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As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption
- diydsp 13y agoAs Feds hire contractors to do this work, the work will leak out of the contractors hands into the hands of those with money, such as foreign organized identity thieves. It's not just about hiding furry porn from the "Murican Gubmint," but about protecting our financial info from foreign thieves.
- mtgx 13y agoWhy can't PFS be a solution for this?
- ColinWright 13y agoFor those what are wondering, PFS: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy
- anovikov 13y agoOf course, it can, and should be used whenever possible.
- EGreg 13y agoPFS and other Deniable encryption (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption) are great for deniability. However, they and everything else can be susceptible to unrelenting rubber-hose "cryptanalysis". (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis) It is said that the goal of cryptography is to make the attacker resort to rubber-hose cryptanalysis, revealing their intentions. In those cases, the best you can hope for is plausible deniability, i.e. decrypt some part of the cipher showing something embarrassing but not illegal, and hope that they think that was all that was there. Actually that's what TrueCrypt provides with its "secret encrypted volume". However, there are some tests for randomness (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness_tests http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness_tests) like the chi-squared test which can detect/identify many such encryption schemes if the size is large enough. In short ... it's an arms race. Your best bet is Steganography (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography) which has been around for centuries. Just write messages where no one suspects. You can encrypt them with PFS and plausible deniability for best effect.
- thirsteh 13y agoJust to be clear, PFS does not necessarily equal repudiability.
- ReidZB 13y agoAny encryption scheme worth using will not be identifiable by a randomness test. Block ciphers like AES are designed specifically to model pseudorandom permutations (or, rather, this was one of their design goals); being able to distinguish them from truly-random data would be a rather frightening result. For more information, see "Is it possible to distinguish a securely-encrypted ciphertext from random noise?" at http://crypto.stackexchange.com/q/1646/2454 http://crypto.stackexchange.com/q/1646/2454
- pnathan 13y agoPretty sure what the poster meant was that if you have a file with random noise on the hard drive, that itself signals that something is encrypted.
- phlo 13y agoWell, only two typical use cases will lead to owning a hard drive filled with (pseudo-)random noise: secure deletion or encrypted data. If you used either, you've got something to hide and it's a well-known fact only terrorists and communists do.
- gknoy 13y agoOr, radio telescope analysis. I wonder how hard it is to get a terabyte of radio telescope noise. If I had that, how hard would it be to use it to xor with a truecrypt partition.
- DennisP 13y agoRubber hoses don't scale.
- EGreg 13y ago
- venomsnake 13y agoPFS protects you if feds get google keys now to not be able to decipher what you told google 3 months ago. But if they have the current keys nothing can protect you.
- mtgx 13y agoWouldn't that mean Google would have to build a system to automatically send each key, for every session, for every user, to the NSA? That would be an insane scenario.
- venomsnake 13y agoUnless I am mistaken the throwaway PFS keys are derived from something. They just have to share it with NSA and they will do the rest. (I am not a serious cryptographer)
- Nursie 13y agoYes, they could share the keys and/or key matter used for every session with the NSA, and the NSA could then decrypt the conversation. Or they could just send the NSA the plaintext logs. There is literally no way to keep a conversation secret if one of the parties involved is compromised, because you're talking to a compromised party!
- phlo 13y agoIn order to provide any forward secrecy, the PFS keys are generated randomly for each session. They are not derived from the certificate holder's RSA keys. A snooping agency holding the private key of, say, Google would still need to intercept each connection and act as a man in the middle. Simply knowing the RSA key (either beforehand or afterwards) is not enough to decrypt PFS sessions. *edit: Google would still be able to collect and hand over all session keys ever used to communicate with them. The NSA might then use those session keys to decrypt any corresponding session.
- patmcc 13y agoWhy? That's perfectly feasible from a technical perspective.
- Nursie 13y agoIf they have the keys they can MITM anything they feel like.
- bhitov 13y agoYes, but it would protect against passive surveillance.
- anovikov 13y agoBroad solution to all this is building your lives in business in a way government can have a minimal control of. Just do what it requires and keep everything else encrypted and anonymized. And don't rely on government for anything, for we are heading for a world of global government failure: people and institutions are going to ignore and circumvent them all, and make them dysfunctional. In a way, that will be like communism: there is little government can be of help nowadays, and it is more and more becoming a nuisance.
- pron 13y agoDon't rely on government for anything? What are you talking about? Almost 100% of scientific research and 100% of infrastructure around the world is funded by government. Almost all of education, health and welfare around the world (though less so in the US) is run by government. A lot of people are suspicious of government, but such fundamental disdain toward and alienation from government are peculiar American (and sometimes Russian) traits.
- santosha 13y ago'such fundamental disdain toward and alienation from government are peculiar American' This. If you're so unshakably convinced that a government full of people you vote for every four years is never going to work in your interests, you have serious problems.
- kenj0418 13y ago"full of people" being the operative phrase here. People with power tend to abuse that power. This is human nature, and this is where distrust of government comes from. People work in their own interest (however they may define that). Working in the interests of those that elect them is just a hopeful side effect of the democratic process.
- nine_k 13y agoI wish you counted the officials you voted for and compared it to the number of governmental bureaucrats, agents, and other persons that are assigned, never elected, and often stay at their offices as elected officials change. The number of non-elected officials is vastly larger than the few thousand elected officials people vote for. Not that governments (and other bureaucratic bodies) never work in your interests. They always work in their own interests, and among these are self-perpetuation and grabbing more power. But as long as their other interests are aligned with yours, they could throw all their power at your cause. Should your interests diverge... well, good luck.
- mrmekon 13y agoAnd as Feds demand skeleton keys to buildings, prepare for the death of cylinder locks? Prepare for a change in how we use it, not for its death.
- digitalsushi 13y agoThe only thing I get really spooked over, is that eventually it gets to a point where the government starts demanding passphrases for hard drives with no hidden encrypted partition. Am I being paranoid? Someone sensible please dilute my paranoia.
- ttctciyf 13y agoRealistically paranoid, I think. Best plan may be to create a small encrypted partition, and put some data on it, so you can give them the passphrase when asked. Don't forget the passphrase!
- mistercow 13y agoAnd what if they say "That data was obviously innocuous so there must be another encrypted partition"?
- dilap 13y agoYou could try putting something embarassing but not incriminating there (e.g., gay porn or whatever).
- mistercow 13y agoSure, but my point is that plausible deniability always comes paired with plausible accusibability. Hell, the very fact that you had one encrypted partition massively increases the probability that you have more than one. Most people don't even know how to set one up. I think you'd be way better off simply claiming you didn't have one. One way or another, you're going to be relying on reasonable doubt in the end.
- minor_nitwit 13y agoAha, obviously you are quite cunning, therefore you knew that I would expect a second partition, so there must be a third partition!
- zokier 13y agoThere is just so much more to public key crypto than public web SSL/TLS.
- Shish2k 13y agoAnd the feds can demand the keys to those other things too :P
- r4pha 13y agoYes, that's true, but there is a big difference between you being responsible for (not) handing over something that is in your possession and being unaware of a presumed safe channel being unsafe.
- click170 13y agoThis is what I was thinking. This sounds more like certificates are broken than public key crypto. Yes they can come to me for my private key, but that's a different issue, then at least they're coming to me and not going to some intermediary "trusted party".
- mhaymo 13y agoIf certificates are broken then public key crypto is broken, because a trusted third-party certificate is necessary to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, no?
- nhaehnle 13y agoNo. The trust model of HTTPS was always broken from the start. This whole story "only" reinforces the point that key distribution and management is hard, and a central list of certificate authorities is not a good solution. This story has exactly zero effects if you use some public-key system with different key management. On the negative side, good systems don't really exist. On the plus side, this story might help push the development of good systems.
- cmircea 13y agoI treat email in Gmail as publicly accessible, same for almost everything I do on the web casually. My business data lives in Amsterdam (Azure EU West), critical services we use are based in Europe. At least in my case I couldn't care less if the big US companies handed out SSL keys.
- evgen 13y agoIf you think that operating in any particular jurisdiction provides you with protection then you are sadly deluded. Your protection lasts just up until the point where protecting you becomes inconvenient. Oddly enough, using the resources of smaller companies provides less protection because they are easier to influence, and basing services outside of the US means that you are completely fair game for the NSA as you lack even the nominal protection that the (waxing and waning, but currently too damn weak for my mind) domestic/foreign distinction offers in terms of US SIGINT.
- cmircea 13y agoThe NSA itself has exactly zero power outside the USA.
- Canada 13y agoThey have the active cooperation of many governments and they have a lot of 0 day.
- nhaehnle 13y agoEuropean snooping agencies seem to be quite happy to cooperate with them, so that argument doesn't really count.
- gknoy 13y agoBe careful that you do not equate "power" and "authority". As Canada mentions below, they have top talent, researchers, and likely many exploits. It seems foolish to believe that geographical location of entities on a globally connected network has a nontrivial bearing on whether the NSA can penetrate it.
- rdl 13y agoSounds like not "the death of public key encryption" but the golden age of building technical controls into hardware/software which cannot be subverted by the operator, even in the face of a state agent with a gun. Assuming the right tech is developed and deployed, this is going to be far better for everyone in a few years. Yes, it will be shitty for a year or two, but by 2020, if we actually have real technical security, it will improve security and trust for end users. Rather than "trust us", it will be "trust us, because...".
- 1337biz 13y agoSituations like these probably rarely produce a real "winner". It is going to be an arms race between those favoring personal privacy and those favoring government snooping. Just keep in mind that government operates basically on an unlimited budget and has access to a wide range of harassment opportunities for non compliance in matters like these. This fact alone will keep them at least at a dead level with potential counter measures.
- rdl 13y agoNo, it's a win because the government is not the only, and in most cases not the worst, threat. Insiders (like Snowden and Manning, ironically) are one of the biggest threats. Being attacked by non-USG outsiders is a major threat ("hackers", state sponsored or not). Your business partners being hacked, or having lax security, is another threat. USG is probably near the bottom of the list of actual threats for most people, in terms of frequency; they just have the most amazing resources. If the "evil NSA boogeyman" is enough to get people to finally care about security, that's great. It's like people preparing for zombies by buying water, freeze dried food, radios, shotguns, etc., when in fact they're at the same time preparing for the far more likely earthquake or civil insurrection.
- ferdo 13y ago> Insiders (like Snowden and Manning, ironically) are one of the biggest threats. They're a threat to those who like running a Surveillance State, not to the average citizen.
- rlpb 13y agoA logical conclusion to this is that if/when governments start forcing people to supply them with their private keys, they will also start forcing companies producing encryption software to include backdoors. At this point, I'm thankful that we have Free Software. With access to the source code, forcing the insertion of a backdoor is futile, since somebody else will fork and remove it. With Free Software, we'll still be capable of running our own encryption in a way that government intrusion will still be detectable by ourselves. Unless, of course, governments then ban communication about backdoors, or instructions on removing them, or distributing source code altogether.
- oleganza 13y agoI agree with your sentiment, but want to provide a slight correction about "Free Software": MIT/BSD licensed software while not free in FSF/GPL sense, is still open and widely used and solves the problem we have right now. To avoid confusion with FSF ideals, I'd talk simply about Open Source software.
- lumberjack 13y agoI think you might be a bit confused. MIT/BSD are fully supported by the FSF and are GPL compliant. They are free software licenses in all aspects.
- chimeracoder 13y ago> MIT/BSD are fully supported by the FSF and are GPL compliant. They are free software licenses in all aspects. To be clear, GPL compliance is not a prerequisite to being a free software license. There exist many free software licenses which are not technically GPL compliant for various reasons: http://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-list.html#GPLIncompatibleLicenses http://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-list.html#GPLIncompatibl... However, while freedom does not imply GPL compliance, I do believe GPL compliance implies freedom. I'm not 100% certain of this, but I can't think of a counterexample or how that might not be true. (I know you probably know this, but I want to make sure others reading your comment do too).
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- forman00 13y agoIf anyone's interested in learning more of how you can use the private key of a server to monitor all communications: see, for example, US Pat. 7,543,051 It describes a way to passively/non-intrusively ("invisible to the server") capture and analyze all network traffic using a cable-tap. Bottom of column 8: "In order to accomplish decryption in a timely manner the secure traffic decryption unit needs the private key of the server. Usually providing the server's private key to another device would be considered a security flaw, since private keys are not meant to be communicated to any other party. But since it may be assumed that usually the server's owner or operator will use the present invention to monitor his/her own server, providing the server's private key to the secure traffic decryption unit does not pose significant security risks."
- forman00 13y agohttps://docs.google.com/viewer?url=patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/pdfs/US7543051.pdf https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=patentimages.storage.goog...
- minor_nitwit 13y agoDoes this work? Has anyone built it?
- niels_olson 13y agoDue to the nature of SCI compartmentalization, I suspect that if this happens, they're going to end up in something like symlink hell, where some FDA inspector in Kansas has root on Facebook via 4 degrees of ssl certificates.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- jasonkolb 13y agoIf they're not careful they're going to endanger what access they have now. If secure communication as we know it ceases to be actually secure people will start (are now) figuring out how to go around points of failure. Meaning, if they push on this too hard they'll lose their ability to listen in on targeted communication because people will have more faith in unsigned than signed keys. All it takes is one leak of this data to throw the entire idea "gimme your private key" requests into the domain of F###ing horrible ideas.
- jasonkolb 13y agoActually, how crazy would it be if the documents that Greenwald is sitting on now bring to light that this is already happening... it would overnight throw software best practices into chaos. I hope he's careful.
- wahsd 13y agoSomething that people have apparently not quite connected is that these developments are incremental steps towards and can already be considered within the spectrum of mind reading. The only reason that that a majority of today's people do not recognize the situation as squarely in mind reading territory based on examples from literature and popular culture is that the the technical limitations still retrain government, with great frustration. Although the same heeds of danger did not suffice in the early 20th century, we are facing the same mechanics that led to the world war. We are at a nexus of an ugly transition into the consequences of the information age the same way that humanity would ultimately face demise at the nexus of the consequences of industrialization leading up to the World War, first and second part. The problem is a generational one; the baby boomer generation, with it's industrial age mindset is incapable from internalizing the consequences of their unprincipled actions.
- btbuildem 13y agoYou mean, we have a new paradigm, an unprecedented new perspective and ability, so the first thing we're gonna use it for is to try and kill as many people as we can before they kill us?
- coldtea 13y ago>so the first thing we're gonna use it for is to try and kill as many people as we can before they kill us? As we always did. But let me correct you "the first thing we're gonna use it for is grabbing as much power as we can, which involves killing as many people as we can before they kill us, as they have the unfortunate tendency to resist".
- geoffw8 13y agoYeah, but thats an entirely different ballgame if you ask me. The thing that differentiates this and mind reading, is full public/mainstream understanding. Consider: "Oh hey ma, the damned government is demanding public SSL keys, that means they can grab the data between your computer screen, and [insert popular services] servers" vs "Err, ma. The government has just announced they're now going to be reading peoples minds wherever and whenever you are." I'm sure one would illicit a much more active response, and as ever, its down to full understanding.
- macspoofing 13y agoDoes the Federal government not understand that this (idiotic) mass scale surveillance is bad for business? All the big American companies generate most of their revenue outside of the US. Majority of the user-bases of the big Silicon Valley tech companies are foreign. This only works if there is a level of trust in the American system and American government. What are they thinking?!?!
- workhere-io 13y agoWhat are they thinking?!?! They clearly aren't.
- bobzibub 13y agoI would have thought that it would worsen big business yet be great for independent consultants setting up their clients' own private email and file sharing operations. A net positive for the economy, I'd guess.
- btbuildem 13y agoDecentralization is good.
- coldtea 13y ago>Does the Federal government not understand that this (idiotic) mass scale surveillance is bad for business? Emmm, it's the business interests that ask for those kind of things. You think the politicians operate on a vacuum? The idea is to get a stable climate where the business interests (multinationals and such) can do as they please, and citizens are afraid.
- rafcavallaro 13y agoThat's objectively false - Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Facebook (among others) have all been at pains to distance themselves from NSA data collection precisely because they understand how bad the NSA's behavior is for their business.
- 13y ago
- thewarrior 13y agoHave no doubt about it, this marks the beginning of the end of online privacy. Now that even the U.S. govt is asking for the TLS Certificates there is no country that has the moral high ground on this issue. I'm from India and when I heard that the Indian government was asking Blackberry for its encryption keys I thought "Hah these people are so ignorant! They don't even know how public key encryption works!!". In hindsight it doesn't look very foolish. In fact they're openly building a surveillance system called CMS which has no checks and balances even on paper. Unfortunately in a country like ours with has so many other pressing issues it isn't a big deal yet. Recently some governments tried to orchestrate a power grab of the internet via the ITU but it was vetoed by the US. "Its better to let the US govt. have a monopoly on the internet", or so I thought. What with all their constitutional protections and all. Recent developments have shattered my hopes. The NSA's worst case scenario has already happened. Other than some modest outrage on the internet nothing much has changed. In a sense it shows a tacit acceptance of mass surveillance by most of the public. Hence my opinion that recent events mark a turning point. With noone having the moral high ground its quite likely that all world governments and corporations are soon going to come to an agreement on permanent mass surveillance . What then ?
- nileshtrivedi 13y agoI am in the same boat. I supported US against my own (Indian) government on the ITU taking over internet governance issue because I genuinely believed US would be a better guardian of the Internet than India. I was proven wrong. Now, decentralization of internet control doesn't seem like all that bad a thing.
- SkyMarshal 13y ago>Recently some governments tried to orchestrate a power grab of the internet via the ITU but the US vetoed it. I thought it would be better for the US govt. to have control rather than untrustworthy foreign govts. Recent developments have shattered even that impression. Yes, this is the thing that worries me the most. It may very well be the beginning of the end of the "multi-stakeholder model" of internet governance. There's no one left with any kind of moral high ground to fight off these attempts.
- johngalt 13y agoIt's a neat argument that the Feds have. If you send traffic unencrypted: 'You have no expectation of privacy, because you're broadcasting information publicly.' Turn on encryption: 'Clearly you have something to hide, and deserve additional scrutiny. It's still not a fourth amendment violation because we are just compelling a business to give us your keys'
- utnick 13y agoRight on, Clearly its also ok for the police to search your apartment at any time as well. You don't own your apartment, an apartment corporation does, so its clearly not a 4th amendment violation
- luminiferous 13y agoHey, don't give them any ideas now.
- dclowd9901 13y agoActually laws do protect private domain of a rental. It's the same reason the apartment companies themselves/landlords are not allowed to enter the apartment without your expressed consent.
- jessaustin 13y agoThe point is those laws are the implementation of the intent behind the Fourth Amendment, and it's strange that we don't have other laws which implement the full intent of the Fourth Amendment with respect to private communication.
- pyrocat 13y agoThey don't need consent, they just need to give notice.
- ColinWright 13y agoMorton's Fork: A man living modestly must be saving money and could therefore afford taxes, whereas if he was living extravagantly then he was obviously rich and could still afford them. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morton%27s_fork http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morton%27s_fork
- Yourfags 13y agoTechnology changes and so does the world, whether we like it or not. The question is always, who will come out on top I'm not really trying to be snide, but it really is an issue that's been sort of hanging around since the before I was born (1980s), who's going to control the internet and how, and whoever does is probably going to have a lot of power
- dasil003 13y ago> To be clear, this is not to assert that targeted, justified intercepts should not be possible under appropriate and realistic court supervision. Why make this disclaimer? To avoid being branded a fringe anarchist? It seems to me that we should absolutely be building intercept-proof communication privacy to the best of our ability since A) there's no such thing as perfect security and B) anything of importance eventually comes into contact with the real world where governments have immense power and don't need backdoors to do their job.
- tootie 13y agoIt's worth noting that prior to the internet there was absolutely no way of creating intercept-proof communication. Whilst I don't want companies handing over the SSL keys any more than you do, we have only had truly secure communication protocols available to the public for the past 10 or so years of human history.
- dasil003 13y agoTrue, but then neither did governments have the capacity to record all telephone and/or telegraph communications either. The sword cuts both ways.
- chris_mahan 13y agoThe only defense against government snooping is air gap. Don't connect your stuff to the Internet.
- jivatmanx 13y agoWhat if there is malware in USB keys?
- 205guy 13y agoFrom the article, I got the impression that the only way to really have secure communications is to create your own crypto. Now that you mention "air gap," I think that is the key (pun intended): it would have to be a crypto device that communicates with a PC through an air gap. Not USB nor bluetooth, actually nothing digital. The device I'm thinking of would rely on certain kinds of digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital conversions.
- chris_mahan 13y agoHow about QR codes? Light spectrum communications.
- downandout 13y agoThis kind of thing makes me think the Snowden disclosures actually emboldened the NSA in some ways. Their nightmare scenario occurred, and nothing happened. Nobody even got fired or "resigned". The public's tepid reaction has brought our nightmare scenario to life - we taught secretive government agencies that they can now do anything they want without fear of public backlash. These kinds of requests can now dramatically increase, with neither judges, politicians, or the NSA itself living in fear of anyone.
- quantumpotato_ 13y agoDo you think it was planned by the NSA?
- downandout 13y agoI don't, but then anything is possible. They could have invented Snowden in response to a credible threat from someone else that was planning to leak this or other even more sensitive materials. Anybody making similar disclosures today would have a tough time getting any attention because the Snowden story drew so little public outrage.
- untog 13y agoThe Snowden story got huge traction. It will be the biggest story of 2013.
- Mordor 13y agoAny country with secret laws and secret courts cannot be trusted, so it's only the death of US encryption (chips, software, hosting and services).
- leef 13y agoThis article seems to be mostly FUD. Per-session, ephemeral SSL keys are available and are used by at least Google [1], CloudFlare[2], and others. No keys are stored, no keys can be given to the NSA. 1 - https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/22/forwardsecret.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/22/forwardsecret.html 2 - http://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-prism-secure-ciphers http://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-prism-secure-ciphers
- dlitz 13y agoThat's only true in a pure eavesdropping scenario. The keys would still allow MITM attacks.
- mpyne 13y agoExcept for cert pinning. I think moxie is working on a general form of that right now.
- dlitz 13y agoCert pinning doesn't solve that problem. Cert pinning solves the problem of a compromised CA signing false certificates. If an attacker has the private key of the endpoint, cert pinning will do nothing.
- mpyne 13y agoI.e. the attacker completely simulates the desired endpoint since they have the priv key, DNS and all? I think that makes sense indeed.
- masswerk 13y agoJust a thought: For the better half of the 20th century, i.e. after WWII, Europe has been confronted and living with acts of terrorism from numerous sides (Israeli – just after WWII, Palestine, left-wing, right-wing, nationalist, etc, etc) with several severe casualties. Europe's democracies (for the better part at least) stepped back from drastic surveillance measures at will. (Partly because of the example of the Eastern block. Look up: Stasi.) It worked anyway. So: There is no possible deal of security versus freedom as it has been proposed for the last 12 years or so. Sorry. It does not make sense. There is no proportion between the losses of freedom and identity, the investment, and the reported "less than 50 use cases" for the whole surveillance system. Please stop. Immediately. Just saying, while we are losing digital identity.
- a3_nm 13y ago> Public-key cryptography as we know it today may be rapidly approaching the end of its useful lifespan. No evidence in the article substantiates this bold statement. - "pressuring major Internet firms to provide their "master" SSL keys for government surveillance purposes": this demonstrates a weakness of centralized public-key infrastructures, it does not follow that public-key cryptography is doomed. (See: web of trust.) - wiretaps, snooping, etc.: everyone is welcome to grab a copy of the ciphertext, this does not prove that cryptography is futile -- quite the contrary. - "concerns about the security of widely used cipher algorithms and a range of other associated exploits": vague. - "it is prudent to at least assume that intelligence agencies around the globe may still be working several steps ahead of public "state of the art" in crypto tech": unfalsifiable. - "forced the hands of chip manufacturers to include "special goodies" for surveillance purposes": I am willing to fear deliberate plausibly deniable weaknesses on accelerated hardware implementation of crypto primitives, e.g., PRNGs, but it seems very hard to believe that implementations of public-key crypto using general purpose instructions could be somehow identified by the CPU and somehow tampered with in a way which would be non-obvious somehow. - "when governments really want to target someone, they'll find some way to compromise the associated computers directly -- either through phishing or other malware attacks, or via in-person "black bag" jobs to physically alter systems as they might feel appropriate": humans are the weakest part of cryptosystems, and if they have physical access then they win; nothing new here. In conclusion: > I believe it would be fully appropriate for us to be considering alternative methodologies for data protection that are sufficiently outside the existing public-key "box" Public-key cryptography is a tool. It certainly does not form, in itself, a full "methodology for data protection", but nothing in the article justifies that has lost any usefulness in its current form.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- mrt0mat0 13y agowhich time?
- 13y ago
- cantankerous 13y agoReally, this article is silly. SSL keys will remain useful for authentication. If you want to make sure nobody's got the master key, just do a double-Diffie-Hellman and you're square...provided the person snooping on the master key isn't trying to use it to MITM you. That's a whole other bear entirely, though.
- kenster07 13y agoArticles like this miss the main issue. Privacy rights should not have to be enforced at the public key encryption level. Before all the sensationalists start going wild, remember that the NSA almost got defunded very recently. That is where the real frontier of this debate should be. At best, this episode exposes how vulnerable public key encryption is. But let's not go off the reservation.
- jensC 13y agoArrrg! Forget about the cloud. I'll host my servers at home, unplug them at night and watch my log files over the day :)
- jokoon 13y agowell no one has to obey them. why so much fuss about it ?
- tallpapab 13y agoPlease forgive my rudimentary (and possible erroneous understanding. There are three things important to public-key encryption. The public key, the private key (together called the key pair) and a certificate. If I understand it the cert is just to give confidence that you have the correct public key. So the NSA having access to the cert is a non issue as everyone has access to same. That's its purpose in life. Also the public key is publicly available or the system wouldn't work. The only sensitive things are the private keys. Is this right so far? If I want to encrypt a message to someone I need to use that person's public key. I use the cert to make sure I have the right one. Now the message can only be decrypted with the private key. So how can the NSA decrypt such a message? They would need the private key. The ISP doesn't have it. Even if they have the private key don't they need a pass phrase to use it? Not sure how the above applies to https or to ssh. Still, in both cases I don't think access to the cert breaks things. Indeed access to it and the public keys are essential to it working at all. (I guess one can operate without the cert too if you trust the source.)
- hkolek 13y agoThe article is conflating stuff and is just FUD. You don't need certs to apply asymmetric cryptography. As I understand it, the NSA could insert itself as a so-called "Men in the Middle" (aka MITM Attack). See this SO question for a far better explanation than I could provide: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/14907581/ssl-and-man-in-the-middle-misunderstanding http://stackoverflow.com/questions/14907581/ssl-and-man-in-t...
- 205guy 13y agoYour understanding of keys is about right. It is the OP article that your are not understanding. You ask "so how can the NSA decrypt such a message?" That's what the article is telling you: Either by 1) getting the private key from the corporation you are communicating with, or by 2) cracking the cryptography. Most people don't encrypt every email, they just use https to their email server. You say you're not sure about https, but that is the big vulnerability. So NSA just needs to ask your emailserver corp for their private key (to decrypt the packets, and then everyone can deny that the NSA obtained your email from the corp). This is case 1) above. For people who encrypt the message end to end (as in your example "encrypt a message to someone I need to use that person's public key"), this is case 2). It is controversial whether the NSA can crack the best ciphers, which are postulated to be near-impossible to crack. But the NSA has resources we cannot imagine and/or secret resources we cannot even know about. When the first encryption schemes came out, they were strong in the day but were later brute forced by more power computers. So there are some who think the NSA can or will be able to crack the current crypto (that's what the OP is referring to when he says "the means to subvert widely used mechanisms"). As others have said, in targetted cases like this, it may be easier for the NSA just to plant a bug on the receiving computer, to read contents after it has been decrypted. Now certs, which you have half wrong. Yes, certs give confidence that you have the correct public key. But certs are mostly used by companies (case 1 above) not individuals (case 2). In case 2, peer-to-peer encryption, individuals rarely go to the expense of getting trusted certificates. You say "let's take this private", and you send him your public key, or he sends you his--no cert involved. Instead you both rely on publishing your public keys everywhere and all the time (at the bottom of every email, on their website, etc.). That provides some history for you to trust the key he sends you--and vice-versa. In other words, public keys MUST be displayed publicly before you want to use it to gain credibility. Certificates are a way for companies to publish their public key with a credible certificate authority (CA). A certificate is essentially another public-private key pair that lets you determine that the CA really endorses the public key you are interested in. The credibility of the CA is determined by their record in the marketplace as to whether they endorse credible companies and whether they keep their master keys secure. The original article really doens't address certs, except to say that if master keys can be deciphered, we cannot trust certs anymore. That's because a malicious party could create a cert that looked real but wasn't (this happened recently when somebody stole one of the master keys used by a CA--they were able to make fake certs). My question to you is: if you misunderstood the article, why are you taking such strong positions in your other comments?
- tallpapab 13y agoAll this increased digital surveillance comes at a time when the US Post Office is under artificial financial pressure. Just last night the news reported a plan to eliminate direct delivery to the door in favor of some sort of community mail box facilities. Interesting coincidence that physical letters (whose contents are still protected by federal statute) are being discouraged while unprotected content is being collected.
- takluyver 13y agoWhat makes you think that the financial pressure is artificial? Postal services in general are having problems because there's not much reason to spend money sending a letter that will take days to arrive, when you can write an email for free and it will arrive in seconds.
- ptaffs 13y agoThe monitoring program is costing an awful lot of money, the data centers could be doing real work streamlining government processes and making the administration more efficient. We know governments, corporates, sys admins will snoop and should be objecting to our tax being used for a probably useless effort to process this raw data. Discuss tax rather than privacy, everyone cares more about that.
- aidenn0 13y agoDidn't moxie marlinspike have an idea for replacing the current SSL trust chain?
- acd 13y agoMaybe we should not trust central key emitting authorities but each other and our friends instead. For e.g. the government could run shadow CAs which normally perform their duties but at demand provide MITM certificates for them.
- teeja 13y agoThe whole cert structure has always been a house of cards. As evidenced last year, e.g, with the Turkish provider ... Since I first looked through the original Netscape, I've never had -any- reason to put so much trust in the hands of these Blue-Ribbon names. Or any ISP, for that matter. If US intelligence goes through with this, then only end-to-end (which has been deliberately stalled off and roadblocked and stonewalled for decades) will be left. At that point we'll find out just how much power we've left to defend the privacy of our communications, our relationships, our finances and our movements. The Cryptocat guy may yet become a legend... or someone like him.