4 ms·
> This was not a MITM attempt I've heard captive portals on here eferred to as MITM attacks, and I think it's an accurate description of what's happening, rega
by chimeracoder 13y ago
> This was not a MITM attempt
I've heard captive portals on here eferred to as MITM attacks, and I think it's an accurate description of what's happening, regardless of the intent of the captor.
In this case, they were hijacking DNS requests that were explicitly being made to another provider (first OpenDNS, then Google), and returning their own results instead of OpenDNS's or Google's.
From a cryptographic perspective, I certainly would say that it fits the description of an MITM: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack
> He should be using OpenDNS which is the only major DNS provider of DNSCurve[2], instead of Google (8.8.8.8 and 8.8.8.4).
Actually, I was using OpenDNS initially - I switched to Google because I thought that might be the source of the OpenDNS error I was getting (the very first screenshot - admittedly a bit small to read in the picture).
But it doesn't matter which DNS provider you use if they're hijacking traffic on port 53, which is what was happening here.
> The author trusts Google with his data, which uses DNSSEC[1], but not DNSSEC because @tptacek said so
It's not just "because tptacek says so" - it's because tptacek wrote a detailed critique comparing both services which I found convincing. I updated the post to link to tptackek's post that explains the issue in more detail; that's what I was referring to, but I couldn't find it at first when I wrote the post.
- jrochkind1 13y agoIf you want to call it an MITM attack, but your browser gives you a cert error, then the most you can say is it's an incompetent, failed MITM attack, right?
- atmosx 13y agoIMHO this diversion doesn't classify as an attack. It was not meant to hurt in any way, or at least there's no sign of any harm done in your post. I try to use common sense first, and only afterwards stick to the letter. Not sure exactly that comparing DNSSEC (signatures == trust) and DNSCurve (encryption + signature but only hop_to_hop, not up to root.) makes sense, that's why I said above that unbound + OpenNIC (which I trust and support DNSCrypt). Thanks for taking the time to reply
- Dylan16807 13y agoIf the data is changed without the permission of either end party, then it is an attack. There was no 'harm' done to the parties involved, but the 'attack' here is not aimed at the parties, it's aimed at the integrity of the connection. The integrity was completely destroyed, so I think 'attack' is an appropriate term.