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New Snowden Leak Reports 'Groundbreaking' NSA Crypto-Cracking
- gojomo 13y agoI think observers have long assumed NSA is some number of years ahead – say, 2-30 years ahead – of openly published results in cryptanalysis and cryptosystem vulnerabilities.
- lifeisstillgood 13y agoBut it's really hard to assume that - that's assuming true mathematical leaps and invention. Admittedly if you put enough cryptographers on the payroll they may form their own university, but they still need the air of their peers on the outside. Imagine a cosmologist today transported 30 years back and asked to attend conferences - they would gain no inspiration. I think we put too much emphasis on the single data point of GCHQ inventing pgp early (IIRC)
- mayank 13y ago> the single data point of GCHQ inventing pgp early It's also much easier to invent a cryptosystem than to break one.
- ktsmith 13y agoThere are multiple data points suggesting the NSA is/was ahead of public researchers. There's the sbox changes to DES in the 70's when differential cryptanalysis wasn't publicly discovered till the 80's. The revisions between SHA-0 and SHA-1 (the attack the changes prevent weren't found for at least 5 years). The Dual EC DRBG random number generator they supplied to NIST that many people suspect of being compromisable by NSA etc.
- damarquis 13y ago"..that many people suspect of being compromisable by NSA etc." If it was a backdoor you certainly can't count it among the NSAs successes. It is never used.
- rgbrenner 13y agohttp://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_st...
- ktsmith 13y agoI would count it's development and publication as another example of the NSA being a bit ahead as it very much looks like they developed an algorithm in secret with a backdoor. I would count the fact that the public found it (after a few years) a point for public crypto research.
- shabble 13y agoYou may be thinking of the Ellis/Cocks/Williamson[1] invention of the RSA encryption and Diffie-Hellman key-exchange algorithms several years prior to their open publication. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_H._Ellis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_H._Ellis
- lifeisstillgood 13y agoYes thank you - too punchy to remember anything useful that late at night.
- nknighthb 13y agoWell, we have at least twice as many data points as that. IBM discovered differential cryptanalysis in the early 70s, and the NSA apparently knew about it before then, and nobody else found out until the late 80s. I don't know what organization spends the most money on cryptanalysis every year, but the NSA's gotta be near the top. It's reasonable to assume they've found important results that the public won't know of for several years.
- gojomo 13y agoBut what if there are quantitatively and qualitatively more full-time, well-funded cryptographers inside the NSA (and its collaborating sibling organizations in its close allies) than outside? They may have an internal system, with geographically-distributed schools of thought, specialties, and long-running debates, as rich and open as the outside world - just completely segregated. At least, that's how I'd do it, if I found myself a global superpower after WW2, thanks in large part to superior signals/crypto work, and didn't want any other emergent groups to surprise me from a "higher perch" of signals omniscience.
- eru 13y agoHow do you keep all that so secret for so long?
- gojomo 13y agoIf you keep it secret, you're well-paid for cutting-edge work that's impossible to do anywhere else. And the general mission – keeping your home country's defense and political institutions the best-informed in the world – can be quite appealing. Inside, I'm sure you hear plenty about feel-good successes: lives saved and national interests protected. On the other hand, if you reveal the programs, you lose your job, get cut off from your professional colleagues, and likely go to jail.
- ig1 13y agoIn practice they do, for example the Heilbronn Institute at Bristol University is funded by GCHQ: http://www.maths.bris.ac.uk/research/heilbronn_institute/ http://www.maths.bris.ac.uk/research/heilbronn_institute/
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- jpalomaki 13y agoBruce Schneier wrote in Applied Cryptography, Second Edition (around 1996): "The NSA probably possesses cryptographic expertise many years ahead of public state of the art (in algorithms, but probably not in protocols) and can undoubtedly break many of the systems used in practise." In 2010 former NSA technical director mentioned that they have been losing ground to their public counterparts during the last twenty years but that they would probably be still ahead of the public by "handful of years". [1] [1] http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/030410-rsa-cloud-security-warning.html?page=1 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/030410-rsa-cloud-secur...
- dnautics 13y agoI remember someone here commenting that the NSA over time is becoming like any other gov't org - beholden to "other factors", i.e. political correctness, which basically amount to making their number theory recruits mediocre. I would not be surprised if the NSA had lost its advantage. In bureaucratic systems like this, where the target (advanced math) is best achieved by exorbitantly intelligent people getting lucky - the weight of a large number of mediocres can wind up becoming a drag instead of an asset.
- CodeCube 13y ago:( up until just a few years ago, I always looked at the NSA organization with a sense of awe and pride ... that we (the US) were so advanced. Now it's just a source of shame that such powerful knowledge is being directed at us, rather than used as a tool for our benefit.
- gnoway 13y agoWell, to be fair, it's being directed at 'everyone,' still ostensibly for 'our' benefit. It's the thought that counts, right?
- jonnybgood 13y agoNSA capabilities are primarily directed out of country. It's the other guy's capabilities I think they're more worried about.
- michaelt 13y agoTo my knowledge Al Qaeda and the Boston marathon bombers didn't have an extensive domestic data gathering program, a billion-dollar data center in Bluffdale, a network of secret courts and so on.
- atmosx 13y agoTruth is that we don't know whether they are that good or just a money-eating machine. They are the largest Mathematicians contractor for sure, but that doesn't mean anything if the bureaucracy in between is humongous (as expected in most of these organizations).
- rubberband 13y agoCompared to the rest of the HN crowd, my knowledge of crypto is very light, so I could be incorrect... But aren't most widely adopted algorithms decently future proof? To where you would sort of have to break math in order for them to be crackable, if used with a very strong password? Sure, flaws were found in RSA, etc. But does something like that have a decent chance of happening again?
- semiel 13y ago"Break math" isn't quite right. You'd have to make a major mathematical advance, but there's nothing saying that's impossible.
- TrainedMonkey 13y agoGiven the fact that we still following Moore's law, no crypto is future proof even if full blown quantum computation never happens. Moreover advances in Math do happen quite often, recent one is about uniformity of data after encryption functions are applied. http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6210852 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6210852 . There was another page that showed lifetime of common ciphers, in terms of ok, partially broken, and broken, but I can't find it.
- magic_haze 13y agoTheoretically, yes. But it's far more likely that there are bugs in the implementation (both in software and hardware.) It's just a matter of time and resources to find them.
- shabble 13y agoThe problem is partly that you personally aren't using just a widely adopted algorithm, you're using a specific implementation layered on some monster protocol stack with weird legacy support for "Look the other way and ROT13" mode as well as AES-$Whatever. HTTPS, for example, depends on both crypto algorithm implementation, SSL/TLS, the responsible Certificate Authority[1], your random number generator, your OS, your hardware, and, of course, much the same list for the people at the remote end. The other part of the problem is that, IIRC, the NSA is one of the largest employers of crypto/number-theoretic mathematicians, and from the article, this program with a 35k headcount probably has a bunch of them. Between them, and compute clusters not implausibly denominated in acres, a teeny tiny little flaw might be enough, if they think you deserve the effort. [1] On a tangent, has anyone explored the implications of a "give us some valid certs/signing keys for $whoever and lie to everyone who asks" NSL to one of their domestic CAs? Apart from the EFF SSL-observatory or someone else maybe noticing, of course.
- thezilch 13y agoBut information on the NSA's efforts to crack the encrypted portion of that traffic — which would include much of the email bouncing around the net — has remained absent What Wired.com? Much of the email bouncing around the net and even internal networks, save for traversals like gmail-to-gmail, are NOT a portion of the encrypted traffic. It's important you report this correctly, because "the masses" are otherwise made unaware or unconcerned about the implications. "Oh, I'll just email you my passwords; I heard 'those guys' can read SMS."
- marshray 13y agoA lot of SMTP server-to-server traffic is encrypted. But a lot of it isn't, and it only takes one exposed hop. So as a general rule email isn't effectively or reliably encrypted. There's probably also a lot of email traffic being carried over crackable VPN links such as PPTP.
- thezilch 13y agoYou're certainly right. By "much" and especially in cases involving security, I don't think we can be happy with or report on the system's security with just a "majority" being all that's need to feel safe. In fact, I'd go as far to say that unless approaching 100% and without considering circumstances like those that involve an NSL, all bets are off. Circumstances concerning an NSL are another matter, and that's where we should eliminate the on-the-wire concerns and opt for PGP-like communication.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- frank_boyd 13y ago> The Post said it withheld the rest, and kept some information out of its reporting, in consultation with the Obama administration to protect U.S. intelligence sources and methods. Weird. Why now? They (admin) refused to do that with WikiLeaks.
- jonnybgood 13y agoDid wikileaks approach the admin for consultation? If not, then it's impossible to refuse.
- computer 13y agoYes, Wikileaks and its media partners requested that for the cables. The USGov refused to help censor the cables to protect sources and other people.
- chris_mahan 13y agoAsk Bezos, I guess.
- count 13y agoNothing that wikileaks released was even remotely as damaging as what might be in the Snowden docs. The wikileaks leaks were all Secret, Snowden is releasing Top Secret stuff. The difference is quite severe.
- WestCoastJustin 13y ago> The Post's article [1] doesn't detail the "groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities" Clapper mentions, and there's no elaboration in the portion of the document published by the paper. Nothing really new, just a breif line mentioning groundbreaking capabilities with no explanation. [1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-...
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- dnautics 13y agoWhat if the "groundbreaking" crypto-cracking was that the NSA discovered you could trick people into cracking "bountied" SHA-256 hashes in a massively parallel operation?
- samstave 13y agoCan you explain this in more detail?
- mahyarm 13y agoI think he is referencing bitcoin's proof of work.
- WestCoastJustin 13y agoYou mean like all these people "mining bitcoins" are cracking encryption codes?
- grandalf 13y agoI think you might be joking but I was actually thinking about this the other day and wondering if it might be plausible.
- dnautics 13y agomostly joking. Remember, in Japanese, surnames come first: "Nakamoto SAtoshi"
- sixothree 13y agoSo maybe there's an agency out there with codes that all start with a number of leading zeros?
- dnautics 13y agooh, I forgot about the leading zeros part =/
- 13y ago
- TwoBit 13y agoThis makes me think that it might be good to have a "security by obscurity" layer on top of the existing security layer. A big weakness of a public security protocol is that a huge government might privately crack it and tell nobody.
- pyre 13y agoOn the other hand, without peer-review your obscure system could be trivially cracked once the government has an interest in it.
- ISL 13y agoAs a professional scientist: One should be very careful about using peer review as a mark of quality. It's not necessary nor sufficient.
- pyre 13y agoIt's not bullet-proof, but if you are the only person evaluating the system, then you've only protected it against the attacks that you can think up, and not against the attacks the other people can think up.
- yk 13y agoNot advocating non standard crypto, but if the system is at least somewhat good ( that is, not susceptible to automatic attacks), it would keep a actual human busy. And you don't loose security, assuming that the cyphertext of the obscure system is again encrypted by a well established cypher.
- zachrose 13y agoMostly I'm surprised at the pay distribution on page 9 of the included document. GS pay tops out around $117k. Is that how much we're paying for top level cryptography research? Do contractors like Snowden get to make $200k because that's just what their consulting firm bills for?
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- marshray 13y agoMy understanding is that huge pay increases are in fact the primary motivation behind the shift to these quasi-private sector contracting arrangements. It's basically an accounting scheme to either "retain the brightest", or to defraud the taxpayers, depending on how you look at it.
- rbanffy 13y agoIt's not either/or. It can be both.
- count 13y agoGS base pay tops out at $117. There are many GS's making much more than that (also, the IC uses a non-GS scale, specifically for that reason).
- dredmorbius 13y agoDon't forget that that's $117k plus full government benefits, including pension (who has those any more) and job security pretty much for life. You might be able to do better than that all told on the outside. You might not. It's "don't have to worry about too much" money (though with inflation it's less that than it used to be), but not "I'm rich" money.
- sandstrom 13y agoI wonder why do newspapers insist on labelling Snowden a 'leaker'. Why not 'whistleblower', or 'privacy advocate'?
- matthewcford 13y agoBecause that would be taking a stance on weather he was a whistleblower or a traitor. He leaked the documents, so he's a leaker.
- mrleinad 13y agoIn my country is worse. The media call him a mole.
- mpyne 13y agoWell, he admitted to as much. I think the only reason they don't call him a 'mole' in the U.S. is that he isn't still there and that is identity is known.
- thinkalone 13y agoIt's AP style - http://blog.ap.org/2013/06/10/whistle-blower-or-leaker/ http://blog.ap.org/2013/06/10/whistle-blower-or-leaker/ Other interesting discussions about language usage on the AP blog - http://blog.ap.org/ http://blog.ap.org/
- steauengeglase 13y ago'Leaker' is the closest thing to neutral. With most people he is either a 'whistle-blower' or a 'traitor'.
- sanderjd 13y agoHmm, this makes sense, but I think they need to find a new neutral word - leaker seems to have moved significantly closer to "traitor" than to "whistle-blower" amongst most of the people I talk to.
- moxie 13y agoThe documents says they are "...investing in groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat adversarial cryptography and exploit internet traffic." Not that they have achieved groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities. It's common for people to suggest that the NSA is 20 years ahead of the private sector, but it's not clear how true this is. That number is commonly cited as a result of changes the NSA made to DES, which later suggested (and Don Coppersmith openly confirmed) they knew about differential cryptanalysis 20 years before Shamir published anything about it. However, that was long before cryptography became as popular a research topic outside of government circles. There are now many other places to go to do that type of research, and based on the public payscale data available, almost all of them pay better than the NSA. Recent developments, such as their Dual Counter Mode proposal in 2001, suggest that they might not be as far ahead as they once were.
- ktsmith 13y ago> "...investing in groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat adversarial cryptography and exploit internet traffic." This could be little more than a way of making the purchase of a bunch of D-Wave boxes sound more compelling than it might really be at this time. The problem with secret organizations with no oversight is that we'll probably never know for sure.
- marshray 13y agoSounds like a natural fit for quantum.
- genwin 13y agoIs there a reason why the groundbreaking crypto-cracking could not be a quantum computer that tries all possible passwords/keys simultaneously? (I'm no expert on this subject.)
- thesteamboat 13y agoYes, because this is not how quantum computers work. That is, they don't perform all computation paths non deterministically and then give you the 'right' answer. The answer that you get is a composition of all paths; it is not known how to use this to solve NP-complete problems. On the other hand, most modern encryption systems are based on the assumption that factoring is a difficult problem. Famously, quantum computers can factor numbers efficiently. So a large scale quantum computer could break current cryptosystems, but there are in fact cryptosystems (such as lattice cryptography) that are secure against quantum computers.
- eru 13y ago> [...] but there are in fact cryptosystems (such as lattice cryptography) that are secure against quantum computers. Or at least: (currently) not more vulnerable to quantum computer than to classical computers.
- etiam 13y ago"Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on. Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrifically weak that NSA can frequently find ways around it." Edward Snowden, in Q&A session at The Guardian's homepage, 17 June 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/edward-snowden-nsa-files-whistleblower http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/edward-snowden-...
- junto 13y agoWhat exactly does he mean by that? Can you give an example?
- etiam 13y agoI interpret that to mean that the NSA are not able to bring into plaintext communications that are protected by strong cryptography, unless there were exploitable mistakes in the handling of the cryptosystem. The NSA /are/ however very capable of, for instance, gaining access to and control of a persons computer. That could be used to inspect the communications before they are encrypted or to reverse the encryption by using the keys the same way the legitimate receiver would.
- bdhe 13y agoThis is as good a thread as any to perhaps start a discussion on something that's been on my mind ever since I learnt about the NSA's penchant for hiring mathematicians and cryptographers. How would you reasonably estimate the NSA's academic prowess when it comes to crypto/codebreaking? How does this compare to the state-of-the-art in academia? I am less interested (but definitely so) in knowing or estimating more about how such a budget helps in deploying and building systems to collect/store intelligence information. I also wouldn't be surprised if they are fairly ahead of the curve in terms of zero-day exploits and the like. The thing that most makes me curious is in terms of pure mathematics (like better factoring algorithms, better predictors of pseudorandomness, weaknesses in commonly used parameters or poor choice of certain elliptic curves, say). There are few interesting pieces of information that would help -- a rough headcount of people in positions comparable to post-docs and professors in the worldwide crypto/math community. I find it incredibly hard to imagine a mathematical breakthrough without significant training and continuous involvement in the research community. Do they get a fair share of the best mathematicians out there? Does the pay make it a fairly attractive destination? -- whether or not they have an active "collaboration" and "internal publication" environment, once again, comparable to the dozen or so reputable conferences occurring yearly that allows for exchange of several interesting ideas across 100s of people with the express incentive in attending these conferences being discussion and collaboration. -- how much we can extrapolate from just 2 instances (from what I know) of the NSA being a decade or more ahead of the curve (the DES S-box and public-key cryptosystem examples). What's a reasonable way, as outsiders, of starting to get a legitimate guess? Do we have more examples or at least hints of such possible examples? (ps: I see after posting this that several other people have raised similar points in the thread. I'd love to learn more about why Bruce Schneier thought that the NSA was decades ahead in 1996 and whether he holds the same opinion in 2013)
- rjsw 13y agoSome people [1] get involved in crypto without specific training. [1] http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/cs/who/dmr/crypt.html http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/cs/who/dmr/crypt.html
- abecedarius 13y agoOn inventing public-key crypto, GCHQ was 3 or 4 years ahead of the public: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography#History http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography#History That source says nothing about the NSA. Is it believed the NSA invented it earlier and didn't share with GCHQ?
- powertower 13y agoIt's one thing to leak documents about the NSA being in a grey area in regards to US citizens rights. But this last month or so all the articles I see here are about Snowden trying to actively 1) attempt to hurt the USA and 2) attempt to embarrass the USA. I don't get it? What is he thinking he is doing?
- rooshdi 13y agoHelp the USA?
- betterunix 13y agoWhat makes you think Snowden is doing anything at this point? What makes you think he is still in contact with reporters? He probably hastily sent them a bunch of documents when he was worried that he would be sent back the USA, and now the journalists are deciding what will be published.
- iamjustin 13y ago>He probably hastily sent them a bunch of documents when he was worried that he would be sent back the USA Really!? You think that's probably what he did? You believe that it's more likely than not that he got all flustered with the USA's response, and sent a bunch of documents to Greenwald that he didn't want released? That's just absurd.
- mattstreet 13y agoAre we blaming him that so many of our actions are embarrassing? Or that they come back to hurt us later?
- smsm42 13y agoI wonder what is top secret there? Those things look quite mundane to me and I don't really understand how revealing, for example, that $1 bn is spent on "mission ground stations" would hurt national security. Revealing more deep details - maybe, I can see it, but on this level it doesn't look like it should be secret at the first place.
- rbanffy 13y agoIntelligence is like this. You piece together seemingly random information from several sources. A tells he ate pasta on Wednesday and you know he had dinner with B because B withdrew money from an ATM next to an Italian restaurant before B's partner phoned B, who, after two hours, bought a bag of diapers on a convenience store on the route between the said restaurant and B's home.
- smsm42 13y agoWhat you're talking about are details. What I'm talking about is very coarse statistics. If you knew I spent $1000 on restaurants last year, what would it tell you about my meeting with B? Probably nothing.
- betterunix 13y agoYou should read The Art of War: When we are able to attack, we must appear unable... The amount of money you spend on one area of intelligence work versus some other area speaks volumes about your plans, priorities, capabilities, and so forth.
- smsm42 13y agoIf somebody thinks US is unable to attack anybody anywhere, he's been living under a rock for the last 300 years. And that rock was located on Mars.
- sillysaurus2 13y agoI think it's important to remember the original motive for leaking. The NSA was conducting operations which many people feel are out of line with the way the American government should operate. Hence, Snowden is generally viewed as a hero rather than a villain. Even if it was morally justified to leak PRISM and XKeyScore, leaking a detailed breakdown of the budget for the entire intelligence arm of the American government seems dubious. Now every other country knows the lower bound of how much money America invests into intelligence. This document could very well be used as a justification in other countries to convince their politicians to dramatically increase their budget devoted to cyber ops / intelligence. If you feel the PRISM and XKeyscore leaks were a good thing, you may want to consider whether this latest leak shares the same merits. It seems a difference in kind.
- lawnchair_larry 13y agoDefinitely the opposite. How do we have an informed debate about whether our tax dollars are funding waste and abuse?
- niels_olson 13y agoGreat, thanks Wired, I just had SECRET/NOFORN material open on a government unclas computer and "I have a dream..." [1]. Both from the front page of Hacker News. Both apparently potentially a violation of law (intel and copyright). This makes the third open post, "Spy Kids" [2], also on the front page, all the more premoniscient. Who needs Kafka. Or Orwell. Or Huxley. It's all here. [1] http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6296086 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6296086
- techdragon 13y agoPoignant question... Which of the 2 possible breaches do you fear reprisal for more?
- niels_olson 13y agoOh, the SECRET/NOFORN, to be sure. That's considered criminal. The copyright thing is civil/administrative.
- at-fates-hands 13y agoYou know what's crazy about Snowden? Every time the guy releases something, people freak out. Why? Because nobody knows exactly what he stole. The even crazier thing is, this could all be a huge misinformation campaign and nobody would notice because we're all Snowden takes documents, gives them to press, and they release them. How do they verify their validity? Oh yeah, they can't since it's all top secret. What a grand one-way street this guy just built for a bullet proof story of his own liking. I think it's strange nobody is questioning the veracity of the documents he's releasing. They just accept them as de facto truth.
- coldtea 13y agoPerhaps you've been living under a rock, and haven't noticed tons of indipendent verifications and evidence showing his stuff is accurate.
- at-fates-hands 13y agoIf you have specific articles which verify the documents he released were real, I'm pretty sure the NSA would like to see those. As far as I know, the only thing that's been verified is he took a LOT of documents. Even the NSA says they have no idea what he took: http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/20/20108770-us-doesnt-know-what-snowden-took-sources-say?lite http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/20/20108770-... The only verification is people saying, "leaked documents confirm XYZ." There's no way to verify the documents he's releasing are in fact - REAL. It's just people saying, "Oh yeah, we thought that was true, is now confirmed with these documents." Even though all the stuff he's releasing could be total fakes and no one would be the wiser. Makes you wonder really. . .
- coldtea 13y agoWonder what exactly? For one, all official responces confirmed that the documents were real, only correcting and trying to save face on minus BS points. And the language they used (e.g using "collect" as meaning "actually checked out by humans") made it clear that they are bullshiting. Read the wikipedia article on the prism thing. It has lots of pointers to statements by officials that confirm the existance and scope of the program. Including officials that have lied before.