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As a former Boeing engineer, other industries can learn a great deal from how airplanes are designed. The Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon disasters were both "z
by WalterBright 3y ago
As a former Boeing engineer, other industries can learn a great deal from how airplanes are designed. The Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon disasters were both "zipper" failures that showed little thought was given to "when X fails, then what?"
Note I wrote when X fails, not if X fails. It's a different way of thinking.
- cedivad 3y ago> When my AoA sensor fails, then what? crickets, let's just randomise which sensor we use during boot, that ought to do it!
- uselpa 3y agoEpic fail indeed, costing many lives.
- rytis 3y ago"AoA sensor" - Angle of Attack sensor. And the reference is presumably to 737 MAX accident. https://www.afacwa.org/the_inside_story_of_mcas_seattle_times https://www.afacwa.org/the_inside_story_of_mcas_seattle_time...
- asystole 3y ago> Airlines really want to be able to use pilots' existing type-rating on this hulking zombie of a 60s-era airframe with modern engines but it behaves differently under certain conditions, what do we do? let's just build a system that pushes the nose down under those conditions, have it accept potentially unreliable AoA data, and not tell pilots about it!
- f1shy 3y agoAs an engineer I think a lot about tradeoffs of cost vs other criteria. There is little I can learn from nuclear or aviation industry, as the cost structure ist so completely different. I’m very happy that the costs of safety in aviation are very good accepted, but I understand that few people are willing to pay similar costs for other things like, say, cars.
- uselpa 3y agoCars might not be the best example, since human lives are at stake, as in aviation. Unless you work on Teslas autopilot, it seems. But yes, backups and restores are often good enough.
- masklinn 3y agoAs it turns out (and as much as we wouldn’t want them to) human lives are still subject to cost/benefit analysis. An airliner is a lot of lives, a lot of money, a lot of fuel, and a lot of energy. Which is why a lot has been invested in training, procedure, and safety systems. Cars operates in an environment which is in most ways a lot more forgiving, they’re controlled by (on average) low-training low-skill non-redundant crews, they’re much more at risk of “enemy action”, the material stresses are in a different realm, and they’re much, much more sensitive to price pressure. Hell, the difference is already visible in aviation alone, crop dusters and other small planes are a lot less regulated amongst every axis than airliners are.
- danhor 3y agoI wouldn't say it's simply cost-benefit analysis. It's also scale of accidents. A whole lot more people die from car accidents, yet there are few reports on national news on accidents. So fewer people care. Meanwhile each time there is an aviation disaster, 100s of people die and it's all over the news for weeks. Similarly with train accidents and nuclear accidents. There where only 2 very large ones but they still haunt the field to this day, while (for example) the deaths from solar installations by people falling from roofs are mostly ignored. Large accidents have to be avoided, a lot of small ones are more acceptable.
- masklinn 3y ago> I wouldn't say it's simply cost-benefit analysis. It's also scale of accidents. But that is cost/benefit analysis. When any accident can kill hundreds and do millions to billions in damage besides (to say nothing of the image damage to both the sector and the specific brand), the benefit of trying to prevent every accident is significant, so acceptable costs are commensurate.
- laydn 3y agoWhat's fascinating about airplane design for me is not the huge technical complexity, but rather, the way it is designed such that a lot of its subsystems are serviceable by technicians so quickly and reliably, not just in a fully controlled environment like a maintenance hangar, but right on the tarmac, waiting for takeoff.
- WalterBright 3y agoDesigning the airplane to minimize required maintenance and to make maintenance and inspections easier and faster is a huge issue for the engineering department. Also make it very difficult for the mechanics to do things wrongly. As it was pointed out to me, airplanes sitting on the ground are a black hole sucking up money. Airplanes in the air carrying payload (note the "pay" in payload) are making money. Boeing understands this very well, and is very focused on getting that airplane in the air making money as much as possible.
- arendtio 3y agoIn the context of disasters that happened due to software failures (e.g. Ariane 5 [1]), one of my professors used to tell us, that software doesn't break somewhen but is broken from the beginning. I like the idea of thinking 'when' instead of 'if', but the verdict should be even harder when it comes to software engineering because it has this rare material at its disposal, which doesn't degrade over time. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariane_5#Notable_launches https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariane_5#Notable_launches
- lloeki 3y agoWhen I worked in an industrial context, some coding tasks would seem trivial to today's Joe Random software dev, but we had to be constantly thinking about failure modes: from degraded modes that would keep a plant 100% operative 100% of the time in spite of some component being down, to driving a 10m high oven has the opportunity to break airborne water molecules from mere ambient humidity into hydrogen whose buildups could be dangerously explosive if some parameters were not kept in check, implying that the code/system has to have a number of contingency plans. "Sane default" suddenly has a very tangible meaning.
- letitbeirie 3y ago> we had to be constantly thinking about failure modes This to me is the biggest difference between writing code for the software industry vs. an industrial industry. Software is all about the happy path ("move fast and break things") because the consequences typically range from a minor inconvenience to a major financial loss. Industrial control is all about sad paths ("what happens if someone drives a forklift into your favorite junction box during the most critical, exothermic phase of some reaction") because the consequences usually start at a major financial loss and top out in "Modern Marvels - Engineering Disasters" territory.
- hooverd 3y agoYou do /not/ want to make it on the USCSB YouTube channel.
- airbreather 3y agoYeah, I work as a Functional Safety Engineer in the process and machinery sector and 90%+ of effort is in planning, considering all the possibilities outside of intended operation and traceability. I have worked on projects where in retrospect the LOC generated per day, if spread out across the whole project, were between 1 and 3. But typically, writing of the code does not even commence in the first year, sometimes two. Then there is the test cases and test coverage etc etc. This is the difference between engineering code and just producing it - all the effort that goes into understanding all the unwanted code behaviour that may occur and how to detect, manage and/or avoid it. Implicit state is the enemy, therefore the best code has all states explicitly defined.
- asystole 3y agoI agree in principle, but I don't think industries should be looking at current-day Boeing's engineering practices except for an example of how a proud company's culture can rot from the inside out with fatal consequences.
- cstross 3y agoReminder that this article was about an aircraft built by Airbus. (Airbus is not Boeing.)
- pbhjpbhj 3y agoHow are aeroplanes designed differently at Boeing vs Airbus? What's the secret sauce?
- hef19898 3y agoSame way Samsung phones are not Huawei phones? Or BMWs aren't Lexus?
- grepfru_it 3y agoA pilot once explained to me.. Boeing planes (before MCAS): we have detected a problem with your engines, would you like to shut down? Airbus planes: we have detected a problem with your engines, we have shut them down for you.
- paulmd 3y agoAt this point the secret sauce is that the EAA isn’t tolerating the same degree of certification fucking and laxity from airbus, and that they generally seem to have their act together. Like what’s the secret sauce of nvidia vs radeon or AMD vs intel? Reliable execution, seemingly - and this is an environment where failures are supposed to be contained to very specific rates at given levels of severity. The FAA has gotten into a mode where they let boeing sign off on their own deviations from the rules, the engine changes forced the introduction of the nose-pusher-down system which really should have required training, but Boeing didn't want to do that, because the whole point of doing the weird engine thing was having ostensible "airframe compatibility" despite the changes in flight characteristics. And they have become so large (like intel) that they don’t have to care anymore, because they know there’s no chance of actual regulatory consequences, nor can the EAA kick them out without causing a diplomatic incident and massively disrupting air travel, so they are no longer rigorous, and we simply have to deal with Boeing’s “meltdown”. And yes they should be doing better but in the abstract, certification processes always need to be dealing with “uncooperative” participants who may want to conceal derogatory information or pencil-whip certification. You need to build processes that don’t let that happen and nowadays there’s so much of a revolving door that they can just get away with it. Like none of this would have happened with the classified personnel certification process etc - it is fundamentally a problem of a corrupted and ineffective certification process. This decline in certification led to an inevitable decline in quality. When companies figure out it’s a paper tiger then there’s no reason to spend the money to do good engineering. The FAA’s processes are both too strict and too lax - we have moved into the regulatory capture phase where they purely serve the interests of the industry giants who are already established and consolidated, and they now serve primarily to exclude any competitors rather than ensure consistent quality of engineering. The specifics are less interesting than that high-level problem - there obviously eventually would be some form of engineering malfeasance that resulted from regulatory capture, the specific form is less important than the forces that produced it. And that regulatory capture problem exists across basically the whole American system. Why do we have forced arbitration on everything, why are our trains dumping poison into our towns? Because from 1980-2020 we basically handed control of legislative policy over to corporate interests and then allowed a massive degree of consolidation. Not that airbus is small, but the EAA isn’t regulatory capture to the extent of most American bureaus.
- WalterBright 3y agoAn example of zipper failure in the Airbus incident is when a wire bundle gets cut, all the functions of all the wires in that bundle are lost. Having two or more smaller bundles physically separated would greatly reduce that risk. Certainly, having the primary and the backup system in the same bundle is a bad idea. On the 757, one set of control cables runs under the floor. The backup set runs in the ceiling.
- benhurmarcel 3y agoIt’s the same on Airbus aircraft, I can tell you from experience.
- WalterBright 3y agoI thought Airbus was fly-by-wire, not cables?
- benhurmarcel 3y agoIt is. I'm talking about redundant electrical wires being physically separated so they don't get damaged by the same event.
- oefnak 3y agoAre you serious in saying that other industries could learn from Boeing?