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I was unsure what this Recovery Key was: https://support.apple.com/en-us/109345 https://support.apple.com/en-us/109345 It is kind of scary too — lose the key a
by JKCalhoun 3y ago
I was unsure what this Recovery Key was: https://support.apple.com/en-us/109345 https://support.apple.com/en-us/109345
It is kind of scary too — lose the key and no one can get you back in to your account.
- josephcsible 3y agoSuch a high risk of being locked out permanently is more than most people can stomach. Why can't they offer a last-resort option like showing up in person at an Apple Store with government-issued photo ID?
- toomuchtodo 3y agoBecause they aren’t required to by law. I have filed comments with the FTC that this recovery path should be legally mandated for digital accounts, I encourage others to do the same. It doesn’t have to be an Apple Store (insider risk, see SIM swapping analogy); could be USPS or another government identity proofer they partner with. Login.gov uses USPS for in person identity proofing, for example. Your data and account ownership interest doesn’t disappear because of failure to possess the right sequence of bytes or a string. Can you imagine if your real estate or securities ownership evaporated because you didn't have the right password? Silliness.
- kccqzy 3y agoWell previously when stock trades involved exchanging physical certificates, I could imagine that ownership could evaporate if you lost that piece of paper. Or just think about cash: you do lose that ownership when you lose that magical piece of paper. It's a simpler world when what you have physically determines what you own.
- josephcsible 3y agoIf the deed to land or the title to a car gets destroyed, what happens? It doesn't suddenly forever become unownable.
- jrkatz 3y agoPhysical certificates are not a thing of the past and can be restored upon loss or destruction: https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/lost-or-stolen-stock-certificates https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-ba...
- toomuchtodo 3y agoPeople want a just world (imho, n=1, based on all available evidence, etc), recourse, and protections, not a simple world. Interestingly, cash will likely be the last to go in the near future from a “possession of value” as the world goes cashless (although whether this is "good" or "bad" can be argued in another thread). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cashless_society https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cashless_society
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoThis should not be required by law because many people specifically don't want it. I'm content to keep my own redundant copies of a recovery key and suffer the consequences of my own actions, rather than allowing someone to steal my account just because they made a convincing fake ID or hacked some government system. In general centralized identity systems are a single point of failure and hooking more things into them is a bad thing. > Your data and account ownership interest doesn’t disappear because of failure to possess the right sequence of bytes or a string. Somehow you have to establish that you are the owner of the account, in a way that nobody else can do it. This is very much not a trivial problem, and government IDs don't provide any kind of solution to it. If you need a driver's license, how do you get a driver's license? With a birth certificate? Okay, how do you get a copy of your birth certificate when you don't have a driver's license? If there is a path to go from your house burning down and you having zero documents to you having a valid ID again without proving you've memorized or otherwise backed up any kind of secrets, an attacker can do the same thing and get an ID in your name. This is why identity theft is a thing in every system that relies on government ID. Requiring all systems to accept government ID is requiring all systems to be subject to identity theft.
- toomuchtodo 3y agoI argue for and advocate that this capability should exist, but not be mandatory. If you do not want to tie your personal identity to your digital identity, certainly, you should be able to not do so and rely solely on a cryptographic primitive, recovery key, or other digital mechanism to govern access of last resort. If your account access is lost forever, it's on you and that was a choice that was made. > Somehow you have to establish that you are the owner of the account, in a way that nobody else can do it. This is very much not a trivial problem, and government IDs don't provide any kind of solution to it. This is actually very easy. You can identity proof someone through Stripe Identity [1] for ~$2/transaction. There are of course other private companies who will do this. You bind this identity to the digital identity once, when you have a high identity assurance level (IAL). Account recovery is then trivial. > If you need a driver's license, how do you get a driver's license? With a birth certificate? Okay, how do you get a copy of your birth certificate when you don't have a driver's license? This is government's problem luckily, not that of private companies who would need to offer account identity bootstrapping. Does the liquor store or bar care where you got your government ID? The notary? The bank? They do not, because they trust the government to issue these credentials. They simply require the state of federal government credential. Based on the amount of crypto fraud that has occurred (~$72B and counting [2]), government identity web of trust is much more robust than "not your keys, not your crypto" and similar digital only primitives. NIST 800-63 should answer any questions you might have I have not already answered: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/ https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/ (NIST Digital Identity Guidelines) [1] https://stripe.com/identity https://stripe.com/identity [2] https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/charts/top https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/charts/top (customer identity is a component of my work in financial services)
- lazide 3y agoHave you seen how easy it is to get fake government ID? It’s damn near a rite of passage for teenagers so they can buy alcohol. $20-$50 if you know the right person or can wander the dark web right. I’m not sure you want that to be the absolute best digital security you can get.
- SoftTalker 3y agoYes it is vulnerable to an attacker who is willing to present himself in person with a fake ID to target a specific account. However it's not scalable or remotely exploitable.
- lazide 3y agoSince it requires a human looking at an ID and then pressing a button, the system triggered by the button press is likely quite exploitable no? Or even worse, scanning and storing an ID, which allows spoofing if those get compromised. Recovery key isn’t susceptible to that - and isn’t susceptible to fake-id-spotting-ability or bribeability of staff either.
- josephcsible 3y agoOkay, then also require a photo when opting in to this, and make sure the person who shows up looks like said photo too.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- semiquaver 3y ago> Why can't they offer a last-resort option like showing up in person at an Apple Store with government-issued photo ID? This is easy to defeat and completely subverts the purpose of the system. If you are not comfortable with self-custody then don’t opt in.
- nottorp 3y agoOnly because you don't have proper IDs over there in the US? I'd say a lot of identity problems are there because companies have to identify people without an official ID somehow...
- matwood 3y agoI think their option for last resort is the trusted contact.
- recursive 3y agoHow would this work? If this was possible, that would mean an Apple employee is verifying the ID. This has failure modes. See SIM swapping attacks.
- mlyle 3y agoThere's a wide set of possible approaches between "let any employee validate any ID" and "never let someone into an account that they have lost the credential to." E.g. you could make it costly to attempt, require a notarized proof of identity -and- showing up at the Apple store, and enforce a n-day waiting period. A different employee does the unlock (from a customer service queue) than accepts the paperwork. We don't lock people out of financial accounts forever when they forget a credential. It could definitely be solved for other types of accounts.
- josephcsible 3y agoAren't SIM swapping attacks only such a problem because you can get a new SIM without showing up in person with ID?
- recursive 3y agoNo, they're also a problem because you can run into a storefront and snatch the employee's authenticated tablet, regardless of what company policy is.
- hedora 3y agoThis is the default behavior if you don't turn this stuff on. They store your account recovery key in an escrow device. The main problem is that walking into an apple store with a government-issued warrant works just as well as walking in with a government-issued ID.
- fennecbutt 3y agoPut in safe deposit boxes at 2 different banks or something, I guess.
- lxgr 3y agoThat raises the TCO of iCloud considerably.
- jareklupinski 3y ago> lose the key and no one can get you back in to your account sounds like a feature "want to totally restart your entire digital life? just rip up your key :) never worry about something from your past coming back to you ever again!
- headmelted 3y agoThat seems like the worst option. Everything up to the free tier would stay there forever with no way for you to ever request it to be deleted.
- sgjohnson 3y agoTurn on Advanced Data Protection before you rip up the key. Then it's all as good as deleted.
- headmelted 3y agoThat’s a rather generous assumption. Do Apple definitely not retain a key? If they don’t is the encryption quantum secure?
- sgjohnson 3y ago> Do Apple definitely not retain a key? If this is the threat vector you’re worried about, you shouldn’t have had anything in iCloud (or any cloud for that matter) to begin with, rendering this debate completely moot.
- bilbo0s 3y agoOnly if you do everything at Apple. You make posts on twitter, it's not protected the same way.
- dylan604 3y agoI want to be upset that you've made a comment so obvious, yet sadly, there will be people in the wild that don't understand the silos platforms build. However, I doubt any of them are here reading this, but you never know.
- ThomasBb 3y ago“ If you use Advanced Data Protection and set up both a recovery key and a recovery contact, you can use either your recovery key or recovery contact to regain access to your account.”
- themagician 3y agoYou can regenerate a new key from any logged in device, so you have to lose the key AND every device.
- lxgr 3y agoExcept if Apple decides, based on undocumented heuristics, that you do in fact need the key, as far as I’ve heard.
- lloeki 3y ago> lose the key and no one can get you back in to your account. Incorrect: only Apple cannot. You can voluntarily declare: - recovery accounts: these trusted accounts can help you authenticate anytime. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212513 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212513 - legacy contacts: these trusted contacts can access your account in the event of your death. https://support.apple.com/en-us/102631 https://support.apple.com/en-us/102631 As for the "lose recovery key" situation is no different than hardware token 2FA + recovery codes. Print multiple copies and spread them to trusted third parties.
- pmontra 3y ago> A recovery key is an randomly generated 28-character code That's easy to backup. You can even print it and bury it in a sealed box in the garden or put it in a book or whatever. It depends who you are protecting against.
- fortran77 3y agoI keep one-time keys between pages of some books on my shelf, and a copy in a safe deposit box. I suppose if I were publically known to have tons of money in "crypto" or were a target of a nation-state, this wouldn't be safe enough. But I think it's OK for my gmail and OneDrive, etc.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- Klathmon 3y agoBut you shouldn't ONLY store it in a box or in your house. That means you're one natural disaster away from losing everything. As much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most
- tacocataco 3y agoWhy can't you bury a 2nd box in your friends yard who lives across the country?
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- CatWChainsaw 3y agoOkay, and when your friend moves, and you buried it years ago, so they forgot to dig it up what with everything else going on in their life at moving time?
- alistairSH 3y agoAs much as it can "weaken" security, an electronic backup is still recommended for most Maybe I'm being dense (probably), but where would you save it? iCloud? No, that doesn't work - you need the key to access iCloud. Some other cloud storage service? No, that doesn't work - you need your phone to generate a token for access and your phone was destroyed in the same fire as the paper backup. Seems like the safe choice is a lock box at a bank or similar. Or a fireproof safe at home.
- m_a_g 3y ago> When you set up a recovery key, you turn off Apple's standard account recovery process. > However, if you lose your recovery key and can’t access one of your trusted devices, you'll be locked out of your account permanently. I considered it before but I think it's just too much risk as I rely heavily on iCloud. On the other hand, I don't see the risk with the current method if you're smart enough not to fall for things like MFA bombing tactics.
- asd4 3y agoThe security researcher in the article was concerned about accidently confirming the prompt on his watch. I don't think its a matter of being "smart enough". Human error can easily creep in when dismissing 10's or 100's of prompts.
- hunter2_ 3y agoThe prompt UX should step into a special "bombed" mode when a frequency threshold is crossed, at which point accepting a prompt has fat-finger protection such as double confirmation steps, and declining all (or perhaps all that share a commonality, like same initiating IP address) becomes possible.
- lazide 3y agoOr you know, not allow this kind of brute forcing at all?
- nerdjon 3y agoYou can setup a recovery contact incase you do loose the key. I just set that up with my partner and the chance of loosing the key and both of us losing all of our apple devices I think is fairly slim. I also stuck that key in 1Password (sure it's less safe, but if my 1Password was breached I have far bigger problems than this key being retrieved). Then keep a hard copy in a safe. Been contemplating sending my parents a safe (who live several states away) with keys on a sheet of paper without context that only I have the combination too. But not sure yet.
- catlikesshrimp 3y agoHard copy? edge the string in a hard surface. My favorite is a rock in my garden. The characters are facing the ground to shield from erosion. The visible surface of the rocks (all of them) is painted white for aesthetic. Survives a fire, earthquake. No tornadoes or tsunamis here. Nobody has stolen any such rocks from here.
- lxgr 3y agoHow many people own a safe? I personally don’t know anybody that does. I do know that safes sometimes get stolen.
- saaaaaam 3y agoYou personally don’t know anyone who obviously discloses that they have a safe. If you have a safe you are keeping something valuable secure. The fewer people know that you have something valuable that needs to be secured the better. If people don’t even know your safe exists then that reduces the chances of it being compromised.
- lxgr 3y agoI know for a fact that many of my friends don’t own a safe, and I don’t think I’m an outlier here. I don’t doubt that many people do, but it’s still not a solution for the majority of Apple users.
- rjbwork 3y ago