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Apple's solution is iCloud Keychain which is E2E encrypted, so would not be revealed with a court order.
by ezfe 9mo ago
Apple's solution is iCloud Keychain which is E2E encrypted, so would not be revealed with a court order.
- tokyobreakfast 9mo agoWhat is your proof they don't have a duplicate key that also unlocks it? A firm handshake from Tim?
- otterley 9mo agoIf they say they don't, and they do, then that's fraud, and they could be held liable for any damages that result. And, if word got out that they were defrauding customers, that would result in serious reputational damage to Apple (who uses their security practices as an industry differentiator) and possibly a significant customer shift away from them. They don't want that.
- tokyobreakfast 9mo agoAbsent the source code, it's incredibly difficult to disprove when the only proof you have is good vibes.
- otterley 9mo agoThere are many things you can't prove or disprove in this world. That's where trust and reputation comes in - to fill the uncertainty gap.
- fsflover 9mo agoYou mean, trust and reputation of Apple? They're not exactly high: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46252114 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46252114 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45520407 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45520407 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42014588 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42014588 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26644216 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26644216
- otterley 9mo agoAt the end of the day, it's all about how you weigh the evidence. If those examples are sufficient to tip the scales for you, that's your choice. However, Apple's overall trustworthiness--particular when it comes to protecting people's sensitive data--remains high for in the market. Even the examples you posted aren't especially pertinent to that (except for iCloud Keychain, where the complaint isn't whether Apple is securely storing it, but the fact that it got transmitted to them in the first place, and there exists some unresolved ambiguity about whether it is appropriately deleted on demand).
- ezfe 9mo agoNone of these really match the scenario we're discussing here. Some are typical big company stuff, some are technical edge cases, but none are "Apple lies about a fundamental security practice consistently and with malice"
- PlatoIsADisease 9mo agoCognitive Dissonance. You already made up your mind, no evidence will change it. Any evidence you get is cast aside for one reason or another.
- fsflover 9mo ago> "Apple lies about a fundamental security practice consistently and with malice" Uploading passwords to the cloud should count. Also this: https://sneak.berlin/20231005/apple-operating-system-surveillance/ https://sneak.berlin/20231005/apple-operating-system-surveil...
- otterley 9mo agoThat link you provided is a "conspiracy theory," even by the author's own admission. That article is also outdated; OCSP is as dead as a doornail (no doubt in part because it could be used for surveillance) and they fixed the cleartext transmission of hardware identifiers. Are you expecting perfection here? Or are you just being argumentative?
- direwolf20 9mo agoThe government would never prosecute a company for fraud where that fraud consists of cooperating with the government after promising to a suspected criminal that they wouldn't.
- otterley 9mo agoThat's not the scenario I was thinking of. There are other possibilities here, like providing a decryption key (even if by accident) to a criminal who's stolen a business's laptop, or if a business had made contractual promises to their customers, based on Apple's promises to them. The actions would be private (civil) ones, not criminal fraud prosecution. Besides, Apple's lawyers aren't stupid enough to forget to carve out a law-enforcement demand exception.
- PlatoIsADisease 9mo agoApple has the number 1 marketing team in the world. They got away with PRISM and terrible security. They are immune to reputation damage. Teens and moms don't care.
- otterley 9mo agoTerrible security... compared to what? Some ideal state that exists in your head, or a real-world benchmark? Do you expect them to ignore lawful orders from governments as well?
- codedokode 9mo agoCooperating with law enforcement cannot be a fraud. Fraud is lying to get illegal gains. I think, it's legally ok to lie if the goal is to catch a criminal and help the government. For example, in 20th century, an European manufacturer of encryption machines (Crypto AG [1]) made a backdoor at request of governments and never got punished - instead it got generous payments. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG
- eddyg 9mo agoYou should watch the whole BlackHat talk (from 2016!) from Apple's Head of Security Engineering and Architecture, but especially this part: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U&t=1993s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U&t=1993s
- PlatoIsADisease 9mo agoLot of trust in the words that cannot be verified.
- deleted 9mo ago[deleted]
- jcalvinowens 9mo ago> Apple's solution is iCloud Keychain which is E2E encrypted, so would not be revealed with a court order. Nope. For this threat model, E2E is a complete joke when both E's are controlled by the third party. Apple could be compelled by the government to insert code in the client to upload your decrypted data to another endpoint they control, and you'd never know.
- dcrazy 9mo agoThat was tested in the San Bernardino shooter case. Apple stood up and the FBI backed down.
- jcalvinowens 9mo agoIt's incredibly naive to believe apple will continue to be able to do that.
- ezfe 9mo agoYeah and Microsoft could insert code to upload the bitlocker keys. What's your point? Even linux could do that if they were compelled to.
- jcalvinowens 9mo ago> Even linux could do that if they were compelled to. An open source project absolutely cannot do that without your consent if you build your client from the source. That's my point.
- ezfe 9mo agoWait I'm sorry do you build linux from source and review all code changes?
- jcalvinowens 9mo agoYou missed the important part: > For this threat model We're talking about a hypothetical scenario where a state actor getting the information encrypted by the E2E encryption puts your life or freedom in danger. If that's you, yes, you absolutely shouldn't trust US corporations, and you should absolutely be auditing the source code. I seriously doubt that's you though, and it's certainly not me. The sub-title from the original forbes article (linked in the first paragraph of TFA): > But companies like Apple and Meta set up their systems so such a privacy violation isn’t possible. ...is completely utterly false. The journalist swallowed the marketing whole.