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These rumors, about IETF in particular, predate the Snowden disclosures. Almost immediately after that happened, a well-known cypherpunk person accused the IET
by tptacek 3y ago
These rumors, about IETF in particular, predate the Snowden disclosures.
Almost immediately after that happened, a well-known cypherpunk person accused the IETF IPSEC standardization process of subversion, pointing out Phil Rogaway (an extraordinarily well-respected and influential academic cryptographer) trying in vain to get the IETF not to standardize a chained-IV CBC transport (this is a bug class now best known, in TLS, as BEAST), while a chorus of IETF gadflies dunked on him and questioned his credentials. The gadflies ultimately prevailed.
The moral of this story, and what makes these "NSA at IETF" allegations so insidious, is that the IETF is perfectly capable of subverting its own cryptography without any help from a meddling intelligence agency. This is a common failure of all standards organizations (W3C didn't need any help coming up with XML DSIG, which is probably the worst cryptosystem ever devised), but it's somewhat amplified in open settings like IETF.
- anonym29 3y agoI wonder what other institutions are infested with swarms of gadflies that'll all swear up and down in unison that something is definitely good or bad, will attack outsiders with narratives that disagree with their own, and weaken the credibility of the entire institution in the process. Surely this can't be a phenomenon unique to technology, can it?
- happytiger 3y agohttps://youtu.be/URdXC6UtfVg?si=b7uwjHujUvYG1hGH https://youtu.be/URdXC6UtfVg?si=b7uwjHujUvYG1hGH Skip to 1 minute in and you’ll see the problem in experimental form.
- tptacek 3y agoIt's just human nature. I refuse to participate in standards work, partly because it's much more pleasant throwing rocks from a safe distance, but also because I recognize in myself the same ordinary frailties that had friends of the original IPSEC standards authors writing mailing list posts about Rogaway being a "supposed" cryptographer. There but for the grace of not joining standards lists go I. I think --- I am not kidding here, I believe this sincerely --- the correct conclusion is community-driven cryptographic standards organizations are a force for evil. Curve25519 is a good standard. So is Noise, so is WireGuard. None of those were developed in a standards organization. It's hard to think of a good cryptosystem that was. TLS? It took decades --- bad decades --- to get to 1.3. Of that outcome, I believe it was Watson Ladd who said that if you turned it in as the "secure transport" homework in your undergraduate cryptography class, you'd get a B.
- dboreham 3y agoTLS originated at Netscape.
- sitkack 3y agoSo did Js, it isn’t a counter argument. Many of the gadflies are useful idiots.
- red_admiral 3y agoIt goes further back than crypto: back in the day, there was the design-by-committee OSI versus the "rough consensus and running code" IETF. The result is that while we still teach the OSI 7-layer model in universities, in practice we use TCP/IP, often with HTTP and TLS on top.
- zdragnar 3y agoYou're basically describing politics, where specific opinions are central to a group identity. So long as there is an innate human desire to belong, there will be plenty of people who are happy to live with any amount of cognitive dissonance. Joining a gadfly swarm just gives them an opportunity to prove their worth to the group.
- mike_d 3y agoDNSSEC is a great example of just how poorly committee designed crypto is. The government doesn't need to do anything to standards, they can just let them play out as-is. We ended up with a huge mess that solves no actual problems, introduced problems that never existed before, and so confusing in what it does that people still blindly defend it.
- SenAnder 3y agoWhy do you assume the government didn't do anything? If anyone on those committees was paid or influenced by the NSA/CIA, they would not have disclosed it.
- michaelt 3y agoYou're right, of course. But standards bodies also sabotage their own work when there's no security relevance (USB's dozens of options with impenetrable names like "USB 3.2 Gen 2×2") And the US DoD reportedly loves Trusted Platform Modules, so presumably if the US intervened at all it was to improve the spec - and yet it's got more holes than swiss cheese.
- acdha 3y agoIt’s true that you can always imagine a perfectly-concealed conspiracy but we see the same dynamics unfold in many places where there’s no security impact so the parsimonious explanation is that there is no conspiracy, only normal human social dynamics.
- mike_d 3y agoDNSSEC is one of the standards where I am confident the US government did not intentionally introduce weaknesses because the US government is the largest deployed base of zones due to a poorly thought out executive order.
- hulitu 3y ago> The moral of this story, and what makes these "NSA at IETF" allegations so insidious, is that the IETF is perfectly capable of subverting its own cryptography without any help from a meddling intelligence agency The 3 letter agencies usually recrut people from academia and sensitive organizations in order to pursue their agenda.
- tptacek 3y agoThis would be a snappier comeback if it wasn't the academic cryptographer who was right, and the random people in non-sensitive organizations who shot the right answer down.
- AdamN 3y agoThat's sort of not saying much. Are they going to recruit Joe the Plumber to submit IETF drafts?
- networkchad 3y ago[dead]