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NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption
- garbageman 2y ago[flagged]
- jedisct1 2y agoThis is a key exchange mechanism, not an encryption system.
- affinepplan 2y agoif it's any consolation, decisions like these (normally) have a very long lead time measured in years. now, these are not normal times, but even so I'd be more concerned about NIST decisions coming out nearer to the end of this administration rather than just now at the beginning.
- dylan604 2y agoMore telling would be any reversals in the next couple of years
- natch 2y agoIf you think the bad actors are only on one side, you are in a bubble that is feeding you bad information.
- affinepplan 2y agoyes, and if you think the _number_ of bad actors on each side are even CLOSE to similar in magnitudes then you are in a bubble that is feeding you bad information
- natch 2y agoI would just encourage you to keep your eyes open and listen to the other side, and revisit this post and see how it ages.
- immibis 2y agoJust yesterday I read someone say that post-quantum cryptography is woke. Not sarcastically. Someone actually believes that post-quantum cryptography is woke, because it's something academics dreamed up and then told everyone they should be using. They view it the same way as DEI.
- whimsicalism 2y agocan we not turn every thread into a politics one? i doubt the Trump admin has strongly vested interest in which post-quantum scheme is selected e: and yes, i am aware of the history around nist and crypto
- kewho 2y ago[dead]
- 123yawaworht456 2y ago[flagged]
- Analemma_ 2y ago> i doubt the Trump admin has strongly vested interest in which post-quantum scheme is selected That's not the argument being made, you're using that as a strawman to distract from the actual position, which is that indiscriminate layoffs (which is what DOGE is doing) reduce institutional competence and increase the likelihood that whatever scheme is selected is not fit for purpose. Address that argument, not the one you've invented in your head.
- whimsicalism 2y agomy point is merely that the quality of discussion in the replies to GGP are going to be bad [0][1][2], the relevance is tenuous, and it crowds out content based discussion. of course, now my content-based questions are getting downvoted. > reduce institutional competence and increase the likelihood most replies interpreted it the same way I did, likely due to the reference to 'loyalties' & 'trust'. [0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43333834 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43333834 [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43333698 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43333698 [2]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43333643 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43333643
- kewho 2y ago[dead]
- dialup_sounds 2y agoNot to defend the practice, but the layoffs have been for employees with 0-3 years in role, which probably does not include the people selecting post-quantum encryption algorithms.
- mikeyouse 2y agoPerhaps, but what surprised the DOGE folks is that “in role” included some people who were recently promoted or had changed teams.. so many of the laid off employees were actually long-time employees with a ton of institutional knowledge. Perhaps they would have learned as much if they had done literally any due diligence to understand the departments they were tasked with organizing, but I guess we’ll never know.
- dylan604 2y agoYou're implying that these people are not smart enough to already have known what they were doing. You will now be logged and noted as a dissenter, and are now officially warned against further dissent. You don't want to FAFO. --DOGE management it's only the next natural step
- nartho 2y agoIf I'm not mistaken, this is inaccurate. It was any probationary employees, which also includes anyone promoted in the last 2 years.
- doikor 2y agoThe 0 to 3 year counter also resets when you get promoted (you are "probationary" for the new role)
- qzx_pierri 2y agoI recommend this video by Computerphile - He talks about how NIST may have been pressured into enforcing compromised (backdoored?) cryptography methods as a standard - Dual_EC_DRBG to be exact. He also gives a super cool/intuitive breakdown on how this came to be. It will definitely grow some food for thought. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nybVFJVXbww https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nybVFJVXbww
- tptacek 2y agoDual EC was not the product of a contest. The NIST PQC algorithms are all designed by academic cryptographers, many of them not US nationals.
- natch 2y agoAnd chosen by NIST…
- tptacek 2y agoAnd? Finish that thought.
- natch 2y agoYou are tptacek; I believe you know exactly what I meant. But to indulge you, do you think we can know that the selection process is not comprised?
- tptacek 2y agoExplain what the compromised selection process does here. NIST doesn't control the submissions.
- immibis 2y agoSeems pretty obvious no? 1. Pretend to be someone else and enter a backdoored algorithm. Or pressure someone to enter a backdoored algorithm for you. Or just give them the algorithm for the reward of being the winner. 2. Be NIST, and choose that algorithm.
- grayhatter 2y agoI was unable to trust NIST before
- rdtsc 2y agoDid you trust them before?
- garbageman 2y agoI trusted them to at least pick an encryption that only they could break...rather than one that other nation states may be able to crack as well.
- rdtsc 2y agoHeh. That's fair. I wonder what other countries do? Do their agencies trust NIST or they recommend their own and run their programs for algorithms. I am thinking of say Germany, France, Britain etc.
- Y_Y 2y agoThey have their own agencies responsible, but take note of what NIST says (especially the UK). https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Informationen-und-Empfehlungen/Quantentechnologien-und-Post-Quanten-Kryptografie/quantentechnologien-und-post-quanten-kryptografie_node.html https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisati... https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document/pqc-transition-in-france.pdf https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document/pqc-trans... https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/next-steps-preparing-for-post-quantum-cryptography https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/next-steps-preparing-for-...
- rdtsc 2y agoThank you. It seems they sort of follow NIST's guidelines mostly: > The NCSC recommends ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 as providing appropriate levels of security and efficiency for most use cases.
- ziddoap 2y agoIf it's breakable by them, it's breakable by anyone. Full stop. It is not possible to create an encryption scheme only breakable by NIST (or NSA, or whatever 3-4 letter agency).
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- ZiiS 2y ago"can we trust this is the best encryption standard" is by definition "no". Doesn't matter who you are asking about what.
- natch 2y agoClaiming loyalty is a litmus test for layoffs is a bit incendiary and a needless introduction of a strongly biased view of politics into the conversation. No doubt for leadership levels an active disinterest in helping enable open inquiry into the state of things would be fireable, but calling this a loyalty test is a strong spin. One that’s been normalized lately to be sure, but there’s no need to further it. I’d be more concerned with whether NIST colludes with the NSA to approve algorithms they could crack.
- kmeisthax 2y agoNo, and that wasn't the case under prior administrations either. Remember Dual_EC_DRBG[0]? NIST is an untrustworthy government agency that occasionally produces useful encryption standards. The answer to "should we use a NIST standard" is to look at what the wider academic cryptography community is talking about. Dual_EC_DRBG was complained about immediately (for various strange statistical properties that made it impractical) and people found the ability to hide a backdoor in Dual_EC_DRBG in 2004. If anything, the biggest issue is that the security experts pointing out the obvious and glaring flaws with NIST standards don't get listened to enough. [0] A random number generator standard designed specifically with a back door that only the creator of its curve constants could make use of or even prove had been inserted. It was pushed by NIST during the Bush Jr. administration.
- tux3 2y agoThe NIST report that explains the decision: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2025/NIST.IR.8545.pdf#page=17 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2025/NIST.IR.8545.pdf#p...
- buu700 2y agoReally glad to see it. It sounds like their reasoning is essentially the same as mine for implementing HQC alongside Kyber in Cyph three years ago: having a different theoretical basis makes it highly complementary to Kyber/ML-KEM, but its public key sizes are much more practical than those of the more well known code-based candidate Classic McEliece.
- whimsicalism 2y agoGive how quickly quantum is potentially coming, I wonder if we should/could find some way of using multiple quantum-resistant algorithms simultaneously as a default, in case a fault is found after the limited time we have to verify that there are no faults. Also - should we not be switching over to these algorithms starting like... now? Am I wrong that anyone collecting https traffic now will be able to break it in the future?
- jonmon6691 2y agoCorrect, KEM's should be replaced ASAP since they are currently vulnerable to store-now-decrypt-later attacks. Digital signature algorithms are less urgent but considering how long it takes to roll out new cryptography standards, they should be preferred for any new designs. That said, the new PQC signatures are much larger than the current 32 byte ed25519 signatures that are most common, and that could end up being very difficult to integrate into embedded systems with low bandwidth or limited memory, ie. CAN bus secure diagnostics, meshtastic nodes etc.
- daghamm 2y agoSorry, can you expand on the issues with KEM?
- MJGrzymek 2y agoIsn't that trivial in a sense? Encrypt with layer 1, then use that encrypted channel to send layer 2 (and so on). Not sure about the performance. Signal has a post about using pre and post-quantum together: https://signal.org/blog/pqxdh/ https://signal.org/blog/pqxdh/ > The essence of our protocol upgrade from X3DH to PQXDH is to compute a shared secret, data known only to the parties involved in a private communication session, using both the elliptic curve key agreement protocol X25519 and the post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism CRYSTALS-Kyber. We then combine these two shared secrets together so that any attacker must break both X25519 and CRYSTALS-Kyber to compute the same shared secret.
- chowells 2y ago
- throw0101c 2y agoMeta: I can understand the math problems behind RSA and DH, and the general concepts of EC, but all stuff for post-quantum algorithms I have yet to have a intuitive understanding even after reading / watching a bunch of videos trying to explain things.
- WaitWaitWha 2y agoI was in the same exact boat. I just could not digest it. I found AI (combo Grok & ChatPPT 4o) to be the best resource for this. It was able to break it down to digestible chunks, then pull it together that made sense. It even made suggestions what math areas I need to brush up on.
- bryan0 2y agoI just did the same thing. Claude (sonnet 3.7) walked me through a toy implementation of the algorithm.
- FateOfNations 2y agoYeah, I'm going to have to spend some time trying to understand the math too. I was mostly waiting for things to calm down standardization wise. This newly selected algorithm is based on error correction codes (the same ones used in communications protocols), which look interesting.
- tptacek 2y agoThe intuition for ML-KEM-style lattice cryptography is actually kind of straightforward. Generate a secret vector x and a random matrix A; multiply Ax, then corrupt it with a random vector of errors e, so instead of Ax=b you have Ax+e=b. Solving Ax=b is like week 2 of undergraduate linear algebra. Solving Ax+e=b, in a lattice setting, is Hard in the same sense factoring is: as you run the steps of elimination to attempt to solve it, the errors compound catastrophically.
- j_chance 2y agoSolving `Ax=b` is easy if `x` can be any value. But if you bound `x` such that all entries must be small (e.g. only zeroes and ones) then the problem is hard: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_integer_solution_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_integer_solution_problem What you described would be closer to learning with errors (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_with_errors https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_with_errors) combined with SIS/SVP. Learning with errors is based on the parity learning problem (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parity_learning https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parity_learning) in machine learning, which I take as a positive sign of security. Interestingly you can get information theoretically secure constructions using lattices by tuning the parameters. For example, if you make the `A` matrix large enough it becomes statistically unlikely that more than 1 solution exists (e.g. generate a random binary vector `x` and it's unlikely that an `x'` exists that solves for `b`).
- Starlord2048 2y ago[flagged]
- neapolisbeach 2y agoThis comment reads as 100% LLM generated
- nartho 2y agoI Wonder why ? It doesn't to me. Maybe I'm just bad at recognizing LLMs patterns
- whimsicalism 2y agothe question/conclusion phrasing at the end is a suspicious red flag to me, quick click on their comment history is confirmation
- hallway_monitor 2y agoThe pattern of a top level comment on each post and no replies gives it away for me. Surprised to see a bot here.
- whimsicalism 2y agofrankly, it's not a bad reply IMO - probably one of the best LLM replies that i've noticed, although perhaps there are better flying under my radar
- basfo 2y agoEnglish is not my first language. Sometimes, especially when I try to write a complex and long idea, I use LLMs to correct my errors, syntax, etc. In those cases, even if the idea remains the same, the text ends up looking LLM generated, since the correction applies its own "robotic style." This is even more noticeable if you ask chatgpt to translate it from another language. (I'm not the author of the post, just mentioning it since it will probably become harder to detect such cases.)
- EGreg 2y agoWhat is your favorite post-quantum encryption approach? I think Lattice-based ones will eventually be broken by a quantum algorithm. I am fully on board with lamport signatures and SPHINCS+
- buu700 2y agoIn Cyph, I went with Kyber (lattice-based) combined with HQC (code-based) for encryption. NTRU Prime also may be a good option if Kyber is ever broken in a way that doesn't fundamentally break all lattice crypto. For signing, I treat Dilithium (lattice-based) as "standard security" and SPHINCS+ (hash-based) as "high security". In particular, the former is used for end user public keys and certificates, while the latter is used for code signing where the larger public key and signature sizes are less of an issue. In all cases, I wouldn't use PQC without combining it with classical crypto, in Cyph's case X25519/Ed25519. Otherwise you run the risk of a situation like SIDH/SIKE where future cryptanalysis of a particular PQC algorithm finds that it isn't even classically secure, and then you're hosed in the present.
- coppsilgold 2y ago> In all cases, I wouldn't use PQC without combining it with classical crypto With hash-based signatures, hybridization isn't required. They are the most powerful signature scheme approach by far. The security assumption hash-based signatures rely on is also shared with every other signature scheme (hashes are what are signed). Other schemes come with additional assumptions. It's unfortunate that hash-based public key exchange is not practical. Merkle Puzzles require 2^n data exchange for 2^2n security.
- buu700 2y agoThat's fair. I'd basically agree, which is why I decided not to hybridize SPHINCS+ with Dilithium as I did with the two post-quantum encryption algorithms. Having said that, while SPHINCS+ seems highly likely to be safe (particularly as far as PQC goes), it isn't impossible that someone finds a flaw in e.g. the construction used to implement statelessness. It's probably fine on its own, and stacking it with something like RSA is maybe more trouble than it's worth, but there's also very little downside to hybridizing with Ed25519 given its overhead relative to SPHINCS+; 64 bytes on top of a ~30 KB signature is practically a rounding error. (Also, small correction to my last comment: only the SPHINCS+ signatures are large, not the public keys.)
- casenmgreen 2y ago[flagged]
- qwe----3 2y ago[flagged]
- knowaveragejoe 2y agoThankfully, we all know that isn't what happened.
- some_furry 2y agoThe title is subtly incorrect: HQC is a fifth post-quantum cryptography algorithm selected for standardization by NIST, but it's only the second KEM (encryption-like). > NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption The other 3 are digital signature algorithms, not encryption.
- bobsmooth 2y agoDon't get me wrong, it's good to be prepared, but what are the chances we'll need these algorithms by 2050?
- MidnightRider39 2y agoBasically zero. Great talk by Peter Gutman why this whole quantum topic is bollocks: https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/bollocks.pdf https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/bollocks.pdf
- est31 2y agohn thread about this (with some interesting comments): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43046631 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43046631
- bawolff 2y agoPredicting anything 25 years out is a fool's errand. Cryptographically relavent Quantum computers are definitely not happening in the near term, but 25 years is a long enough time horizon that it is plausible. Just consider what tech was like 25 years ago. Would anyone (without the benefit of hindsight) in 1999 really be able to predict modern AI, the ubiquity of smart phones, etc. Heck 25 years ago people still thought the internet thing was a fad. Anyone trying to predict 25 years out is full of crap. https://xkcd.com/678/ https://xkcd.com/678/
- tptacek 2y agoExcept for RC4, which people were side-eyeing on Usenet in the 1990s, and key size progress, I think the cryptography primitives we were using 25 years ago have held up reasonably well. A lot of things that have been major issues since then are things that we know theoretically back in 2000, but just didn't know viscerally, because people hadn't written exploits. That's not the same thing as, like, Peter Schwabe's take on whether a particular key exchange or KEM is likely to survive until 2050.
- mmooss 2y ago
- bdcravens 2y agoCompletely off-topic, but in today's climate, I worry about any department like this having their efforts rendered moot if they become a DOGE target.
- rsfern 2y agoIt’s not that off topic IMO, NIST (along with all the other federal agencies) is finalizing restructuring/reorganization plans this week in response to one of last month’s executive orders. It’s not clear when the extent of the cuts will be announced, or what the criteria will be for which programs are to be affected. Though in the Commerce secretary’s confirmation hearing there was mostly good will towards this kind of light touch non-regulatory standardization approach that NIST tries to take