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If a malicious update can be pushed because of some failure in the signature verification checks (which already exist), what makes you think the threat actor wo
by hsbauauvhabzb 9mo ago
If a malicious update can be pushed because of some failure in the signature verification checks (which already exist), what makes you think the threat actor won’t have access to signing keys?
This is not what attestation is even seeking to solve.
- avadodin 9mo agoFirmware upgrades don't need to use the same protocols. Without secure boot any applet can take a security hole escalate and persist until you take a trip to a zone of interest. With secure-boot+attestation, the vendors can choose not to let you download the latest map data, report you to the authorities, etc. Why do people take DA as "Hail Satan" anyways.
- hsbauauvhabzb 9mo agoIf this was about stopping malware, it wouldn’t be targeting Linux endpoints.
- cwillu 9mo ago“With secure-boot+attestation, the vendors can choose not to let you download the latest map data, report you to the authorities” As far as I'm concerned, you just conceded the argument.