12 ms·
Sorry, RSA, I'm just not buying it
- ska 13y agoAre EMC/RSA denying that they took money from the NSA? That alone seems damning, since I can't think of any way that the existence of such a contract for any stated purpose doesn't undermine the credibility of the company fatally.
- JoachimSchipper 13y agoReally, "implement this, it'll help us get our pet standard through the process" isn't that unlikely a request to get - standard processes are rife with shenanigans at the best of times, and more companies/agencies than you'd hope take part in those. Also, note that "the NSA is backdooring American crypto" has not always been considered a likely proposition. (Of course, all of the above is bad/wrong; it's just not that much worse than you'd expect. "That much worse than you'd expect" is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_Security#Security_breach. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_Security#Security_breach.)
- ska 13y agoSure, it's exactly the sort of request you would expect. It's also exactly the sort of request you need to stay well shut of if you want credibility as a crypto provider to business and consumers. Any interactions with agencies like the NSA taint you, regardless of the intent. By their very nature they are suspect in this context.
- a3n 13y agoWhat this shows, in the most charitable if feeble light possible, is that RSA will implement something important to one paying customer that affects all paying customers, and will not disclose that without rocks having been turned over.
- davidgerard 13y agotl;dr point by point on why RSA's press statement makes them lying liars who lie, and that they were wilfully negligent from 2007-2013 at the very least.
- macspoofing 13y agoI really needed someone to summarize the article in one sentence (who has time to read more than one) and at the same time editorialize. Now I don't have to read the article or reason. Super convenient. Thanks!
- salient 13y agoNSA didn't need to backdoor DES when they just forced everyone to use weak keys: > 1979 - Present, DES: The Data Encryption Standard was altered by the NSA to make it harder to mathematically attack but easier to attack via Brute Force methods. The original version of DES, called Lucifer, used a block and key length of 128-bits and was vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis. NSA requested that the already small DES key size of 64-bits be shrunk even more to 48-bits, IBM resisted and they compromised on 56-bits11. This key size allowed the NSA to break communications secured by DES. http://ethanheilman.tumblr.com/post/70646748808/a-brief-history-of-nsa-backdoors http://ethanheilman.tumblr.com/post/70646748808/a-brief-hist... This is why any known NSA employee from security standards groups (including IETF and Trusted Computing Group [1]) must be forbidden to participate in the making of that standard. Their role there can only be seen as to facilitate weakening of the standards, either by weakening the algorithms themselves, or if that's too hard and/or obvious, to convince everyone else to use a weaker version of it (which NIST kind of tried to do with SHA-3 recently, too). As long as there's any chance of NSA being involved even remotely in a security standard, I'm going to lose faith in that whole standard and the group. [1] - http://www.securitycurrent.com/en/writers/richard-stiennon/it-is-time-for-the-trusted-computer-group-to-repudiate-the-nsa http://www.securitycurrent.com/en/writers/richard-stiennon/i...
- abadidea 13y agoI did consider trying to work in the part where they shortened the keys and eventually DES became useless because of it, but it was a bit of a diversion from the salient (heh) reason I put this on the timeline, that they improved the s-boxes without explanation and that colors any subsequent requests they made to do similar.
- jonpeda 13y agoFWIW, being crackable with extreme brute force (that only the best-funded attackers have) can be a reasonable compromise -- NSA can't crack everything, just the few pieces of data they are willing to spend compute on. The part that I don't understand is Moore's law: if a government lab can crack 56-bits11 in 1979, surely my phone can crack it today?
- atmosx 13y agoThat's a dead corp imho. Do we have any famous customer's list floating around?
- wavefunction 13y agoWe use RSA tokens at the financial institution I work for. I'll be checking in with our CTO tomorrow (was out sick today) to see about removing them from our systems.
- mrobot 13y agoHere's a question: Do we think Snowden is intentionally misleading us to attack RSA and EMC, or that he's actually releasing as little information as he can to get us on the right track toward fixing things? Why would this particular piece of information be selected if it was not a real problem?
- mikevm 13y agoI'm tired of having to correct people on this, but here goes: Snowden is not leaking anything anymore. He leaked most of the documents he had to some selected journalists a long time ago and it is now up to them to analyze them and responsibly report whatever interesting information there is to be learned from them.
- mrobot 13y agoThank you for clarifying, Mike. Deciding what is responsible is likely a coordinated effort. I think the same argument applies. Do we think someone might be being irresponsible here? Sensationalism, or real problem?
- willows 13y agoYeah, I'm not too knowledgeable about the whole situtation, but I wish Snowden had leaked the documents to the public. It sucks having to trust the press. Assumedly if Snowden didn't like how they were handling it he'd step in in some way, though.
- salient 13y agoIf he did, they'd just yell that he put everyone in life-threatening danger, like they did with Manning and also Wikileaks. I guess he wanted to avoid that level of accusations, although people like Mike Rogers still say that about him anyway: http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131223/02311625673/rep-mike-rogers-goes-national-tv-to-lie-about-nsa-programs-snowden.shtml http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131223/02311625673/rep-mi...
- uptown 13y agoAnd the stock-market shrugged. https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:EMC https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:EMC
- mrobot 13y agoMy gut tells me EMC's stock price does not directly correspond to what's actually been going on here, and that this is not limited to RSA. Let's briefly assume that the RSA issue is just a tiny piece of a giant EMC public-private pie. Can anyone knowledgeable on such issues speculate as to how significant profits from intentionally secretive corporate public partnership might be visible or non visible to the public eye?
- mey 13y agoThat is what is interesting to me, investors in theory should be complaining about this from a business perspective.
- Havoc 13y agoIts not even showing on Bloomberg (yet?). I doubt this will make a dent in the stock price anyway, even if its irrefutably confirmed.
- MichaelGG 13y agoEMC bought RSA for $2bn. With a market cap of $51BN, why would you expect RSA to be a major component? The $10M NSA payment was apparently 30% of that particular RSA group's revenue. And even if RSA was standalone, should we expect a major impact on the company's sales? It's not like Wells Fargo is going to stop using RSA keyfobs because of this. Although I admit I don't know where most of their income comes from.
- marcosdumay 13y ago> why would you expect RSA to be a major component? Now that everything is public, would you choose to trust your data to EMC hardware and software?
- diminoten 13y agoI don't think the, "We trusted the NSA" explanation makes them look stupid or negligent. This article does reference the fact that people are now retroactively claiming understanding of some of these revelations, but I think the writer forgets that this might apply to him as well. NOW it makes perfect sense to see how terrible this is, but we haven't always just blatantly assumed the NSA was out to get us. They used to not have the worst reputation in the world in the security community, right? I'm not the best authority for this, but from what I could gather they played a kind of spooky-but-helpful role prior to the Snowden leaks in the intelligence community - that is, you could generally trust they were thought to have the community's best interest at heart, even if they couldn't say why.
- chilldream 13y agoIt seems to me that she addressed those exact concerns: > So, yes, it is possible that, in 2004, nobody at RSA had any articulable suspicions about Dual EC. They may have taken it on faith that this was another DES situation where the NSA knew it was better but couldn't disclose why. Okay. Is that fair? I think that's fair. > If that were the end of the story, I would be standing here saying “poor RSA! How cruelly the NSA mistreated them!” But, guess what, it isn't. In 2007 the possibility of a backdoor was made very public, and after that “everyone knew” not to use it. None of us knew for sure it was backdoored (even if some people retroactively pretend they did) but that was kind of a crazy risk to take when there were other RNGs to pick from with no known risks and were faster to boot.
- diminoten 13y agoThe point is it's not a crazy risk to take when you trust the NSA, even in 2007, when everyone else knew not to use Dual EC. I just don't see how the RSA is supposed to realize the NSA is evil before the Snowden leaks.
- ska 13y agoYou don't have to assume the NSA is evil to understand that its mandate means you can never trust their incentives in something like this. You don't have to have any bad guys to have conflicts in purpose and incentive, and this has clearly been true for the entire existence of such interactions.
- morsch 13y agoNot sure if this tidbit made Hacker News -- the OpenSSL project added Dual_EC_DRBG support at the request of a paying customer: http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/Consequences-to-draw-from-the-latest-Snowden-revelations-td46453.html#a46455 http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/Consequences-to-draw-from-... They're under NDA and cannot reveal the customer's name. The thread doesn't say how much the customer paid, does anybody know? A friend told me 600k USD last night, but I cannot find any sources that back this up.
- a3vioces 13y agoYes, it was 600k.
- jwcrux 13y agoDo you by chance know the source?
- dotBen 13y agoAnd where exactly did the money go? $600k is a lot of money to implement an existing standard. That's 4-5 annual engineer salaries. I'm wondering exactly how much work was actually undertook for $600k and whether those doing it (/charging for it/taking the money) felt it was unusual size remuneration.
- DannyBee 13y ago"$600k is a lot of money to implement an existing standard." Not if such a requirement includes things like FIPS validation, which is entirely possible in this case. Plus, in some cases, these things are done in liu of donations, etc. I can think of plenty of cases where well known contractors on open source projects have been paid very well simply as a way of showing support for that project.
- andrewcooke 13y agothe only other comment by this acct was a weird attempt to impersonate someone else. it seems more like a troll than an anon informer.
- RSAInsecurity 13y agoWe're responding to our valued customers as fast as we can over on Twitter. https://twitter.com/RSAInsecurity https://twitter.com/RSAInsecurity
- alan_cx 13y ago$10M says the NSA is a valued customer.
- VLM 13y ago"As a bonus, all the other algorithms are apparently faster and that’s generally a desirable property." I apologize for discussing a technical topic in whats likely to be a political crypto-rage flamewar, but I've been digesting some thoughts about this and the figure of merit of processing required per bit of randomness is probably interesting, in that for a given set of professional grade RNGs (not algorithms implemented by idiots) the more processing required to generate a bit of randomness, the more likely it is someone's sticking a nasty backdoor in. Or rephrased the more time you spend sticking magic "nothing up my sleeves" constants into a bit, the more likely something unpleasant is getting stuck in there. (edited to add I'm talking about "real" RNGs not implying the worlds simplest shortest LFSR is magically better than a real RNG just because its really fast... I'm talking about more "in class" performance comparisons than joke vs real.)
- Guvante 13y agoIt depends on what you are talking about, sometimes you want a slow protocol, since it makes bruteforcing the original value more complicated. I can't wrap my head around why that would matter for a PRNG, but it sometimes does have value.
- ogreyonder 13y agoAnd that's exactly what had everyone else scratching their heads, too! There are plenty of slow random number generators. They're easily built from cryptographic hash functions [1]. Heck, use something like Bcrypt as your hash and you can get as many seconds per number as you like. The reason we don't use them even though they work perfectly well is that they are too slow. The challenge is making a fast PRNG that can maintains the properties of cryptographic randomness. That's why everyone was so confused with dual EC. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function#Use_in_building_other_cryptographic_primitives http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function#Use...
- bradleyjg 13y agoAs I understand it the whole reason you use a PRNG rather than just using your source entropy with some conditioning, is speed -- or maybe the risk of stalling, which is related to speed. So if you want slow, you can forget the seeding-a-deterministic-algorithm part altogether.
- ChuckMcM 13y agoTrue/sad story. So at Sun when I was building crypto tools for Java I wanted to be able to use the RSA public key algorithm in the class loader (part of a capabilities based security system). We negotiated with RSA for a right to use their patent in Java, which proceeded right up until the final contract came back (which our lawyer signed but I did not get a chance to review) where the wording was changed to be a license to BSAFE rather than the patent. Clearly I wasn't going to put BSAFE into the JVM, I l already had an implementation of their algorithm in Java. There was never a good explanation for how the lawyer got so "confused" at the last minute and "forgot" to have these changes reveiwed by the engineer leading the project. Given the sort of shenanigans we've been reading about I would not be surprised to hear that someone who was neither a Sun or RSADSI employee said "spike this deal". [edit: clarity]
- pydave 13y agoI don't understand your "spike this deal" idiom. I can't make sense of an analogy to a spiked drink (rufie) or spiked football (scoring a point). The closest I can find is "spike somebody's guns" meaning "to spoil someone's plans". Do you mean someone wanted to prevent you from using RSA's patent in the JVM? (I initially assumed you meant "force this deal".)
- saurik 13y ago(Searching for "spike this deal" finds two kinds of usages: people making a play on words in advertisements for volleyball and football products, and people talking about ruining a deal on purpose.)
- wavefunction 13y agoThe historical reference is to putting a spike in an enemy's cannon barrel, which should render any attempts to use the cannon to catastrophically fail, as cannons generally had to be well-cast/flawless to operate under their loads.
- tod222 13y agoverb: spike; 1. impale on or pierce with a sharp point. (of a newspaper editor) reject (a story) by or as if by filing it on a spike. "the editors deemed the article in bad taste and spiked it" stop the progress of (a plan or undertaking); put an end to. "he doubted they would spike the entire effort over this one negotiation" historical: render (a gun) useless by plugging up the vent with a spike. From https://www.google.com/#q=define+spike https://www.google.com/#q=define+spike
- onedev 13y agoWhat if we literally didn't buy it?
- thearn4 13y agoKind of odd: this seems like something better suited to a blog post than a Gist.
- ihsw 13y agoThis seems like a business opportunity for Github.
- abadidea 13y agoMy blog has been accruing more personal things and whiny rants lately. I decided to separate this from my doubtlessly profound philosophical ramblings about the meaning of life and Skyrim. All in all, a list of markdown gists is just about as functional as tumblr...
- idan 13y agoWhich is why I made gist.io: http://gist.io/8101758 http://gist.io/8101758 (the OP's content, but nicely formatted for reading on any size screen, and with attention to typographic detail.)
- PaulHoule 13y agoNote up until this transition around 2001 the NSA was focused on controlling the key length of cryptography available. They gave up on that and chose to focus instead on stealing the keys
- alan_cx 13y agoIs this to do with when a certain strength of cryptology was catagorised as a weapon and there for not allowed to be exported from the USA? Does this mean that that was relaxed becasue the NSA, or whoever, eventually got a back door or whatever?
- PaulHoule 13y agoYes. It wasn't just a matter of one "back door" but a matter of knowing that (1) people usually use codes incorrectly or screw up the key management and (2) if you give them a little help the key management will always be screwed up.
- ozten 13y agoWith a quarterly income of $587 million in Q2 of 2012, isn't 10 million dollars "chump change" for EMC? Perhaps it's more of a lubricant for the larger picture of deals and pressures.
- blazespin 13y agoYes, likely the 10M was just a token amount. Being friends with the NSA no doubt lead them into other deals.
- drig 13y agoI worked for RSA back in the 1990s. Back then at least, the sales staff's pay was based heavily on commission. It has a sliding structure that meant that people who sold more got a higher percentage. $10m might not have been a lot to EMC, but to the sales guy it probably meant over $50k, maybe over $100k. That one sale alone would have blasted him/her past the quota and bumped up the commission percentage.
- jusben1369 13y agoI think there are two types of commentators on this issue. Those who've been involved in negotiating agreements like this and those who haven't. Those who have can see how something like this happens. Those who haven't cannot believe how something like this could happen. It's important to remember/realize that no one, outside a handful of folks, understood what the NSA was up to until the last 12 months. Heck, at one point not too far back it was probably prestigious to mention you worked closely with the NSA on developing your technology. Help you impress a few corporate execs and close some deals.
- Lagged2Death 13y agoIt's important to remember/realize that no one, outside a handful of folks, understood what the NSA was up to until the last 12 months. There were loads of people - members of the general public, security researchers, government watchdog types, privacy advocates, crazy conspiracy nuts, etc. - who very strongly suspected, for good reason, exactly what turned out to be going on. ECHELON started in the 1960s. Rumors about it were everywhere by the early 1990s. It became so famous it was featured in pop-culture movies, TV shows, and video games. There was at least one good book (note 2005 publication) that showed how it was possible to piece together some pretty good guesses about what was happening from unclassified information: http://www.amazon.com/Chatter-Dispatches-Secret-Global-Eavesdropping/dp/1400060346/ref=sr_1_2 http://www.amazon.com/Chatter-Dispatches-Secret-Global-Eaves... In short, that book argues the NSA was expanding its eavesdropping capabilities so enormously, so quickly, that the only reasonable target for it was "everything." There simply weren't enough top-secret, diplomatic, or encrypted messages to justify the infrastructure devoted to the task; the NSA had to be developing the ability to listen to absolutely anything it wanted to.
- nullc 13y ago> assume it was publicly documented at the time that BSAFE defaulted to Dual EC Was it? Before it was revealed to be the BSAFE default I was going around saying that no one would have chosen to use it anyways, so it was probably a pretty ineffectual backdoor except if it ever was option for a downgrading attack.
- aaronchriscohen 13y agoNSA deserves an award for accomplishing this for just $10 million.
- chris_wot 13y agoWhat did you expect? RSA got purchased by EMC in 2006. That's the kiss of death in terms if any semblance of ethics. Someone in EMC would have known about this and swayed decision making.
- crystaln 13y ago"we continued to rely upon NIST as the arbiter of that discussion" This seems like a reasonable position to me, but I'm not in the field. Can someone tell me why it's not reasonable, in the face of all sorts of theories and suspicions being thrown about, to rely on the leading standards body as to whether the algorithm is flawed?