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Julian Assange: Cryptographic Call to Arms
- mtgx 14y agoThis is why I'm glad HTTP 2.0 intends to implement SPDY's always-on encryption. It probably won't be long until governments find a way around that, especially the US government, who can pretty easily gain access to companies like Google, Verisign, and even ICANN, but it would be a good first step in the right direction. Hopefully future steps like web crypto will help increase the security of people's conversations online further.
- hughw 14y agoAlway-on encryption is necessary but not sufficient. As long as Facebook or Google have the decrypted information, you are still subject to the transnational dystopia. The other day I found this fellow's idea for a peer-to-peer social network service: http://code.google.com/p/peer-book/ http://code.google.com/p/peer-book/ "Your data is stored in a distributed fashion, across the network, so that even when you turn off your instance of PeerBook, your friends will still be able to view your Profile and send you messages. "Of course, all of this data is encrypted and backed up several times, so that even if Alice's data is being stored on Eve's machine, Eve will only be able to read it if she is Alice's friend; and Eve will only ever be able to delete her local copy of Alice's data which has no effect on its overall availability to the rest of Alice's friends." He's got the right idea. I haven't examined the project, and it doesn't seem active.
- ef4 14y agohttps://github.com/diaspora/diaspora https://github.com/diaspora/diaspora
- moe 14y agoHow on earth can you bring up diaspora in this context? Some kind of cruel joke? I'm downvoting parent and giving you the right link: https://freenetproject.org/ https://freenetproject.org/
- ef4 14y agoHeh, I probably should have said it's not an endorsement. Just another example of a (dubious) attempt at a distributed social network.
- hughw 14y agoThanks, it was useful to learn of the project.
- Egregore 14y agoDo Freenet now have any social features in it? Last time I looked (few years ago) it didn't have any significant.
- rattus 14y agoIt appears to be useful for admins getting convicted of CP trafficking for running a node. Does that count? Try this one: http://distributedcity.github.com/ http://distributedcity.github.com/ The previous incarnation of Distributed City was pretty cool. I haven't looked at their new code.
- Egregore 14y agoIt's difficult to work on a project when you don't see the support, the people who would like to use it.
- eze 14y agoWill it be an option to serve unencrypted content under HTTP 2.0?
- aidenn0 14y agoForget Google, Verisign and ICANN. Any of these people can generate certificates that completely eliminate the MITM protection of https: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/included/ http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/included/
- unimpressive 14y agoI think that more focus, at least in the short term; needs to be put on making crypto accessible to windows users. As an example, consider the following project website: https://www.gpg4win.org/ https://www.gpg4win.org/ An invalid security certificate, and even that only if you go out of your way to specify https. If the vast majority of users saw this, they'd go running; including myself. I can't in good conscious recommend crypto that doesn't have it's own security certificates under control. I have as yet not seen any less shady open implementations of PGP out there. Of course, because of the proprietary nature of windows, it is totally possible for them to have back doors which will break your encryption, but I'm fairly sure that there are ways to verify, even without source code; that Microsoft isn't pulling any funny business.[0] [0]: Besides, I'd prefer a situation where politically unsavory backdoors have to be used to read your data, as opposed to it being plain text and free for all.
- rdl 14y agoI feel pretty safe predicting that most communications are moving to mobile, vs. desktops. Even if you have a desktop, most of your communications will happen on a mobile device. The thing we really need (and what I'd fund if I had a spare $Xmm or so) is a great crypto API and solution to the user key management problem for iOS and Android, hooked into apps. It's technically easier to do on Android. On iOS, you're kind of stuck due to the core apps (mail, messages, etc.) being first-party Apple). It basically would take Apple deciding they cared about this issue, then building it into the OS in a way which didn't actually require trusting Apple completely, to work very well. Android has some steps toward this with some NSA projects, and wouldn't even necessarily require a full forking. Some way to do tokenization and thus fairly transparent encryption on the client (phone) inside apps like the Facebook App, Twitter, etc. would also be nice. That's both a technical challenge and a UI/UX problem. Silent Circle (from Jon Callas, Phil Zimmerman, Vinnie Moscaritolo (the PGP team...) and some Navy SEALs and defense contractors I knew from Iraq) actually seems like a pretty viable choice for sms, email, and voice right now. It unfortunately doesn't integrate into the social networks and other services people use, though.
- unimpressive 14y ago
- anigbrowl 14y agoFirst, recall that states are systems through which coercive force flows. Factions within a state may compete for support, leading to democratic surface phenomena, but the underpinnings of states are the systematic application, and avoidance, of violence. Land ownership, property, rents, dividends, taxation, court fines, censorship, copyrights and trademarks are all enforced by the threatened application of state violence. As if we lived in a halcyon utopia prior to that. I can't buy into Assange's Manichean view of government, given the pre-governmental state of society as war of all against all, qua Hobbes: "In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, not culture of the earth, no navigation, nor the use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Back when Wikileaks first came to prominence, it exposed malfeasance by private actors as often as states, notwithstanding the desire of those private actors to keep their doings private or even encrypted; Trafigure being a prime example (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trafigura http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trafigura). States can certainly be destructive of liberty, but the absence of a state (either literally or by legal limitation ) does not necessarily yield liberty; often it results in mere libertinism.
- contingencies 14y agoAssange speaks truth. You cannot deny the fundamentals of the state are violence. The US speaks already of a capacity for instant global weapon strikes within the hour. You claim it is wrong to question the system, implicitly suggesting there is no alternative. But anthropology shows clearly that premodern societies had more free time, greater material and economic equality. (Try 'Debt: The First 5000 Years'). You attack a perspective, quoting on a tangent, without contributing anything meaningful except the notion that government can have value: but of course! Nobody denies this. Assange and other politically engaged hackers like him seek improved systems of governance: greater protection of fundamental freedoms, greater availability of additional freedoms, greater truth and transparency. Relax, nobody wants to topple your car and burn your house down.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- spindritf 14y ago> The world is not sliding, but galloping into a new transnational dystopia. This development has not been properly recognized outside of national security circles. I agree with Moxie Marlinspike on that, we were preparing for fascism but got social democracy[1]. Assange is still preparing for fascism. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eG0KrT6pBPk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eG0KrT6pBPk
- droithomme 14y ago"Assange is still preparing for fascism." You mean the guy who is in internal exile in Britain because as a journalist he revealed war crimes committed by Britain's partner the United States? He's the guy who is delusional about the form of government that surrounds him, huh? Glad it's as simple as that.
- blablabla123 14y agoTo add some more complexity: the reason he is in a dodgy situation in the first place are rape allegations. Looking at some "leaked" parts of his biography this doesn't sound too far-fetched to me. I definitely appreciate his engagement in disclosing many interesting documents about the micro-social diplomatic environment. But after all, what about the more interesting stuff? Leaked documents from the center of the turbo capitalist universe are still pending. (IIRC those were promised for around last christmas...)
- chunkyslink 14y agoThere have been no charges laid against Julian Assange. The only 'dodgy situation' as you put it is that there has been so much effort to get him extradited to Sweden by a UK government who would not normally be interested in 'allegations' without substance from abroad.
- sliverstorm 14y agoThere have been no charges laid against Julian Assange Isn't this because he refuses to undergo questioning? As I understood it, the laws under which he is to be charged prohibit laying charges against him until they question him. So in this case, to say he has not been charged is devoid of meaning.
- rdl 14y agoI'd prefer to stick to http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html I also find Eric Hughes much easier to rally behind than Julian Assange, although John Gilmore is better still (although largely focuses on drug policy, now). Or John Perry Barlow or Mitch Kapor.
- derrida 14y agoI'd be interested to know what you think of the Cryptoparty 'movement', rdl? Eric Hughes talked in Amsterdam. Would you get involved?
- rdl 14y agoIt's too broad in scope for me to be really interested, I think -- meetings more focused on specific problems and solutions to those problems, vs. "the overall concept of cryptography and secure communications" seem more likely to be productive. There are really no shortage of events like this in the Bay Area. I think "how to help mainstream developers build and operate services securely" would be the only thing I'm really into; end users are too varied and stressful for me. (there are usually a critical number of true tinfoil hat, "I've been marginalized by society and need someone who hack my girlfriend's email" types at open end-user crypto meetings...) At least based on the previous several attempts at this kind of thing (2600, Ian/Len's key signing parties, cypherpunks physical meetings, etc.)
- derrida 14y agoI've certainly found the experience of talking about Tor to end users quite stressful, but I haven't had the experience of tin-foil hat users. There was an obvious low-level cop asking about the Silk Road at one of them. In-fact if I look around the room, I'm the one talking about what William Binney has said & Echelon, so I'm probably the tin foil hat. I agree about the focus. What's interesting is some of the bugs that I've found because I don't often see things from a UI perspective, and talking to end users has made me see some new bugs, also see problems that remain to be solved that I am currently working on. I think the bay area is unique, there is nothing much of it's kind like this in Sydney.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- mtgx 14y agoI think this is very relevant here - interview with the NSA whistleblower, William Binney, on how NSA is storing every post people are making online, so they (and FBI) can use it later: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TuET0kpHoyM http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TuET0kpHoyM No wonder NSA and FBI want warrantless access to private companies by lobbying for new laws like CISPA, and trying to build backdoors in services like Facebook, Skype, Twitter etc. They want to know absolutely everything you do online, besides your public posts: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/fbi-seeks-internet-backdoors/ http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/fbi-seeks-internet-... I don't know if they are doing it out of malice/power grabbing/control, or purely as a way to make their jobs more "efficient". But their #1 priority should always, always, be respecting the Constitution, and not trying to skirt around it. And I think they've forgotten all about that long ago.
- revelation 14y agoI think the point is democratic states should (need) not have intelligence agencies with unlimited powers. They corrupt the state as they establish themselves as a central pillar of power (next to the military and the government). They don't even have any historical roots in western political systems. The country with the claim to that is Russia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okhrana http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okhrana), where they were commonly used to quell internal unrest and combat opposition.
- hythloday 14y agoThe role of an internal secret police goes back at least as far as the Roman Frumentarii[0] and I think you can trace a direct lineage from Walsingham's[1] operations to the CIA/NSA. [0] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frumentarii http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frumentarii [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Walsingham#Entrapment_of_Mary.2C_Queen_of_Scots http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Walsingham#Entrapment_o...
- xfs 14y agoThey don't mean to grab particular information about every individual. They want to ensure completeness of their data mining results.
- georgeorwell 14y agoThis kind of over-the-top writing confirms what I already thought, which is that despite whatever good he might do in terms of exposing corrupt governments in the world, Julian Assange is just desperate for attention. Being this paranoid he should be advocating "post-quantum cryptography", i.e. cryptographic methods that are secure even once somebody develops a quantum computer. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography
- mtgx 14y agoNice username you got there. So you're saying this all conspiracy theory stuff? I think we've gotten way passed the point where the fact that the government monitors everyone online is just a conspiracy theory.
- georgeorwell 14y agoThanks :) I don't think it's a conspiracy theory, I just think that the way he frames it is a bit overly dramatic. Personally I just try to stay relatively anonymous and I operate under the assumption that whatever I say or do is basically public information. I can't be bothered with encryption when I'm talking to my friends because those conversations usually consist of things like, "Where do you want to eat?"
- neilk 14y agoI see, so you think if you just try to be as boring as possible, then you have nothing to fear from surveillance? Good luck with that. What if the world changes, and yesterday's orthodoxy is tomorrow's heresy? This used to happen in the old Soviet Union, all the time. What if, unknown to you, you are friends with a guy who the government doesn't like? This very thing happened to Maher Arar - actually it was two hops away, his friend's brother signed his lease, and that's all that was needed for the US government to whisk him from JFK airport to be tortured in a Syrian dungeon. Maher Arar is a guy just like you and me - he works in wireless tech, and crossed from Canada to America all the time. See http://maherarar.net/ http://maherarar.net/ . Why do I have to explain this to someone whose nick is georgeorwell?
- scarmig 14y agoA sufficiently motivated government has a nearly infinite amount of tools available for breaking encryption. Ignoring the possibility that it might know proprietary weaknesses to various systems (a hypothesis that is unknowable), there's just so much you need to secure at each node in a computer system. Are you personally sure no backdoors exist in the physical hardware you use? In the operating system you use? In the compiler used to build your OS? In any of the applications on your system? Are you sure that there's not a hardware keylogger on your keyboard, and do you check every day before sitting down that there's not one? Are there any secret cameras pointed at your keyboard, or sensitive microphones hidden nearby that can distinguish what keys you hit? And once you're sure of all that, are you just as sure everyone you communicate with is equally diligent? And, while we're at it, have you come up with a solid patch to prevent the well-known rubber hose vulnerability that exists in all cryptographic systems? That doesn't mean the crypto-anarchist project must fail. Encryption is invaluable: while the vast majority of other technological advances--sedentary agriculture, writing, maths, roads, sewage systems, paper, the telegraph, electricity, the light bulb, cars, "computers," satellites, Google--have all increased the legibility of the world to the State, encryption does the opposite. The panopticon isn't an existing, established system but instead an equilibrium point that the State has to constantly push us toward: anytime the economic cost of that push is increased, it gives us more opportunities for creating spaces of genuine human autonomy. But once you recast crypto-anarchism in that more moderate and stronger form, encryption moves from "our one hope against total domination" and a "hope that with courage, insight and solidarity we could use to resist" to something more banal: one tool of many. Not even a particularly effective tool: governments don't care about a bunch of nerds throwing PGP parties, and all the encryption in the world hasn't prevented the State from throwing Assange into jail (a pleasant jail with some fine Ecuadorian decor, but a jail nonetheless) and obliterating his organization.
- mtgx 14y agoIn Cory Doctorow's talk at Google, he said that all routers today have interception technology in them. It's only a matter of being enabled or not in some countries or in others. But it seems so many have asked for it, that they don't even bother to build routers without that interception technology in them, so now their default router has interception built-in by default. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbYXBJOFgeI http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbYXBJOFgeI
- acabal 14y agoI agree with the sentiment, but Assange's prose is a little dense. Maybe it's OK for his target audience, as I assume the layman won't be reading cryptome.org. What we really need is a champion to explain in relatable, plain English why encryption is essential even for mom and dad, and to explain it in a more mainstream venue. I think a big reason why people don't encrypt mail, etc., is because: 1) they don't know why it's important because nobody can explain it to them in relatable terms (like saying: when you send an email, Google keeps a copy forever, and the FBI can read it just by picking up a phone and asking nicely), and 2) if they do know the importance, the practicalities of encryption are explained impenetrably. A blur of acronyms, bad metaphors ("keys?" terrible choice of metaphor, considering how a pair is intertwined and their actual use), and no well-known authority you can trust to explain it all simply. The problem isn't that people don't care. They would care if they knew the realities of how their communications are stored, processed, and exposed to their governments. The problem is that nobody can explain it to them in a way that's not ridiculously complex or laden with terms like "Platonic realm" and "transnational dystopia".
- 18hrs 14y agoFor this reason I am fond of Jonathan Zittrain. Not that he particularly aligns with Assange but he is very good at presenting these issues in a compelling manner.
- belorn 14y agoEben Moglen has also made several good talks about the abolishment of privacy, and its effects. I would especially suggest listening to the Berlin talk made this year called "Why Freedom of Thought Requires Free Media and Why Free Media Require Free Technology".
- epa 14y agoLink for the lazy: http://youtu.be/sKOk4Y4inVY http://youtu.be/sKOk4Y4inVY
- SoftwareMaven 14y ago
- TranceMan 14y agoMany governments now have no fear of encryption - trust no one....
- IheartApplesDix 14y agoSHA-1024 Should only take a million square foot datacenter filled with GPUs an hour or so.
- beloch 14y agoAssange certainly has a flair for the dramatic... but he doesn't understand encryption. http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/wikileaks-insurance-file-decrypted-names-of-informants-exposed/56553 http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/wikileaks-insurance-file-decry... Wikileaks has distributed AES encrypted files that it claims are full of government secrets. They have withheld the information needed to decrypt some of those files ( although some keys have leaked from wikileaks, oddly enough) as a deterrent to persecution by governments. There's just one minor problem... This is effectively publication with delay, and it forces governments to go after them hard rather than deterring them. AES is based on computationally difficult to crack algorithms. If you assume there will be no advances in algorithms, no new types of computers, no weaknesses found in the implementation of AES, etc. then it will take a comfortingly long period of time for these files to be cracked. These assumptions are bad. Cracking algorithms are advancing rapidly. It is astronomically improbable, but not impossible that someone could come up with an efficient algorithm for factoring tomorrow that would render all factoring-based cryptography impotent overnight. The prospect of quantum computing on the horizon also places a time limit on how long these files can remain secure. When you commit secrets to a current form of encryption based on computationally difficult problems and distribute the cypher text broadly, you have effectively published those secrets with an unknown delay. This is why governments want Assange so badly. He's not keeping secrets to deter them, he's publishing them with a delay because he doesn't know what the heck he's doing when it comes to encryption. If he used a one-time-pad (Vernam cipher) and kept the key on his person he'd be in a far better position, but he's apparently too stupid to do this. How do you use a one-time pad? Cipher = message XOR key (XOR = exclusive OR) 10110101... (secret message in binary) 11010111... (true random key) -------- 01100010... (ciphertext) For this to work, Assange would have to distribute the ciphertext and keep the random key secret, perhaps on a USB key around his neck. This method of encryption has been mathematically proven to completely secure provided the key is truely random and not from a pseudo-random number generator. True random number generators can be bought for relatively cheap these days. If Assange had encrypted the files this way they would be safe from any cryptographic attack, safe from quantum computers, or anything else out there. For all time. The only thing that could unlock these files would have been his USB key. Obviously, this is not a convenient method for online transactions, since transmitting the secret gives eavesdroppers all they need to decode the ciphertext. However, for the use Assange has been putting AES to, one-time pads are perfect. Why didn't Assange use a one-time pad? The only answer can be that, for all his bluster, he remains utterly ignorant of how encryption works. Thanks to his ignorance the governments of the world have a vested interest in taking him down. Even if someone else picks up where Assange left off, hopefully that someone will understand how encryption works.
- CorsairSanglot 14y agoHere's another excerpt from "Cypherpunks" at Salon: http://www.salon.com/2012/12/02/julian_assange_the_web_can_create_revolutions_or_jail_revolutionaries/ http://www.salon.com/2012/12/02/julian_assange_the_web_can_c... You can only buy this book direct from the publisher. Amazon isn't carrying it.
- rdl 14y agoYou can also find it on popular torrent sites, as information wants to be free. (I would have bought it if it had been on Amazon, but, well.) 1dc2e5b6f0d5036a182e85ab34da839d15eaf1ed cypherpunks.epub 5d546aaa83aebd43a2342f6dc737d271a34ff684 cypherpunks.mobi ccaf1c45fc31633c9728dcd2cd4545b55a27be7c cypherpunks.pdf
- CorsairSanglot 14y agoWait...so your two options are buy from Amazon or pirate? Amazon is basically the worst corporation on the face of the earth. Supporting a small publisher -- especially a small publisher willing to publish Julian Assange, books about Bradley Manning, and books about Wikileaks, is basically a decent thing to do.
- chj 14y agopayment is very inconvenient. That's why a free payment system (without state control) should be given the top priority.
- rdl 14y agoYeah, it's not so much a moral argument as that I'm willing to pay ~10 seconds and up to $20 (and ideally, $10) for a book.
- rdl 14y agoActually I poked around the site more; it's not as bad as I thought (it takes normal credit cards, although authorize.net is kind of a pain). And the non-DRM ebooks are fairly acceptable. I'd still strongly prefer Amazon, but wouldn't pirate out of spite.
- lucb1e 14y agoAnd you can't donate with Bitcoin? What is this?
- gasull 14y agoThis is Cryptome, who isn't associated with Wikileaks. You can donate to Wikileaks using Bitcoin.
- coopdog 14y agoI think his call to action at the end is too abstract. It's important to understand that there is a problem, but the solution lies in understanding why the government is the way it is and why people vote to have such a government (fear). The battle is winning the minds of the average person, by showing them that an encrypted, unmonitored, uncensored internet is in their best interests and not something to fear. Or in the worst case, show that an all powerful (and therefore eventually corrupt) government is the greater of two evils. The proper tool for this is probably cheap, scalable marketing stunts and compelling media that spells this out in layman's terms.
- genuine 14y ago> and if all else fails, to accelerate its self-destruction. Unfortunately, that is how you know if someone has gone off the deep end. I agree though that we should all be encrypting communication, but our government helped develop the methods of encryption, and some methods have been known to have backdoors: http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/~eroberts/cs201/projects/ethics-of-surveillance/tech_encryptionbackdoors.html http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/~eroberts/cs201/projects/... Why it is highly recommended not to implement your own encryption method, we shouldn't be using something that could easily be decrypted by the wrong people either. We need to study methods that we use extremely well, and be aware that encryption susceptible to decryption via brute-force with significant resources are just as dangerous as backdoors. I also advocate development of wireless mesh networking technology to handle larger adhoc networks. While those that wish to spy could still become a member of an adhoc network, it would significantly complicate things for them.
- contingencies 14y agoIt is interesting that this preface has been extracted and hosted on Cryptome. Given the history of Cryptome and Wikileaks; and having had the opportunity back in 2009 to ask Assange in person about his views of Cryptome, I am no doubt his eyebrows would raise as well. I wonder if John Young posted it himself or it was submitted. IIRC part of Assange's concerns around Cryptome were some well reasoned arguments around editorial and source protection policy.
- guscost 14y agoTLDR: P ≠ NP
- marshray 14y agoIt's not proven that anything in TFA is actually NP.
- aurelianito 14y agoThis xkcd strip was never more on-topic than now. http://xkcd.com/538/ http://xkcd.com/538/
- nickpinkston 14y agoHa - this is what I was thinking the entire time. As long as humans are physical, we will be subject to coercion. I think Assange has good points, but the internet could still be used for plenty of harm even if they couldn't tell exactly what you're saying - even that is doubtful.
- gregsq 14y agoYeah but, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system)
- aurelianito 14y agoThey will torture you just in case.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- strictfp 14y agoI feel that we have to understand that using technology to fight legal battle never is the right answer. As soon as the government sees a particular technology as a hinder, threat or even an inconvenience, they can legislate against it. This holds true for encryption, VPNs and all other technological "saviours" that internet evangelists keep ranting about. The truth is that the only reasonable thing to do is to become politically active. If you can't beat them, join them.
- fauigerzigerk 14y agoI generally agree with you that there is no technological solution to these issues, not on a broad scale at least. Educating everyone about using encryption isn't going to fly because as soon as it becomes effective, they will legislate against it. But I wonder what shape any political activism could have. Maybe this cryptography movement should be seen as just that, a way to force a political debate and make any political activism relevant.
- AnthonyMouse 14y agoYes and no. Sure, we have to fight bad laws. Here's the thing: Encryption is legal now, but what good is it if we don't use it? We need to build and use technologies that respect human rights and we need to fight to make sure that they remain legal. One without the other is nothing. There is no point fighting to keep something legal if you don't have the technology and infrastructure to use it.
- yason 14y agoIn maybe five to ten years, the internet will effectively split in two. There will be major, commercial service providers such as Facebook-type social media hubs, major news sites but there will also be an invisible internet that is everything internet used to be, and in addition to that encrypted, anonymous, and untraceable. How it shows most prominently at the moment is file sharing. Setting the endless copyright debates aside, what happens is that governments and large companies want to interfere with the privacy of what citizens are doing with their own bits. They say copying is theft while citizens consider twiddling their own bits a private matter that's none of anyone else's business. The citizens don't understand that while it's de facto legal to form a sneakernet—the actual legal status probably varies from place to place but nobody has ever been sued for sneakernet filesharing because nobody else never knows about it—it's illegal to form a filesharing network over the internet. I don't promote or demote filesharing per se: it's just the cutting edge where the future trends will show years before they land elsewhere and that's what it makes it so interesting. A marginal slice of file sharing has already moved to anonymous darknets but in a few years and after a few more bad copyright/freedom-of-speech incidents with bad publicity, there will eventually be a breakthrough and the whole filesharing activity will go underground en masse. When the masses go for it, the capacity and availability of invisible darknets will raise in orders of magnitude. That means there will be other providers in the anonymous networks as well, websites and services. There already are some, from anonymous wikis, anonymous project pages to anonymous forums but currently those are playgrounds. That is not so in ten years: there will be a major "bazaar" going on underground. While everything is anonymous and untraceable, everything is also secure. An online bank could very well operate in the anonymous network because the traffic is already cryptographically signed, and users can enjoy strong authentication if they wish to or remain a pair of anonymous public/private keys. At that point the traditional grasp of internet control is lost. The institutions governing the internet and the copyright and whatnot are faced with a big dilemma: do they dare to ban and make illegal anything that's not specifically permitted on the internet and if so, how to go about it in actuality. Do they lobby for laws that only allow ISPs to let citizens connect to a http proxy that validates all traffic to be "approved"? Do they extend the charges for any use of the invisible internet that is deemed illegal, to cover all users of the invisible internet? We're still in the shadowdancing mode but the stakes are going higher, and in at most ten years the problem of control versus anonymity will have come out in the public. We better know what we want, at that point.
- jimmytucson 14y agoMy initial thoughts are, I don't know if this is the right way to combat widespread warrantless search and seizure, although maybe it is. I'm not sold either way. Let's say there were some massive breech of probable cause before billions of people used the internet every day. Maybe some king is issuing multitudinous search warrants to go and seize all postal mail correspondence within some large sector of the population. I'm thinking of something "old tymey" here. Okay. Well, it seems to me, the 18th century version of Julian Assange would essentially argue that people need to start getting good at writing in and decoding cryptograms. What we really need is the 21st century version of James Otis. I know, it's a very, very unfair analogy. But it explains my point. If this stuff that William Binney is talking about is really going on, wouldn't a legal or a socio-political (not sure if I'm even using that term correctly) response be more lasting and effective than having everybody start writing letters in the form of a NY Times crossword puzzle?
- yakiv 14y agoDoes it seem strange to anyone that the whole book isn't available for free? This doesn't appear to be intended as mere entertainment. This is supposed to be about maintaining freedom . . . it seems like a case where you'd want to get your ideas out and save the day over earning money from it.
- skrebbel 14y agoStrong cryptography can resist an unlimited application of violence. No amount of coercive force will ever solve a math problem. Not entirely false, but http://xkcd.com/538/ http://xkcd.com/538/
- elux 14y agoLong before Wikileaks, Assange worked on a project called "Rubberhose". (A hidden encrypted filesystem designed to offer protection against cryptanalysis by torture.) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system) Wired in 2008: "Among other achievements, he [Assange] co-invented Rubberhose deniable encryption, which would let a dissident being tortured reveal one key to unlock a hard drive, while not giving away that there was a second or third password-locked folder of information." http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2008/07/wikileaks?currentPage=all http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2008/07/wiki...
- jalada 14y agoSee also: TrueCrypt hidden volumes.
- nnq 14y agovery platonic, but totally oblivious to "rubber hose cryptanalysis" ...unless you have a group of fanatically loyal people at the core of your "freedom protectors" group and the "engineers" that implement your cryptography systems part of this group, force and bribery will always win. ...and if you have a group of people truly loyal to freedom, then you don't need much crypto anyway ...just spoken words, physical transfer written/printed papers or usb sticks (this is how bin laden supposedly communicated his speaches if I remember well, right?) or other media and a brotherly handshake...
- marshray 14y agoYou might be interested to learn that Assange had developed the Rubberhose file system. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_%28file_system%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_%28file_system%29 So I don't think he's oblivious to the concept.
- nnq 14y agodo you how does it compare to similar features offered by TrueCrypt?
- rattus 14y agoTrueCrypt's plausible deniability system is dependent on a passphrase instead of an auth key iirc. Another likely difference is that truecrypt works. Neither will stand up to scrutiny for the purposes of deniability. It's obscurity which is effective in the scenarios that the docs outline below. http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability
- BoredAstronaut 14y agoEven the strongest encryption is only as strong as the will of the person who knows the key. And what if the state decides to enforce controls over access to encryption algorithms and software? What if it's a crime to use unbreakable encryption? The only defence against tyranny is the effort of a sufficient number of people, with the will and means to resist, choose to actively support freedom and dismantle tyranny. Specifically, people in power: politicians, judges, lawyers, and police. If the people who run the state, and exert force in its name, prefer tyranny, then tyranny is what we'll get. And that's exactly what happens when those who oppose tyranny abandon the state those who support it.
- ChristianMarks 14y agoI'm toying with a very low bit rate protocol for short length messages. Low bit rates are associated with high signal to noise ratios at low power. Most of the messages people send aren't worth sending or receiving, and among those that are worth sending, many are short and non-urgent. There is a need for a slow, highly obfuscated messaging service...
- mrich 14y agoThis article seems to propose that encryption is the solution to everything. However, it should be relatively easy to discern an encrypted message from an unencrypted one. When everbody starts encrypting and this really poses a threat to intelligence agencies and governments it will simply be outlawed and payload that is deemed encrypted will not be routed.
- b1daly 14y agoIt's funny, I've come to think of the HN community as being the most skeptical and contrarian of all internet forums. (Jokingly, to the point that if someone posted a blog about how Hitler was evil, there would be an a reliable proportion of posters here pointing out how the citation free post was rhetorically weak and that there were some little understood benefits to the Nazi regime). Now, this short excerpt of Assange's argument strikes me as outlandish, and there's only a couple of skeptical posts to be found! There are a bunch of problems that I can see with it, I'll just list a few off the top of my head. 1) It's a predictive argument, which is hard (prediction). The prediction is that society will become worse because of the internet. 2) Glorification of the past: a casual consideration of societies and governments of the past highlights that they are, all of them, horrible. You don't have to go back far in US history to get to an amazingly evil government (1970s CIA activities for example) 3) The increased transparency brought on by the internet is a good thing. ,I'm glad Petraeus got his ass busted, as the phony hero creation meme has been weakened that provides cover for US misdeeds in the war theaters. Governments have been literally getting away with murder since time immemorial. There is a better chance of stopping them if there is, in general, more public, unencrypted communication (this is precisely what brought Petraeus down) 4) There is no way the public at large is going to start encrypting their communication. That kind of secrecy is just not that useful to the average citizen. It is also too complicated to understand for busy non-hackers. 5) The benefits created by network effects will be significantly diminished by introducing private encryption. One of the main uses of the internet is the creation of large scale markets. Markets are by definition public, or at least open to a group. To get efficient markets you need a sizable group. To keep access to a market private gets harder the more participants it has. Fairly determined efforts to conduct secret, anonymous actions by hacker groups like Anonymous have proved to be easily broken by law enforcement. And these are hackers! 6) Efforts at resisting tyranny can be demonized, and crushed, more readily if conducted in secret. The fact that Wikileaks acted somewhat non-anonymously to release supposedly secret data to public is what made it effective. If Assange had tried to undermine the secret making apparatus of the power structure in secret, he would have been just another terrorist (and maybe dead) I could go on, but my point is that I think what Assange is promoting here is pointless. I can't even conceive of how private keys could be distributed to a large network without being easily compromised. I would love to hear some of you smarter folk comment on this.
- Egregore 14y agoI'm afraid until most people will understand the use of cryptography, there will not be move forward. I've spent a lot of time on ResoMail, a an easy to use open source secure alternative mail, but during beta testing it didn't show user interest, people don't understand the dangers of trusting their data to corporation and didn't use it, so now the project is on hold, now I'm looking for new opportunities to develop it.
- mseebach 14y agoTim Bray said it better: Why It Matters: [...] This blog isn’t terribly controversial. But if only the “controversial” stuff is private, then privacy is itself suspicious. Thus, privacy should be on by default. https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/201x/2012/12/02/HTTPS https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/201x/2012/12/02/HTTPS EDIT: Ironically, I accidentally linked to the non-HTTPS version. Fixed.
- joycer 14y agoI am completely confused here. Perhaps it is his ridiculous tone of a hyperbolic Call To Arms, but can someone help me weed through this nonsense? So he's saying we need to create and use for ourselves more powerful encryption schemes to protect us from powers that be? Wikileaks is all about breaking information out from behind those walls that the powers themselves puts up to protect themselves. So create systems to protect ourselves from people like ourselves? It's nonsense. I thought Assange's old call to arms was much more on point with the inevitable future: transparency. Has he changed his mind? Does he now agree with his old enemies? I always thought the old adage of 'Failing to Beat 'em so Let's Join 'em' was a sign of weakness?
- mullingitover 14y ago>"Strong cryptography can resist an unlimited application of violence. No amount of coercive force will ever solve a math problem." No, but most average citizens' crypto is still ridiculously vulnerable to the three Bs: Burglary, Blackmail, and Blunt force trauma.