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> 4.2 Safety measures taken by the manufacturer I would have hoped for Boeing to add a warning system in the case of dual input, like in Airbus aircrafts, but

> 4.2 Safety measures taken by the manufacturer I would have hoped for Boeing to add a warning system in the case of dual input, like in Airbus aircrafts, but it seems they did the bare minimum here. Simple warnings were added to the pilot hanbook that basically amount to "don't apply opposite inputs".

juujian 3y ago
If Boeing was a student, they would be the kind that does the bare minimum in every class just so they don't fail.
- ramijames 3y ago
  This seems to be the core reason why pure capitalism is a failed concept. There must be regulatory oversight to ensure that what is done MOST RIGHT and not CHEAPEST.
  - stef25 3y ago
    Thinking that "fuck it, we'll risk loss of human life and possibly having to shut down the company" isn't due to capitalism, it's psychopathy and I'm fairly sure that never happened. Anything that goes wrong is due to dysfunctional management, not greed.
    - masklinn 3y ago
      Ford literally did a cost/benefit analysis for fixing the Pinto versus societal costs of injuries and deaths, and went with the cheaper option. They actually put it to paper and sent that to the NHTSA to argue against fuel system regulations. “Dysfunctional management” is a direct function of managerial incentives, which is generally capitalistic greed (aka “obligation to maximize shareholder value”)
      - nradov 3y ago
        Every auto manufacturer does the same thing. The Ford Pinto case was particularly poorly handled. But for any given car design, it's always possible to further improve safety by making it more expensive. A Mercedes-Benz S-Class is far safer than a Nissan Sentra by any objective standard. Should we tighten safety requirements so that every car is as safe as the S-Class, and costs about as much? Where do we draw the line on safety regulations?
        yawpitch 3y ago
        If we tightened safety regulations so that every car was as safe as the S-Class then cars as safe as the S-Class would dramatically drop in price, simply by virtue of there being more of them. As for where you draw the line on safety regulations, the optimum answer is always “considerably past the point that business owners start complaining about excessive regulation”.
        FredPret 3y ago
        You don’t think the input costs have something to do with the price of an S Class? Pricing is due to both supply and demand - there can’t be a sustainable supply of a expensive-to-make cars at loss-making prices
        kube-system 3y ago
        The S-class is a bad example, because it is expensive for other confounding reasons. However, all else equal, a vehicle with more active and passive safety features and more safety engineering is more expensive. Even after you account for economies of scale. For example, airbags are extremely mass produced and have just about as much economies of scale as possible. But, in countries where they are not mandated, you can still find cars offered without them, because they are cheaper. The same is also true for vehicles without UHHS safety cages, ABS, stability control, etc. All of these things cost money.
        yawpitch 3y ago
    - cqqxo4zV46cp 3y ago
      Don’t make excuses. Putting psychopaths in the drivers seat is a precipitation of capitalism. Capitalism decides the ultimate KPI, and eventually things shake out this way. We don’t just get to say, yes, there goes another psychopathic executive, and wash our hands of the whole thing. Christ. We all make systems for a living. Look at indirect consequences.
      - stef25 3y ago
        Even psychopaths don't want to end up disgraced or in jail. So maybe it's the lack of punishment we dole out to these kinds of people. Nowadays companies can seriously suffer by mishandling their "attitudes" over social justice issues, my gut reaction was that if that's true how could they get away with a plane falling out of the sky. Still a bigger deal than dozen people dying in cars with faulty fuel systems, perhaps just because of the optics.
        feoren 3y ago
        > Even psychopaths don't want to end up disgraced or in jail. So maybe it's the lack of punishment we dole out to these kinds of people. You're describing effective regulatory oversight. That is a manual control on capitalism, and something capitalism inevitably fights against. Psychopaths exist and look for ways to exploit capitalism, including "fuck it, we'll risk loss of human life and possibly having to shut down the company", which you said isn't due to capitalism. But it is: it's due to the combination of capitalism and human nature, but we can only control the former. The solution is regulatory oversight, as you just pointed out. Also: realize that psychopaths will absolutely risk shutting down the company if they think they can exit with a personal profit before that happens. CEOs routinely fuck over the longevity of the companies they lead, knowing they won't be around for the fallout. In fact it's hard to find situations where this doesn't happen -- it's almost always private companies or companies where the CEO is completely entrenched.
      - foofie 3y ago
        > Don’t make excuses. Putting psychopaths in the drivers seat is a precipitation of capitalism. That's a disingenuous take. There are plenty of examples where psycho apparatchiks of anti-capitalist regimes made decisions "for the common good" that resulted in loss of life and even genocide and still they hailed those results as a win.
- danparsonson 3y ago
  And if they were an SV startup, they'd be receiving abundant praise for rapidly disrupting their market...
  - dotcoma 3y ago
    I am not so sure I want an airplane manufacturer to disrupt much of anything, especially if it involves cutting corners…
    - jetbalsa 3y ago
      Well... SpaceX did it with rockets :V
      - jacquesm 3y ago
        But not while carrying passengers.
      - AlgorithmicTime 3y ago
        [dead]
      - dotcoma 3y ago
        I’m not going to board a rocket anytime soon :)
  - throwawaaarrgh 3y ago
    That's not a great comparison though. Commercial Airlines are known for safety and reliability, startups are known for being tire fires
    - cqqxo4zV46cp 3y ago
      Yeah I get that dunking on Boeing is the cool new thing but realistically the amount of caution they take with things almost certainly dwarves whatever most of us software gardeners do.
- tgv 3y ago
  And then complain all the way up to the provost when they do fail.
  - lotsofpulp 3y ago
    Crazy how many titles there are in academia. What is the distinction between provost/dean/chancellor/president/etc.
- deleted 3y ago
  [deleted]
megabless123 3y ago
Profit > Safety is the American way
sofixa 3y ago
Yeah, punting everything on "airlines should just establish procedures" is such a lazy copout. Funnily they're doing the same thing with the 737 Maxes undergoing certification now (10 and 7), which have a small design defect in that if the engine de-icing is on and you leave it on after takeoff, it will overheat and melt the cowling... silently, without any warning or sensor or indicator. They plan on fixing this in like 2025 and want an exemption to allow them to certify the 7 and 10, same as the 8 and 9 that are already certified and flying with this defect, with the solution of "pilots should just not forget to turn it off".
- BenoitP 3y ago
  Sounds like my coworker telling a marketing campaign operator he has yet again let Excel interpret phone numbers as integers. And that he should learn to properly wield Excel. The downstream system is a call center made of humans. They lose a few seconds inputting the phone number manually though. No lead is lost. I don't want to speculate too much, but I think we might be in the clear. The client is not losing too much money. But if he complains once, we'll have to implement more checks to validate the Excel file. Then I'll have to buy my coworker breakfast, so that he doesn't bitch the whole implementation time. Such is life.
- JohnBooty 3y ago
  Generally, yeah. Red tape bad, and anything that reduces a pilot's cognitive load is generally going to be a very good thing. In an emergency, there is a lot for them to process. But this? Expecting pilots to communicate to each other about which one of them is flying the aircraft (as opposed to like, just grabbing a yoke and YOLOing it?) does not seem like an overly onerous amount of red tape. That seems like an absolutely fundamental aspect of flying. It's so fundamental I'm not even sure it would qualify as CRM (crew resource management)
  - sofixa 3y ago
    > Expecting pilots to communicate to each other about which one of them is flying the aircraft (as opposed to like, just grabbing a yoke and YOLOing it?) does not seem like an overly onerous amount of red tape. It already exists, but in emergency under stress it's an easy thing to forget or even not hear at all(cf. the linked incident and many others).
epups 3y ago
The Air France 447 incident occurred in an Airbus aircraft with these warnings, and it ended in a crash (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447). The airplane in this incident had a flight system that gave tactile and visual feedback that the other pilot was giving inputs. I think it would indeed be better to have an additional auditory warning, but we should not underestimate the fact that pilots can and do make serious mistakes. Since this is the same company, it points to issues in training.
- spangry 3y ago
  Pretty chilling reading. A disturbingly similar situation occurred in AirAsia Flight 8501 (Airbus A320): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501#History_of_the_flight https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501#.... Similar to the AF incident, the autopilot disengaged and the flight control switched to alternate Law. The aircraft began to roll and the first officer over-corrected back and forth while also pitching the nose up and causing the plane to stall. The pilot and the first officer were both providing opposite inputs (nose down and nose up respectively) which cancelled each other out, preventing recovery from the stall condition. The plane crashed into the ocean, killing everyone onboard. I'm starting to wonder if there's something inherent in the design of the Airbus side-stick that makes this sequence of events (i.e. banking, overcorrecting, climbing) more likely if the aircraft suddenly switches from normal to alternate law.
  - burnerthrow008 3y ago
    > I'm starting to wonder if there's something inherent in the design of the Airbus side-stick that makes this sequence of events (i.e. banking, overcorrecting, climbing) more likely if the aircraft suddenly switches from normal to alternate law. I think it’s less something specific to the Airbus sidestick implementation and more over-reliance on cockpit automation in general. Airbus alternate law flies more like (not exactly like) a non-FBW traditional airplane, and pilots who never train that skill (because they always fly normal law) become overloaded when thrown into that situation unexpectedly. A primary problem is that your muscle-memory is all wrong. Holding the stick to the side no longer gives a constant-bank turn. You have to re-center the stick when you get to the desired bank angle. Pulling all the way back doesn’t give you a constant near-maximum rate of climb (You can stall the airplane), and need to apply a little less back pressure when you get to the desired pitch. You also need to manually adjust pitch trim for any speed or power changes. So a failure that induces alt law means that you took off in one airplane and are now flying a different airplane. The event that precipitated alt law is nearly always an emergency or near-emergency on its own. So not only are you flying a different airplane than the one you’re used to, you’re also diagnosing system failures at the same time. If there’s anything to blame with Airbus’s implementation, I would argue it’s that the normal law is too dissimilar to how airplanes actually fly. Edited for clarity.
spangry 3y ago
It's not so straight-forward. Mechanically linked dual controls, like those on this aircraft, do give you indication that the other pilot is operating them (i.e. your controls physically move in tandem with their inputs). The problem is that if you both provide exactly opposite inputs at the same time both parties can interpret the physical resistance as jammed controls. An audible warning could be useful, but it could also fail if you're in a critical situation that has triggered other audible alerts (e.g. an audible stall warning). Audible warnings also carry the danger of not being comprehensive - if pilots come to rely on warnings of input conflicts instead of training to use explicit verbal communication, they may mistakenly assume that the absence of a conflicting input warning means there is no conflicting input (which may not be the case if the warning system is not absolutely comprehensive). Another approach here is to have a mechanism that allows one pilot to lock-the controls of the other pilot, coupled with some sort of visual/audible indication as to who is in control. This is sort of a different spin on the 'explicit communication' approach.
- Workaccount2 3y ago
  It seems a unique haptic feedback given to both pilots controls would work well here.
- gukov 3y ago
  How does a fly-by-wire system deal with dual inputs?
  - formerly_proven 3y ago
    Warnings and the possibility to override This thread is kinda funny because generally aviation threads on HN like to shit on airbus for their sidesticks and tout linked controls as obviously superior.
    - badcppdev 3y ago
      Rather than saying: "aviation threads on HN" have you considered using the usernames to identify the individuals with negative comments and positive comments and determine whether it's a small number of accounts saying the same thing repeatedly or a large proportion of the users?
traceroute66 3y ago
> add a warning system in the case of dual input The trouble is that those warnings should not be necessary. It is drummed into the skulls of all pilots that there is only ever one person at the controls. When you are a student pilot with an instructor in the other seat, the "I have control", "You have control" mantra is drummed into you. When you progress onto professional multi-crew operations, this is further re-enforced through operational "Pilot Flying", "Pilot Not Flying" roles introduced during your MCC (Multi Crew Cooperation) training. Also, from a purely practical perspective Boeing are yoke-based aircraft, not Airbus joysticks. So it should be pretty bloody obvious if dual control is going on.
- sokoloff 3y ago
  > it should be pretty bloody obvious if dual control is going on. Yet we have an example here where it wasn't obvious to a (presumably) fully competent crew who got to the point of missing an approach and declaring an emergency for a flight control anomaly that they couldn't diagnose as being the other human 4 feet away from them also being on the controls. "Should be" obviously wasn't "is" in this case. Edit to add: Also from the report: The following factors may have contributed to the simultaneous inputs on the controls: <snipped 5 other bullets> • the conviction that simultaneous inputs on the controls would be quickly perceived by crews on this type of aeroplane.
  - traceroute66 3y ago
    > fully competent crew who got to the point of missing an approach and declaring an emergency I think you need to re-read the PDF. My reading of it is that the missed-approach decision was made by the PF on the basis of the unstablised approach, and that it is what happened after that decision that is under investigation in this report. Undertaking MAP due to unstable approach is pretty standard stuff that occurs all day, every day. The report states there were zero force inputs by PM prior to the missed-approach, which correlates with the other note in the report that the PM ghosted the controls in the period following the missed-approach and that is when the apparent reflex action occured.

juujian 3y ago

If Boeing was a student, they would be the kind that does the bare minimum in every class just so they don't fail.

ramijames 3y ago
This seems to be the core reason why pure capitalism is a failed concept. There must be regulatory oversight to ensure that what is done MOST RIGHT and not CHEAPEST.
- stef25 3y ago
  Thinking that "fuck it, we'll risk loss of human life and possibly having to shut down the company" isn't due to capitalism, it's psychopathy and I'm fairly sure that never happened. Anything that goes wrong is due to dysfunctional management, not greed.
  - masklinn 3y ago
    Ford literally did a cost/benefit analysis for fixing the Pinto versus societal costs of injuries and deaths, and went with the cheaper option. They actually put it to paper and sent that to the NHTSA to argue against fuel system regulations. “Dysfunctional management” is a direct function of managerial incentives, which is generally capitalistic greed (aka “obligation to maximize shareholder value”)
    - nradov 3y ago
      Every auto manufacturer does the same thing. The Ford Pinto case was particularly poorly handled. But for any given car design, it's always possible to further improve safety by making it more expensive. A Mercedes-Benz S-Class is far safer than a Nissan Sentra by any objective standard. Should we tighten safety requirements so that every car is as safe as the S-Class, and costs about as much? Where do we draw the line on safety regulations?
      - yawpitch 3y ago
        If we tightened safety regulations so that every car was as safe as the S-Class then cars as safe as the S-Class would dramatically drop in price, simply by virtue of there being more of them. As for where you draw the line on safety regulations, the optimum answer is always “considerably past the point that business owners start complaining about excessive regulation”.
        FredPret 3y ago
        You don’t think the input costs have something to do with the price of an S Class? Pricing is due to both supply and demand - there can’t be a sustainable supply of a expensive-to-make cars at loss-making prices
        kube-system 3y ago
        The S-class is a bad example, because it is expensive for other confounding reasons. However, all else equal, a vehicle with more active and passive safety features and more safety engineering is more expensive. Even after you account for economies of scale. For example, airbags are extremely mass produced and have just about as much economies of scale as possible. But, in countries where they are not mandated, you can still find cars offered without them, because they are cheaper. The same is also true for vehicles without UHHS safety cages, ABS, stability control, etc. All of these things cost money.
        yawpitch 3y ago
  - cqqxo4zV46cp 3y ago
    Don’t make excuses. Putting psychopaths in the drivers seat is a precipitation of capitalism. Capitalism decides the ultimate KPI, and eventually things shake out this way. We don’t just get to say, yes, there goes another psychopathic executive, and wash our hands of the whole thing. Christ. We all make systems for a living. Look at indirect consequences.
    - stef25 3y ago
      Even psychopaths don't want to end up disgraced or in jail. So maybe it's the lack of punishment we dole out to these kinds of people. Nowadays companies can seriously suffer by mishandling their "attitudes" over social justice issues, my gut reaction was that if that's true how could they get away with a plane falling out of the sky. Still a bigger deal than dozen people dying in cars with faulty fuel systems, perhaps just because of the optics.
      - feoren 3y ago
        > Even psychopaths don't want to end up disgraced or in jail. So maybe it's the lack of punishment we dole out to these kinds of people. You're describing effective regulatory oversight. That is a manual control on capitalism, and something capitalism inevitably fights against. Psychopaths exist and look for ways to exploit capitalism, including "fuck it, we'll risk loss of human life and possibly having to shut down the company", which you said isn't due to capitalism. But it is: it's due to the combination of capitalism and human nature, but we can only control the former. The solution is regulatory oversight, as you just pointed out. Also: realize that psychopaths will absolutely risk shutting down the company if they think they can exit with a personal profit before that happens. CEOs routinely fuck over the longevity of the companies they lead, knowing they won't be around for the fallout. In fact it's hard to find situations where this doesn't happen -- it's almost always private companies or companies where the CEO is completely entrenched.
    - foofie 3y ago
      > Don’t make excuses. Putting psychopaths in the drivers seat is a precipitation of capitalism. That's a disingenuous take. There are plenty of examples where psycho apparatchiks of anti-capitalist regimes made decisions "for the common good" that resulted in loss of life and even genocide and still they hailed those results as a win.
danparsonson 3y ago
And if they were an SV startup, they'd be receiving abundant praise for rapidly disrupting their market...
- dotcoma 3y ago
  I am not so sure I want an airplane manufacturer to disrupt much of anything, especially if it involves cutting corners…
  - jetbalsa 3y ago
    Well... SpaceX did it with rockets :V
    - jacquesm 3y ago
      But not while carrying passengers.
    - AlgorithmicTime 3y ago
      [dead]
    - dotcoma 3y ago
      I’m not going to board a rocket anytime soon :)
- throwawaaarrgh 3y ago
  That's not a great comparison though. Commercial Airlines are known for safety and reliability, startups are known for being tire fires
  - cqqxo4zV46cp 3y ago
    Yeah I get that dunking on Boeing is the cool new thing but realistically the amount of caution they take with things almost certainly dwarves whatever most of us software gardeners do.
tgv 3y ago
And then complain all the way up to the provost when they do fail.
- lotsofpulp 3y ago
  Crazy how many titles there are in academia. What is the distinction between provost/dean/chancellor/president/etc.
deleted 3y ago
[deleted]

megabless123 3y ago

Profit > Safety is the American way

sofixa 3y ago

Yeah, punting everything on "airlines should just establish procedures" is such a lazy copout. Funnily they're doing the same thing with the 737 Maxes undergoing certification now (10 and 7), which have a small design defect in that if the engine de-icing is on and you leave it on after takeoff, it will overheat and melt the cowling... silently, without any warning or sensor or indicator. They plan on fixing this in like 2025 and want an exemption to allow them to certify the 7 and 10, same as the 8 and 9 that are already certified and flying with this defect, with the solution of "pilots should just not forget to turn it off".

BenoitP 3y ago
Sounds like my coworker telling a marketing campaign operator he has yet again let Excel interpret phone numbers as integers. And that he should learn to properly wield Excel. The downstream system is a call center made of humans. They lose a few seconds inputting the phone number manually though. No lead is lost. I don't want to speculate too much, but I think we might be in the clear. The client is not losing too much money. But if he complains once, we'll have to implement more checks to validate the Excel file. Then I'll have to buy my coworker breakfast, so that he doesn't bitch the whole implementation time. Such is life.
JohnBooty 3y ago
Generally, yeah. Red tape bad, and anything that reduces a pilot's cognitive load is generally going to be a very good thing. In an emergency, there is a lot for them to process. But this? Expecting pilots to communicate to each other about which one of them is flying the aircraft (as opposed to like, just grabbing a yoke and YOLOing it?) does not seem like an overly onerous amount of red tape. That seems like an absolutely fundamental aspect of flying. It's so fundamental I'm not even sure it would qualify as CRM (crew resource management)
- sofixa 3y ago
  > Expecting pilots to communicate to each other about which one of them is flying the aircraft (as opposed to like, just grabbing a yoke and YOLOing it?) does not seem like an overly onerous amount of red tape. It already exists, but in emergency under stress it's an easy thing to forget or even not hear at all(cf. the linked incident and many others).

epups 3y ago

The Air France 447 incident occurred in an Airbus aircraft with these warnings, and it ended in a crash (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447). The airplane in this incident had a flight system that gave tactile and visual feedback that the other pilot was giving inputs. I think it would indeed be better to have an additional auditory warning, but we should not underestimate the fact that pilots can and do make serious mistakes. Since this is the same company, it points to issues in training.

spangry 3y ago
Pretty chilling reading. A disturbingly similar situation occurred in AirAsia Flight 8501 (Airbus A320): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501#History_of_the_flight https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501#.... Similar to the AF incident, the autopilot disengaged and the flight control switched to alternate Law. The aircraft began to roll and the first officer over-corrected back and forth while also pitching the nose up and causing the plane to stall. The pilot and the first officer were both providing opposite inputs (nose down and nose up respectively) which cancelled each other out, preventing recovery from the stall condition. The plane crashed into the ocean, killing everyone onboard. I'm starting to wonder if there's something inherent in the design of the Airbus side-stick that makes this sequence of events (i.e. banking, overcorrecting, climbing) more likely if the aircraft suddenly switches from normal to alternate law.
- burnerthrow008 3y ago
  > I'm starting to wonder if there's something inherent in the design of the Airbus side-stick that makes this sequence of events (i.e. banking, overcorrecting, climbing) more likely if the aircraft suddenly switches from normal to alternate law. I think it’s less something specific to the Airbus sidestick implementation and more over-reliance on cockpit automation in general. Airbus alternate law flies more like (not exactly like) a non-FBW traditional airplane, and pilots who never train that skill (because they always fly normal law) become overloaded when thrown into that situation unexpectedly. A primary problem is that your muscle-memory is all wrong. Holding the stick to the side no longer gives a constant-bank turn. You have to re-center the stick when you get to the desired bank angle. Pulling all the way back doesn’t give you a constant near-maximum rate of climb (You can stall the airplane), and need to apply a little less back pressure when you get to the desired pitch. You also need to manually adjust pitch trim for any speed or power changes. So a failure that induces alt law means that you took off in one airplane and are now flying a different airplane. The event that precipitated alt law is nearly always an emergency or near-emergency on its own. So not only are you flying a different airplane than the one you’re used to, you’re also diagnosing system failures at the same time. If there’s anything to blame with Airbus’s implementation, I would argue it’s that the normal law is too dissimilar to how airplanes actually fly. Edited for clarity.

spangry 3y ago

It's not so straight-forward. Mechanically linked dual controls, like those on this aircraft, do give you indication that the other pilot is operating them (i.e. your controls physically move in tandem with their inputs). The problem is that if you both provide exactly opposite inputs at the same time both parties can interpret the physical resistance as jammed controls. An audible warning could be useful, but it could also fail if you're in a critical situation that has triggered other audible alerts (e.g. an audible stall warning). Audible warnings also carry the danger of not being comprehensive - if pilots come to rely on warnings of input conflicts instead of training to use explicit verbal communication, they may mistakenly assume that the absence of a conflicting input warning means there is no conflicting input (which may not be the case if the warning system is not absolutely comprehensive). Another approach here is to have a mechanism that allows one pilot to lock-the controls of the other pilot, coupled with some sort of visual/audible indication as to who is in control. This is sort of a different spin on the 'explicit communication' approach.

Workaccount2 3y ago
It seems a unique haptic feedback given to both pilots controls would work well here.
gukov 3y ago
How does a fly-by-wire system deal with dual inputs?
- formerly_proven 3y ago
  Warnings and the possibility to override This thread is kinda funny because generally aviation threads on HN like to shit on airbus for their sidesticks and tout linked controls as obviously superior.
  - badcppdev 3y ago
    Rather than saying: "aviation threads on HN" have you considered using the usernames to identify the individuals with negative comments and positive comments and determine whether it's a small number of accounts saying the same thing repeatedly or a large proportion of the users?

traceroute66 3y ago

> add a warning system in the case of dual input The trouble is that those warnings should not be necessary. It is drummed into the skulls of all pilots that there is only ever one person at the controls. When you are a student pilot with an instructor in the other seat, the "I have control", "You have control" mantra is drummed into you. When you progress onto professional multi-crew operations, this is further re-enforced through operational "Pilot Flying", "Pilot Not Flying" roles introduced during your MCC (Multi Crew Cooperation) training. Also, from a purely practical perspective Boeing are yoke-based aircraft, not Airbus joysticks. So it should be pretty bloody obvious if dual control is going on.

sokoloff 3y ago
> it should be pretty bloody obvious if dual control is going on. Yet we have an example here where it wasn't obvious to a (presumably) fully competent crew who got to the point of missing an approach and declaring an emergency for a flight control anomaly that they couldn't diagnose as being the other human 4 feet away from them also being on the controls. "Should be" obviously wasn't "is" in this case. Edit to add: Also from the report: The following factors may have contributed to the simultaneous inputs on the controls: <snipped 5 other bullets> • the conviction that simultaneous inputs on the controls would be quickly perceived by crews on this type of aeroplane.
- traceroute66 3y ago
  > fully competent crew who got to the point of missing an approach and declaring an emergency I think you need to re-read the PDF. My reading of it is that the missed-approach decision was made by the PF on the basis of the unstablised approach, and that it is what happened after that decision that is under investigation in this report. Undertaking MAP due to unstable approach is pretty standard stuff that occurs all day, every day. The report states there were zero force inputs by PM prior to the missed-approach, which correlates with the other note in the report that the PM ghosted the controls in the period following the missed-approach and that is when the apparent reflex action occured.