerabilities pretty much written into their mission statements. Why would we assume they would not be involved in something they obviously should be (however perverted their goals are)? It would be grossly incompetent of the NSA not to try introducing bugs into OpenSSL.
- ge0rg 13y agoThe heartbleed bug looks exactly like an NSA backdoor: * the protocol extension rfc and implementation are from the same person (who is now working for the largest German IT service contractor; formerly state owned T-Systems). * the extension provides means for one party to send arbitrary data which needs to be returned - a keepalive mechanism would have worked with an empty packet * there is no input validation on network originated data, in a crypto library, in 2011 This has huge implications on all of the Internet, while the individual parts being reasonably deniable.
- this_user 13y ago* T-Systems was never state-owned. The German Federal Post used to be state owned but was split into separate post, communications and banking divisions in 1995. Deutsche Telekom IPO'd in 1996. T-Systems was founded in 2000 as a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom. The German state currently holds around 15% of Deutsche Telekom stock. * RFC 6520 was published in February 2012. At that time Robin Seggelmann wasn't employed by T-Systems but was instead writing his dissertation at the University of Duisburg-Essen [1]. * His dissertation [2] actually gives an explanation for the payload: "The payload of the HeartbeatRequest can be chosen by the implementation, for example simple sequence numbers or something more elaborate. The HeartbeatResponse must contain the same payload as the request it answers, which allows the requesting peer to verify it. This is necessary to distinguish expected responses from delayed ones of previous requests, which can occur because of the unreliable transport." [1] http://www.robin-seggelmann.de/ http://www.robin-seggelmann.de/ [2] http://duepublico.uni-duisburg-essen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-31696/dissertation.pdf http://duepublico.uni-duisburg-essen.de/servlets/DerivateSer...
- EvanAnderson 13y agoThis is the first that I've had time to actually sit down and look at code, the RFC, etc, and I'm scratching my head. The rationale for the payload for DTLS (sent over UDP) is reasonable, but I'm scratching my head over why the payload is even there for TLS. I guess there's some logic in making the protocol the same irrespective of underlying transport, but the payload is completely redundant for reliable protocols, which will handle any retransmission or reordering automatically. Edit: Upon further (amateur and arguably ill-informed) reflection I'd argue that the heartbeat functionality shouldn't apply to TLS at all. It's needless complexity that can be handled by the underlying reliable transport. That doesn't change that the OpenSSL project clearly has code-quality issues, but it would have averted this particular fiasco, at least. I am dismayed that a security-oriented protocol isn't focused on minimalast design. That seems very backward to me.
- ensmotko 13y agoCheck out phk's fosdem talk[0]. I've linked to the the part where he talks about openSSL, but I'd suggest watching the whole thing. I'm now starting to believe the talk wasn't a joke at all... [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwcl17Q0bpk&feature=youtu.be&t=27m22s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwcl17Q0bpk&feature=youtu.be...
- scrollaway 13y agoBecause it wasn't. I was there at the talk and while he put a humorous spin on it by playing the part of a NSA agent, it's also extremely insightful to see it from that point of view. And yeah, when you really think about it... OpenSSL is the NSA's playtoy. Of course, there's no way to prove that. But really, does it matter? Whether the NSA is behind OpenSSL sucking or not... we have to assume they know of several backdoors/exploits, and the OpenSSL API still sucks and prevents people from doing productive crypto.
- higherpurpose 13y agoIETF already has chairs that work for NSA, which they refuse to get rid of.
- rblatz 13y agoSounds like it's time to create a competing group that issues standards for the internet.
- TacticalCoder 13y agoThere's a talk that was given in Belgium / Brussels at FOSDEM2014 two months ago or so by Poul-Henning Kamp (FreeBSD) regarding the NSA and how he'd do it if he had to create holes in software: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwcl17Q0bpk http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwcl17Q0bpk He's talking specifically about OpenSSL quite a lot (basically saying it's too complex to ever be secure and probably received many "security patches" from NSA employees). The entire talk is an eye opener. He explains how NSA shills are reading reddit / HN and poisoning communities / standards / protocols / etc. How everything is made, on purpose, needlessly complex to prevent honest developers from working on important things. He talks about shills submitting a few correct patches over the months / years, slowly gaining reputation among the community and then misusing that trust to submit (not so) subtle patches introducing security holes on purpose. He mentions a few of the "common mantra" repeated often (including here) by people who have an interest in the status quo. He explains why SSL/TLS is broken and says that the "SEC" part of "DNSSEC" is not going to be that secure ; ) I think that the problem is much worse than most people think and that Poul-Henning Kamp is closer to the truth than the ones constantly repeating "bug happens" as if nothing malicious was ever going on.
- glomph 13y agoToo be fair it is obviously intended to be a talk on what could be happening and not what certainly is.
- sentenza 13y agoIt is, however, reasonable to assume that "they" are as smart as we are, so "how would I do it" analysis is quite called for.
- philh 13y agoYes, but it's not reasonable to assume that our armchair "how I would do it" theorizing is, in fact, how they would do it. We can assume that they have come up with the idea, but maybe they discarded it for reasons that aren't obvious to us.
- 13y ago
- higherpurpose 13y agoEven the name "Heartbeat" sounds like something NSA would name it.
- spacemanmatt 13y agoWhat would it sound like if it were named to indicate signs of life?
- arca_vorago 13y agoI think now would be great time to reconsider the OpenBSD ipsec debacle in this kind of new light. Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't ssh use openssl libraries and the openbsd guys were heavily involved in openssl's development? A lot of people think the closed audit that found a minor unintentional bug was the last word on this subject, but the orginal guy who made the claim posted in 2012 further explaining how the FBI had made this attempt. Can't wait to find out SSH is comprimised too!
- mzs 13y agoopenssl was not created by the same people behind openbsd.
- arca_vorago 13y agoYou are correct, just got done reading Theo's rants on the subject and realized I was mistaken, so apologies. The same style of potential subversion may be at hand, regardless.