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Intel OEM Private Key Leak: A Blow to UEFI Secure Boot Security
- rolph 4y agowieghting in at 1.5TB, it should take a while for first seeds to appear.
- flangola7 4y agoA 1.5TB private key?
- rolph 4y agothe entire leak was said to be 1.5TB
- inciampati 4y agoThe total exfiltrated data.
- teddyh 4y agoLink?
- rolph 4y agofirst paragraph >>In April, MSI fell victim to a cyberattack perpetrated by the ransomware group Money Message, who successfully infiltrated MSI’s internal systems and exfiltrated a staggering 1.5TB of data, predominantly comprising source code.<< https://securityonline.info/intel-oem-private-key-leak-a-blow-to-uefi-secure-boot-security/ https://securityonline.info/intel-oem-private-key-leak-a-blo...
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- ftxbro 4y ago> 1.5TB of data, predominantly comprising source code that's a lot of source code it makes my typing fingers tired just thinking of it It's possible they could have written it if all 2,672 MSI employees typed this source code constantly in 8-hour shifts seven days a week for five years with no lunch break no restroom break and not allowed to think before typing.
- hduebdivd 4y agothey probably kept the node_modules and .cargo directories
- capableweb 4y agoHow poor must your security be at such a big company for no one or no system to detect 1.5TB data being exfiltrated to a remote host? Especially supposedly extra sensitive data like private keys...
- transpute 4y agoRelated thread, https://twitter.com/binarly_io/status/1654287041339998208 https://twitter.com/binarly_io/status/1654287041339998208
- csdvrx 4y agoHow can you scan your firmware on linux, without running an unknown payload, to know if you're affected? How can you test the leaked key say to edit your bios, resign it, then reflash it?
- transpute 4y ago> How can you scan your firmware on linux, without running an unknown payload, to know if you're affected? According to the Twitter thread above, you would upload the original OEM firmware for your device to Binarly's web portal at https://fwhunt.run https://fwhunt.run. The firmware file matching your device could be obtained from the OEM's website, rather than the running system. I haven't tried this myself, don't know if it requires unpacking or pre-processing the OEM firmware file format.
- csdvrx 4y agoThey must be doing the equivalent of a grep. It seems safe, but I'd rather do that locally.
- transpute 4y agoMaybe someone could add key manifest inspection to this OSS tool, https://fiedka.app https://fiedka.app. Hopefully Intel and OEMs will make official statements soon. If you're copying a firmware file from the OEM's website to Binarly's website, then receiving a text report, they would have an IP address, browser fingerprint and device model number, but little else.
- discerning_ 4y agoIf these keys are leaked, they should be adopted by open source projects to disable secure boot.
- Arnavion 4y agoIs there any platform using Intel CPUs with Boot Guard where Secure Boot can't already be disabled?
- NelsonMinar 4y agoOn one of my systems disabling secure boot also disables other aspects of the BIOS. I forget what, maybe use of the Intel graphics on the chip? It was severe enough I spent an hour figuring out how to make secure boot work instead.
- Arnavion 4y agoWhich system?
- fowtowmowcow 4y agoI'm not sure that they can of the key is proprietary to Intel. I think this would open up those projects to litigation.
- zapdrive 4y agoIt's just a string of characters.
- Xorlev 4y agoSoftware, movies, music is just a string of bits. Using something leaked always carries some inherent risk.
- realusername 4y ago
- codedokode 4y agoIsn't it good? Does leaked key mean that now owners of hardware will be able to read and modify the firmware, including IME, and check it for backdoors? Such keys should be in the hands of users, not Intel.
- hilbert42 4y agoAbsolutely. My first thought was 'ah now I can modify my BIOS the way I want it'.
- QuiDortDine 4y agoIf there was something to leak, it was always going to. Just a matter of when. Pretending otherwise is just security theater.
- guerrilla 4y agoYeah, don't depend on a permanent global conspiracy for your security. Someone always defects and accidents often happen long before that.
- henriquez 4y agoIt is not a conspiracy. Just like the iOS App Store it is for your own protection. There is no legitimate reason to run your own software on general purpose computing hardware.
- ChrisClark 4y ago/s I hope. ;)
- brookst 4y agoDoesn't really matter /a or not, it's a ridiculously reductive and extremist position either way. Security is about tradeoffs, most notably security vs convenience, but also many others. Anyone who suggests that their personal preferences in tradeoffs are not just universally correct but also the only reasonable position to hold is just silly.
- derefr 4y agoIn general, a bad thing for security. But is there any silver lining here related to jailbreaking proprietary Intel-based devices?
- Macha 4y agoOr things like DRMed media systems
- hammock 4y agoThe leaked key means that now owners of hardware will be able to read and modify the firmware, including IME, and check it for backdoors
- csdvrx 4y agoI'll be eagerly waiting for such analysis - including the nixing of ME or at least setting the HA bit on intel gen 10 to 13!!
- yyyk 4y agoIs there only one 'private key', or do they use an intermediate cert kind of setup where they could revoke MSI via a BIOS update?
- andromeduck 4y agoYou can always factory reset.
- SXX 4y agoWhat factory reset? PC motherboards are not Android phones. When you flash new BIOS you can't get back to old one without flashing it and obviously new BIOS versions after accident will likely forbid flashing of older versions.
- pseudo0 4y agoOn many modern motherboards there is a backup bios that you can boot into by shorting certain pins. This can be done in about 10-15 minutes by a person with a metal paperclip, some basic technical knowledge and instructions from a YouTube video. I don't think there is even a mechanism to update this backup version, it's just a "known good" bios shipped with the hardware so that a bad bios update does not brick the device. So even if they push an update, people can pretty easily downgrade to a vulnerable version if they want to.
- SXX 4y agoI doubt there are actually many boards with dual bios. For a while Gigabyte had a lot of them, but for many years very many of their boards dont have this feature
- thathndude 4y agoThis was always a dumb idea. No different than a “master” TSA key. All it does is create a single point of failure.
- throwawaymanbot 4y ago[dead]
- rektide 4y agoKind of/almost a good thing. More and more security processors seem to have irrevocable keys or other non-user setups. It's. Just. Not. OK. And more and more governments are making demands about decrypting users data on demand, about blowing up security for their own greedy needs. They have no idea the awful horrific mess, the buggy by design systems we get when we forgoe security for their paranoid snooping. This is such a textbook lesson. Alas that we need another blow to the face to remind ourselves.
- Woodi 4y agoYou are of course wrong ! Becouse everyone needs to buy new... everything every 2 years ! It's good for some :>
- chinabot 4y ago3 people can keep a secret if two of them are dead. Good luck with hundreds!
- ustolemyname 4y agoThere's an off by one error in the above statement. Not sure if it's the right or left hand side.
- ChainOfFools 4y agoThis quote, attributed to Benjamin Franklin, was meant to be understood as HHOS.
- yarg 4y agoUnless and until we get to efficient homomorphic compute, these measures will only ever be security via obscurity.
- bawolff 4y agoI don't see how homomorphic encryption is particularly applicable to secureboot.
- yarg 4y agoYou want to be able to deploy and execute code outside the control of whoever physically controls the machine. Either you implement it with security features hidden from the device holder, in which case it will always be broken eventually, or you guarantee the capabilities with mathematics - in which case a security break cannot happen even if the physical machine's description is completely public. There are certainly layers to this that I'm missing, but I think homomorphic compute is the only unbreakable answer to secure compute in general.
- bawolff 4y agoMy understanding (which might be wrong, crypto is a complex topic and i am an amateur) is that homomorphic would hide the data being worked on from the algorithm working on it. Here we want to verify the (non-secret) algorithm has been approved (code signing) which we then run on non-secret data. I don't think homomorphic encryption can help with that since its kind of a different problem. The issue here, of the key holder leaking the key, also seems impossible to work around in general, since the requirements are: 1) there exists someone who can sign code. 2) that person cannot screw up (e.g. leak the key) and allow the wrong code to be signed. These are pretty contradictory requirements, that no amount of crypto can fix. Ultimately it is a social problem not a technical one; there is no full technical definition of misusing a key. There are things that can help - like HSMs, splitting the key between multiple parties, having better methods of revoking and replacing compromised keys (hard without network access and an unwillingness to brick old devices). Not the same domain, but AACS is an interesting example of a system somewhat resiliant to key compromise.
- bawolff 4y agoIts kind of surprising that such a high value key wasn't split into multiple subkeys.
- wmf 4y agoWe've had HSMs for decades and Intel isn't forcing their OEMs to use them. This is pretty sad.
- transpute 4y agohttps://twitter.com/matrosov/status/1654930508252581888 https://twitter.com/matrosov/status/1654930508252581888
- bawolff 4y agoSure, but intel is ultimately left holding the bag here not the oem, and it was totally within their power to put stipulations in the contract around key management.
- transpute 4y agoMargins are not great in the x86 PC hardware business. Has there ever been a lawsuit between Intel and an OEM?
- wmf 4y agoContracts don't work. IMO Intel should not provide raw keys to the OEMs but HSMs with the keys preloaded. And MS should require good key management for the Secured Core sticker (although probably few/no MSI products are Secured Core anyway).
- aborsy 4y agowhy wasn’t it in an HSM?
- PrimeMcFly 4y agoThere is no reason to use a manufacture key anyway, at least for SecureBoot. Obviously it isn't in everyone's skillset, but if you have the means there is nothing preventing you from generating and using your own key. Honestly it seems like a good basic security precaution, not only to prevent against leaks like this, but also to counteract any backdoors (although kind of a moot point with chipmakers).
- dathinab 4y agoYesn't 1. some EFIs are broken in ways that make using private platform keys hard or impossible 2. there are PCIe cards which need option ROMs to be executed (most commonly that dedicated GPUs), this ROMs are not always but often signed by one of the Microsoft Keys and removing it from the trust db will prevent the ROMs from running and lead to all kinds of problems, e.g. not having any video and in turn not being able to undo to EFI setting/disable secure boot. You can make sure the specific ROMs are whitelisted, but then you need to be very very careful about e.g. graphics drivers updating the GPU firmware and similar. And putting the right data in the trust db isn't easy either.
- PrimeMcFly 4y agoGood points. I was subconsciously focusing on laptops when I made my comment.
- jonas-w 4y agoIs there a way to know if it is safe to enroll my own keys? I always wanted to, but always didn't do it, because I often read that it can make the system unbootable.
- Arnavion 4y agoThe question is whether you have any mandatory UEFI drivers or not. If they're in the ESP you can just look there to check, but UEFI drivers can also be loaded from PCI cards or baked in the firmware itself. If you're using a TPM for Secure Boot, you can use the commands in https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/wiki/FAQ#option-rom https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/wiki/FAQ#option-rom to know for sure.
- josephcsible 4y agoThis isn't a blow to real security, just to DRM and treacherous computing. There's no legitimate security from "Secure" Boot.
- bawolff 4y agoEvil maids?
- Filligree 4y agoHow many of us have maids? How many of those maids are evil?
- ghostpepper 4y ago"Evil maid" is a generic descriptor for any number of attacks that can be performed with physical access to a device. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack "The name refers to the scenario where a maid could subvert a device left unattended in a hotel room – but the concept itself also applies to situations such as a device being intercepted while in transit, or taken away temporarily by airport or law enforcement personnel. "
- codedokode 4y agoWith physical access you can simply install a keylogger, GPS tracker, and maybe something worse (malicious PCI-Express or USB device for example).
- guilhas 4y agoStill, how real of a threat that is for 99% of computer users? And law enforcement will have a device to bypass most devices security
- Avamander 4y ago> And law enforcement will have a device to bypass most devices security What makes you say that and how is that an excuse to do nothing?
- TheMagicHorsey 4y agoWhy do people think that these security schemes that are based on a "secure" central key are ever going to work in the long run. The most secret documents of the US state are leaked periodically by dumbasses, and yet the FBI thinks they can keep backdoor keys to all our devices secure. Give me a break.
- jnsaff2 4y agoHah, funny, just this week finished the new Doctorow book Red Team Blues [0] which has a similar aspect. [0] https://craphound.com/category/redteamblues/ https://craphound.com/category/redteamblues/
- dathinab 4y agoI don't understand how such keys can leak? Hasn't intel heard about locking keys in hardware, e.g. like with hardware security key modules similar but faster/flexibler then a TPM. Surly one of the main developers of TPM does understand that concept.... right? /s
- pmontra 4y agoPeople know keys, people eventually leak keys. It always happened.
- mynameisvlad 4y agoThe point is that you can't leak a key from a HSM.
- josefx 4y agoOn the one hand that is the goal, on the other hand the applicable standard seems to be FIPS 140, which counts products with a flawless security history like OpenSSL amongst its long time adherents. In other words there is a non zero chance that the modules will just spit out the key if you even look at them funny.
- 29athrowaway 4y agoBecause security is a cost center and business people do not give a shit.
- noizejoy 4y agoIt’s not just business people. Most humans seem to see security (and safety) as a burden, not as something enjoyable.
- userbinator 4y agoThat's because people still generally value freedom over security, and that's a good thing.
- guenthert 4y agoDoes that mean I can update my eol'd Chromebook Pixel with a current Linux distribution w/o disassembling it?
- surteen 4y agoChromebooks don't use UEFI, just coreboot
- teddyh 4y agoThe original links: Announcement: http://blogvl7tjyjvsfthobttze52w36wwiz34hrfcmorgvdzb6hikucb7aqd.onion/news.php?id=2 http://blogvl7tjyjvsfthobttze52w36wwiz34hrfcmorgvdzb6hikucb7... (link likely to be invalid over time, since the number seems to change) Link with the actual data: http://vkge4tbgo3kfc6n5lgjyvb7abjxp7wdnaumkh6xscyj4dceifieunkad.onion/ http://vkge4tbgo3kfc6n5lgjyvb7abjxp7wdnaumkh6xscyj4dceifieun... (Links found via https://www.ransomlook.io/group/money%20message https://www.ransomlook.io/group/money%20message)
- jokowueu 4y agoGitHub link below https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/MSI/ImpactedDevices.md https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/M...
- teddyh 4y agoIIUC, aren’t those the public keys, and not the actual, leaked, private keys?
- hduebdivd 4y agoi guess they self regulated the leak to avoid github ban.... and to think at one point guthub could host the deccs keys. how times have changed
- 1827163 4y agoSo true, I forgot about that, wow, how the frog has boiled so slowly over the years. I now see every GitHub repo has a 'report' button, to facilitate censorship, in the name of 'safety' as usual. With a huge list of categories.
- Animats 4y agoThere's an upside to this. It can be used politically as an argument against backdoors for "lawful access"[1] to encrypted data. [1] https://www.fbi.gov/about/mission/lawful-access https://www.fbi.gov/about/mission/lawful-access
- voidfunc 4y agoThe argument doesn't matter because the federal government and politicians don't give a shit about facts
- hilbert42 4y agoUntil their PCs get hacked and their medical and psychiatrists' notes about them become front page news.
- TheRealPomax 4y agoSorry, what? This literally happened, THIS YEAR, and not a single one cared beyond saying "oh no, this is terrible, if only there was something we could have done!" https://apnews.com/article/congress-data-breach-hack-identity-theft-e4355e9e6756b1487c34c7accd0eb58e https://apnews.com/article/congress-data-breach-hack-identit...
- LadyCailin 4y agoAlternatively: Stuff is going to be leaked anyways, so we might as well also make it easy for law enforcement to do their job.
- Guthur 4y agoTheir job is not what you think it is. It's to maintain the status quo no matter how corrupt or abhorrent it is. The word enforcement says it all.
- 4y ago
- userbinator 4y agoYes! FUCK "secure" boot! Another win for freedom. On the other hand, never underestimate the ability of the "security" establishment to spin this as a bad thing and instill more fear and paranoia. All these user-hostile in the name of "security" features do is take control away from and put it in the hands of some centralised entity whose interests certainly do not align completely with yours.
- ok123456 4y agoThis may just be the year of the TempleOS desktop.
- 29athrowaway 4y agoYou must certainly glow in the dark.
- DANmode 4y agoI bet you can name three superpowers using something similar for lots of important things!
- ok123456 4y agothey already had keys.
- TacticalCoder 4y agoTo all those saying SecureBoot brings absolutely nothing security wise... Why is a project like, say, Debian, even bothering signing kernels: https://wiki.debian.org/SecureBoot https://wiki.debian.org/SecureBoot What's their rationale for supporting SecureBoot?
- unglaublich 4y agoIt's what the customer has come to expect.
- cptskippy 4y agoDoesn't this enable them to be installed on systems with Secureboot enabled without having the user muck around in the BIOS? Smart for VMs?
- TacticalCoder 4y agoI can see your point but, geez, that's pretty depressing if it's the only reason it's supported! As a sidenote for having installed Debian with SecureBoot on on several systems, I'd say I still had to muck around quite some in the BIOS/UEFI. Latest one I scratched my hair for a bit was an AMD 3700X on an Asrock mobo where I somehow had to turn "CSM" (Compatibility Support Module) off otherwise Debian would stubbornly start the non-UEFI (and hence no SecureBoot) installer. On my Asus / AMD 7700X things were a bit easier but I still had to toggle some SecureBoot setting (from "custom" to "default" or the contrary, don't remember). All this to say: it's still not totally streamlined and users still need to muck around anyway.
- Vogtinator 4y agoThere's another reason but it's even worse: Some certifications require that secure boot is enabled.
- neilv 4y agoThat wiki page buries what might be the rationale in the "What is UEFI Secure Boot?" section: > Other Linux distros (Red Hat, Fedora, SUSE, Ubuntu, etc.) have had SB working for a while, but Debian was slow in getting this working. This meant that on many new computer systems, users had to first disable SB to be able to install and use Debian. The methods for doing this vary massively from one system to another, making this potentially quite difficult for users. > Starting with Debian version 10 ("Buster"), Debian included working UEFI Secure Boot to make things easier. Sounds plausible, but I don't know how seriously to take it, when that wiki page also includes very generous and regurgitated-sounding bits like: > UEFI Secure Boot is not an attempt by Microsoft to lock Linux out of the PC market here; SB is a security measure to protect against malware during early system boot. Microsoft act as a Certification Authority (CA) for SB, and they will sign programs on behalf of other trusted organisations so that their programs will also run. There are certain identification requirements that organisations have to meet here, and code has to be audited for safety. But these are not too difficult to achieve. I normally look to Debian to be relatively savvy about detecting and pushing back against questionable corporate maneuvers, but it's not perfectly on top of everything that goes on.
- libpcap 4y agoIs the perpetrator nation-sponsored?
- sylware 4y agoThis "security" is "security" against you. Don't fool yourself.
- roggrat 4y agoDoes this affect MSI motherboards with AMD sockets ?
- mjg59 4y agoThe pervasiveness of secure boot has genuinely made things difficult for attackers - there'd have been no reason for the Black Lotus bootkit to jump through all the hoops it did if it weren't for secure boot, and the implementation of UEFI secure boot does make it possible to remediate in a way that wouldn't be the case without it. But secure boot at the OS level (in the PC world, at least) is basically guaranteed to give users the ability to enable or disable it, change the policy to something that uses their own keys, and ensure that the system runs the software they want. When applied to firmware, that's not the case - if Boot Guard (or AMD's equivalent, Platform Secure Boot) is enabled, you don't get to replace your firmware with code you control. There's still a threat here (we've seen firmware-level attacks for pre-Boot Guard systems), but the question is whether the security benefit is worth the loss of freedom. I wrote about this a while back (https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/58424.html https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/58424.html) but I lean towards thinking that in most cases the defaults are bad, and if users want to lock themselves into only using vendor firmware that's something that users should be able to opt into.
- hathawsh 4y agoWould it be sensible to make that choice using a good old fashioned jumper? For example, when the jumper is connected to pins 1 and 2, the firmware must be signed by a list of vendor-controlled keys; when the jumper is connected to pins 2 and 3, the firmware must be signed by a list of user-managed keys. That way, I can choose what kind of freedom makes sense for me. Most people value the freedom of not having to worry about firmware, while others value the freedom to use or create their own firmware.
- Cloudef 4y agoThen netflix wont serve you HD content unless you run your OS with pin 1-2 setup as those are the only keys they "trust" :) This is what "trusted platform" is all about.
- mjg59 4y agoNo, because the entire point of this is to be resilient against physical attack - anyone re-flashing your firmware already has your case open and can just move the jumper while they're at it.
- transpute 4y agoThere is a better solution already designed into Intel Boot Guard, which avoids the problems of OEM "secrets" and allows an owner-defined firmware root of trust. As described in a 2017 MIT paper from Victor Costan, Ilia Lebedev and Srinivas Devadas, "Secure Processors Part I: Background, Taxonomy for Secure Enclaves and Intel SGX Architecture", https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/EDA-051 https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/EDA-051 > The TPM's measurement can be subverted by an attacker who can re-flash the computer's firmware .. the attack .. can be defeated by having the initialization microcode hash the computer's firmware (specifically, the PEI code in UEFI) and communicate the hash to the TPM module. This is marketed as the Measured Boot feature of Intel's Boot Guard. > Sadly, most computer manufacturers use Verified Boot (also known as "secure boot") instead of Measured Boot (also known as "trusted boot"). Verified Boot means that the processor's microcode only boots into PEI firmware that contains a signature produced by a key burned into the processor's e-fuses. Verified Boot does not impact the measurements stored on the TPM, so it does not improve the security. On a related note, some HP devices have a dedicated security co-processor (SureStart) to verify and/or fix system firmware, instead of relying on a CPU vendor root-of-trust like Intel BootGuard. Since HP's proprietary security co-processor can be disabled by a device owner, those HP devices may be amenable to OSS firmware like coreboot. 2017 HP Labs research paper, https://ronny.chevalier.io/files/coprocessor-based-behavior-monitoring-acsac-chevalier-2017.pdf https://ronny.chevalier.io/files/coprocessor-based-behavior-... > We apply this approach to detect attacks targeting the System Management Mode (SMM), a highly privileged x86 execution mode executing firmware code at runtime .. We instrument two open-source firmware implementations: EDKII and coreboot. We evaluate the ability of our approach to detect state-of-the-art attacks and its runtime execution overhead by simulating an x86 system coupled with an ARM Cortex A5 co-processor. 2021 HP marketing whitepaper, https://www8.hp.com/h20195/v2/GetPDF.aspx/4AA7-6645ENW.pdf https://www8.hp.com/h20195/v2/GetPDF.aspx/4AA7-6645ENW.pdf > Every time the PC powers on, HP Sure Start automatically validates the integrity of the firmware to help ensure that the PC is safeguarded from malicious attacks. Once the PC is operational, runtime intrusion detection constantly monitors memory. In the case of an attack, the PC can self-heal using an isolated “golden copy” of the firmware in minutes.
- fatfingerd 4y agoMeasured boot is great in theory.. But it is only really practical to determine that your bios haven't changed at all. If you are going to trust updates you are ultimately going to have to make the same mistake as verified boot, just manually.
- LZ2DMV 4y agoFrom the linked article, I'm left with the impression that this is only a problem for MSI (and a few other vendors) devices. If Intel Boot Guard works by including a public key in a fuse in all CPUs from a set of series and now the corresponding private key is leaked, why isn't this a global problem? The same CPU with the same public key must be in every machine with an Intel CPU from these generations. What am I missing here?
- transpute 4y agoIn addition to the BootGuard public key, there is a chipset fuse with OEM configuration, https://www.securityweek.com/flawed-bios-implementations-lead-intel-boot-guard-bypass/ https://www.securityweek.com/flawed-bios-implementations-lea... > The boot chain uses an RSA public key (its hash is hard-coded inside the CPU) and an OEM private key. The OEM sets the final configuration and writes it to one-time-programmable Intel chipset fuses during the manufacturing process, thus making it almost impossible for an attacker to modify the BIOS without knowing the private part of the OEM Root Key. However, because some OEMs might fail to properly configure Intel Boot Guard, attackers could end up injecting code and permanently modifying BIOS. > At Black Hat 2017, security researcher Alex Matrosov presented some vulnerabilities in poor BIOS implementations, explaining that not all vendors enable the protections offered by modern hardware. Because of that, attackers could elevate privileges, bypass protections, and install rootkits, he explained. Some HP business devices don't use Intel BootGuard, because HP has their own proprietary solution for firmware integrity verification, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35845073 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35845073
- crest 4y agoDoes this mean we're finally closer to getting CoreBoot on Intel consumer boards from this decade, because everyone can sign a valid image?
- hduebdivd 4y agothat was never the issue. coreboot is fragmented and lacking contributors.
- garbagecoder 4y agoITT: I have no idea how government works, but I can sound more cynical than you can when I make it up.
- mesebrec 4y agoDoes this have an effect on SGX and trusted computing? Or only secure boot?
- transpute 4y agoNeed to wait for an official statement from vendors, but there's a claim about CSME, https://twitter.com/_markel___/status/1654625944697556992 https://twitter.com/_markel___/status/1654625944697556992
- fafzv 4y agoIs this something that can be fixed with a software update or is it basically game over? I've got an MS-7E07 which is in theory not affected, but who knows...
- DethNinja 4y agoIf MSI ever updates the BIOS of your motherboard with new / assumed to be unleaked Intel keys, then you will need to reflash it with the new BIOS. So, you need to do a manual BIOS update to fix it.
- WhereIsTheTruth 4y agoSomething deep inside me telling me that they are preparing "TPM 2.0" season 2 "To boot windows 69, you are now required to have a CPU with the newest Microsoft Chip, full of backdoors btw, but shhh" :p
- hduebdivd 4y ago"full of app stores for firmware key updates, for your safety"
- pmorici 4y agoWhy would MSI have Intel’s private key? How private could it have been if they were handing it out to OEMs?
- fatfingerd 4y agoThe most alarming part of the article is that we are only really getting a revocation of these keys because they didn't pay a ransom and the ransomers were apparently too stupid to sell them secretly instead of releasing them to the public. As far as we know, if MSI had paid no one would know that Intel shipped shared private keys to multiple vendors who could then lose them like drunken monkeys. People ask why these weren't on HSMs.. The article seems to claim that they weren't even able to generate the most important ones in the correct locations, let alone on HSMs with non-extractable settings.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- Dwedit 4y agoHow do you know that the bad guys will actually destroy their copy of the data?
- fatfingerd 4y agoMy concern is that MSI not announcing they were comprised implies they were going to act like they believe that. The keys were permanently compromised as soon as they were exfiltrated but there's no longer a market for buying them.
- hduebdivd 4y agoknowing the ramson is important for the window on how incompetent intel was... but paying a ransom for a secret is extra dumb. glad they didn't and announced.
- fatfingerd 4y agoAFAIK MSI didn't announce, the hackers leaked the keys themselves as a public service. For all we know MSI was still hoping to reach a lower ransom amount and then never disclose that the keys were most likely sold in the exploit market. I think we have to assume Intel was willing to put together a broken system with total incompetents. I think the US is better off with foreign chips watched closely than Intel watched poorly.
- DethNinja 4y agoI guess lesson learned here is: Always self-sign the secure boot keys, do not use any third-party keys. Unfortunately, this complicates the kernel & boot loader upgrade process as one shouldn’t keep private keys in the same machine.
- Arnavion 4y agoThe leaked key in question has nothing to do with Secure Boot keys. The leaked key in question affects you even if you have your own Secure Boot keys.
- somat 4y agoConversely I think events like this make things more secure. It highlights the danger of having a third party control what should be your keys. For the sake of convenience we ended up with an inversion of control. There can still be a chain of trust. However the owner of the machine should be the root of the chain, not the vendor/manufacturer. the vendor should sign their firmware and the owner should authorize that sig on the machine.