5 ms·

Team from ETH Zurich make high quality quantum swap gate using a geometric phase

241 points by joko42 6mo ago

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-026-10285-1 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-026-10285-1 https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22112 https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22112

joko42 6mo ago
Seems like we are moving from theory to pactice faster than expected.
- adrian_b 6mo ago
  > “We can now make lots of swap gates with neutral atoms”, says Tilman Esslinger, “but of course we still need a few other ingredients to build a working quantum computer.”
- SideQuark 6mo ago
  This is not a 17000 qubit general computer. Read the paper.
- dathinab 6mo ago
  yes, while this may not be a 17k qubit computer and has ways to go to get there the insights from it will likely help us to get there faster and it's not the only "this is moving faster then expected new" a year or so(?) ago some investments happen which make only sense if there had been some unpublished break through in hardware (through you never can exclude foolish absurd high Risiko investments) then more recently google researchers had some break through wrt. quantum algorithms, it's not generally assumed that 10k qubits (in the right setup) are enough to break 256 elliptic curve cryptography (or 2048bit RSA) _in minutes_! and there also where other breakthroughs quantum computer wrt. hardware the general consensus of people more knowledgeable in this field seems to be going in the direction that you must _finish fully migrate to post quantum cryptography by 2029_. Note that this isn't a "100% guarantee there are cable quantum computers in 2030", but a "the chance of this happening is too high to not be prepared by then". Overall: - from a academic/paper background 2029 seems to be the deadline to finish migrating to post quantum cryptography - claudflare agrees and has moved up it's internal deadline to 2029 - same for Google, Google also seem to have prioritized quantum secure authentication over harvest now/decrypt later protections, which implies they are seriously worried about their authentication breaking potentially as early as 2030 - IBM expect some "moonshot" attacks against high value targets already in 2029 ___ Through overall what does that mean for most people? - if you run some small low security service then probably for now nothing, but make sure you can move to pq if the tooling (webpki, TLS, etc.) does - for webpki, TLS and co having well working and by default supported pq cryptography is paramount - if you have some very sensitive material where it's a big problem if it leaks even years later, then you have a problem because you probably should have already migrated to post quantum cryptography 1-2 years ago ... Note that symmetric encryption is mostly unaffected. Sure there are a lot of people saying it's "slashed in half" (e.g. 128bit => 64bit) but luckily that isn't fully true. I personally still would go with 256bit where viable, often there is little reason not to. BUT a lot of the ways of sharing that symmetric key use encryption which should be assumed to be broken soon. - for VPNs if they allow complementing the asym. crypto with a symmetric key do that now (e.g. wireguard pre-shared key) but that is for many use cases a hen/egg issue as how do you securely exchange the pre-shared key? So look out for changes in the tooling/ecosystem. - for DevOps, look out for changes in the ecosystem especially webpki/TLS/certs and look out for tools which have a high chance to not mitigate in time - for Devs post quantum cryptography often looks like it could "just slot in" but that often isn't fully the case due to very different key sizes and performance characteristics. Look out for it. Also making you system ready to migrate to pq-safety was a recommendation by NSA and pretty much any other national cyber security agency for years by now. Furthermore with the standardization of ML-KEM the recommendation shifted to using that where viable (potentially in a hybrid KEM). So if you now notice that you never bother to check/plane ahead you probably should give it some priority now as you may be found to have acted in neglect which could in unlucky cases turn into legal liabilities.
adrian_b 6mo ago
Non-paywalled research paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22112 https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22112
snthpy 6mo ago
For real? I wouldn't have thought so many would be possible so soon. Might actually need to look into quantum computing again after 20 years.
- sigmoid10 6mo ago
  It is still orders of magnitude away from breaking RSA 2048 even under the most optimistic assumptions. And qubits double waaay slower than transistors so far.
  - foobar10000 6mo ago
    AES128 / Grover?
    - sigmoid10 6mo ago
      Still requires thousands of logical qubits, which would correspond to millions of physical qubits. And this machine isn't even fully there for the physical qubit part. It's like the first step to physical qubits.
  - snthpy 6mo ago
    Thanks. What order of magnitude qbits would be needed for RSA 2048?
- SideQuark 6mo ago
  They did not make a 17000 qubit computer. The qubits were not controllable or general in any way. The paper is linked, look at it. This title is misleading.
  - snthpy 6mo ago
    Thanks for the clarification.
fsh 6mo ago
I find the editorialized title misleading. They trapped 17000 atom pairs in an optical lattice and demonstrated a high-fidelity quantum gate between the atoms of each pair in parallel. There is no interaction between the atoms of different pairs and no individual control. The experiment demonstrates a very robust gate scheme, but is a long way from a programmable computer.
- baxtr 6mo ago
  With the hype QC these days, I find it hard to separate hype from real progress.
  - trollbridge 6mo ago
    Reminds me the state of nuclear fusion.
    - blitzar 6mo ago
      Just a decade away now.
      - mrroper 6mo ago
        So just like AI?
      - ashirviskas 6mo ago
        Nah, it's a decade away from *now*.
        blitzar 6mo ago
        nahhh, definately from *now* though - 100% this time
        dwd 6mo ago
        Now now or Just now? * I've worked with too many Sth Africans.
randomtoast 6mo ago
How does this bring us closer to a 17000 qubit computer and how close are we?
deleted 6mo ago
[deleted]
nottorp 6mo ago
Judging by the other comments on here, they learned to title their articles from OpenAI and Anthropic.
- hmry 6mo ago
  The HN title is not the article's title
- aswegs8 6mo ago
  BREAKING: ETHZ REFRAINS FROM RELEASING THE DETAILS OF THEIR QUBIT EXPERIMENT IN FEAR OF BREAKING THE FABRIC OF REALITY. READ NOW!!
- Keyframe 6mo ago
  And "they" being OP, not ETHZ.
KellyCriterion 6mo ago
And ... can it run Crysis? :-D
ForgotMyUUID 6mo ago
“Demonstrates“ vs. “can be applied to 17,000 qubits simultaneously.“ - too completely different things, you know ...
- wasabi991011 6mo ago
  Not sure what distinction you are trying to make. The researchers used a 58000 atom system, turned 17000 of them into qubits, and applied their gate to all those qubits simultaneously. Are you doubting this? On what grounds? It's stated pretty clearly in the paper.
dathinab 6mo ago
things are speeding up dangerously sure this isn't a 17k qubit quantum computer, but it's a step in that direction and this isn't the only news falling under "this is moving faster then expected" just one in many which scream "time to take it serious, deadline 2029 try earlier" --- a year or so(?) ago some investments happened, which made only sense if there had been some unpublished break through in quantum computer hardware (through you never can exclude foolish absurd high Risiko investments). (Sadly I didn't bookmark/safe the relevant articles/analysis, so take with a grain of salt.) then more recently, google researchers had some break through wrt. quantum algorithms. It can now be generally assumed that 10k qubits (in the right setup) are enough to break 256 elliptic curve cryptography (or 2048bit RSA) _in minutes_! There where also other hardware breakthrough published, and error correction break throughs etc. The general consensus of people more knowledgeable in this field then me seems to be going in the direction that you must _finish fully migrate to post quantum cryptography by 2029_. Note that this isn't a "100% guarantee there are cable quantum computers in 2030", but a "the chance of this happening is too high to not be prepared by then". Also that is mainly true for webpki, TLS, cloud infrastructure/deployment systems, code signing, etc. Overall: - from a academic/paper background 2029 seems to be the deadline to finish migrating to post quantum cryptography - claudflare agrees and has moved up it's internal deadline to 2029 - same for Google, Google also seem to have prioritized quantum secure authentication over harvest now/decrypt later protections. Which IMHO implies they take that deadline quite serious. - IBM expect some "moonshot" attacks against high value targets already in 2029 (i.e. ~one year earlier) instead of 2030. ___ Through overall what does that mean for most people? - If you run some small low security service then probably for now nothing much. But make sure you can move to pq if the tooling (webpki, TLS, etc.) starts supporting it and keep an eye on the topic. - For webpki, TLS and co having well working and by default supported pq cryptography is paramount. This tech isn't just powering the secure web, it's used far beyond and if broken might be enough to take over large parts of whole cloud providers. - If you have some very sensitive material, where it's a big problem if it leaks even years later, then you have a problem. Because you probably should have already migrated to post quantum cryptography 1-2 years ago ... Note that symmetric encryption is mostly unaffected. Sure there are a lot of people saying it's "slashed in half" (e.g. 128bit => 64bit) but luckily that isn't fully true. I personally still would go with 256bit where viable, as often there is little reason not to do so. BUT a lot of the ways of sharing/accessing/deriving that secure symmetric key use cryptography which should be assumed to be broken soon. - for VPNs if they allow complementing the asym. crypto with a symmetric key do that now (e.g. wireguard pre-shared key). But that is for many use cases a hen/egg issue as how do you securely exchange the pre-shared key? So look out for changes in the tooling/ecosystem. - for DevOps, look out for changes in the ecosystem especially webpki/TLS/certs and look out for tools which have a high chance to not mitigate in time - for Devs post quantum cryptography often looks like it could "just slot in" but that often isn't fully the case due to very different key sizes and performance characteristics. Look out for it. Also making you system ready to migrate to pq-safety was a recommendation by NSA and pretty much any other national cyber security agency for years by now. Furthermore with the standardization of ML-KEM the recommendation shifted to using that where viable (potentially in a hybrid KEM). So if you now notice that you never bother to check/plane ahead you probably should give it some priority now as you may be found to have acted in neglect which could in unlucky cases turn into legal liabilities.
freetonik 6mo ago
Every single discussion thread about any announcement in quantum feels exactly the same: 1. this is not what you think it is, there are caveats and the title is misleading. 2. I feel there is so much hype around quantum computing. 3. It's like nuclear fusion, always 10 years away. 4. Nuclear fusion is at least practical. QC is not. 5. Did they manage to find prime factorization of 17 already? LOL 6. Cryptography will be dead, RIP bitcoin and https. 7. No, actually quantum computers are useless. It's tiring. I recommend this recent post by Scott Aaronson https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=9668 https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=9668
deleted 6mo ago
[deleted]
ktallett 6mo ago
I am of the view the 17000 is simply referring to once they had the system set in the final stage they are happy with. They ran 17000 qubits through it over the course of testing and it led to a fidelity of 99%. Which is useful as fidelity is important, although this still isn't accurate enough, but it is no where near programmable general quantum computer.
- wasabi991011 6mo ago
  They had something like 58000 atoms in their lattice and managed to form 17000 qubits from atom pairs. Pretty impressive already yeah, I'm sure either their team or another research team will try to improve the qubit yield. Increasing the atom count could be harder though, I'm not an expert but at some point you run into limits from the size of your lab/cooler/trap. And yeah 99.9% fidelity is not anything groundbreaking, but it's pretty surprising for a "first try" on a new gate implementation. In contrast superconducting systems have been worked on for years and years with ridiculous amounts of investment and also only get 3 nines of fidelity, and IonQ just recently demonstrated 4 nines fidelity, but only after working on their system for many years too.
  - ktallett 6mo ago
    It will be very challenging to implement their system off this paper as there are many key experimental details missing. I won't get into my hatred of this but open methodology is sorely needed in QC and it really hampers speed of development across the whole sector. As you say you will run into limitations eventually but again hard to judge where those limitations are.
fedorsapronov 6mo ago
[dead]

241 points by joko42 6mo ago

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-026-10285-1 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-026-10285-1 https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22112 https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22112

joko42 6mo ago

Seems like we are moving from theory to pactice faster than expected.

adrian_b 6mo ago
> “We can now make lots of swap gates with neutral atoms”, says Tilman Esslinger, “but of course we still need a few other ingredients to build a working quantum computer.”
SideQuark 6mo ago
This is not a 17000 qubit general computer. Read the paper.
dathinab 6mo ago
yes, while this may not be a 17k qubit computer and has ways to go to get there the insights from it will likely help us to get there faster and it's not the only "this is moving faster then expected new" a year or so(?) ago some investments happen which make only sense if there had been some unpublished break through in hardware (through you never can exclude foolish absurd high Risiko investments) then more recently google researchers had some break through wrt. quantum algorithms, it's not generally assumed that 10k qubits (in the right setup) are enough to break 256 elliptic curve cryptography (or 2048bit RSA) _in minutes_! and there also where other breakthroughs quantum computer wrt. hardware the general consensus of people more knowledgeable in this field seems to be going in the direction that you must _finish fully migrate to post quantum cryptography by 2029_. Note that this isn't a "100% guarantee there are cable quantum computers in 2030", but a "the chance of this happening is too high to not be prepared by then". Overall: - from a academic/paper background 2029 seems to be the deadline to finish migrating to post quantum cryptography - claudflare agrees and has moved up it's internal deadline to 2029 - same for Google, Google also seem to have prioritized quantum secure authentication over harvest now/decrypt later protections, which implies they are seriously worried about their authentication breaking potentially as early as 2030 - IBM expect some "moonshot" attacks against high value targets already in 2029 ___ Through overall what does that mean for most people? - if you run some small low security service then probably for now nothing, but make sure you can move to pq if the tooling (webpki, TLS, etc.) does - for webpki, TLS and co having well working and by default supported pq cryptography is paramount - if you have some very sensitive material where it's a big problem if it leaks even years later, then you have a problem because you probably should have already migrated to post quantum cryptography 1-2 years ago ... Note that symmetric encryption is mostly unaffected. Sure there are a lot of people saying it's "slashed in half" (e.g. 128bit => 64bit) but luckily that isn't fully true. I personally still would go with 256bit where viable, often there is little reason not to. BUT a lot of the ways of sharing that symmetric key use encryption which should be assumed to be broken soon. - for VPNs if they allow complementing the asym. crypto with a symmetric key do that now (e.g. wireguard pre-shared key) but that is for many use cases a hen/egg issue as how do you securely exchange the pre-shared key? So look out for changes in the tooling/ecosystem. - for DevOps, look out for changes in the ecosystem especially webpki/TLS/certs and look out for tools which have a high chance to not mitigate in time - for Devs post quantum cryptography often looks like it could "just slot in" but that often isn't fully the case due to very different key sizes and performance characteristics. Look out for it. Also making you system ready to migrate to pq-safety was a recommendation by NSA and pretty much any other national cyber security agency for years by now. Furthermore with the standardization of ML-KEM the recommendation shifted to using that where viable (potentially in a hybrid KEM). So if you now notice that you never bother to check/plane ahead you probably should give it some priority now as you may be found to have acted in neglect which could in unlucky cases turn into legal liabilities.

adrian_b 6mo ago

Non-paywalled research paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22112 https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.22112

snthpy 6mo ago

For real? I wouldn't have thought so many would be possible so soon. Might actually need to look into quantum computing again after 20 years.

sigmoid10 6mo ago
It is still orders of magnitude away from breaking RSA 2048 even under the most optimistic assumptions. And qubits double waaay slower than transistors so far.
- foobar10000 6mo ago
  AES128 / Grover?
  - sigmoid10 6mo ago
    Still requires thousands of logical qubits, which would correspond to millions of physical qubits. And this machine isn't even fully there for the physical qubit part. It's like the first step to physical qubits.
- snthpy 6mo ago
  Thanks. What order of magnitude qbits would be needed for RSA 2048?
SideQuark 6mo ago
They did not make a 17000 qubit computer. The qubits were not controllable or general in any way. The paper is linked, look at it. This title is misleading.
- snthpy 6mo ago
  Thanks for the clarification.

fsh 6mo ago

I find the editorialized title misleading. They trapped 17000 atom pairs in an optical lattice and demonstrated a high-fidelity quantum gate between the atoms of each pair in parallel. There is no interaction between the atoms of different pairs and no individual control. The experiment demonstrates a very robust gate scheme, but is a long way from a programmable computer.

baxtr 6mo ago
With the hype QC these days, I find it hard to separate hype from real progress.
- trollbridge 6mo ago
  Reminds me the state of nuclear fusion.
  - blitzar 6mo ago
    Just a decade away now.
    - mrroper 6mo ago
      So just like AI?
    - ashirviskas 6mo ago
      Nah, it's a decade away from *now*.
      - blitzar 6mo ago
        nahhh, definately from *now* though - 100% this time
      - dwd 6mo ago
        Now now or Just now? * I've worked with too many Sth Africans.

randomtoast 6mo ago

How does this bring us closer to a 17000 qubit computer and how close are we?

deleted 6mo ago

[deleted]

nottorp 6mo ago

Judging by the other comments on here, they learned to title their articles from OpenAI and Anthropic.

hmry 6mo ago
The HN title is not the article's title
aswegs8 6mo ago
BREAKING: ETHZ REFRAINS FROM RELEASING THE DETAILS OF THEIR QUBIT EXPERIMENT IN FEAR OF BREAKING THE FABRIC OF REALITY. READ NOW!!
Keyframe 6mo ago
And "they" being OP, not ETHZ.

KellyCriterion 6mo ago

And ... can it run Crysis? :-D

ForgotMyUUID 6mo ago

“Demonstrates“ vs. “can be applied to 17,000 qubits simultaneously.“ - too completely different things, you know ...

wasabi991011 6mo ago
Not sure what distinction you are trying to make. The researchers used a 58000 atom system, turned 17000 of them into qubits, and applied their gate to all those qubits simultaneously. Are you doubting this? On what grounds? It's stated pretty clearly in the paper.

dathinab 6mo ago

things are speeding up dangerously sure this isn't a 17k qubit quantum computer, but it's a step in that direction and this isn't the only news falling under "this is moving faster then expected" just one in many which scream "time to take it serious, deadline 2029 try earlier" --- a year or so(?) ago some investments happened, which made only sense if there had been some unpublished break through in quantum computer hardware (through you never can exclude foolish absurd high Risiko investments). (Sadly I didn't bookmark/safe the relevant articles/analysis, so take with a grain of salt.) then more recently, google researchers had some break through wrt. quantum algorithms. It can now be generally assumed that 10k qubits (in the right setup) are enough to break 256 elliptic curve cryptography (or 2048bit RSA) _in minutes_! There where also other hardware breakthrough published, and error correction break throughs etc. The general consensus of people more knowledgeable in this field then me seems to be going in the direction that you must _finish fully migrate to post quantum cryptography by 2029_. Note that this isn't a "100% guarantee there are cable quantum computers in 2030", but a "the chance of this happening is too high to not be prepared by then". Also that is mainly true for webpki, TLS, cloud infrastructure/deployment systems, code signing, etc. Overall: - from a academic/paper background 2029 seems to be the deadline to finish migrating to post quantum cryptography - claudflare agrees and has moved up it's internal deadline to 2029 - same for Google, Google also seem to have prioritized quantum secure authentication over harvest now/decrypt later protections. Which IMHO implies they take that deadline quite serious. - IBM expect some "moonshot" attacks against high value targets already in 2029 (i.e. ~one year earlier) instead of 2030. ___ Through overall what does that mean for most people? - If you run some small low security service then probably for now nothing much. But make sure you can move to pq if the tooling (webpki, TLS, etc.) starts supporting it and keep an eye on the topic. - For webpki, TLS and co having well working and by default supported pq cryptography is paramount. This tech isn't just powering the secure web, it's used far beyond and if broken might be enough to take over large parts of whole cloud providers. - If you have some very sensitive material, where it's a big problem if it leaks even years later, then you have a problem. Because you probably should have already migrated to post quantum cryptography 1-2 years ago ... Note that symmetric encryption is mostly unaffected. Sure there are a lot of people saying it's "slashed in half" (e.g. 128bit => 64bit) but luckily that isn't fully true. I personally still would go with 256bit where viable, as often there is little reason not to do so. BUT a lot of the ways of sharing/accessing/deriving that secure symmetric key use cryptography which should be assumed to be broken soon. - for VPNs if they allow complementing the asym. crypto with a symmetric key do that now (e.g. wireguard pre-shared key). But that is for many use cases a hen/egg issue as how do you securely exchange the pre-shared key? So look out for changes in the tooling/ecosystem. - for DevOps, look out for changes in the ecosystem especially webpki/TLS/certs and look out for tools which have a high chance to not mitigate in time - for Devs post quantum cryptography often looks like it could "just slot in" but that often isn't fully the case due to very different key sizes and performance characteristics. Look out for it. Also making you system ready to migrate to pq-safety was a recommendation by NSA and pretty much any other national cyber security agency for years by now. Furthermore with the standardization of ML-KEM the recommendation shifted to using that where viable (potentially in a hybrid KEM). So if you now notice that you never bother to check/plane ahead you probably should give it some priority now as you may be found to have acted in neglect which could in unlucky cases turn into legal liabilities.

freetonik 6mo ago

Every single discussion thread about any announcement in quantum feels exactly the same: 1. this is not what you think it is, there are caveats and the title is misleading. 2. I feel there is so much hype around quantum computing. 3. It's like nuclear fusion, always 10 years away. 4. Nuclear fusion is at least practical. QC is not. 5. Did they manage to find prime factorization of 17 already? LOL 6. Cryptography will be dead, RIP bitcoin and https. 7. No, actually quantum computers are useless. It's tiring. I recommend this recent post by Scott Aaronson https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=9668 https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=9668

deleted 6mo ago

[deleted]

ktallett 6mo ago

I am of the view the 17000 is simply referring to once they had the system set in the final stage they are happy with. They ran 17000 qubits through it over the course of testing and it led to a fidelity of 99%. Which is useful as fidelity is important, although this still isn't accurate enough, but it is no where near programmable general quantum computer.

wasabi991011 6mo ago
They had something like 58000 atoms in their lattice and managed to form 17000 qubits from atom pairs. Pretty impressive already yeah, I'm sure either their team or another research team will try to improve the qubit yield. Increasing the atom count could be harder though, I'm not an expert but at some point you run into limits from the size of your lab/cooler/trap. And yeah 99.9% fidelity is not anything groundbreaking, but it's pretty surprising for a "first try" on a new gate implementation. In contrast superconducting systems have been worked on for years and years with ridiculous amounts of investment and also only get 3 nines of fidelity, and IonQ just recently demonstrated 4 nines fidelity, but only after working on their system for many years too.
- ktallett 6mo ago
  It will be very challenging to implement their system off this paper as there are many key experimental details missing. I won't get into my hatred of this but open methodology is sorely needed in QC and it really hampers speed of development across the whole sector. As you say you will run into limitations eventually but again hard to judge where those limitations are.

fedorsapronov 6mo ago

[dead]